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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

The American system of public education reflects
a conviction that the people of the nation recognize the
significance of an educated public.

Through the adoption of

the tenth amendment to the Federal Constitution education
became one of the powers reserved to the states.

Since the

development of the first state constitutions provisions re
lating to public education have been reflected in the organic
documents of the various states— of the 128 constitutions
adopted from 1776 to 1929 there were only 13, one of which
was Louisiana's first in 1812, that did not provide for public
education in some form.^

Then, the public school may be con

sidered as a creature of the state and subject to the government thereof.
It is only natural to expect the heterogeneity of
Louisiana's population to have affected her educational atti
tudes.

France, Germany, Spain, England, and the United States

Ijohn M, Matzen, State Constitutional Provisions for Educa*
tlon (New York, 1931), p. 1.
Bjoakim F. Weltzin, The Legal Authority of the American
Public School (Grand Forks, 1930), p, 1,

were the chief sources of early immigration to the state*

In

all those nations, except the United States, the courts are
subsidiaries to the crown or the legislative bodies*

In France,

legislation enacted by the National Assembly is held valid by
g
every tribunal throughout the republic.
"In Germany, the
courts are required to enforce without question the legislative
will, repugnancy to the constitution offers no excuse to do
otherwise."^

In Spain the same relation exists between the

courts and the law-making bodies.®

According to Sir William

Blackstone, in England "what the parliament doth, no authority
upon earth can undo."®

In the United States, the courts, under

the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, began to exercise
in the early nineteenth century the authority of passing on the
validity of legislative acts whether those acts were based on
the constitution or on established practice.

These two con

flicting theories as to the relationship between the courts
and the legislative bodies have affected the educational poli
cies of the state.

The acquiescent attitude of the people in

accepting the educational enactments without questioning is

^Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of
the Constitution (London, 1 9 0 8 ) , p. 153.
^William B. Bizzell, Judicial Interpretation of Political
Theory (New York, 1914), p. 27.

Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England (Philadelphia, 1889), 1, bk. Ï, p.“Tl7.
^William B. Bizzell,

0 £.

oit.. pp. 5-46.

4
evidence that the European theory of Judicial and legislative
relationships was prominent in Louisiana during its formative
period.
Those early immigrants from Europe brought not only
different conceptions of government but also the parent coun
tries' philosophy that education is a product of the Church,
especially of Catholicism, which was the legalized and dominant
religion of France and Spain.

This theory, which was firmly

established in Louisiana during its formative period, influ
enced the development of educational policies, particularly
those concerning the establishment of public schools.
That Louisiana has developed abiding faith in public
education during the past century may be indicated by the facts
that for the first thirty-four years of the state's history
there was only #1,100,637,75, or an average of $38,371.70
yearly, spent by the state for parish schools and subsidised
p
academies, while during the school year of 1930-1931 alone
the state and parishes spent #20,902,364.00 for the maintenance
of public schools^ and |4,838,224.00 for the school building
p r o g r a m , o r a total of $25,740,588.00 for public school
purposes.

The latter total had to be secured through various

forms of taxation and bond issues which required the calling
of many elections, the making of contracts, and many other

®Edwin W. Fay, The History of Education in Louisiana
(Washington, 1898), p.
^State Department of Education of Louisiana. Elahtv-fourth
Annual Report, for the Session 19^2^3 (Ëaton feouge. 1Q55), p7 14.
lOlbid.. p# 16.

legal procedures.

The spending of that amount so as to offer

proper educational opportunities for 663,169 educable children^^
to be taught by 12,887 teachers

12

in 2,924 schools

1

throughout

the state demanded both the Judicious development and the prac
tical application of an Intricate public school system.
The above comparison is but one indication of the
vast enterprise that Louisiana's system of public education
has become.

In the functioning of that enterprise, where much

capital and many people of different interests are involved,
there may be expected to have arisen many questions of law and
procedures about which men have differed.

Research studies

reveal that many of these differences, not only in Louisiana
but also in other states, have been adjudicated by the courts
in order to determine the law.

It has been estimated that

1 case of 150 cases tried in the lower courts reaches the state
14
supreme courts.
In 1927 there were 231 school cases settled
15
in the supreme courts of the various states.
Accepting the
former ratio and latter count as correct and considering
Louisiana as an average state, there should have been in 1927

Instate Department of Education of Louisiana. Eighty-second
Annual^keport. for the Session 1930-31 (Baton RouSeT ”1931)".
pp. 142-143.
ISlbld.. p. 30.
1*»
pp. 98-101.
G, K. Jarvis, "Recent Supreme Court Decisions on
Teacher Contracts," School and Society. XXIV (1926), p. 153.
15
Richard B. Thiel, "An Analysis of the Nature and Frequency
of Supreme Court Cases in School Law for the Calendar Year of
1927," Journal of Educational Research. XIX (1929), p. 178.

a
approximately 760 eontroversial school questions that found
their way to the courts for adjudication, 5 of which should
have been continued to the supreme court of the state for
final disposition.

By actual count, Louisiana In 1927 brought

before its supreme court 7 cases involving 26 different points
of law and received from its attorney general 19 opinions on
public school questions.
Since the courts and the attorneys general, by means
of decisions and opinions as based on organic and statutory
enactments and established rights, have the responsibility of
deciding what the law is, and since the law is the final author
ity, their interpretations may be accepted as influential in
the shaping of public school policies.

The study herein pre

sented is an attempt to discover the law governing the free
public school system of Louisiana and to designate those basic
policies which were dominant in the development of that system.
This study presents for the first time Louisiana's
interpretation of her educational law.

It la submitted with

the anticipation that it may prove a contribution to those
educators in general and school administrators in particular
who may attempt to solve the present and future problems of
the state's public school system.

LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

To indicate how broad or how limited may be a problem
which deals with the legal bases of public school policies a
few related studies are cited.

Otto T. Hamilton, in 1927,

attempted to discover the law governing the ourriculum of the
American public school as revealed by the facts of oases and
the decisions of judges in the higher courts of all the states
16
of the Union*
A study completed by Fred H, Barber in 1928
was an attempt to determine the educational policies of Tennessee
as revealed by the state's constitutional provisions and the
decisions of its supreme c o u r t , I n 1932 Jennings B. George
presented a study purporting to show the development of public
school policies in Mississippi as revealed by judicial interTfl
probations of the state's constitutions and statutory laws.
In the same year Carl G. Leech published the results of an
investigation which sought to ascertain the constitutional
and legal provisions for the establishment of public education
in Hew Jersey, in as much as such principles are implied in
the state's constitutions, statutory laws, and court decisions,
Thus, it may be seen that in related problems the limitations
have ranged from one phase of education in all states to all
phases in one state, some having for their legal bases judicial
interpretations of the law, some including constitutional in
fluences, and others adding statutory enactments and opinions
from the states’ legal counselors.

l^Otto T. Hamilton, The Courts and the Curriculum (New York,
1927),
Fred H, Barber, The Constitutional and Le&al Basis of PublicSehool Administration tn Tennessee (Chfcago,1926),
Jennings B, George, The Influence of Court Decisions in
Shaping Sehgol Policies in Mississippi' ’Washvlile, 1938) *
l^Car! G. Leech, The Const1tutional and Legal Basis of Education
in Hew Jersey (Philadelphia, 1932).

6
This study of the publie school policies of Louisiana
confines itself to the interpretations of the state's organic
and statutory laws as rendered primarily by her supreme court.
In the absence of decisions by the supreme court, rulings by
the state court of appeal
been used.

and by the attorneys general have

Also, in the few cases where the state supreme

court decisions were not final the interpretations by the United
States Court were obtained.

PROCEDURE

In the preparation for this research study, approxi
mately a year was spent in an intensive survey of the material
in any way related to the development of education In the state.
One product of this general investigation was a problem showing
20
the developments of education in Louisiana prior to statehood.
A résumé of this problem appears as the historical foundation
for the present study.
Work on this study proper began with a systematic
collection of all proceedings indicating the development of
educational policies in the state's organic law as found in the
Official Debates and Journals of the nine Louisiana consti
tutional conventions.

This information was taken in typewritten

form and filed.

M a r t i n L. Riley, The Development of Education in Louisiana
Prior ^ Statehood (unpubiTsbed MS*, Louisiana £>iate University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1936),

a search of the various digests there was com
piled a bibliography of cases pertaining to public education
in Louisiana.

To facilitate the work of analysis, the principal

oases— those listed in the digests under the topics, "Public
Education" and "Schools and School Districts"— were typewritten.
Supplementary cases were located by examination of the cases
listed under the cross-references in the digests, those re
ferred to in the cases previously collected, and those listed
under the various principal cases in Shepard's Louisiana
Citations through the December, 1934, Supplement.

This system

was continued with the supplementary oases until the oases
referred to were in no way connected with the public schools.
Some of the oases thus located were typewritten while others
less related to schools were briefed.
Next there were listed from all the reports of the
attorneys general the opinions concerning public education.
These opinions, which were in the form of letters written to
individuals in answer to questions on educational law, were
typewritten and filed as separate notes.
Â search was then made for previous studies bearing
on the subject.

Notes and citations therefrom were collected

and added to the files.
In the work of analysis, cases or briefs were care
fully read, a name was assigned to each, and a first grouping
of the cases was made; this led to the eight major divisions
of the study.
Each case or brief was then reread and all major and
minor points therein were listed.

These phases were classified
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according to the major divisions and organized within the sub
divisions which they established.
Opinions of the attorneys general were next classified
according to the divisions and subdivisions set up by the
supreme court decisions, additional subdivisions being made
when necessary.
The material on each major topic from all sources—
constitutional conventions, supreme court decisions, opinions
of the attorneys general, and any other source whatever— was
organized and presented as a chapter of the study.
Liberal use has been made of clear and concise quo
tations, but in a limited study of this nature there was not
space to permit their use on all issues found in the constitu
tions, statutory laws, court decisions, or attorney generals'
opinions; however, enough have been presented to enable the
reader to interpret for himself some of the pertinent under
lying policies involved in the law governing Louisiana's
system of public schools.
Each chapter which presents one of the eight major
divisions is concluded with a summary of the issues and trends
that seem to indicate the development of educational policies
according to the data confined therein.

The last chapter at

tempts to reveal the law governing the free public school sys
tem of Louisiana by pointing out in the study as a whole those
salient issues and trends which have appeared fundamental in
shaping the educational policies of the state.
The chapters, determined mainly by the classification
of the supreme court decisions into topics, as explained, and
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composed of ell data similarly classified, are presented
under the following titles:
I. Introduction.
II. prostate Foundations of Public school Policies.
III.

Public Education as a state Function.

IF.

Public school

Support through Land Grants.

7.

Public school

Support through General Funds.

VI.

Public school

support through special Funds.

VII. Educational Control by Nonprofessional Agencies.
VIII. Educational Control by Professional Agencies.
IX. School Districts and Property.
X. Administration of Pupil personnel and the Curriculum.
XI. Conclusions.

CHAPTER II

PRESTATE E0DNDATI0N3 OF PUBLIC SCHOOL POLICIES

CHAPTIJÎ II

PRESTATE FOÜRDATIONS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL POLICIES

In the study of educational policies of the state
of Louisiana it is significant to note that many of the
existing theories of today antedate the period of statehood.

From the beginning there seems to have been felt the

need for a power higher than the administrative officials
of the educational institution themselves to settle contro
versial issues 9 whether that power was the crown of France
or Spain or the territorial legislature under the United
States,

Likewise, at an early date those interested in

education found themselves incapable at times of inter
preting satisfactorily the standards set up and contracts
entered into; consequently, the Superior Council and the
Cabildo--the judicial bodies of the French and Spanish
periods, respectively— and the governing authorities of the
territorial period rendered frequent interpretation of the
then existent educational practices.

Those theories,

decisions, and interpretations, forerunners of the work of
the supreme court of today with respect to education, have
a natural presentation according to the various govern
mental periods which the territory of Louisiana had before
the state came into existence in 1812.
13
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BSOIîmiNQS UNDER IHE FRENCH DOMINION

From the time of the first French settlement on the
Crulf Coast In 1699 to the transfer of this territory to Spain
by the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762 the French Government
prescribed and enforced the controlling policies of her
Louisiana colony.

The Church, which dominated educational

thinking in the mother country, was similarly influential in
the new province— that is, the religious organisations
assumed responsibility for the training of the youth.^
During this period many families of wealth sent
their sons to the mother country for college training, but
the education of the girls and of those boys who were unable
to attend college in France presented e serious problem.&
The school of this period which demanded most
attention from the French crown, through its immediate
governing body— the Company of the Indies, was the petit
collège established at New Orleans by Father Raphael, the
Capuchin Superior,

in a letter written, September 15, 1725,

to the Abbé Raguet, Ecclesiastical Director of the Company,
Father Raphael stated that a director and an assistant had
been employed— the one to instruct advanced pupils, the
other to teach beginners.^

^Biographical ^nd Historical Memoirs of Louisiana (Chicago,
1892), I, p. ïoà.

^Dunbar Rowland, and Albert Q. Sanders, Mississippi provincial
Archives, 1701-1729, French Dominion (Jackson. 1929), II,
pp. 50B-5O?;
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The founder of this school advocated the theory of
state support and state-controlled ourrioulim— or the equiv
alent thereof— when he recommended that no fees be charged
for admission and that the Company furnish for the new under
taking an ample supply of catechisms, primers, elementary
books, grammars, and other material for advanced work.^
Anticipating the Company's interest in this undertaking,
Raphael conferred with Sieurs de Lery and de la Frénière,
outstanding men of the colony.

The three agreed to purchase

conjointly a small house from Monsieur Langloy at the price
of three thousand livres to accommodate the pupils,5 about
fifteen in number, who were in the colony and eligible to
enter^^

The presence of a struggle to determine which

theory of support— private or public— should dominate Is
evidenced by Father Raphael's statement to Abbé Raguet, May
16, 1726, as followss
**1 am only embarrassed about the payment
of the house where school is conducted. Those who
promised me to advance money for It, seem to disown
their word, fearing lest they should not be reim
bursed and not wishing to make outlays In favor of
the public. I beg you, Sir, to honor me with your
protection In this matter, for if I should be forced
to abandon the house, this institution, so necessary
and useful, will be surely ruined.**”

4lbid. p. 514.
^Claude L. Vogel, The Capuchins in French Louisiana
(1722-1766) (New York, 19281, pp. 70*^1.
®Dunbar Rowland, and Albert G. Sanders,
^Claude L. Vogel, o^. cit.. p. 71.

0 £.

cit., p. 508,
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In reply, Father Raphael was advised to discuss the problem
with Governor Perier and Monsieur de la Chaise of Hew Orleans
with a view of Interesting local authorities in paying for
the building or of compelling the defaulters to fulfill their
promise and, If necessary, of asking the Company to assume
the obligation.8
1787 an interpretation of the Company's contract
with respect to schools was sought from the Superior Council
by Monsieur Langloy, when he brought before that body a suit
to compel Father Raphael to pay the three thousand livres as
a past due obligation*

The hesitation of the Council itself

to interpret in favor of public support is revealed by the
various reversals of decisions.

The developments of the

case, as given in a research study of the Capuchins,9 were
the following.

In the first hearing, October 27, 1727, the

Council held that Father Raphael was acting only as an agent
for the Company, which by virtue of its contract was to
provide churches, schools, and other religious establishments
in the colony, and that therefore Raphael was exonerated from
the obligation.

In July, 1730, the case was reopened and

that time Father Raphael was ordered to pay Langloy the sum
of three thousand livres for the house he was using for a
school.

Again, April, 1731, Father Raphael presented his

plea of defense, explaining that, since he was acting in the
capacity of an agent for the Company, the duty of paying for

Gibld.
* 2 M 1 . pp. 71-74.
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the sohoolhouse devolved not on him but directly on the
Company or indirectly on the inhabitants of the colony.
Three months later the case was still pending and apparently
against Father Raphael, for in July, 1731, he addressed
Monsieurs Brusle and Bru of the Superior Council, reiterating
his reasons for not being held personally responsible for
the pending debt and reading from a letter received from the
Company of the Indies in 1727 excerpts concerning the school
as follows s
"The establishment of the school concerns
the inhabitants only, since it is for the education
of their children, it is just that they contribute
to the payment of the house they have chosen for
the school. The Company is willing to enter for
one fourth, considering it not proper that estab
lishments. be made without Its having a share
therein."10
The two gentlemen promised to take the matter up again with
the Council for a final settlement, and since neither the
court record nor Father Raphael refers to the matter again,
it is assumed that the Company ultimately agreed to liquidate
the obligation.

And so, it seems that finally the theory

of public support, through the Company, was upheld by the
Council and agreed upon by those in controversy*
The assumption of education as a responsibility of
the colony was earnestly sought by Governor Jean Baptiste le
Moyne de Bienville, who felt "that the prosperity and even
the existence of the Colony depended, In a great measure, in
establishing educational institutions for the young.

lOlbia.. p. 73.
1727-1884

Teresa Austin Carroll, The Uraullnes in Louisiana.
(New Orleans, 1886), p. e T
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Through hie Influence and the work of Father de Beaubois,
the Jesuit Superior* the Ursulinee of Houon were contracted
with to send nun® to the colony to care for the sick and to
educate the girls especially.

The Ooiapaay's recognition of

the Importance of education is stated in the Preamble of the
Treaty with the Ursulinee as follows:
The Company having considered that the
most solid foundations of the Colony of Louisiana
are the establishments which tend to the advance
ment of the Glory of God, . . . and wishing again,
by a new establishment equally pious, to relieve
the poor sick and provide at the same time for the
education of young girls, has agreed to and
accepted the offer® which have been mado to it by
ulsters Marie Tranchepaln . .
By way of support, the "Company agreed to maintain six nuns
including the superior; to pay their passage and that of four
servants to servo them during their voyage; and moreover to
pay the passage of those who, from whatever motive, would
wish to return to F r a n c e * A n o t h e r indication of support
by the government is found In a letter written b y Governor
perler to the Company of the Indies, November 3, 1728, la
which it was stated:

*»/tS for the orphan girls, we put thorn

with the nuns for the sum of one hundred and fifty livres
that we pay them per year for each of them, * . * Vïhen the

^ % e n r y Renshaw, "The Louisiana Ursulinos," Louisiana
Historical Society publications. II (December, 1901), p. 57.
Translation from "Traité de M a Compagnie des Indes avec les
ürsulines," which is included in the article*
^^Holoise H. cruaat, "The Uraullnes of Louisiana," Lauisiuna
Historical Quarterly. XI (1919), p. 9. Explanation in footnote:
•^Taken from 'Hoiation das premieres uraullnes a la Nouvelle
Orleans et de leur établissement en cette ville par la
reverende Uere de Tranohepaln, supérieure.’"
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hospital is built we shell put the boys la it also whom we
shall be able to place as apprentices at a certain age with
workmen for their time,

As a further step, the colony in

1740 budgeted twelve thousand livres for the support of the
twelve nuns and their

o r p h a n s .
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partial control by the

Company, to recompense for partial support, was assured when
"it was agreed that one of the nuns would be overseer of the
hospital, that she would supervise all temporal needs, and
would render account once a month to Messrs. the Officers;
. • • that there would be one for the school for the poor,
. .

In the contract the Oompmy agreed that the nuns could

take girl boarders when It did not interfere with their
stated obligations,!? and in approving the treaty the King
of Prance promised the Religious his protection and safe13
guard*
In July of 1737 the Ursulines had occasion to
request the superior Council to interpret those agreements
when they sued to collect from the estate of M. St. Julien
the sum of four hundred forty-nine livres and ten sols for
the board of a mulâtress which the said St. Julien had placed

!^unber Rowland, and Albert G* Sandora, op. cit., pp. 591,
601-602.
!5Mary Teresa Austin Carroll,

0 £.

cit., p. 10.

!*H0 loiae H. Cruzat, loo, cit.

!®R«verend Henry c. Sample (ed.), The Ursulines jn Hew
Orleans and Our Lady of Prompt S u c c o r A Reoorî of Two
5 e n r u r T e i 7 *lTSPr-TUS& T N e ” ttric’,'TUS 5 r, p p . T T ^ r r y F T ---
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in their oare.

The attorney for the vacant estate demanded

the return of the mulatress, whereupon the nuns presented
their bill before releasing the girl.

The claim was sustained,

the debt was ordered paid, and the mlatress was released
from the Convent.!^

Those instances are sufficient to show

that with the Ursuline educators there was beginning to be
put into practice the theory of public support and control.
The establishment of a government school had long
been earnestly sought by Bienville, end in a communication
addressed to the French government, June 15, 1742, he gave
proof that there existed an educational consciousness for a
higher institution of learning in the colony.

However, this

memorial was disregarded by the French government because it
felt that a colony of about thirty-five hundred inhabitants
spread over such an Immense territory was not ready for that
type of institution.20
With regard to private schools and apprenticeships,
two of the educational institutions giving tlie most returns
during the French period, the Company assumed no responsibility
of support or control, but through its superior Council
assured those institutions their just rights and protection.
One such case dealt with the breaking of a dontract between
Madame Hoffman end Sieur Dupare,

Madam© Hoffman apprenticed

!^Reeords of the Superior Council of Louisiana (MS.,
Archives of the Louisiana Historical society, Cabildo, Hew
Orleans), No. 2110, July 29, 1737, pp. 8577-8579.
BOoharles Gayerre, History of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1903)
I, pp. 521-522.
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a young slave to Sieur Dupare for a stipulated period of time.
The trade master agreed to teach the boy a trade, and also,
reading and writing.

Madam© Hoffman sued Dupare for a return

of the boy before the end of the stipulated time because of
non-fulfillment of the contract.2!
Thus, when the whole of the almost three-fourths
century of French rule in the Louisiana territory Is considered
there is evidence of the beginnings of partial support and con
trol of educational institutions by the public, attempts to
promote the theory of the right and duty of the public to
establish educational institutions, and the function of a
judicial body as an Interpreter for education.

DISVSLOPMSNTS DURING THE SPANISH REGIME

Soon after the passing of Louisiana to Spanish con
trol in 1762 there seems to have been initiated by the
government of the mother country a very definite move to
establish, support, and control a system of schools.

The

King's resolves, as stated in a letter from the Minister of
the Indies to Governor Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, July 17,
1771, were:

"to establish schools in the Province of Louisiana

in order that the Christian doctrine, elementary education,
and grammar may be taught, . • .«22

pefinlta and detailed

2!Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, August 9,
1741.
22])avid K. Bjork (ed. and trans.), "Documents Relating to
the Establishment of Schools in Louisiana, 1771," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XI (1924-1925), p. 562.
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provisions for control by the government were contained in
the contract, as Is illustrated by the tenth section, which
read:
I, Don Manuel Andres Lopez d© Armesto,
as Director, to whom the other three are to be
subordinate, shall prescribe for them the method
and rules for literary exercises and piety; shall
watch over the progress of the pupils, conduct of
the teachers, and supply their vacancies in ease of
sickness or any other unforeseen accident so that
the movement may maintain the good order of this
great important work; and my salary and remuneration
siiell be a thousand pesos yearly paid the same as
each one of the others mentioned above.**
Not only did the Spanish government thus introduce the practice
of establishing public schools but also it provided definitely
for curriculum control by specifying the subjects to be taught,
emphasizing the teaching and spread of the Spanish language,
and sending a supply of books for the beginning of a library
and other books to be sold to the pupils at cost.2^

%n this

undertaking there was no trace of compulsory education—
rather. Governor Unzaga guarded against any attempts at
forcing parents to patronize the government schools; he sought
attendance through presenting the educational facilities as
a great opportunity made possible by the government.
A further step in control— that is, supervision by
the Spanish educational director of the colony— was taken in
1800 by the Governor when in granting a license to Don Luis
Francisco L© Fort of France he stated;

B^ibid., p. 566.
2^Ibid., pp. 561-569.
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The license for which he has petitioned has been
conceded to him in order to start « public school,
in this city, with the object to teech the Latin,
English and French languages, and the parts of
Mathematics and the rest which he stipulates in
his memorial, for the utility and benefit that
can result to the public as the Senor Director
explains in his information, to whom it is
entrusted to watch over its fulfillment as also
that a Christian end polite education be given to
the pupils, as is suitable to them#25
Public support of the schools established under the
French rule was continued by the Spanish crown, especially
those directed by the Ursulines.

A pension was granted the

convent "for the support of two of the nuns, probably those
who taught the free s c h o o l # "25

Governor Don Estevan Miro’s

report of 1785 listed seven hundred twenty dollars for the
support of six nuns and three hundred sixty dollars for the
care of twelve orphan g i r l s * 2?
To the various existing types of educational
institutions the government, through its Judicial body, the
Cabildo, gave protection and interpretation in controversies
arising from time to time.

Illustrating this form of service,

the attorney for the Ursulines forced collection and resumption
of payment to the convent of a yearly pension which had
defaulted for twelve y e a r s . 28

Another case concerned a private

2%enry P. Dart, "Public Education in New Orleans in 1800,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XI (1928), p. 246.
2%other Mary Austin Carroll, "Education in Louisiana in
French Colonial Days," Essays, Educational and Historic (New
York, 1899), p. 47.
2?Franpois-Xavier Martin, The History of Loulslana (New
Orleans, 1882), p. 242.
28spanish Judicial Records of Louisiane (MS., Archives of
the Louisiana Historical Society, Cabildo, New Orleans), No.
10711, June 18, 1770, pp. 96994-96997.
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tutor*

In 1779 Pedro Flouard filed suit against Francisco

Knae to collect forty-two pesos and four reales for service
rendered in teaching his children to read and write,

in

refusing to pay, Ense testified before the Court that Flouard
failed to remain In his home a full year, a requirement
stipulated in the contract; the teacher's reply was that he
could not remain because he was not properly fed.

The

plaintiff's j^tition praying that his bill be ordered paid
was

granted.

29

Also, as a means of protection to both the

master and the youth who was to be trained, apprenticeship
contracts were placed on record with the judicial body.
v ^r o a the foregoing educational activities during
Spanish rule in the territory, it seems that the foundation
for the establishment of schools by the public was laid, that
support by the public was increased, that governmental control
extended itself to include the setting-up of the curriculum,
the naming of books to be used, and supervision, and that
the governing body continued to interpret contracts and
administer justice to those in controversy concerning teaching
and learning.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS WHILE A TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES

When Louisiana became a territory of the United
States in 1803 its most serviceable educational institutions

29Ibid., No. 3699, May 14, 1779.
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which had survived from the Spanish regime were the ursuline
Convent, private schools, tutors, and academies.

To the

first of those, in particular, the United States promised
protection without interference from civil authority*^0

The

schools established, supported, and controlled by the Spanish
government seem to have met with little permanent success.2!
in fact, as a result of the efforts of all types of educa
tional institutions, not more than half of the inhabitants,
as shown by a survey made in 1803, were supposed to be able
to read end write, of whom not more than two hundred, perhaps,
were able to reed and write legibly.52
The progress of education during the eight years of
territorial g o v e m ment by the United States consisted, not
mainly in the establishment and support of schools, or in the
development of policies by Judicial interpretation, but in
the promulgation of educational theories by the inhabitants
themselves thr o u ^ their representative bodies.

During the

period it was not variances of opinion which demanded settle
ment by a court that were of significance— rather, the
signifioant struggle was within the territorial legislature
itself where eduoqtlonal policies, many of which were to carry
over to the state, were being formulated as a product of the
composite attitudes of the people of the territory.

SÛReverend Henry C. Sample, OB. elt., pp. 59-61.
^^Dunbar Rowland (ed^), Official Letter Books of W. C. Ç.
Claiborne, 1801-1816 (Mad 16^x7'1917)"f
52American state Papers: pooument®, Legislative and
Executive, of the 'tfongress o f t be UnlTe d~S ta t e s.~Mis oellane ous
(Washington, 18&4), I, p. 355.
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To Governor William C. C. Claiborne, as is revealed
by his various messages and activities, is due much of the
oredit of promoting the cause of public education.

He

stressed continuously to the people, especially the territorial
assemblies, the significance of establishing a system of free
public schools under the direction of the government.

The

various legislative responses show the gradual development
of an educational consciousness which led to the acceptance
of the theory that education is a state function.

The first

step, the passage of "An Act to Institute an University in
the territory of Orleans," approved April 19, 1805,55
provided for the establishment and the control, through a
board of regents, of a college at New Orleans and. a number
of academies throughout the territory— in substance, it
authorized an elaborate state system of institutions of
secondary and college rank.

The curriculum, the district, and

pupil personnel were incorporated in this first act, for the
board was authorized to establish "within each county of
this territory, one or more academies for the instruction of
youth, in the French and English languages, reading, writing,
grammar, arithmetic, and geography"5^ and "such a number of
academies in this territory as they may Judge fit, for the
instruction of the youth of the female sex in the English
and French languages, and in such branches of polite litera
ture and such liberal arts and accompliahments as may be

55Act_s Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council
of the Te^rritory of Orleans, l # i , "An a o T T o instliute~an
university in iheTerritory of Orleans," ch. xxx.

5%bid., sec. 4.
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suitable to the age and sex of the pupils*
Concerning the policy of support, without which
there could have been no permanence to establishment or con
trol, there was much struggling.

The act of 1805, which

placed establishment and control In the hands of the public,
through its agent, provided that the system be supported by
lotteries.56
80

This, however, did not prove satisfactory, and

in 1807 the particular section was repealed, but there

was no provision for other means of support.5?
AS yet the system of public education established
had not provided for that which the masses needed most—
namely, elementary education.

In 1806 the legislature

authorized the establishment of elementary schools in the
various counties,5® but not until 1808 did it provide the
means of establishment, which was a parish school board whose
duty was to determine the mode, place, and amount of tuition
money for the education of youth, in the manner which to them
should appear most convenient.5®

As may be seen, this act

55lbld., sec. 5.
56jbid., sec. 8.
5?Acts Passed at the Second Session of the First legislature
of tte Territory o f
leans, X8677 ^An Act to repeal 'tn© eigbth
secfïon of the Act of
legislative Council, entitled, 'Ah
Act to establish an University within the territory of Orleans,
and for other purposes,'" oh. vli.
5®Acts Passed at the First Session of the First Legislature
of the Territory oF Orleans. 1806, "An Act to provide for the
6stebltshment of publie free schools in the several counties
of the Territory," oh. iv.
59Acts Passed at the First Session of the üocond Legislature
of the Territory of Orleans,' lëgë. '"An Act to pro^de for the
means of estabilshihg public schools in the parishes of this
Territory," ch. vii.
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made no provision for public support by the Territory,
support having been oared for in the control phase.

Even

that provision for support was weakened in 1609 when there
was passed an act permitting individuals to decide for themf*
selves whether or not they wished to pay the tuition fee set
up by the parish school board*
So uncertain seemed definite provision by the
people of the Orleans Territory for adequate support of
public schools that Governor Claiborne besought Congress to
provide some form of financial aid which would enable the
Territory to establish seminaries of learning in the various

counties**!
Finally, in 1611, the legislature accepted the
responsibility of financing a program of public education by
providing for the College of New Orleans an initial and an
annual appropriation.

To each of the twelve counties there

was an appropriation for the establishment and maintenance of
one or more schools therein,

control was further strengthened

by the placing of the execution of the lew In the power of the
regents of the University in cooperation with a board of
administration for each county.

*^Acta Passed at the Second Session of the Second LcgislatureoF the ÿerrTtory of 3'flean s , iëûUT
Act to expie In
the Act entitled, *"An AcT^to pfbvfde for the means of estab
lishing public schools in the parishes of this Territory,'"
ch. XX*
*!charles Oayarré,

0 £*

cit*, IV, pp. 224-225.

^^Acts Passed at the Second session of the Third Legis
lature o? the ŸêrrTtory of ofleans, iaiT7 "An Act supple
ffl®ntafy*To an act entltied*, *An Act to institute an univer
sity in the territory of Orleans,'" oh. xviii.
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Thus, it is seen that the Territory of Orleans, through
Its body politic, was possessed with an educational consciousness
which led it to provide early for the establishment and control
of a system of public education, but which permitted it to
shift and evade the burden of support until 1811, when that
obligation was acknowledged by the legislature in an act
appropriating money to aid in the construction and maintenance
of public educational institutions.
From the foregoing brief survey of the early
development of the law concerning public education through
regal orders, interpretation by judicial bodies, and legis
lative enactment, it may be concluded that in Louisiana
prior to statehood there were laid the foundations for the
power of the state to establish, to support, and to control
%

a system of free public schools, and there was established
some law concerning school districts, the teaching and
learning personnel, and the organization and administration
of the curriculum.

CHAPTER III

PDBLIC EDUCATION AS 'A STATE EUKCTIOK

CHAPTER III

PUBLIC EDUCATION AS A STATE FUNCTION

Louisiana's policies of education inherited from
her territorial periods were primarily products of the Church
or private institutions, with a specific trend toward govern
mental interest in the development of secularized education,
Governor William C. C, Claiborne, who served as the highest
official during both the territorial and early state periods,
was an ardent advocate of the theory that, since an educated
public contributes to the general welfare of a republic, the
state should provide educational facilities for its youth.
The assumption is made that education in Louisiana
has been accepted as a state function.

The purpose of the

present chapter is to determine whether the educational pol
icies as

based upon the provisions of the organic law and

established by judicial

interpretations have revealed that

Louisiana's theory of education allocates It as a responsi
bility of the state.

LEGAL IÎÆPLICATIONS

Education as a
The theory of

Reserved Power of the State
public education as a function of the

state was legally recognized by the Articles of Confederation
31
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two years prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution.
This implication was embodied in the Ordinance of 1787, which
was the first law providing for a territorial form of govern
ment.

Article III of that compact declared that:

"Religion,

morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged."

This portion of the document has

proved a potential factor in Influencing the development of
legal bases for

ublic schools in the various states of the

Union
The presence of an educational consciousness vdien
the National Constitution was being formed is evidenced by
the discussions of leaders, such as Charles 0. Pinckney,
James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris, relative to the possi
bility of giving Congress educational powers, if such powers
Z

were expedient or necessary.
Since there is no direct mention of education in the
Federal Constitution, one may reasonably ask by what right the
state assumes the responsibility of public education.
Through the adoption of the Tenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution in 1791, provisions were made whereby;
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,

!Joaklm F. Ueltzin, The Legal Authority of the American
Public School (Grand ForEs”7 1930), p. 31.
2
Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year
1698-63 TWa8hin>rton. 1898). II. pp. 1293-1295.
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nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."

In interpreting this amend

ment Chief Justice Morrison R. Wait© said, "The Government of
the United States is one of delegated powers alone.

Its

authority is defined and limited by the Constitution.

All

powers not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to
the States or the people."®

Since education was not one of

the delegated powers, it became one of the powers reserved to
the states

■4.

solely as a function of the

'

’overnment*

underlying theory accepted by legal opinion is that;
belongs to the state.

5

The
"'Education

It is no part of the local self-government,

inherent in the township or municipality except so far as the
Legislature may choose to make it such.'"^

Therefore, the

establishment, support, and control of schools passed "to the
people of the different states to handle, or to neglect, in
any manner which they saw fit,"

7

Early Statehood Provisions
When it is considered that Governor Claiborne, a
staunch advocate of education, and the Honorable Julien

3
United States, Flff. In Err., v . William
Cruiksbank
et al., (1876) 92 U. S. 551.
4
Earvey G . Voorhees, The Law of the Public School System
0 1 ' the United States (Boston, 1916T, p* 5.
5
Fred Engelhardt, Public School Organization and Adminis
trât ion (Boston, 1931), p. 563.
^Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public School
as a State Institution {Bloomington, 192ST7 p. 30.
7
Ellwood P. Cubberley, State School Administration (Boston,
1927), p. 10.
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Poydras, su educational philanthropist, were dominant person
alities in the Constitutional Convention of 1812, it is difficult
to explain why public education received no mention in the
state's first organic law,

A partial explanation may be

attributed to the fact that:
, . . the need for free schools had not as yet been
brought home to the Convention members who were
all men of means, representatives of that class
who were able to employ private tutors for their
children or patronize private schools of which
there were quite a number besides those taught by
the nuns and members of the priesthood. Many
of the wealthy parents sent their sons to.schools
in France or to those in northern cities such as
Philadelphia or Baltimore.®
This silent attitude manifested by the delegates of Louisiana's
first constitutional convention in providing for a system of
free public schools is reflected by similar assemblies throughout
the Nation— of the 23 states that formed the Union in 1820 only
13 made any organic provisions for public e d u c a t i o n , ^ end in
1916 New York's Constitution was still silent on this subject.
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional pro
visions for education, the legislature proceeded to create
machinery for the purpose of establishing public schools
throughout the state« ü

These provisions were expanded by

®Henry S, Chambers, A History of Louisiana (Chicago, 1925),
I, p. 565,
®Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States
(Boston, 1934), p, 94.
!®Hcrvey C. Voorhees, o^. cit., pp. 5-6,
l^Acts of Louisiana: 1819, "An Act to amend the several laws
enacted on the subject of Public Schools within this state, and
for other purposes," pp. 52-54; 1820-21, "An Act to extend and
improve the system of Public Education in the State of Louisiana,"
pp. 62-60.
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the acts of 182?!^ and 1833,!®

Thus, statutory law alone

furnished the legal bases of public education in Louisiana
until its Constitution of 1845.
Organic Policies
An Interest in free public schools was reflected in
a constitutional convention In Louisiana for the first time
on August 12, 1844.

At that date e committee on education

was appointed to make a survey of the educational status of
the state and to "report whether any, and if any, what pro
visions ought to be made by the constitution upon the subject
of education and the promotion and encouragement of liter
ature."!*

Approximately six months later this committee

submitted Its recommendations to the Convention.

Chairman

G. Mayo’s lengthy report indicated that the committee assumed
education to be a function of the state, as may be seen by
the following:
AS it is through the medium of education
that the intellectual faculties of man are cultivated,
and his physical and mental powers regulated and per
fected, the subject would appear to Justify as much
attention and care as any other thnt can engage the
attention of the legislator.

The necessary steps ought first to be taken
to place within the reach of the mass of the children

Acts of Louisiana, 1827, "An Act to provide for the support
end administration of parish schools and for other purposes,"

pp. 80-88.
IS

Acts of Louisiana, 1833, "An Act supplementary to the sev
eral acts relative to Public Education," pp. 141-144.
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throughout the state, such an education as will fit
them for the higher branches, and In such a manner
as to place all on an equal footing in the enjoyment
of the benefits to be derived from the funds of the
State. This would create a laudable ambition between
those whose progress and advancement would fit them
for the higher schools; and thus the higher as well
as the lower would be supported. The progress of
the child in the acquisition of a substantial edu
cation, would emulate the parent; parents would
encourage each other; and when the spirit of education,
could be fairly put into operation, it is believed
that it would here, as it has done in many of the
States of the United States, and in Prussih end
Germany, carry with it public opinion, which in this
country is all that is necessary to sustain any
measure that promises to be permanently useful.
Any system that may be organized, not
calculated to enlist the feelings and receive
the cordial approbation and support of a majority
of the citizens, cannot be relied upon to effect
the object desired, viz; that of furnishing to
the greatest number of the rising generation, upon
equal terras, the best education that the resources
of the State, and of its citizens generally, will
justify.

The cultivation of the mental faculties
for the promotion of wisdom, morality and virtue, is
amongst the first duties of a state. The chief
object of constitutions and laws being to render its
citizens secure in their lives, liberty and property,
the importance of a good education to each individual,
to every community, and to the State, cannot be too
highly valued. It is certainly of too great value
to be estimated by any pecuniary consideration.

Where a right direction is given to the
young and tender mind,>correct principles incul
cated and impulses given, morality, virtue and
reason commence their reign, and with the necessary
culture fit their possessors to bo useful to them
selves, ornaments to society, and safe-guards to
the State. The strength of the State aiid the hap
piness of its people increase with the increase of
useful knowledge. Without knowing their rights and
duties men become dangerous to the state, nuisances
to the community, and burdensome to themselves.
By laying the foundation of a system susceptible of
being carried into practical operation, and which
will secure to the rising generation the means by
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15
which they mey be educated.
Section 2 of the report proper proposed to erhod^r in the state's
organic I; w the folXovtingî
The legislature shell encourage the
institution of common schools throughout the State
for the promotion of literature and the arts and
solenoes, and shall prosrid© means for that purpose
end for their support.
After an interval of slightly more than two months the report
was called from the table#

For the section pertaining to

the institution of schools, the following substitute was offered:
"'The legislature shall establish throughout the State a system
of free schools, for the education of all the children of the
people of the State, and shall provide the means for that
17
purpose, and for their support.*"
There were some In the
convention who were opposed to any provisions for public
education and others who were very reluctant to make It
mandatory tbmt the legislature should provide for the establish
ment of fro© public schools, as is indicated by the spirited
discussions between them m à the advocates of the proposed
18
section.
Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions as
finally adopted were: "The legislature shell establish free
Public Schools throughout the State, and shall erovlci® means

Ibid.. pp. 316-318.
l*Ibld.. p. 310.
^'ibld.. p. 902.
18
Ibid.. pp. 903-007.
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for their support by taxation on property or otherwise#”^®
Bvidently, the delegates chosen to revise the state's
organ! 0 law in 1858 were satisfied with the constitutional
sanction of a public school system as provided by the framers
of the previous document» for they incorporated that feature
in article 136 of the Constitution of 1858 and added thereto
a provision for the distribution of the funds previously
authorised*®^
When the question of circumscribing the state's
responsibility toward education was being considered by the
writers of the Constitution of 1864 there were underlying
currents of conflicting issues growing out of the war for
Southern independence*

Provisions for educational oppor

tunities for the children of the white and colored races
presented a difficult problem*

In the first report on schools

made by Alfred G* Hills» chairman of the committee on public
education» it was proposed:

"The General Assembly shall

establish free public schools throughout the state for all
children * • • but all schools for colored children shall
be separate and distinct from schools for white children.
This report brought the question of providing public schools
for colored children to an issue end much time was consumed In

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1646» art# 134*
BOjournal of the Convention to Form a New Constitution
for the steVe of Louisiana. 1 6 8 ^ p* 067
®^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention
for the Revriion aiCT^AmenlEFnt^ of this ConaFlTui’ion of 1;lie
s R t e of Louisiana *
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diseuseions over the extension of the state system to include
gg
colored children*
Some even sought to change "shall" to
"may" so that the matter of establishing public schools for
colored children might be left to the discretion of the legis83
lature*
Notwithstanding the conflicting opinions concerning
the state*s acceptance of the responsibility of educating a
special race, the compromising article
that;

as adopted required

"The Legislature shall provide for the education of all

children of the State, between the ages of six and eighteen
years, by maintenance of free public schools by taxation or
otherwise*"®^
Apparently, the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of 1867-1868 were controlled by radicals who be
lieved that the children of both races should attend school
in the same institutions.

Soon after the committee on educa

tion was organized it was Instructed by resolutions and
ordinances to provide that all the children of the state shall
"attend school in the same schoolhouses,"®^ that no munici
pality "shall make any rules or regulations contrary to the
spirit and intention"

of the constitution, end that

22

Debates in the Convention for the Révision and Amendment
of the 6onititutlon of the ^tate of Louisiana. l A R . pp. 13ë'.

T43“
83

76, 483, 50i*
Ibid.. p. 161*

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1864, art. 141.
®^Offioial Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention for
Framing a Constitution for, tj^ State of Louisiana. 1867-1868.
p. l i *
2*ibia.
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educational opportunities be offered to all children without
S7
regard to race or color.
Even the committee itself was
S0
divided over these controversial issues#
Further evidence
of a strong sentiment in the convention to make ample pro
visions for the colored children was indicated in a pro
posed resolution which directed the legislature to establish
at least six public schools in every parish for all children
between six and twenty-one years of age without distinction
89
as to race or color.
These conflicting opinions were
30
perplexing problems throughout the convention.
Not
withstanding the several attempts of a conservative group
to provide for the establishment of separate schools for the
two races, the staters function with respect to education
was specified as follows:
The General Assembly shall establish
at least one free public school in every parish
throughout the State, and shall provide for its
support by taxation or otherwise. All children of
this State, between the ages of six (6) and
twenty-one (2l) shall be admitted to the public
schools or other instituions of learning sustained
or established by the State, in conmion, without
distinction of race, color or previous condition.
There shall be no separate schools or institutions
of learning established exclusively for any race
by the State of Louisiana#
No municipal corporation shall make any
rules or regulations contrary to the spirit and
intention of article one hundred and thirty-five
(135).31

p. 45.
p. 60.
p. 154.
®°rbld., pp. 94, 107, 200-202.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1868, arts. 135- 136
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The delegates in the Constitutional Convention of
1879 found that the power of the state to establish public
schools was no longer an issue.

Since the two previous conven

tions reflected the views held by radical reoonstruotionists,
vdio were determined to establish a unitary system of public
schools, regardless of race or color, It is difficult to
understand «diy this convention, which was dominated by
Louisiana Democrats, assumed such a tolerant attitude toward
the children of different races.

Superintendent Thomas E.

Harris says that it might have been because of anticipated
interference from Congress.&&

The proposal of a new phase

of the state's ftinction demanded attention at this time— it
was the inclusion of high schools as a part of the approved
s y s t e m .

55

Herein, the advocates were attempting merely to

be consistent with the established policy of the famous
Kalamazoo case.54

Excerpts from the report advocating the

public high school reveal some of the grounds of support of
the new move to be;
It is true, that but a comparatively
small number of children attend the high schools
of our cities and towns, but wherever well managed,
their uplighting, infiniting influence is felt in
every school of lower grade and. by every pupil.
The high school is the sun that gives light and

5®Thomas E. Harris, The Storv of Public Education in
Louisiana (New Orleans, 1924), p. 52.
55offiolal Journal of the Proceeding# of
Convention of the State of Louisiana. 1879.

the Constitutional
p. 168.

5^harles E. Stuart and others v. School
the Village of Kalamazoo and others, (1874)

District No. 1 of
30 Mich. 69.
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Apparently, the majority of the framers of the constitution
considered the implication of organic sanction sufficient to
legalize the high school, as is indicated by the provisions;
There shall be free public schools es
tablished by the General Assembly throughout the
State for the education of all the children of the
State between the ages of six and eighteen years;
and the General Assembly shall provide for their
establishment, maintenance and support by taxation
or otherwise. And all moneys so raised, except
the poll tax, shall be distributed to each parish
in proportion to the number of children between
the ages of six and eighteen years.
The establishment of public schools

wüs

not an issue

in the Convention of 1896, for it was practically unanimous
that there should be provision for "free public schools for
37
the white and colored races” in separate institutions.
A
new feature was given legal recognition when the system was
extended downward to include kindergarten children from four
38
to six years of age.
Further evidence that education is a
function of the state was the provision;

"The General Assembly

shall not pass any local or special law . . .

Regulating the

management of public schools, the building or repairing of
sohoolhouses, and the raising of money for such rurposes."

39

The Constitutional Convention of 1913 was called on
the condition that only certain phases of the previous consti
tution would be considered.

Public Education was one of the

subjects which were to remain intact, as may be seen by the

56

Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art, 224.

37

Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State ofTouistana. 1698, p. 290.
58
Constitution of Louisiana, 1098, art, 248.
art. 48.
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president'a statement to the convention:

"You are not to

change existing laws relating to , . , the educational system
of the State; . • ."40
The framers of the Constitution of 19SI were in
accord with the policies adopted by previous constitutional
conventions, for they made no essential changes in the organic
law pertaining to the establishment of free public schools.
This harmonious attitude indicates that the state's power and
duty to establish a system of free public schools had been an
accepted policy for many years.

Organic sanction was given

to secondary education as a part of the public school system,
which phase had formerly been implied through the offering of
educational opportunities to all adolescent youth.
recognition was expressed in the following terms:

This
"The ele

mentary and secondary schools and the higher educational
institutions shall be so coordinated as to lead to the stand
ard of higher education established by the Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical

C o l l e g e . " 4 2

Thus, it may be seen that according to the Federal
Constitution, education was one of the undelegated powers,
which were reserved by the states to be exercised at their
discretion.

That the populace of Louisiana was conscious of

the state’s responsibilities to provide education for its

40offioial Journal and Calendar of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of the State of louiaïana. 1?T5,
pp.

11-12.

4^Con8titution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12.
4 % b i d . ,

sec. 2.
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youth i® evldmioed by the fact that her legislature, fcting
on Its established rights, made provisions for free public
schools before her organic laws authorized them*

However,

since 1845 the state's constitution® have made it mandatory
that a system or free public schools be established throughout
the state.

Sot only has this policy been upheld, but also

the system has been expanded to include children of color, the
kindergarten, and the secondary school*

. JUDICIAL INTEWi C T A T i m s

Public Schools as State Institutions
General bases.

It has been stated that in an effort

to define the function of public schools in organized society:
• . # the courts have been forced by necessity to
formulate a theory of education based upon what
they deem to be fundesœntal principles of public
policy* In legal theory the public school is a
state institution* * , * The function of the
public school, in legal theory at least, Is not
to confer benefits uvon the individual aa such;
the school exists as a st^te institution because
the very existence of civil society denands it*43
"The doctrine that education Is a function of the state la well
44
established in American law,"
One theory for the establishment of

0

public school

system as a function of government is that It is not the child

43
Newton Edwards, The, Ootprte and the Public Schools (Chicago,
1933), p* 1.
44
Ira M, Allen, The Teacher's Contractual Statua (New York,
1928), p. 4.
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which is the direct beneficiary of its service, but that the
system "was brought into being in order to promote the general
45
welfare."
Numerous opinions to this effect have been found,
for example:

"'The primary purpose of the maintenance of the

common school system is the promotion of the general intelli
gence of the people constituting the body politic and thereby
to increase the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens,
46
upon which the government of society depends.'"
The theory of public education in Louisiana is
expressed by its State Department of Education as follows;
For more then one hundred years public
education has been recognized as one of the most
important functions of the State Government. It
is the keystone of the arch upon which rests the
superstructure of our democracy. The framers of
our Federal Constitution left the responsibility
for public education to the States. Whether this
was wise or unwise, the fact remains that each
State has met this responsibility in its own way
by setting up a school system and providing funds
for its support. The theory underlying public
instruction as a state function has its basis in
the fact that the maintenance and perpetuation of
our democratic Institutions necessarily rests upon
an educated citizenship. If this theory is sound—
and we all accept it— then, the success of our
Government and the continuance of our social insti
tutions depend upon the efficiency end success of
the public school system. It is the foundation of
our future generations. We must train our youth,
through these public institutions, i n the hope
and belief that such training wijl fit them for the
responsibilities of citizenship.*

^^Hermann fi. Sohroeder, op. cit.. p. 23,
*®Ibld.,

p.

24.

State Department of Education of Louisiana. Eighty-fourth
AnnueT"tteport, for the Session 1932-33 (Éaton RouRe. 1933 ). p . 31
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In the same ooaneotion, one of the state’s supreme court
Justices has said:
Education is one of the functions of government;
and the public school system is a department of
the governmsnt. Education insures domestic tran
quility, provides for the common defense, promotes
the general welfare, and it secures the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. The
State of Louisiana from the earliest time has
made provision for the support of education, beginning^gith the Constitution of 1845, arts# 135 and
In 1931 the supreme court handed down a decision^®
in which it was necessary to define the status of public edu
cation,

In the language of the court, it was stated;

. . . it may be observed that the public school
system of the state is a state institution# This
is obvious from Section 1 of Article IS of the
Constitution which provides that; "The educational
system of the state shall consist of all free pub
lic schools, and all institutions of learning
supported in whole or in part by appropriation of
public funds#""®
This ruling upheld former decisions in maintaining that edu
cation is a function of the state.
Land grants to the state#

The granting of school

lands by the Federal Government to the various states further
establishes that education is a state function.

In this

connection, the supreme court of Louisiana has said:

^®Herold et al# v. Parish Board of School Directors et al#,
(1915) 136 La. 1042-1043.
49state ex rel# Wimberly v# Barham et al# State ex rel.
Gray v. pipes et al, state ex rel# white v. Mason et al,
(1931) 173 La. 488, 137 So, 862#
SOlbid., 173 La. 494,
®^The State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public schools
of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La, Ann# 92,
7 So. 674,
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The sixteenth section of every town
ship of the public lards of the United States have,
from the adoption of the Constitution, been reserved
from rublic sales, for the maintenance of public
schools in the township; and this reservation has ,
always been considered a grant to the State in which
it lies, on the admission of the State into the
Union# It must amount to a grant; because Congress
have no power under the Constitution, to administer
property for the purposes of education, within the
limits of a sovereign State; . # #52
School tax as _a state tax#

Another indication that

education is a state funot'on is the school law pertaining to
taxation#

"Many citizens, including Ejany school officers, seem

to have difficulty in grasping the idea that school taxes are
state taxes, even where they are levied locally,
the courts#

hot so with

They do not lose sight of the fact that taxes

levied for school purposes are levied in support of a State
53
school system#”
In 1896 Louisiana made provisions for parish,
municipal, and public board taxes for ell purposes whatsoever
54
not to exceed ten mills yearly#
%ien a railroad company
refused to pay such tax under its exei pticn rights from ordl55
nary taxes, its claim was upheld by the court#
The status
of a tax so levied was established ss follows;
Indeed, the fact that the tax is in aid of
the rublic schools shows conclusively thet it is a
mere ordinary tax# How could a tax In aid of the
public schools be a special assessment when the
maintenance of the public schools is one of the
most ordinary of the ordinary chorees of our rovemment, and, by the > ost elenentary principles,

52

Robert 'î-rl^nd et al. v, Thomas M. Jackson et al., (1852)
7 La, Ann. ?8#
53
Hermann H. Gohroeder, o£. cit.. p# 58#
54
Constitution of Louisiana, 1888, art. 832#
55
Louisiana &, N. W# R, R. Co# v# State Board of Appraisers
(Board of School Directors of Parish of Natchitoches et al#,
Interveners), (1908) 120 La# 471, 45 So. 394#
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our government must have recourse to ordinary taxa
tion for meeting its ordinary charges, and cannot
have recourse to special assessment, and if, as
is well settled in our jurisprudence, the limi
tations of the Constitution upon taxation do not
apply to special assessments, the situation would
he that for meeting its ordinary charges our
government could levy unlimited taxes simply by
pretending that they were special assessments# If
the present tax were a special assessment, the
situation would be that, notwithstanding the
limitation placed upon taxation in the Constitution,
the Legislature could authorize the parishes to
levy unlimited taxes in aid of the public schools*
No one would pretend that the Legislature could do
anything of the kind*^®
The construction and maintenance of public schools
are ordinary charges of the government which must be sup
ported by ordinary or general taxation and not relegated to
any special assessment upon any particular class of tax57
payers#
Thus, in various decisions which have designated the
support of public schools as one of the ordinary charges of
the state, it has been definitely implied that public
education is a function of the state*
Municipal and parish power indicative of state
function#

The state legislature's power relative to the

jurisdiction of parishes and municipalities in the support
of public schools is a further indication that education is
a function of the state#

It has been explained that:

• • • when a municipal body, or a county, or a
school district, levies taxes for school purposes,
the tax so levied is a State and not a municipal,

120 La. 473.
57

Guaranty Bank k Trust Co# v# Ward Lumber Co., (1926)
161 La# 803, 109 So# 496#
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county or di strict tax, although it be levied end
collected by municipal or county or district
officers* The feet that a tax is levied and collected
for the state by these agencies of the state
appointed for
that purpose does
not depriveit of
its character
as a state tax."®
This teat was made

when the board of

directors of the public

schools of New Orleans attempted to have enforced a leggo
islative act
which purposed to compel the city to make
certain appropriations for the s c h o o l s , i t was pointed out
that the legislature was required to provide for the support
of the system of schools^! and to authorize parishes to levy
taxes within certain limits for assistance in that respect.
In furtherance of that provision, parochial authorities were
empowered to raise

such tax at their

same statute, provision

was made for

d i s c r e t i o n , I n the
the city ofNew Orleans,

which is also the parish of Orleans, to appropriate from the
revenue derived from her constitutional tax levy an amount
sufficient, according to her discretion, for school purposes,
but later in the section the exercise of that power was
circumscribed by the designation of a minimum l i m i t * T h e
city, acting according to the authority of its charter

®%eimann H# Sohroeder, o£* oit*, p. 59,
®^Acts of Louisiana, 1868, No* 81, sec* 71.
^ T h e State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public Schools of
New Orleans v* City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La* Ann* 92, 9
So. 674*
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 224,
^^IblA., art.*229.
^^Acts of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 54.
^^Ibid*, sec. 71.
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end under the assumption that the amount it should budget to
public education was discretionary, allocated an amount not
in keeping,with the statutory direction.

It was held that

the city was acting within its constitutional rights and that
the legislative enactment defining such limits was uncon
stitutional, for "if by the terms of the Constitution, or by
fair implication from them, it appears that the Legislature
can not compel the city to make any appropriation for school
purposes, It irrestibly follows that the Legislature is
not permitted to do so, either by special or general legis
lation, or by an amendment of the charter,
In support of this decision reference was made to
a former case involving the same question of discretionary
power with respect to the levying of a school tax in the
parishes.

There It had been held that legislation upon ed

ucation must have constitutional authority, because public
education is a responsibility of the state.
Definitely the court, in the case at bar, held that
education is a state function when it said:

"The system of

public education in Louisiana is a State Institution, and as
such, is placed under the control and protection of the state
by the very terms of the Constitution."®^

®®The state
of New Orleans

ex rel. Board of Directors of Public Schools
v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La. Ann. 100.

®®State ex rel. Parish Board of School Directors v. Police
Jury, (1888) 40 La. Ann. 755, 6 So. 25.
®?The State
New Orleans v.

rel. Board of Directors of Public schools of
City of Hew Orleans, (1890) 42 Le. Ann, 100.

ex
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The amiulment of &n ordinance of one of the city
corporations which purposed to provide for the creation and
68
maintenance of a high school
again established that public
education is a responsibility, not of the municipality, but
of the state*

This privilege of providing for a school was

not authorized in the city's charter but was attempted to be
executed under the provision of the general welfare clause.
In keeping with its policy of decrees on this subject, the
court maintained that the controlling act which permitted a
city corporation to revise its charter did not authorize the
incorporation of the power to levy a tax for the maintenance
of a high school when that power had not been rranted origi
nally in its charter.

With reference to the allocation of

powers pertaining to education Justice Samuel D. Mclnery saidi
Public education is declared by the Constitution
to be an affair of the State, and it assumes the
whole responsibility of public education.

The subject of educ&tion is an important matter,
and it is so treated by the State, as it seems to
be jealous of the exercise of the power by sub
ordinate political corporations, as it has not.
granted local self-taxation for this purpose*
School officers as state officials.
of the public schools "are state officers.

The officers

Consequently, they

may be selected in any manner that the legislature may
dO
A, T. Nelson et als. v. Mayor and Selectmen of the Tcv:
of Homer, (1896) 48 La. Ann. 258, 19 So. 271.
go
Ibid.. 48 La. Ann. 259-260.
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determine*

They may be eXeoted by the people, be appointed

by the courte, or be selected by any other agencies which
policy may dictate#*?®

"And even though such officers are

locally elected, they are the agents of the state, not of the
locality#
Judicial decisions in Louisiana have upheld the theory
that since education is a state institution,?^ its officers,
whose duties concern the entire state or the general public in
a limited territory, are state officers.?&

For example, it

has long been an established policy to consider the boards of
school directors an important feature in the system of public
education established by the state, and to expect them to serve
as official agents of the state in the administration of that
system.?^

The state superintendent of public education as an

officer of the state not only is assured legal advice in
matters pertaining to his official duties, but has no authority
to appear in court except through the attorney general or
district attorney of his vicinity#?®

In a case, which

?^Newton Edwards, 0£. oit.. p. 7#
^^enaann H. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 55*
? ^ h e State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public schools of
New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La* Ann. 92,
7 SO. 674.
?®State ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel.
Gray v. pipes et al. State ex rel. white v. Mason et al.
(1931)
173 La. 486, 137 So. 868.
?^The School Board of Union Parish v. J# E. Trimble, (1881)
33 La. Ann. 1073.
?®Edwin H. Fay, Superintendent of Public Education v. Allen
Jumel, Auditor, and E. A# Burke, Treasurer, (1883) 35 La. Ann.
368.
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sought to determine the official status of the perish super
intendent,

the appellants’ presentation of the theory

that the "’educational system of a state is one of the most
vital instruments of ita sovereignty’"?? was endorsed, and
It wee held that the perish superintendent "is an officer of
the greatest importance to the educational Interests of this
state.
High school support by taxation legalized.
eight years after the famous Kalamazoo

csbo,

Twenty-

which first

legalized the support of high schools by taxation, the supreme
court of Louisiana was called upon to detormina the legal
status of the high school in rolatlon to the public Gohool
system.

The right to establish and support the high school

as an integral feature of the system was questioned in the
Andrus case,?® where taxpayers objected to the use of a
portion of the school fund for h l ^ schools, oleiming that
all of it should be u&ed for the support of the elementary
schools.

In the court’s answer the right to establish and

support high schools and their existence as a part of the
state system of public education were maintained

ûb

follows;

The "high school" is well known in the public
school system of this state, and in the legislation
and literature concerning that system as an insti
tution in which scholars from the various common

?®stete ex rel.
Smith et el. v,
(1905) 114 La. 1097, 38 Bo. 870.

Theus, DistrictAttorney,

^^Ibld., X U L b . 1103,

?8ibld.
Andrus St al.
Landry, (1902) 108

. Board of Directors of Parish of St,
La, 386, 32 So.
420.

y
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sohools complete their public aohool education;
and, if no other language had been used, the
authority conferred upon the parish boards to
establish "high schools" would suggest the idea
of schools having a sphere of usefulness dif
ferent from, if not wider than, that of the
common schools of a single district* The
language of the law is, however, "central, or
high, schools," thus making "high schools" and
"central schools" synonymous terms, and leaving
no room for reasonable doubt that It was the
intention to authorize the parish boards to
establish not only such district schools as they
might see proper, but with the concurrence of the
state board, and upon the conditions specified,
to establish central schools for higher education,
to which the district schools may serve as feeders*
And the authority to establish such schools,
considered in connection with the general power
and discretion vested In the school boards, carries
with it the authority to maintain them from the
general school fund*®®
Junior colleges an extension
That Louisiana has legalized as a part

ofsecondary education*
of her

state system

the upward extension of secondary education in the form of the
Junior college is evidenced by statutory law,®^ legal opinion,
and decisions of the supreme court*

In the McHenry case®®

the school board of Ouachita Parish had proceeded to establish
a Junior college district for the purpose of submitting to
the qualified electors therein the question of levying a
tax for the construction and maintenance of a Junior college
at Monroe*
tax.

Promulgation had been declared in favor of the

To prevent the school board from executing the levy

®®Ibid., 108 La. 592-595.
®^Acts of Louisiana, 1928, No, 173.
®^Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1928, io Aprri" 3 o T T 9 3 ? —
4 9 g:-----------------®®McHenry et al. v. Ouachita Parish School Board, (1929)
169 La. 646, 125 So. 841.
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their action was attacked on grounds of unoonstitutionality
of the controlling act*
The supreme court ruled in favor of the defendants,
the parish hoard, in reversal of the district court decision*
This opinion on a new phase of the state school system es
tablished several bases of the policy that the state's responsi
bility for public education may extend to include the junior
college.
The constitution made mandatory the proper co
ordination of the public schools so as to lead to the
84
standards of higher education
but left to the legislature
the method of effecting this.

The response of that body

was Act. No. 173 of 1928 which provided for the establishment
of junior colleges In parish-wide districts under the
governing authority of the parish school board.

Such

junior colleges are differentiated from the higher Institutions
of learning, as they "have no legal existence or status what
ever, except in connection with £ state high school, are purely
local institutions, are maintained by local taxation, and
are created for the sole nurpose of supplementing the course
85
of studies prescribed in the high schools of the state."
Further, the court established the status of the junior
college in relation to the high school;
"Junior Colleges" are mere super-high
schools, and not institutions of higher learning

®^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec* 2.
85
McHenry et al. v, Ouachita Parish School Board, (1929)
169 La. 655.
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of the state# For these reasons, a special tax
may be levied under Act No# 173 of 1928 for the
construction and maintenance of a "Junior College"
as validly as for the construction and maintenance
of a schoolhouse for any state public high school*®®
In the decree the constitutionality of the act
creating parish Junior colleges was upheld; thereby their
existence as a part of the state public school system was
legally recognized,
public schools as continuous institutions.

When

a parish school board ordered by resolution that certain
schools be closed for a year, this being their discretionary
method of changing to e fiscal year basis in accordance with
recent enacted legislation, they were met with the judicial
demand to open the schools in question and the decree that
public schools are continuous Institutions*®?

In dealing

with the question of the closing of the schools the court
established some of its policies in relation to the schools
as follows:
we are dealing here with new and ex
perimental legislation, public education is
a state institution, fostered by the state, and
for which the state is required by the consti
tution to provide*

We cannot assume that legislation,
impossible in its enforcement, without disaster
to the public school system of the state, has
been adopted. Laws are presumed to be constructive

®®Ibid., pp. 658-659*
®^State ex rel. Day et al. v. Rapides Parish School
Board, (1925) 158 La* 251, 103 So. 757.
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and not destructive, when relating to the insti
tutions, which it is the duty of the state to
protect*

It is therefore clear that neither the
state hoard of education nor the state Législature
Intended any sudden and drastic action by parish
school boards that might eventuate in the closing
of the public schools for an entire year, prior
to July 1, 1928, as the result of the enforcement
of the provisions of the act of 1922,®®
Herein the court held that the public schools are
not only a function of the state government, but also that
their operation must be continuous by sessions, although
their closing for a year seemed a practical way of assuring
a sound financial basis.

SUMMARY

The theory that education is a function of the
state is reflected both by legal implications and judicial
interpretations.
Legal Implications
The legal implications which seem to show that
education is a function of the state are principally the
following:
1, The Ordinance of 1787 recognized the state
as the governing authority of public education.

®®Ibld., 188 La. 284-285.

59
£• In the Federal Constitution education was one
of the undelegated powers and was thereby reserved as a state
function.
3. It is obvious that Louisiana's populace was
cognizant of the state's educational responsibilities, for
the legislature, acting on its prerogatives, provided for
public schools long before the organic law made this action
mandatory •
4. Since 1845 the constitutions of the state have
embodied the underlying principles of public education and
have required the legislature to provide for a system of
free public schools throughout the state.
5. The framers of the constitutions during the
period of Reconstruction emphasized the establishment of
educational facilities for all children of school age without
regard to race or color.
6. Since the Constitution of 1879 educational
provisions have been made for all children of school age
with a separation of the white and colored races.
Judicial Interpretations
On the theory that the welfare of a democratic
society depends on an educated populace, the state declares
through Judicial interpretations the following;
1. The primary purpose of the public school is to
promote the general intelligence of the people and thereby
increase the efficiency of the state's citizenry.

ÔO
2# The

public schools are state institutions, since

education is a function of the government•
3. The

granting of school lands to the state by the

Federal Government further establishes that education is a
responsibility of the state.
4. Taxes for the support of public education,
whether levied by a municipality, a district, a parish, or
the state, are classified as ordinary taxes.
5. Since education is a public function, ail school
officers are agents of the state.
6. The right to establish and support high schools
as a

part

of

thestate system of public education is recog

nized.
7. Recently the junior college has been considered
as an extension of secondary education and, therefore, in
cluded in the free public aohool system.
8. Public schools are continuous institutions by
sessions and the officials are not permitted to interfere
with this continuity.

CHAPTER 17

FDBLZC SCHOOL SOFFOHT THROUGH LARD GRANTS

CHAPTER K

PDBLIO SCHOOL SUPPORT THROUCB LAND GRANTS

The legal basla of public aohool finance Is estab
lished on the theory that education for a democracy le
indispensable.^

If education Is a function of the state—

and It has been reasonably shown that the state has the
power to establish free public schools throughout its
doalnlon— It logically follows that the state has power to
provide for its support.

"Where the power to do any given

thing Is granted by the law, the means whereby this power
may be exercised is likewise granted*"®

The avenues through

which Louisiana supports her public schools have been divided
— for treatment by chapters in this study— into three groups:
land grants, general funds, and special funds.

In presenting

each group the purpose is to show the legal basis of public
school suppprt as revealed by judicial interpretations of the
organic and statutory laws pertaining to that particular
source*

In dealing with such legal aspects, an attempt is

^Arthur B, Moehlman, Public School finance (Chicago,
1927), p. 6.
Estate of louisiana ex rel, Warren Easton v. Treasurer
of Board of School Directors of New Orleans, (1906) 3 Orl,
App* 391.
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made to bring out pertinent Issues and dominant policies
which the state has pursued in the financing of her free pub
lic schools*

The present chapter treats the first phase—

that is, support of the public schools through land grants.

SCHOOL LANDS AND THEIR PROCEEDS

Development as Source of Revenue
The principle of Federal aid for the support of
public schools antedates the period of statehood.

The court

has explained the origin of this support as follows:
"The practice of setting apart section
No. 16 of every township of public lands for the
maintenance of public schools is traceable to the
oardlnance of 1765, being the first enactment for
the disposal by sale of the public lands in the
western territory. The appropriation of public
lands for that object became a fundamental princi
ple by the ordinance of 1787, which settled terms
of compact between the people and states of the
northwestern territory, and the original states,
unalterable except by consent• One of the articles
affirmed that 'religion, morality, and knowledge,
being necessary for good government and the happi
ness of mankind,' and ordained that 'schools, as a
means of education, should be forever encouraged,*”®
The Constitution of the United States gives Con
gress the power to sell or otherwise dispose of her public
lands.

Relative to the exercise of this power with Louisiana

lands the court has said:

3

Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of
Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La, 32,
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Shortly after the cession of Louisiana to the
United States, by the eleventh section of an act
of Congress, approved the Slst of April, 1806,
the President of the United States was authorized
to offer for sale, such of the public lands lying
in the Western District of the Territory of Orleans,
as were surveyed, with the exception of sections
sixteen, «diioh, in the language of the act, "shall
be reserved, in each township for the support of
schools within the same."^
Thus, since 1806, the sixteenth sections in Louisiana have
been set apart for public school support.
The principles underlying the designation and as
signment of sixteenth sections have been legally interpreted
as follows:
"Until the survey of the township and the
designation of the specific section, the right of
the state rests in eompaot-^binding, it is true,
the public fai^, end dependent for execution upon
the political authorities# Oourts of justice have
no authority to mark out and define the land # # .
subject to the grant# But when the political
authorities have performed this duty, the compact
has an object, upon sdiidi it can attach, and if
there is no legal impediment the title of the
state becomes a legal title# . # #" Cooper v,
Roberts, 18 How. 179, 15 L. Ed. 338.
A survey made by the government must be
held conclusive against any collateral attack in
controversies between individuals. After a survey
of the township has been made by the proper United
States authorities, and section 16 of a named town
ship has been made and placed, the said section
becomes the property of the state for school pur
poses from the date of such survey.^

R o be r t Garland et al# v. Thomas M. Jackson et al., (1852)
7 La. Ann. 66.
®Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Orleans
V# New Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La. 33.
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Some of the early steps taken by the state to
realize results from its lands reserved for school support
were legislative resolutions to Congress emphasizing the
necessity of making the school lands available for purposes
of support,& and urging additional grants’^ and special pro
visions® to meet the particular needs of louisiana, as
expressed in one of the resolutions:
Whereas on account of the peculiar topog
raphy of the State of Louisiana, the sixteenth
section assigned in every township for the use of
public schools is so often located on marshes and
other lands of no value that about one-fifth of
the lands appropriated for primary instruction, are
to be considered as entirely worthless; and whereas,
in oonseqpence of other townships being completely
covered by private claims, it is estimated that
about thirty-eight th cue and acres more are lost to
the state, for want of public lands to apply to
school purposes: therefore,
Be it resolved by the Senate and House
of Représentât^ es of tne S^ate of Loul si ana 7 In
general assemtiy^conveneT. that our senators anî
représentâtIves in congress be and are hereby
requested to obtain from congress the passage of
a law giving to this state, in all oases where
the sixteenth section in any township is composed
of worthless land, or where that section or any
part thereof is covered by previous valid title,
the right of selecting and entering, for the
benefit of primary schools, the seme quantity of
public land, to be located in the same township,
or, in default of good land therein, in such ad
jacent townships as may furnish lands not yet
appropriated, and of more value.
Be it further resolved. &c., That our
senators anH representatives are moreover requested
to unite their best exertions to obtain a law from

®Aota of loul8iana, 1820-gl, "A Resolution," pp. 130-132.
^Ibid., 1835, "Resolution,” pp. 5-6.
8

'Ibid.:

1839, Resolution No. 11; 1845, No. 54,
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congress giving the general assembly of this state
power and authority to rent, lease or sell as may
be deemed expedient or necessary, the sixteenth
sections of school lands situated therein.9
By Congressional enactment in 184310 Louisiana's
legislature was authorized to provide for obtaining revenue
from the school lands through sales thereof.

In 1845 the

state's constitution provided for the development and pro
tection of this means of school support:
The proceeds of all lands heretofore
granted by the United States to this State for
the use or support of schools, and of all lands
which may hereafter be granted or bequeathed to
the State, and not expressly granted or bequeathed
for any other purpose, which hereafter may be dis
posed of by the State, • • • shall be held by the
State as a loan, and shall be and remain a per
petual fund, on which the State shall pay an
annual Interest of six per cent; which interest
together with all the rents of the unsold lands,
shall be appropriated to the support of such
schools, anà this appropriation shall remain
inviolable.il
Since the state acquired complete title to all
school land grants through the final approval in 1873 of the
official surveys, it has been held that the legislature from
that date was free to provide for the administration of the
school lands as it saw fit.12

°Ibld.. 1841-42, No. 48.
^^Acts of Congress, 1842-43, "An Act to authorize the
Legislatures of the States of Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Tennessee, to sell the lands heretofore appropriated for
the use of schools in those States," oh. xxxiii.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art. 135.
^ ^ y e r ▼. State, (1986) 168 La. 146, 121 So. 604.
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Constitutional provisions pertaining to the six
teenth sections remained unchanged from 1845 to 1879.

It

is reasonable to assume that much of the school land was
disposed of during this interval of thirty-four years.
That practically all proceeds from the sales of such lands
were lost during the War for Southern Independence and Re
construction is common knowledge.1^

Evidence for this

assumption is added by the provisions of the Constitution
of 1879 to the effect that:
The debt due by the State to the free
school fund is hereby declared to be the sum of
one million one hundred and thirty thousand eight
hundred and sixty-seven dollars and fifty-one
cents in principal, and shall be placed on the books
of the Auditor and Treasurer to the credit of the
several townships entitled to the same; the said
principal being the proceeds of the sales of lands
heretofore granted by the United States for the
use and support of free public schools, which amount
shall be held by the State as a loan and shall be
and remain a perpetual fund, on which the State
shall pay an annual interest of 4 per cent from
the first day of January, 1880, and that said
interest shall be paid to the several townships
in the State entitled to the same, in accordance
with the act of Congress, Ho. 68, approved February
15, 1843, and the bonds of the State heretofore
issued, belonging to said fund and sold under act
of the General Assembly Ho. 81, of 1872, are here
by declared null and void, and the General Assembly
shall make no provision for their payment, and may
cause t h ^ to be destroyed.14
Further provisions for securing permanency to this
source of revenue were made by the Constitutional Convention
of 1921:

^®Thomas H. Harris, The S'torv of Public Education in
Louisiana (Mew Orleans, 1924T, p. 49.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 253.
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Where sixteenth sections or indemnity
lands granted by Congress for public school purposes,
have been erroneously sold by the State, or paid by
the State as fees for services rendered, such
deficiencies shall be properly adjusted, and the
fund, so derived, shall be credited to the several
townships and be treated as a loan to the State on
which it shall pay four per cent per annum Interest,
The Legislature shall enact all necessary laws to
carry this section into effect.
The debt due by the State to the free
school fund arising from the sale of lands granted
by Congress for school purposes shall remain a
perpetual loan to the State on which it shall pay
to the several townships four per cent (4^) per
annum interest.I®
Disposition of School Lands
In 1843 Congress authorized the Louisiana legislature
to provide for the sale of the sixteenth section lands and
the conveyance of a fee simple title to the purchasers*^®
% e legislature made the first provisions therefor by Act
No, 321 of 1855 in which the manner of sale and the dis
position of the proceeds were prescribed.

For the

inhabitants of the township wherein the section is located
the state became the trustee, both of the lands and of the
proceeds from their sale, and in transactions the state or
its legalized representative is charged with the disposition.

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art, 12, secs* 18-19,
^^Aots of Congress, 1842-43, "An Act to authorize the
Legislatures of the States of Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Tennessee, to sell the lands heretofore appropriated for
the use of schools in those States," oh, xxxiii, sec, 1,
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State am trustee.

The trusteeship of the state was

recognized by the Congressional Act of 1843 to the extent that
the legislature warn authorised to provide for the sale of the
lands reserved to the aohools and for the Investment of the
money arising from such sales in some productive fund, of
which the proceeds were to he forever applied to the use and
support of the schools, under the provision that no sale was
to he made without the consent of the inhabitants of the town
ship in question*

Although Inconsistency of assumptions is

indicated when Congress gave a qualified permission to sell
sixteenth sections after the lands had ceased to belong to
the United States, this gift of the school lands to the state
has been held a b s o l u t e * % e

state had the power to sell

the lands without the consent of Congress.

Ho attack on the

validity of a sale can be sustained if the basis of complaint
is only that the sale was not made in the manner prescribed
by the Congressional Act of February 15, 1845.^®

He who has

bought school land under the laws of the state la decreed the
rightful owner in contest with a claimant holding e patent
shown to have been issued erroneously by the Federal Govern
ment,

^9

The United States parted vdth the title when the land

James
Cooper, Plaintiff in Error, v. Enoch C, Roberts,
(1653) IB How. 173, 15 L, M , 538: State of Alabama, Plaintiff in
Error, v. Sudle r^hmldt, (1913) 832 U, 3. 158, 54 S. 0, 501,
56 L* Bd* 555.
^ S t a t e of Louisiana, by School Board of Parish of Tangipahoa,
V, William Tf Joyce Co. et al., (1919) (Cîr. Ct. of App.) 861
Fed # 186#
^^Oullen McCastle v. J . J* B* Chaney et al*, (1876) 88 La*
Ann. 720.
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ms

selected by the state as school land; the title remained

in the state until the time of the sale.

However, one who

has been in possession without legal title may rightfully
expeot reimbursement for improvements from one to whom the
land must be surrendered after legal purchase.®^
Court decrees concerning who have the right to stand
in Judgment for a sale of school lands have followed the
policy of recognizing the state aa trustee.

When one pur

chaser excepted to the right of the state treasurer to sue
for the rescission of a sale, this right of the state treas
urer, to whom the notes were made payable, was maintained
In refusing to uphold the right of a parish board to
represent the state in a land suit in 1860, Chief Justice Thomas
C. Manning, with relation to a previous decision v/hlch had recog
nized this right of a particular school b o a r d , r e a s o n e d :
Can the Board of School Directors of any
parish represent the State in a like case without
her authority? The plaintiff cites School Directors
V, Anderson, 26 Ann, 796 as conc].usive, but it is
against him. That suit was on the part of the
Board for Carroll parish, and the court maintained
the right on the ground that legislative authority
had been expressly given, by a law on the subject
which was restricted to Carroll parish, Sees, Acts
1861, p. 99, though we are inclined to think if the
language of that Act had been scrutinized, it would
have been found deficient for that p u r p o s e , 28

2°ibia.
*^3obert A, Hunter, State Treasurer, y, Robert W. Williams
et alse, (1861) 16 La, Ann. 129.
^ S c h ool Directors, etc., v. R. K, Anderson, Administrator,
et al,, (1876) 28 La. Ann. 739.
^ B o a r d of School Directors of Concordia v. Albert C. Ober,
(1880) 92 La. Ann. 419.
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With reference to the state's safeguarding this power of
trustee he added:
The title to this land has never been in
the parish Board of School Directors. The title
was in the State under the donation of the general
government, and she held it for a specific purpose,
with authority to sell the lands, and a Mandate to
hold the proceeds and iznrest them for the benefit
of the schools* No doubt she could confer authority
on the parish Boards of Directors to sue in her
stead, but she has not done It* On the contrary the
State has seemed very tenacious of this power, and
we think rightly, considering the position of
trustee in which she stands to this fund* Never
has she by a general act given the parish Boards
the power to sue in such case in their n a m e s * 2 4
Consequently, the court ruled that the board of school directors
of a parish is without authority to bring

suit forthe reven

dication of school lands unless empowered

to do so by a

legislative act.

Thus, to the state the power of trustee

has been reserved.
By Act No* 158 of 1910 the state transferred to
the parish school board part of its power

to stand in Judgment

concerning school lands as followss
That the several school boards of the
various parishes of this state be and they are
hereby authorized and empowered to contract with
and employ on the part of the state of Louisiana,
attorneys at law, to recover for the state, damages
for trespass to the sixteenth section known as
school lands the title to which is still in the
state, each of said boards to have authority,
to make said contracts for the lands situated
in its own parish and no others; and the several
school boards shall also have authority to sue
for and recover the sixteenth section known as
school l a n d s . 2S

®4ibid.* pp. 419-420♦
^®Acts of Louisiana, 1910, No* 158, sec. 1.
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but reserved that:
Suit in all sueh cases shall be brought
in the name of the state of Louisiana, and the
attorneys, employed as aforesaid, shall sue for
the value of all timber cut and removed from any
such lands, as well as any end all other legal
damages caused by any such trespass.
In 1915 the court interpreted this latter act to the
effect that the board of directors was without authority to
bring suit to recover school lands in its own name.

In the

case in reference the board of directors of the public schools
of the parish of Orleans brought suit against the New Orleans
Land

Compemy2?

to recover fractional section sixteen, as

belonging to the public schools of said parish.

This suit

was filed prior to the passage of the act of 1910.

Judgment

was obtained in the trial court and in the first hearing of
the supreme court, but on application for rehearing the
judgments were set aside with the following explanation;
Hence it appears that, since the present
suit was filed, the state has by the Act No, 156
of 1910, given to the parish boards of school
directors authority to employ attorneys and to sue
for and recover the sixteenth sections to which the
state has not legally parted with its title, and to
recover damages for trespass on sixteenth sections.
But the Legislature was careful to provide that
the attorneys are to be employed on the part of
the state of Louisiana; that damages for trespass
on the sixteenth sections, the title to which is
still in the state, are to be recovered for the
state; that the suit, in all such cases, shall be
brought in the name of the state of Louisiana; and
that vAatever sums are recovered in such suits
shall be paid into the state treasury, to be
credited by the auditor and treasurer to the town-

26

Ibid.. see. 3.

Board of Directors of Publie Schools of Parish of Orleans
T. Hew Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La. 32, 70 So. 27.
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ship in which the land is situated, in the same
manner as theretofore provided by law for the
proceeds of the sale of sixteenth sections.
The plaintiff had no authority or right
of action to sue to recover a school section or
sixteenth section of land when this suit was filed,
that is, before the passage of the act of 1910;
and, under the terms of that statute, the plaintiff
has authority now to bring the suit only in the
name of the state of Louisiana.2®
When this suit came through the courts later under
correct title of the state, recognition was given to it.^®
Also, the residents and alleged taxpayers in a
township in whom is vested the title of the sixteenth section
have the authority to stand in judgment, according to a
decision handed down in 1892 when the residents of a sixteenth
section in St. Tammany Parish were heard in a suit to annul
an illegal sale of the section*®®
In various decisions the court has endorsed the
trusteeship of the state and protected the schools* rights in
their lands by decreeing certain transactions vhen pertaining
to school lands as not permissible.

In the case of State v.

Hew Orleans Land Company^^ several rulings pertaining thereto
were handed down.

Where an asylum for destitute orphan girls

had transferred its lands to the drainage board and ultimately
to the City of Hew Orleans, trustee of the drainage board,
and some of which lands were sixteenth section, the court

^ I b i d .. 138 La. 57-50.
®^State V. New Orleans Land Co., (1918) 145 La. 858, 79 So.
515.
®®Edwin Telle et al. v. The School Board of St. Tammany
Parish et als., (1892) 44 La. Ann. 365, 10 So, 801*

SI
state T. N«r Orleans Land Co., (1918) 143 La. 858, 79 So.
515.
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said:

"To our mind it is very plain that the asylum could

not transfer the land of the state or of the public schools
in payment of any debt it might owe, and that the fact that
the debt was due in part for the drainage of this land could
not make any d i f f e r e n c e , T h e defense argued also that al
though the land did belong to the schools, it was liable to
the drainage assessment by Act No* 165 of 1858, creating the
drainage board, but the court replied,

* . w e are very

clear that the state's property and the property held by the
state as trustee for the schools was not intended to be em
braced in said act;"®® and, "This state property could not
have been seized and sold under said act of 1858, and still
less could it be transferred by the asylum or by any other
stranger to the title,"®4

Oonoeming the diverting of the

land from its trust purpose the court held plainly;
. . . for, until the decision of the Land Department
awarding this land to the schools and rejecting the
claim of the state to it shall have been set aside,
the land must be held never to have belonged to the
state, and hence to have never been subject to be
alienated by her, either by direct deed or through
the medium of an estoppel, as land belonging to her.
And, of course, holding this land es trustee of the
schools, she could not divert it from the schools,
its trust purposes, and transfer it to the drainage
board for drainage purposes; it could no more do
that through the medium of an estoppel than by
direct act of donation.®®

143 La. 063.
p. 864.

p. 867.
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In answer to the defendant's plea of prescription acquirendi
causa against the state, there was further protection in the
decision:
Inherent in the state's title to such school land
is a condition Imposed by the act of Congress (Act
Feb. 15, 1643, o, 33, 5 8tat, at L« p, 600) that
the state cannot alienate same without the consent
of the inhabitants of the township in which the
land is situated. If, then, the state cannot
alienate same by express statute to that effect
without such consent, she is in no better position
to do go by her laws of prescription acquirendi
causa.36
Thus, the court has upheld the policy that the lands
reserved for the benefit of schools are under the trusteeship
of the state or its legalized representative, are subject
to exceptions pertaining to state property, and that this
property must be dealt with only as legislation directs and
as the Judicial body of the state and of the nation interpret.
Legal methods of authorizing sales.

The act of

Congress donating the sixteenth section to each township for
the maintenance of the schools provided that the sale of
those sections be made only with the consent of the inhabitants
of the township.

Legislative acts administering that right

required elections to be held to ascertain the will of the
voters of the township, specifying that "Polls shall be open
at the most public places in the township after advertisement
of thirty days.”3^

The definiteness of this was confirmed in

St. Tammany Parish when the court annulled the sale of a

®^Bdwln Telle et al. v. The School Board of St, Taminany
Parish et als., (1892) 44 La. Ann. 369.
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sixteenth section partly o n the grounds that the advertisement
was not made as required and that the election was not held*®®
Consistency in the policy relative to the sale of
school lands is indicated hy the frequent advice of the attorney
general to the effect that no legal sale of the whole section
or parts thereof may he consummated without the approval of
the voters concerned.®^

This pertains also to a disposition

for such purpose as a right of way— the accepted public land
method of a grant by the governor and register of the state
land office is not sufficient,40

Elections for determining

the will of the people should be conducted by the parish school
boards and only legal voters should participate .41

However,

idien "the majority of the voters in a township give their
consent and approval to the sale of such sixteenth section
lands, . . .in ease of the failure to sell the land when
first offered for sale, the land may be again offered at
public auction without another election.*4#

Similarly, this

provision holds for the auctioning of timber#43
These regulations do not pertain to those sections
idiieh are uninhabitable by reason of their being swamp or
sea marsh or which for any other reason do not contain any

38

Ibid.. 44 La, Ann. 365, 10 So, 801*
39,
Opinions of the Attorney Seneral of Louisiana; May 1, 1980,
to Vsy
toy XI,
May
1,
ld24,
to
May 1, 1986, p. 485;
. Iÿâ'87"p7T59:
X » x e ,
y *
«
WV
X.
X
Vb-X.
W
May 1, 1930, to April SO, 1938, p. 476.
May 1, 1928, to May 1, 1924, p. 673.
41

Ibid.. May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 446.

*^Ibid.. May 1, 1906, to May 1, 1908, p. 888.
43
Ibid.. May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1928, p. 290.
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legal voters*

In these situations the school hoard is

Inrtrusted to make proper application to the auditor of pub
lic accounts, who in hie discretion may determine whether or
not a sale should he made and authorized accordingly*44
W o * isËÊ » M

b

ftOTyslagd m l w * got y a U d ,

At first the minimum price at which the lands could be sold
was fixed by the legislature at #1*25 per acre*

In 1857

additi<mal provisions were made;
Be it further enacted, &c*, That if a
majority of the votes taken in a township shall
give their assent to the sale of the lands afore
said, it shall be appraised by three sworn appraisers
selected by the Treasurer and Recorder of the parish;
then they shall be sold by the Parish Treasurer at
public auction, before the court-house door, or by
the Sheriff, or an auctioneer to be employed by the
Treasurer at his expense, to the highest bidder,
in quantities not less than fbrty acres; but in no
case at a less sum than one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre, . * *49
The necessity for the appraised value to be received was
established idien the court set aside a sale, explaining;
Unless it were the intention of the
legislature that the land should not be sold for
less than the appraised value, there would be no
object in enacting that it should be appraised*
Neither would there have been any reason for
amending the Act of 1855, by requiring that it
should be a p p r a i s e d *46
The same ruling was handed down in 1892 when no title was
declared to the adjudioatee of a sixteenth section which was

^^id.:
May 1, 1906, to May I, 1900, p* 289; May 1, 1908,
to May 1, 1910, p* 802} /ïtey 1, 1910, to May 1, 1918, p* 585*
^Jlctè of Louisiana, 1857, No* 859, sec. 34*
^®School Directors, &o*, v* Nicholas D* Colcnen, (1859)
14 La* Ann* 106,
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bought in 1687 at less than #1*25 per

acre.

47

However, this

decision w&e criticized a few years later by the same court
for not having taken cognizance of the revised statute of 1870,
which superseded all previous acts and by which the "manner,
terms, and conditions of the sale of school lands" were re
stated and no mention was made of a minimum price— only was
the land to be appraised and sold to the highest

bidder.4®

In the latter case the policy of sale at the appraisal price,
regardless of the amount thereof, was upheld.4#
Recovery of lands.

After the custom of selling

school lands was fairly well established, a question which
soon presented itself was;

May a legitimate sale of school

lands be dissolved or rescinded for cause and the lands
recovered by a school board?
The court had occasion to answer this in the Hunter
case.®®

There the defendants were in possession of school

lands legally sold January 20, 1851, and secured by notes made
to the state treasurer.

In February, 1861, the plaintiff,

state treasurer of that date, sued to demand payment of the
notes, and In the event of non-payment, rescission of the

47
Edwin Telle et al. v. The School Board of St. Tammany
Parish et als., (1892) 44 La, Ann. 365, 10 So. 801.
Acts of Louisiana, 1855, No. 321, sec. 34; Revised Statutes
of Louisiana, 1870, sec. 1316; Acts of Louisiana, 1858, Ho. 267,
sec. 2; Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1870, sec. 2960.
49
Board of Directors of Parish of Livingston v, Lanier et
al., (1906) 117 La. 307, 41 So, 583.
®®Robert A. Hunter, State Treasurer, v. Robert W. Williams
6t als., (1861) 16 La, A m , 129,
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sale.

The oourt's order was that the sale be rescinded and

that the said lands be restored b y the defendants to the law
ful authorities of the state for the benefit of the schools
of the district to which they belonged*®!

As settlement of

another suit for dissolution of sale and recovery of rent
because of defaulted payments®® the court decreed a restitutio
in integrum— "The vendor returns the portion of the price
paid, with interest from the date of payment, and the vendee
returns the thing with its revenues*"®®

To this point, there

was judgment dissolving the sale and giving rent for the
cultivated land at specified rates during different periods
less certain amounts— cash payments with interest, and the
cost of clearing land and making ditches and levees— leaving
a balance of #1,016.00 in favor of plaintiffs; also, it was
ordered that plaintiffs recover rent on sixty acres of land
at eight dollars per acre from 1875— the date of calculations
by the lower court— to date of delivery to

plaintiffs.®4

The state is estopped to recover school lands from
professed owners who claim title through mesne conveyance by
transfer recorded prior to the state’s record of a judgment
annulling the original sale and retroceding the land to the
state.

This was the substance of a decree rendered when the

p. 130.
School Director*, etc., ▼. B, K. Anderson, Administrator,
•t al., (1876) 28 La. Ann. 730.
®*Ibid.. p. 741.
®*Ihid.
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State sought to reecver a sixteenth section after It had
delayed fifty-eight years in recording a judgment which cancelled the original sale for want of failure to meet payments,
and had placed of record a deed of conveyance, thereby converting
the land into private property#

Also, the state was held not

entitled to collect the unpaid balance on the land vdien it
had p e»itted more than ten years to expire before reinsoribing
the vendor's lien in the mortgage office#®®
Likewise, prescription runs against the state when
it seeks action on notes for the deferred purchase price of
school lands.®®

On the other hand, when the state brings

action in due time the court recognizes the mortgage on the
land and orders enforcment through the seizure and sale of
the land to satisfy the matured notes outstanding.®^
After the state has sold a sixteenth section of land,
it is estopped to recover that land through contesting the
title of the owner on the grounds of illegalities or irregu
larities la the original sale#

In this connection the state

must conform to estoppel in the same manner as if it were a
private individual, and the fact that it represents the
interest of the inhabitants of the township in which the
section is located does not affect the estoppel#®®

®®State ex rel# Board of School Directors v# Brooklyn
Cooperage Co., (1030) 170 La. 531, 188 So. 470#
®®y# Graham, Auditor, v. 0# W, & J. T. Tignor et al., (1871)
83 La. Ann. 570.
®^May.r ▼. State, (1929) 168 La. 146, 121 So. 604.
®®Th. State of Louisiana ▼. Albert 0. Ober, (1882) 34 La.
Ann. 359,

81
After the state had all sohool land titles legalized
In 1875 through an off lei al aooeptanoe of a survey of its
lands hy Surveyor General E# W. Foster,®® efforts were made
to reoover sixteenth seotions which had not been legally dis
posed of.

Action to recover results merely in nonsuit when

there is not satisfactory proof that the land In question was
ever selected as school lands,®® but with respect to definitely
established claims the court has expressed, in no uncertain
terms, the state’s right to recovery as follows:
The laws of the United States are clear
to the effect that every sixteenth section in place,
or part of a sixteenth section in place, belongs to
the state of Louisiana, for school purposes, and the
parish sohool board having the administration of the
schools and the property intended for their benefit
are entitled to institute suits for recovery of such
sections of land found in the possession of third
persons.®!
A very complicated suit of long duration and rehear
ings on this subject was the one brought against the New
Orleans Land Company to reoover a fractional section sixteen
as belonging to the public schools of Orleans P a r i s h . T h e
land in question had come into possession of the defendant
by various transfers and sales, some of which involved colonial

®®Meyer v. State, (1939) 168 La. 146, 121 So. 604.
®®Barton’s Executrix v, Hempkin, (1841) 19 La. 508; Parish
Board of School Directors v. Rosa B. Collins et al., (1881)
33 La. Ann. 434.
®^1Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Orleans
V. New Orleans Land Co., (1915) 136 La, 37.
®®Ibid.. 138 La. 33, 70 So. 27; State v. New Orleans Land Co.,
(1918)
La. 858, 79 So. 515; State of Louisiana, Petitioner,
V. New Orleans Land Company, (1918 ) 248 U. S. 577, 39 S. 0. 18,
63 L. Ed. 439.
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grants, but not any of ndiioh, aooordlng to the opinion of the
ease, were in keeping with the authorized sale of a sixteenth
seetion at the time of the transfers#

The court ruled, and

the Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition
for a writ of eertiorari to the state court thereupon, that:
The said colonial grant and the titles
following it extend, however, no further back than
40 arpents from Bayou St. John, and therefore em
brace only a part of the land in dispute. As to
the remainder, the defendant has no title, and has
no standing for contesting in any way the title of
the schools. To the extent of this remainder,
therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.®®
Thus, the state’s right to recover sohool lands
lAich had not been secured In a legal statutory manner was
upheld, but her power to reoover lands once secured through
a colonial grant was denied.
Again, in 1931, it was maintained that the state’s
claim to sixteenth sections for the benefit of schools does
not control i^diere certain prior rights of title prevail.

The

claim of the state was denied with respect to land formerly
owned by A. B« Hoxsan and which was originally the Nicholas
Verret colonial grant.®4

The court presented the conditions

of this recovery thus;
The state cannot successfully claim a six
teenth section, or sohool section, in this township,
if the Nicholas Verret grant was a complete grant
vdien the United States acquired the Louisiana Terri
tory, or if the claim of Nicholas Verret, was there
after made valid by the act of Congress confirming
the grant and the statute of this state relinquishing
the state’s claim.®®

®^State V. New Orleans Land Co., (1918) 143 La. 873-873.
®^State V. Bowie Lumber Co. (Rives et al., Warrantors),
(1931) 148 La. 581, 87 So. 303.
*®Ibld., 140 la. 585,
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A litigation testing Governor Roman's title had found its

way to the Supreme Court of the United States.®®

With

reference to the decree therein the court in the instant case

said:

"The decision therefore was nothing more nor less than

a judicial declaration that Gov. Roman's title was complete
and did not need a decree of any court to confirm it."®^
By an act of Congress®® Governor Roman's title had been con
firmed as far aa claims of the United States were concerned
and by statute®^ Louisiana had relinquished any claim she
might have had to the lend.

The court's ruling was that the

state's demand to reoover be rejected.
Recovery by the state is not held when the only
charge against the validity of the sale of the land is that
it was according to statutory enactment but not as prescribed
by the Congressional Act of February 15, 1843,^^
The legality of attorneys' fees to the

amount of one-

fourth of the land recovered was established when a transferee of
the claims of the attorneys in the Mew Orleans Land Company case,
supra.

secured a ruling in favor of partition by licitation—

one-fourth to the plaintiff and three-fourths to

the

AA
The United States, Appellants, v, Armend PollerIn et al.
The United States, Appellants, v. A. B. Roman. The United
States, Appellants, v. Carlos de Villemont's Heirs et al. The
United States, Appellants, v. Jean B. Labranche's Eeirs.
(1851) IS How. fi, 14, L. Ed. 28.
®^State V. Bowie Lumber Co. (Rives et al., Warrantors),
(1921) 148 La. 593.
®®Acts of Congress 1853-54, "An Act for the Relief of A. B.
Roman of Louisiana," ch. xovi.
®^Act8 of Louisiana, 1855, No. 114.
^^State of Louisiana, by Sohool Board of Parish of Tangipahoa,
V. William T. Joyce Co, et al., (1919) (Gir. Ct. of App.) 261

Fed. 128,
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s t a t e . I n answer to the state's attack that the acts under
which the plaint iff s o u ^ t relief were in conflict with the
Congressional Act of 1843 the court said:
It is clear, therefore, regardless of
anything that may have been said to the contrary
in State v. Hew Orleans land Co*. 143 La, 668,
70 So* 515, that a complete legal title vested
in the State of Louisiana after the survey of
1871-72 and its official approval in 1873, and
that the Act of Congress of February 16, 1843,
was no legal impediment to the subsequent passage
by the state Legislature of Acts 158 of 1910
end Act 184 of 1928, which are constitutional
and valid*?:
Sale of timber*

The courts have upheld the policy

that the sale of timber on sixteenth section sohool lands is
under similar jurisdiction to the sale of the land itself.
Provisions for the latter were made in 1885 and 1858*^®
An

interpretation of

the effect of these statutes onthesale

of

timber was sought

in a mandamus suit to compel thepresi

dent of the school board to sign a deed conveying all the
timber on a certain section to relator, pursuant to a resolu
tion of said board selling the timber to the relator at
private sale*?^

It was argued that the board had the right

to gather the fruits of the soil by being in the position of
a usufructuary, but the court said that no such right had
been conferred by statute and that the board is merely an
agent of the state, «diioh holds the title in trust for the
school district.

^ h la y ttT r .

In rendering decision the court sustained

state, (1929) 188 la. 148, 121 So. 604.

9fi
Ibid.. 188 la. 163.
^*Aeta of loHialana:
Ro. 267, M O . 2.

1856, No. 321, aaoa. 32-35; 1888,,

^*8tate ex rel. Eopkine ▼. stark, (1904) 111 la. 594, 35 So. 760.
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the refusal of the president to sign the instrument of sale,
daareaing;
The sixteenth section cannot he sold
without the approval of a majority of the legal
voters of the township, and the sale must be at
public auction* To hold that a parish school
board has implied power to sell at private sale
or otherwise all the timber on the section,
constituting in this and other oases almost the
entire value of the tract, would be to nullify
the statutes*”®
Prior to the passage of Act No* 129 of 1908, which
authorised the sale of the timber without the sale of the land,
it was the policy of the legal advisers of the state to uphold
the theory that the school lands and the timbers thereon were
inseparable and that one could not be disposed of without the
other#?®

The same policy of strict adherence to statutory

provisions was followed in a case in 1912 when there was the
decree that the attempted sale by a sohool board of the right
to "cut and pull" the timber on a sixteenth section was abso
lutely and incurably n u U and conveyed no title vdiatsoever*
In addition, the vendee was held to be a possessor in bad
faith end liable to the state for the value of the manufactured
product of the timber less the cost of logging and manufacture#*
Very similar liability was demanded of another company which
contracted with an unauthorized board, except It was specified
75
State ex rel# Hopkins v# Stark, (1904) 111 La* 595#
?®Oplnlons of the Attorney General of Louisianai May 1,
1906, to May 1, 1908, pp. 21^5, àl6; Way 1, Ï9ti8Ï to May 1,
1910, p. 180.
^^State V. F. B, Williams Cypress Co#, Limited, (1912)
131 La. 62, 56 So. 1033#

66
that the value of the produot would date to the time of
removal of the timber*^®
Further interpretation of the act of 1900
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has been

rendered to the effect that "whatever may be said of the land
in the school sections, the timber, apart from the land, could
not, legally, have been sold without the consent of a majority
of the legal voters, residing, not in the parish where the
timber may be situated, but in the township, obtained at an
election called for that purpose, . .

The power of the

parish sohool board goes no further than to permit it to take
the sense of the legal voters,

When the vote is affirmative

a report is made to the auditor, who authorizes the board to
make the sale.

The action of a parish treasurer in making

such a sale and in deducting a commission therefor was held
unauthorized and void.®!
Actions for the recovery of the value of timber
illegally out from school lands are properly brought, under
Act No. 158 of 1910, In the name of the state by the district
attorneys of the respective parishes from which the timber
was removed, assisted by special counsel employed by the
respective boards of directors.®®

^®State V. Rathbone et al., (1919) 144 La. 855, 61 So. 534.
^^Aots of Louisiana, 1900, No* 129.
® % t a t e V. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co., (1919) 144 La. 570
®!lbid., 144 La. 559, 80 So. 722.
®®Ibid.

87
Various statutes®® have attempted to transfer to
the perish sohool hoard the power to authorize the sale of
timber on sixteenth seotions.

These have often been decreed

unconstitutional, as being in conflict with the act of Con
gress providing that none of the sixteenth sections shall be
sold without the consent of the inhabitants of the township
concerned.®*

A change in the statutory provision to ecoord

with legal opinion was made in 1922 and has been upheld thus:
section 30 of Act 100 of 1922 is the
last expression of the Legislature upon this
subject. . . .
It provides that all elections
to authorize the sale of Sixteenth Section lands
or of timber on Sixteenth Section lands shall be
conducted by the Parish School Boards. It there
fore follows, we think, that the timber upon a
Sixteenth section could not be sold until the
inhabitants of the particular township in which
the section is located have held an election and
the majority authorize the sale thereof.®®
The state's legal
that

advisers have agreed in maintaining

the funds derived from the sale of school lends shall

be paid Into the free school

fund of the state treasury to

the credit of the particular township,

®®ACt8 of Louisiana:

but they seem to

1916, No* 180, sec. 69; 1918, No. 142.

®*State ex rel. Hopkins v. Stark, (1904) 111 La. 694, 36 So.
760; State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., Limited, (1912) 131 La*
62, 58 So. 1033; Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana:
May 1, 1918, to MayT7Ttaïï7 “ 75^7W
17 TUSCr," T o H a y T T T U s s .
pp. 742, 745, 753; May 1, 1922, to M a y 1, 1924, pp. 665, 667;
May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1923, p. 248.
®®OPinions of the Attorney General of Louisiane, May 1, 1928,
to Aprli
Apr
â ï ï T i ^ o T T . ""515... ......................
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®®Ibid:

June 1, 1912, to May 1, 1914, p. 594; May 1, 1920,
M a y T T 1988, p. 737; May 1, 1924, t o May 1, 1926, p. 425.
to May
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have differed®? oonoeroing the oonstitutlonality of acts which
sought to provide that the proceeds from the sale of timber
should be credited to the account of the current school fund
of the parish rather than to the free sohool fund.

Much

opinion has charged unconstltuttonality, and most recent
opinion,®® as based on section 50 of Act No. 100 of 1988,
holds that money from the sale of timber and of the land must
continue to be deposited in the state treasury and placed at
Interest for the benefit of the particular township.
Lease.

That the state has a right to lease its

sixteenth section lands was evidenced In a case where a later
board sought to dissolve a Mfty-year lease of the fractional
part of a sixteenth section which had been made by an earlier
board in 1636 in conformity with the law.

In rendering the

decision. Justice Isaac T. Preston said:
Tbe land is now in the possession of the
defendants under that lease, and the plaintiffs,
the present trustees, bring suit to reoover it, and
la effect, to annul the lease. They cannot do it.
The State of Mississippi leased their sohool lands,
acquired In the same manner for a term of ninetynine years, end the Supreme Court of that State
held the leases to be valid. The laws under which
the defendants hold the lease, however unwise, ex
pressly gave power to the trustees to lease the
land for that term. They conflicted with no act
of Congress, or the Constitution of the United
States. The lessees acquired a vested right in
the lease, by bidding for it at public auction, on
the terms prescribed by the Legislature, and paying
the price; and it would be a violation of our
Constitution to deprive them of It.®®

May l, l.gO, to May 1, 1922, pp. 738-738.
®®Ibld.. May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1928, p. 425.
®®Robert Garland at al. v , Thomas M. Jaokson et al., (1852)
7 La. Ann. 69.
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The decree was that there he Judgment for the defendants.

The

legal counselors of the state have been consistent In main
taining the theory that the law granting the right to dispose
of said lands through sales generally included the right to
lease said school lands or to lease or sell the oil and mineral
rights t h e r e o n . T h e statutory provisions of 1922 with
respect to leases have been upheld to this extent:
Section 30 of Act 100 of 1922 is the last
expression of the Legislature upon this subject.
It provides that Parish School Boards have author
ity to rent sixteenth section lands, or lease the
mineral rights of same by a resolution of the Board
and without the authority of a vote of the electors
of the township in which such lands are located,
Much controversy among the state's counsel seems to
have arisen concerning which school fund should receive the
money derived from lease of the land and of oil and mineral
rights, and there does not seem to have been consistency of
opinion that such income should be transferred to the current
school f x o A of the parish rather than to the state free school
f u n d A n

opinion, based on section 30 of Act No. 100 of

1922, contends that these revenues are to go to the current
school fund,93 while a slightly more recent one holds that the
proceeds from the lease of mineral rights can not be delegated
constitutionally to the current school fund of the parish.®^
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Oninlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana; June 1,
1912, to kay"l, 19IÎ, p. 590; May 1, 1920,l;o i&y 1, 1922,
p. 742; May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1928, p. 248.
*^Ibld.. May 1, 1988,

to April SO, 1980,

p. 515.

*^I5ld.i May 1, 1980, to May 1, 1928, p. 737; May 1, 1984,
to May 1, 1926, p. 428,
®®Ibid,, May 1, 1924,

to May 1, 1926, p.

425.

94
Ibid., May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1920, p. 248.
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Sixteenth Sections Which Are Not School Lands
Hot all sixteenth sections are reserved as school
lands,

The discrimination thereof is founded on the type of

survey which officially located them.

In upholding the

governmental surveys against an attack upon their authority
and correctness, Justice Walter B* Somerville explained them
and their relation to schools quite completely as follows:
The United States government has provided
for two methods of surveying lands in Louisiana.
One is known as the rectangular system of surveying,
and is provided for hy the Act of Congress of i&y
18, 1796, c. 29, 1 Stat. 464, which provides that
each township shall he six miles square, subdivided
into thirty«^six sections, each one mile square.
% e sections are to be numbered respectively,
beginning with Ho. 1, in the northeast corner, and
proceeding west and east alternately through the
township with progressive numbers, until 36 sections
are surveyed.
If, in making this survey of the public
lands in a township, a complete, or an approved,
grant is found that overlaps a part of any section,
the surveyor places this complete or approved grant
on his map, and only the remainderof the section
not covered by the grant is public land.
The other method of surveying the lands
in Louisiana is the survey of lots or tracts along
watqr courses, etc. The United States government,
by the Act of March 3, 1811, o. 46, sec, 2, 2 Stats.
662, authorizes the public lands on water courses,
etc., to be surveyed and subdivided into tracts of
56 poles in front and 465 poles in depth.
The Act of i^y 24, 1624, c. 141, 4 Stat.
34, authorizes the President to direct the survey
of lands fronting rivers, water courses, etc., by
lots, 2 acres front by 40 acres in depth.
The tracts surveyed along water courses
in accordance with the acts of 1811 and 1624 are
commonly known as "lots” or "radiating sections”
or "fractional sections.”
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The Department of the Interior of the
United States has ruled that sections 16 when they
are "radiating sections* or "fractional sections*
or "lots," as they are indiscriminately called,
which front on water courses, do not belong to the
state for the benefit of the township for school
purposes, but that only the sections or parts of
sections that are rectangularly surveyed and are
"in place” belong to the state for school p u r p o s e s .
The principle that fractional sections, radiating
sections, or lots, number sixteen, were not the property of
% e schools was emphasized by the court in 1865 in the
explanations
This defense must fall before the fact
that the lot in question (16) is a radiating, or
anomalous, or irregular lot, not in place, and
that the general laws consecrating lot or section
16 of townships to school purposes apply only to
such lots as have been surveyed in square or
rectangular lots or sections. Decision of Secretary
of the Interior, July 23, 1860; of July 1, 1882;
Bartons vs. Hempkin, 19 L, 510; (Parish Board of
School Directors v. Hollins) 3 3 Ann. 424. See
also 4 Ala., Long vs. Brown, pp. 622, 627, 628;
18 How. 173, 177, 178, 181, 182 (15 L. Ed. 338);
Cooper vs. Roberts; Public Domain 1883, p. 227,
indemnity selections; R« S. La. 2938; Sec. 14,
Act 75 of 1880.9*
Lack of authority of state to sell fractional sections
as school lands.

Again, in

1905,

the court interpreted that

fractional sections are not school lands.
the title was in

oonteat9?

The land to which

was alleged to have been secured by

a sale made by the treasurer of the parish of Iberville under
Act Ho.

250

of

1853,

which provided for the reorganization of

^^Board of Directors of Public Schools of P a r i ^ of Orleans

V. Hew Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La. 35-36.
Joseph H# Bres v. M. Louviere et ale., (1885) 37 La.
Ann. 738.
Q7

Laure et al. ▼. Wilson, (1905) 114 La.

69 9 ,

38 So. 522.
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public school lauds iu the state*

It was described as school

section sizteeu, but it was definitely established that it
was a radiating or irregular section*

The court's decree to

the effect that the sale thereof as school lands carried no
title was:
Fractional sections in fractional town
ships did not pass to the state under the general
grant by Congress of sixteenth sections for school
purposes, and the sale of such a section by a
parish treasurer, professing to sell school land
under the authority of Act Ho* 250, p; 213, of
1853, which authorized the sale of school land
alone, conveyed no title.@8
Indemnity Lands
To assure equity in the school funds provided through
the reservation of sixteenth sections "in place,” Congress,
by a revision of related previous legislation, enacted in
December, 1873, that:
%here settlements, with a view to pre
emption, have been made before the survey of the
lands in the field, which are found to have been
made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those
sections shall be subject to the pre-emption claim
of such settler; and if they, or either of them
have been or shall be reserved or pledged for the
use of schools or colleges in the State or Territory
in v&ich the lands lie, other lands of like quantity
are appropriated in lieu of such as may be patented
by pre-emptors; and other lands are also appropriated
to compensate deficiencies for school purposes, where
sections sixteen or thirty-six are fractional in
quantity, or where one or both are wantin^s by reason
of the township being fractional, or from any natural
cause whatever.9^

^ I b t d .. 114 La. 699.
**aerlse4 statut.* of the United State*, 1873-74, seo. 2275.
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Administration of indemnity lande and their proceeds,
In response to the Federal provisions the state declared:
The Register of the State Land Office is
required to ascertain in what townships in this
State there are no reservations of school sections
by reason of oonflie ting claims, or from any other
cause, or when the reservation is less than contem
plated by law; and In such oases It is made his
duty, under the superintendence of the Governor,
to apply for and, as soon as possible, obtain a
location of any land or parts of land in lieu
thereof.
When such locations can not be made, if
d e w e d more advantageous to the State, the Register,
with the assent of the Federal government is author
ized to issue scrip for such lands, Which scrip
shall not be sold for a less amount than $1.85 per

aore.lOO
That the issuance of Indemnity certificates by the
state was legal and of common practice is shown in the McEnery
case,101 where a mandamus was issued to compel the Governor
and the Register of the State Land Office to execute end
deliver to the relator patents for certain lands, some of
vdiich were Indemnity lands.

The relator by contract with a

previous governor had recovered certain school indemnity lands
and was entitled to fifty per centum thereof.

In reply to

the Register's complaint that the state held those lands only
in trust, the court called attention to several well-considered
opinionslOB dealing with the legal destination of the title

^^^Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1880, secs. 2951-8958.
^ ^ ^ % e State ex rel. John McEnery v. Francis T. Nioholls,
Governor, et al., (1890) 42 La. Ann. 209, 7 So. 738.
^®®Board of School Directors of Concordia v. Albert G, Ober,
(1880) 32 La. Ann. 417; Joseph R. Bres v. M. Louviere et als.,
(1685) 37 La. Ann. 736; Cullen MoCastle v. J. J. B. Chaney et
al., (1876) 28 La. Ann. 780; and James M. Cooper, Plaintiff in
Error, v. Enoch 0. Roberts, (1855) 18 How. 173, 15 L. Ed. 338.
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to school Indemnity lands and snmarized therefrom:
The foregoing is deemed perfectly conclu
sive as to the legal title of such lands being in
the State, with the right of sale, and of making
perfect and complete titles to purchasers from her,
and the right of dedicating the proceeds of sale to
the inhabitants of such townships as may be entitled
thereto.ÏOS
As an expression of its views on the whole situation the court
farther said;
On account of the great public importance
of the question involved and the stress laid upon
it in the argument of the Attorney General, we have
dealt with it as res nova and examined it most care
fully and thoroughly, and our conclusion is that the
statute is broad enough and sufficiently ample in
terms to authorize the contract in this respect
between the relator and the Governor; that the laws
of Congress, and the prior statutes of the State
authorized the recovery and selection of the Indemnity
school lands; that the right existed in, and the
duty was imposed upon the State through appropriate
legislative action, to make sale of them and dedi
cate the proceeds to school purposes; and that the
authority in the Legislature to confer upon the
Governor the power to convey a part of said lands,
when recovered, to such person as should aid in
their restoration to the State, is likewise a m p l e .
The pertinent act in 1880105 provided that the holder
of indemnity warrants might locate his claim on any lands
belonging to the

s t a t e ;

106 however, Act No. 103 of 1904

changed this method of satisfying claims of unlocated lend
warrants by providing for refunding to the holder of such

1 0 3 ^ ^ State ex rel. John McEnery v. Francis T. Nioholls,
Governor, et al., (1390) 42 La. Ann* 219#

^^^Acts of Louisiana, 1080, No. 75, sec. 8.
^^*Onlnlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1.

1918,*toW“l7"l?S5,TrT9^
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olalms the orlgiml purchase price of the scrip.10?

This act

aeema to have been a eolation for the adjudioatlon of individ
ual elaime, but in some instaneee it appears that townships
had not reoeived their pro rata share of lieu lands.

Act Ho.

1S5 of 1918 purposed to remedy this condition by authorizing
the register of the state land office "'Wien it is made to
appemr from the records of his office and such other evidence
as he may require that a township has not received from the
State the School Indemnity Lands to which it la entitled*
to issue warrants in the name of the President of the School
Board of the deficiency,** Wiieh warrants may be located upon
any vacant state lands subject to entry.1^®
When these indemnity lazWs have been properly
allocated to the townships entitled to them, it has been the
policy to apply the laws governing the sixteenth sections in
place to them,109 except when special provisions were enacted,
as is indicated by the following:
Hhile it is true that the Act of Congress of
May 80th, 1686, provided that school indemnity lands
Shall be held by the same tenure and upon the same terms
as 16th section lands, this statute, as well as other laws
was superseded by sections 8875 and 8876, tJ. 3, Revised
Statutes, which latter placed no limitation on the State,
but left it free to dispose of the lands according to
appropriate legislation provided that the proceeds should
be turned over to the schools in the township entitled to
the indemnity,

109,...^ J May 1, 1922, to May 1, 1924, p. 677} May 1, 1924,
to May 1^ 1926, p. 483.
.. May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 438.
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Thus, it may he seen that the principle of the
legal standing of the state to administer indemnity lands
end their proceeds, as based on Federal provisions, for the
benefit of the schools in those townships entitled to such
indenmitr claims has been consistently followed,
tttle to school lend lost through use of
serin therefor.

When the state accepts and sells indminity

scrip for a section of land or more in lieu of a fractional
sixteenth seoticm in place, the state loses its vested title
to the school land in that township,

This was declared true

in 1914 when a plaintiff's vendor, who had secured a part of
a sixteenth section through patent directly from the United
States after the state had accepted and sold indemnity warrants
for more than the 640 acres, had his ownership established by
the court's conclusion "that the Department of the Later lor,
in passing upon the application of Thomas J, Hickman, decided
correctly that the selection of additional school indemnity
in excess of the area of section 16, T, 6 H, B, 3 W , , was an
acknowledgment on the part of the state that it had no title
to the sixteenth section in that townbhlp,”^^^

The land in

question at the date of issuance of patent belonged to the
United States; consequently, the holder of the patent was
declared as having a legal title, free from any school land
claim thereon.2-lB

^ B i g g i e V. MbNeely et al., (1914) 136 La. 396.
^ I b l d .. 136 La, 391, 65 So. 658,
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The Free School Fund
This fond was a natural consequence of the act of
Congress which granted the sixteenth section of each township,
or its equivalent, in the state as a permanent source of
revenue for the public schools.

Congressional provisions for

the fund wares
That.the Legislatures of Illinois, Arkansas, Loui
siana, and Tennessee, be, and they are hereby,
authorized to provide by law for the sale and con
veyance in fee simple, all or any part of the lands
heretofore reserved and appropriated by Congress
for the use of schools within said States, and to
invest the money arising from the sales thereof in
some productive fund, the proceeds of which shall
be forever applied, under the direction of said
Legislatures, to the use and support of schools
within the several townships end districts of
country for which they were originally reserved
and set apart, and for no other use or purpose
whatever; . « • and in the apportionment of the
proceeds of said fund, each township and district
shall be entitled to such part thereof, and no
more, as shell have accrued from the sum or sums
of money arising from the sale of the school lands
belonging to such township or district.

That if the proceeds accruing to any township or
district from said fund, shall be insufficient for
the support of schools therein, it shall be lawful
for said Legislatures to invest the same in the most
secure and productive manner, until the whole pro
ceeds of the fund belonging to such township or
district shall be adequate to the permanent main
tenance and support of schools within the same:

Acts of Congress, 1842-43, "An Act to authorize the Legis
latures of the States of Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Tennessee, to sell the lands heretofore appropriated for the
use of schools in those States,” oh. xxxill, secs. 1-3.
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The state*8 peeponae was to make statutory provisions
for the establishment and administration of a "Free School
Fuad,*114

A supplementary act in 1857 provided for the ascer

tainment of the amount of the debt due the free school fund
by the state and directed the issuance of bonds therefor in
denominations of one thousand dollars.

It declared such fund

to be a perpetual trust of which the income only might be
used,115

All the state's constitutions which have dealt with

public education have sought to perpetuate this fund.

In

1879 the debt was recognized to be $1,150,867,51; the state
promised to retain this as a perpetual trust and to pay there
on ah annual rate of interest.H*
Perpetuity of fund.

The legislature passed, in 1872,

an act which sought to abolish the free school fund and ordered
the bonds composing it to be sold by the auditor and treasurer
of the state.11?

Protection of the schools from such disposi

tion of the fund was maintained in a case in which the board
of liquidation, provided for In the Funding Act of 1874 as
amended the next y ear,H® was sued for the collection of three
of the said bonds possessed by the plaintiff.

Unoonstitution-

ality of the act of sale was decreed by the court in 1877 as
follows:

^ ^ A o ts of Louisiana, 1855, No. 321, secs. 32-34, 36.
llGlbid.. 1057, No. 182, secs. 1-2, 8.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art, 235.
^ ^ A o t s of Louisiana, 1872, No. 81, secs. 3, 6.
^^®Ibid.; 1874, No. 3, secs. 1-2; Extra Session, 1875,
No. 11, see. 3.
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In our opinion this aot 81 of 1872 not
only violates the act of Congress and the legis
lation thereunder and the const!tut Ion, but was
an aot of spoliation, intended and designed to
deplete the treasury of every available asset or
fund in it. These school bonds were supposed to
be more salable than Auditor's warrants and cer
tificates of indebtedness with which the state had
been deluged; hence some device to get hold of
them had to be concocted, and act 81 was the
result. Some of these bonds were, it appears,
not even negotiable; hence act 61 provides and
directs that in such case the Auditor should in
dorse them with words to the effect that they
were hereafter payable to bearer.

The interest of these school-fund bonds
was pledged for the payment of the interest annually
due to tne several towhships for school lands sold.
The third section of act 81, directing the Auditor
to annually estimate what would have been due to
the free-school fund, if the same had not been
abolished, and to levy and collect a tax to pay
interest thereon, is not a compliance with the act
of Congress, nor does it relieve the measure of the
character we have already given it. We regard act
81 as violating the faith and s o l e m pledges of the
State, that the State quoad those bonds was and Is
a mere trustee, and that the acts of Congress and
the legislative action thereunder created obliga
tions on the part of the State, in favor of the
inhabitants of the various townships and other
beneficiaries, which the State is not at liberty
"to abolish" at its pleasure.
We therefore regard the sale of these
"free-schooi bonds" held by the re3ator to be null
and void, and that he acquired no title to them by
virtue of the pretended sale under section six of

said act 81.11?
A year later the court upheld its policy of main
taining the perpetuity of the free school fund «

The Louisiana

National Bank had liquidated twenty-nine free school bonds
sold to it under the act of 1872; the liquidation had been
zaade mainly with a warrant which the state had issued the

Hastate of Louisiana ex rel. T. J, Durant v. The Board of
Liquidators, (1877) 29 La. Ann, 81.
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bank for a previous loan for levee protection#

The bank

applied to the board of liquidation to fund the bonds or to
issue consols for the amount of the warrant representing the
loan.

The court upheld the board's refusal to fund the bonds,

since their sale had been decreed a nullity, but ordered the
board to fund the claim evidenced by the warrant, explaining
that the state is justly entitled to the possession of the
school bonds but that it could not keep the money loaned by
refusing to meet the claim of the warrant #1^^
Again, 1879, this policy of decreeing the unoonstitutionality of destruction of the free school fund was
followed; in this instance the auditor and the secretary of
state, the lawful custodians of the fund, were authorized to
demand that the bonds vhich had formerly been a portion of
the fund be returned to the state#1^1
Disposition of interest accrued. Various provisions
have specified that the proceeds of the free school fund are
to be forever applied to the parishes in terms of the sections
or parts of sections lying therein#

The policy of accepting

these proceeds as school funds to be used by the parishes
was endorsed udien there was judicial recognition of warrants
which represented a portion of the interest on the free school
fund, and Which had been sold by one parish to replenish Its

120The Louisiana National Bank v# The Board of Liquidati on,
(1878) 50 La. Ann. 1356.
^^^3un Mutual Insurance Company v. Board of Liquidation
(Secretary of State and Auditor, Interveners), (1879) 31 La#
Ann. 175.
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school t r e a s u r y A l s o , the state's legal counselors have
been consistent in advising that only the income from this
fund may be used for school purposes.
That the interest on the free school fund is to be
distributed to the parishes correctly, to the extent that
mistakes after many years must be righted, if demand is made,
was established in 1864.

In the involved case one parish had

received from the state for eight years annual payments of
free s<Aool fund interest and had expended the majority of the
total amount in the purchase of a lot and the construction of
a sehoolhouse.

% i s course was pursued, although the recipient

parish knew that the fund rightfully belonged to an adjoining
parish Tdiere lay the township which the fund represented*
The court ruled that the plaintiff parish was entitled to re
cover the money or the property to which it had been traced
and which represented the fund.124

Prompted by the theory that education is a state
function, Louisiana accepted in good faith the financial
responsibility of her public schools.

las

The lands set apart by

Ibid.; State of Louisiana ex rel. T. J * Durant v* The
Board o i Liquidators, (1877) S9 La# Ann. 77.
123
‘^ ^Qpinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana; June 1,
1912, to May l~l^i4, p. 0^4; ifiay 1, 1524, to May 1, 1926, p. 428.
1£A
School Board of East Oarroll Parish v. School Board of
Union Parish, (1684) 36 La. Ann. 806*
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the Federal Government f o r the support of education in the
eta te furnished one of the basic sources of public school
revenue*
The dominant policies pursued in the administration
of school lands and their proceeds appear to have been the
following:
1.

The theory of using public lands as a source of

support for the state's educational system had its beginning
with the Ordinance of 1787 which maintained that the dissemina
tion of knowledge is necessary for good government and that the
sixteenth sections of the public domain should be dedicated to
the respective states for school purposes.
Zm

School lands were one of the earliest sources of

support for public schools in Louisiana; an act of Congress
in 1806 reserved in the Western District of the Territory of
Orleans the sixteenth section of each township for the support
of public schools therein.
3. In 1043 Congress authorized the Louisiana legis
lature to provide for the disposition of school lands.

The

Constitution of 1845 acknowledged this responsibility and made
provisions whereby a permanent source of public school support
was created.
4.

According to the Federal Government provisions

and the laws as interpreted by the courts, the state has bean
consistently declared the legal trustee In the administration
of school lands and their proceeds.
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5* The general policy has been that no school lands

may be disposed of without the consent of the inhabitants of
the township concerned.

Special provisions govern those sec

tions Tdiich are not inhabited*

Regulations concerning the

sale price of school lands have been determined by law; where
the board of school directors fails to adhere thereto, the
sale may be declared illegal.
6. School lands may be recovered when there is proof

that the disposition was not according to the authorized method
at the time of the transfer or when there is non-payment of
notes therefor by the purchaser*

Recovery, however, is sub

ject to prescription and estoppel and to certain rights of
priority of title through colonial grants.
7. In general, the disposition of timber on school
lands and of the proceeds therefrom are governed by the same
laws as the sale of the lands.

Only since 1908 has there been

legal sanction to the effect that timber could be disposed of
separately from the land,
8. The school
of the state m y

board of directors acting as an agent

lease school lands, the income of which is

delegated to the current school fund of the parish.
9* The topography of Louisiana has necessitated two

types of official surveys; sections sixteen located by the
rectangular survey— referred to as "in place"— are reserved
for school purposes, but those surveyed along water courses—
referred to as "lots" or "radiating sections" or "fractional
sections"— do not belong to the state for the benefit of schools.
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10.

as a result of confliotlng olalins or any

other cause a township did not receive a sixteenth section or
received only a part of it, indemnity lands were granted in
lieu thereof and if such locations could not be made satisfac
torily, there were provisions for the issuance of indemnity
scrip with regulations governing its sale and redemption.
The law governing sixteenth sections seems to have been
applied to all types of lieu lands,
11. The free school fund was the natural result of
the Congressional provisions which reserved the sixteenth
section of each township for school purposes and specified
that only the products from such lands or the interest on
the proceeds of land sales might be allocated to the respec
tive townships.
12. The perpetuity of the free school fund was
assured by the courts of the state when an attempt by the
legislature in 1872 to abolish the public school fund was
declared unconstitutional.

In 1879 there was constitutional

recognition of the debt which the state was due to the free
school fund.

This specified amount was #1,150,867.51, which

the state promised to retain as a perpetual trust and on vhich
it agreed to pay an annual rate of interest*

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT THROUGH 03KERAL FUNDS

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC SCHOUL SUPPORT THROUGH GKMRAI^ ÏÜIÎDS

Public taxation for the maintenance of public
funotiona is one of the established rights of a state.^
Since no public school system can be created and maintained
without funds, and since the taxing of property is one of
the chief sources of public revenues, any state may be
expected to utilize the taxing power in its program of
finances.

This chapter proposes to present Louisiana's

law in making provisions for the support of her public
schools through the avenue of general funds.

THE SCHOOL FUND IN GENERAL

On the theory that a legislature may enact, for
the general welfare of a state, any law which is neither in
conflict with the Federal Constitution nor prohibited by the
organic laws of the state, the Louisiana lawmakers proceeded
to provide for the support of public education long before
the constitution of the state made it mandatory.

In Chapter

III of this study it was shown that Louisiana accepted the
thsory of her responsibility to finance a program of public

^Heriaann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public school
as a state Institution {Bloomirigton19^877 P* 56.
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education.

Duriiig early statehood money was appropriated

for the construction of buildings end maintenance of schools
and in many Instances financial aid was given to private and
parochial schools.2

In 1833 the state was appropriating from

#2.50 to #4.00 par month for each child enrolled in the various
schools.5
Legal Foundations
In the Constitutional Convention of 1844-1845,
G. Mayo, chairman of the education committee, pointed out the
necessity of embodying the underlying principles of public
school support in the organic lew.

He gave in support of

his statement— **This state has for many years acted with a
degree of liberality in making appropriations for the
erection end support of colleges and academies, and for the
education of indigent children^4^-the fact that from 1812 to
1845 there had been spent by the state #1,710,559.40 for the
support of an unregulated school system.

He further empha

sized the need of state aid for free public schools and said
that the above ^facts are stated for no other purpose than
to bring to view the disproportion in the expenditure, and

2gdwin W. Fay, The History of Education in Louisiana
(Washington, 1898), pp. 6^-^7.
^Acts of Louisiana, 1833, "An Aot supplementary to the
several acts relative to Public Education," sec. 6, p. 143.
^Official Report of Debates in the Louislana Convention,
1844-45, p. Sl6•
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actual waste of public money for want of a well regulated
system of education."®

Mayo contended that the state should

aot only establish public schools but should "provide means
for that purpose and for their s u p p o r t , A n effort was
made to provide for the establishment of public schools with
out their being "free*”

One member opposed this by declaring

that "in the word 'free* lay the whole gist of the matter"^
and adding that, if the proceeds of the public lends were
insufficient to establish and maintain the schools, "he was
fully willing that a tax of a half a million should be raised
to sustain t h e m . A f t e r considerable discussion as to
whether the state should assume the obligation of maintaining
a system of public education article 134 was adopted; this
not only made it mandatory that free public schools be estab
lished, but directed the legislature to "provide means for
their support by taxation on property or otherwise."®
In keeping with this constitutional mandate, the
state and its parishes adopted by 1847 the policy of supporting
public education.

By that time a levy of one mill on the

property in the state, the proceeds from school lands, and
fines and forfeitures were being collected as the chief

^Ibld., p. 519.
'ibid., p. 906.
Gibld.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art. 154.
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educational funds and distributed to the various parishes of
the state according to the educable children therein from six
to sixteen years of age*^®
The delegates in the Convention of 105S accepted
the policy of public school support by the state without
protest.

The significant amendment to the previous consti

tution was provision for the distribution of such funds to
the effect that;

"...

all moneys so raised or provided,

shall be distributed to each Parish in proportion to the
number of free white children between such ages as shall be
fixed by the General Assembly.
It is obvious that the Constitutional Convention
of 1864 was affected by different theories pertaining to the
maintenance of education.

Some members advocated state

support for schools to be established for colored children,^®
while others felt that all children, regardless of color,
should attend the same tax-maintained schools.^®, some even
thought that schools for colored children should be supported
by taxes collected from colored people and that schools for
white children should be supported by taxes collected from
the property owned by white p e o p l e . T h e r e was a strong

^ A O t s of Louisiana, 1647, Ho. 225, sees. 2-3*
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1852, art. 136.
^Debates ih the Convention for the Hevision and Amendment
of the ConaFilEutlon olT iHe'siate of"%ouTsi a'na, l§o¥, p p . " 7 ^ , 5 02.
ISlbld., PP* 494-502.
^^Ibid., p. 523.
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element which favored state aid for all private^® end parochial
s c h o o l s , w h i l e others regarded it the duty of the state to
support only public s c h o o l s . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the many
controversial issues, the state refused to give financial aid
to any educational institutions except public schools.^®

as

disposition of the question of support for schools for colored
children, the legislature, in article 141, was directed to
provide for the education of all youth "between the ages of
six and eighteen years, by maintenance of free public schools
by taxation or ot,horwlse."^^
Obviously, the Constitutional Convention of 18671868 was dominated by those who believed that schools main
tained by public taxation should bo onen to all the children
of all the people without color distinction,

b^lth the

direction to the legislature to provide for the support of
public schools, it was declared that, "There shall be no
separate schools or institutions of learning, established
exclusively for any race by the Stato of Louisiana" and no
municipal corporation should violate even the spirit of the
law.20

po. 72, 476.
^^Ibld.. pp. 476, 489-502.
^'ibld., pp. 477, 529.
l®Constltutlon of Louisiana, 1884, art. 146.
^^Ibld., art. 141.
SOlbld., 1858, arts. 135-136.
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The legislature in 1869 followed the policy of
general support, as implied in the oonstltutlon adopted the
year before, by raising the general state levy for public
eduoation from one to two

m i l l s .

21

In 1079 a liberal attitude was again reflected in
the organic law to the extent that there was provision for
the support of free public schools for all children of the
state between the ages of six and eighteen

y e a r s . 2 2

Another

Interesting feature of this convention was an attempt to
interpret what was meant by the public school fund;2® article
229 explained it to consist of:
1. The proceeds of taxation for school
purposes, as provided in this Constitution.
2. The interest on the proceeds of all
public lands heretofore granted by the United States
for the use and support of public schools.
3. Of lands and other property which may
hereafter be bequeathed, granted or donated to the
State, or generally for school purposes.
4. All funds or property, other than
unimproved lands, bequeathed or granted to the state,
not designated for other purposes.
6. The proceeds of vacant estates falling
under the law to the State of Louisiana.**

Educational finance was not a controversial issue
in the Constitutional Convention of 1890.

Interest of the

2^Acts of Louisiana, 1869, No. 181, sec* 57.
22constitutlon of

Louisiana, 1879, art. 224.

2®official Journal of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention or the State of Louisiana, 107^7 PP. l^îi,

2*Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art* 829.
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people, however, wee demonstrated by the presentation of a
petition from the oitizens of Rapides Parish which reoommended
more liberal provisions for the support of public schools
by special taxes and suggested that citizens of local districts
should be permitted to tax their own property for school
p u r p o s e s .

25

Q^e significant change was that the legislature

was directed to provide for the enumeration of educable
children as a basis for the distribution of the general
school fund as described above and to appropriate at least
"one and one-quarter mills of the six mills tax levied and
collected by the state" for the support of public

s c h o o l s . 2 5

This remained intact until an amendment in 1918 which increased
the rate to one and one-half mills.2?
The Constitutional Convention of 1981 seemed to
assume a liberal attitude toward the support of public educa
tion*

Such attitude is reflected in a resolution introduced

in the beginning of the convention which reads as follows;
Whereas, public institutions are of such
vast importance in the regulation and perpetuation
of civilization that no State can afford to neglect
the importance of their support,
And whereas, that all such institutions
as are provided for through the medium of taxation
or other forceful means.
And whereas, the maintenance of all such
institutions should be borne with equal ratio of
burden on all taxable property of the state,

25official Journal of the Proceedings of the Const!tutIpnal
Convention of the éiete of 'Louisiana , 1Ô9FT p* 58'."""'"
25constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 854.
2?constitution of Louisiana, 1913, art. 254, as amended by
Act NO. 226 of 1918, adopted November, 1918.
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And whereas, our present mode of taxation
are (alo) unintentionally discriminate in character,
placing as It does a greater burden on the taxable
property of many subdivisions that is not necessary
to be borne by others, to wit, Special Taxes,
And whereas, the intention of the following
resolution is not so much to raise the school fund
In the aggregate but to equalize the burden of
responsibility,
Therefore, be it resolved, That this
Convention adhere to democratic principles by
inserting into our tax laws a clause providing for
a five mill general fund school tax to be dis
tributed equally between the parishes of the state
in proportion to the educable children between the
age of six and eighteen in the respective parishes**®
This theory was put into practice in the embodiments of the
organic law to the extent of the provision that the public
school funds of the state shall consist of:
First, The proceeds of two and onehalf mills of the taxes levied and colleoted by
the state ; provided, that out of the portion of
said taxes collected in the city of New Orleans
fifty thousand dollars (#50,000.00) shall be
paid annually to the Isaac Delgado Trade School.
Second, The proceeds of the poll tax,
which shall be applied exclusively to the support
of public schools in each parish in which collected,
and shall be paid by the tax collector directly
to the parish school board.
Third, The interest on the proceeds of
lands heretofore or hereafter granted by the united
States for school purposes, and the revenues
derived from unsold portions thereof.
Fourth, All funds and the proceeds of
lands and property, other than unimproved lands,
heretofore or hereafter bequeathed, granted, or
escheated to the state, not designated for any
other purpose.
Fifth, Such other funds as the Legis
lature may appropriate.

2®official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convent ion o f the State of Lourslena. 19817 pp. 93-94“.
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All eo&ool fund®, except the poll tax
and the Interest on proceeds of lands granted by
the United states for the support of public schools*
shall be distributed to each parish in proportion
to the number of children therein between the
ages of six and eighteen years. The Legislature
shell proxide for the enumeration of eduoable
children.
Levying and Collecting the Regular school Tax
The parish treasurer as collector of state school
fund.

As some of the public school funds come from the

state, it is necessary for an official to be charged with
the responsibility of collecting said fund,

since the

parish treasurer is the depositary of the school fund due
his parish, it appears that he might have the right to

demand payment from the state in case of default.

In 1857

a decision was handed down from the supreme court in which
Judge H. M. Spofford, by quoting from the governing
statute,50 held;

” »The sums due to each of the parishes

in this state from the annual collection of the school
tax, shell be paid quarterly to the treasurer thereof, by
the State Tax Collector.#*51

In response to the parish

treasurer's request, the court ordered the state tax
collector to pay not only the amount due the parish school
fund, which was In arrears, but also 20 per cent upon the
principal as a penalty from e stated date.5%

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. IE, sec. 14.
50Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1856, *Free Public Schools,*
sec, 6, p. 191.
51j, B. Hendricks v. A, J . Bobo et al., securities of
Barham, (1857) 12 La. Ann. 620.

52ibld.
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Provisions for looal levies.

The state's right to

support public education through the general school fund does
not preclude municipalities, parishes and school districts
from contributing to the general fund for the benefit of their
respective territories, when authorized by the legislature.
In fact, the derivation of public school funds from looal
tax levies has long been an established principle in Louifilana.53

parish assistance was authorized by the act of

18705* which gave police Juries the authority to levy a
maximum of two mills in their respective parishes for school
purposes,

in 1879 looal tax levies were given constitutional

recognition in the provisions that "every parish may levy a
tax for the public schools therein, which shall not exceed
the state tax; provided that with such tax the whole amount
of parish taxes shall not exceed the limits of parish taxation
fixed by this Constitution."55

Local levies for school

purposes were optional with parishes and districts until
1868, when a law was enacted to the effect that police
Juries were required to appropriate annually as much as
one and one-half mills of the parish assessment to the public
schools. 56

Organic sanction of legislative authority to

55^cts of Louisiana, 1820-21, "An Act to extend and improve
the system of Public Education in the state of Louisiana,"
sec. 4, p. 54.
54ibid. , Extra session, 1870, Wo. 6, sec. 46.

BSoonstitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 229.
56^ots of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 54.
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provide for looal ievia© was continued In 1898,5? and

through the adoption of an amendment to the constitutif^ in
1910 the police Juries of the various parishes were requited
to levy and collect a three-mill tax annually for the use
of schools in their respective par i s h e s * 5®

The Constitution

of 1913 made no changes in the

59

r e q u i r e m e n t s ,

an amend

ment thereto in 1918 reduced the rate to one and one-half
mills.However,

this reduction was of short duration,

for the Constitution of 1921 put the rate back to three mills
except where the parish school board might certify to the
police Jury that a smaller levy would be sufficient.
Const itutionality of local levies.

Whether or not

the "Act to establish Free public Schools in the State of

L o u i s i a n a , g a v e the district board of school directors a
right to levy and collect local taxes for the benefit of
the schools in its district was a question decided by the

court in 1852.45

specific ground of attack against

the levy so laid was that the practice was in violation of
article 127 of the Constitution of 1645, which declares,

5^0onstitutlon of Louisiana, 1898, art. 254»
58lbid., as amended by Act No. 257 of 1910, adopted
November, 1910.
5®Constitutlon of Louisiana, 1913, art. 255.
4Qjhid., as amended by Act No. 218 of 1918, adopted
November, 1918.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 15.
4^Acts of Louisiana, 1847, Ho. 225.
^^villeneuve Bordelon at el. v. Thomas H. & W. B. Lewis,
(1852) 8 La. Ann. 472.
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"Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state."
In arriving at the decree the court referred to
several decisions which had involved the constitutionality of
special taxes for purpose© other than schools, but which
involved the same principle as in the case at bar.^^

The

following statement in the Lexington case was quoted as being
equally applicable to Louisiana:
"Among these political ends and principles,
equality, as far as practicable, and security of
property against irresponsible power, are eminently
conspicuous in our State constitution, but an exact
equalization of the burden of taxation is unattain
able and utopian."45
In the Providence case the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
"However absolute the right of an i n d i v i d u a l may
be, it is still in the nature of that right,
that
it must bear a portion of the public burthens;
and that portion must be determined by the legis
lature. The interest, wisdom end Justice of the
representative body, and its relations with its
constituents, furnish the only security, whore there
is no express contract against unjust and excessive
taxation; as well a s against unwise legislation
generally.
By a comparison with the second Municipality case, there
was the

explanation that If the legislature had a

rightunder

the act

here in contest "to delegate the power of

taxation

to the City of New Orleans, or one of its municipalities,

44^he providence Bank v, Aipheus Billings and Thomas G.
Pittman, (1820) 4 Peters 514, 7 L. Ed. 959; City of Lexington
V. Mcquillan, (1839) 9 Dane 513, 35 Am. Deo. 159; The Second
Municipality of New Orleans v. Duncan, (1047) 2 La* Ann. 182.
45villeneuve Bordelon et al. v. Thomas H. & ?/. B. Lewis,
(1852) 8 La. Ann, 472.

Ibid., p. 473.
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to promote publie education* as we have already determined,
there is no good reason why the same power should not be
delegated to school directors in the various parishes of the
State."47

To another ground of attack— that the tax was
levied to liquidate the indebtedness of the board's pred
ecessors in office— the court said:
" . . . if no tax was imposed by the former directors,
and the people of the district have had the benefit
of the schools, they are bound In conscience to pay
those expenses for which a tax might have been
imposed, and they have suffered no irfjury by the
delay which has been given them. Laws should
receive a reasonable interpretation**4o
Since no evidence was submitted to prove that the
tax was equivalent to spoliation, or the unlawful appropria
tion of private property, the court advised that the only
remedy the defendants had was the ballot box, if the conduct
of the school directors was not in accord with their wishes.
Hence, the constitutionality of local levies was upheld and
there was recognized the legality of those which did not
amount to spoliation.
The police jury's position In the levying of looal
taxes.

According to the interpretation of the law by the

supreme court the levying of a parish tax for school purposes
was at one time optional with the police Jury.

When a school

board sought a mandamus to compel the police jury to levy such
a tax of one and one-half mills, under the provisions of
flection 54 of Act No. 81 of 1888, the court held the act to
be permissive only, as follows:

47lbld.
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. . the section under consideration must be read
ae meaning that the police Jurors of the several
parishes, etc,, are authorized to levy, etc., and
cannot he viewed as imposing upon them absolutely,
the duty or obligation to levy the tax.
It consequently follows that the term
used is not mandatory, but parmiasivo only, and
that the propriety of the levy of tho tax is
merely optional with police Juries, who. In
their wisdom, may or not exercise the prerogative.**
In another ease, where a elmiler question was Involved, the
court bald that the legislature oarinot force e parish to
levy a tax for school purposes, but that it may authorize
it to do

80

, end that when such authorization is granted

and the pariah undertakes to levy and collect the tax,
the constitutional limits must be observed.
In 1902 the legislature saw fit to amend the pro
visions on this subject to read, " . . .

no polio© Jury of

any parish shall levy for the support of its schools less
than one and one-quarter mills on the dollar of th© a s s e s s e d
valuation of the property

t h e r e o f .

Both the attorney

general®^ and the supreme oourt^® have referred to this ©naotmant as being a mandatory charge to the polie© Jury to
levy the tax as specified.

4^The state ex rel. parish Board of School Directors v.
Police Jury, (1888) 40 La. Ann. 7&6.
5®The State ex rel. Board of Directors of public Schools
of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La. Ana.

92, 7 SO. 674.
5^Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, aoo. 63.
82^Onlnione of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1, 190S, p. 281.
1908 , to
5®wllliams et al. v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish,
(1914) 135 L B b 448, 05 So. 004.
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The Constitution of 1898 had fixed the maximum limit
of the levy by the police Jury at six mills with the provision
that the whole amount of parish taxes should not exceed the
constitutional m a x i m u m . A f t e r another change in the speci
fication of the minimum amount* the court Interpreted the
police jury's duty in regard to the school levy in excess of
the stated minimum as being discretionary:
The Constitution* as amended, agreeably to Joint
Resolution No. 857 of 1910, p. 437, declares that
the police Juries shall devote the proceeds of
"at least three mills of the annual tax which they
are empowered to levy" to the support of the public
schools, and, under other provisions of law, con
stitutional and statutory, they cannot devote more
than 6 mills of sUch annual tax to that object.
They may, however, levy special taxes in addition
to the annual tax, upon being specially authorized.
But whether they shell devote more than 3 mills of
the annual tax to the schools is left to their
discretion, subject to the condition that they
ere bound to provide for the expense necessary to
the discharge of the functions of their parishes
as political corporations; . . .55
Opinions from the state's legal advisers have consistently
maintained that the police Juries In the various parishes are
required to levy the minimum tax as provided In the constitu
tion.®*

Thus, court decisions and opinions of the attorneys

general have consistently upheld the policy that It is left
to the discretion of the police Jury to determine the amount
of the annual parish levy to be used for schools as long as
minimum and maximum limits are observed.

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 854.

®®Wllliams et al# v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish, (1914)
135 La. 451?452.
®*Oplnions of tj^ Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1910, to May 1, iKS, p.^107; May Ï, 1 ^ 8 , to May 1, 1980,
p. 787.
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Essentiality of tax iQvy

b© In budget,

since

the passage of Act No# 27 of 1908 a valid tax levy by the
police jury must be included in the regular budget.6?

a

failure to conform to this statute was the principal issue
pertaining to the school tax in a case entered in the courts
in 1909 and which was subject to various remands and appeals.®®
The pertinent feature of these litigations was to determine
if a three-mill school tax which had been assessed on the
property of Livingston Parish by the police jury but not
included in the regular budget could be legally collected
by the tax collector.

A tax of four mills had been budgeted

but the subsequent amount levied was seven mills.

In ruling

on this question Chief Justice Joseph A. Breaux cited many
decisions on different phases of the budget showing that a
tax to be collectable must be definitely stated in the budget,
or in a supplementary b u d g e t . T h e statute under which the

57 Ibid., May 1, 1908, to May 1, 1910, p. 163,
®®Howcott V. Smart, state and Parish Tax Collector, et al.,
(1909) 125 La. 50, 51 So. 64; Ibid., (1911) 128 La. ISO, 54
So. 586; Ibid., (1912) 130 La." 3 ^ , 58 So. 515; Ibid., (1913)
133 La. 6Srr'63 So. 281.
®^George K. Shotwell v. City of New Orleans et als., (1884)
36 La# Ann. 938, approved The Parish Board of school Directors
V. The City of Shreveport, (1095) 47 La. Ann. 1310, 17 So.
823; State ex rel. Douglas v. Kennedy et el., (1908) 121 La.
757, 46 So. 7 96; Nathan Lorie v. Bennett Hitchcock, Tax
Collector, et el., (1874) 26 La. Arm. 154; Isaac Levy v. E. B.
Mentz, Sheriff, et als., (1871) 23 La. iinn. 361; Police Jury
of Jefferson Parish v, F. J. LaBarre, (1877-1880) Man. Unrep.
Cas. 110; The parish of Lincoln v. J. G. Huey, (1878) 30 La.
Ann. 1»44; swords, sheriff, v. Daigle, (1902) 107 La. 510,
32 SO. 94; Constant et al. v. Parish of East Carroll et al.,
(1901) 105 Le. 286, 29 So. 728.
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tax in question was imposed had not been adopted before the
budget was advertised, but the court saw this as no reason
for not Including the amount in a supplemental budget, or
for passing the additional levy over in silence.

Respon

sibility of the perish was placed as follows:
. . . under the statute, the parish is responsible
for this tax. It is a parish tax, and all such
taxes should be budgeted. It is a part of the
parochial affairs In charge of the police jury.
If these three mills on the dollar can be left out
of the budget entirely, then there are other
amounts which may as well be left out.*®
The court’s decree, as upheld by a rehearing on the
final suit and as arrived at by parts in the various suits,
declared the excess tax of three mills illegal and perpetually
enjoined its collection*

Thereby, it was definitely estab

lished that a levy must be included in the adopted budget to
be legal.

A

similar view was handed down by the attorney

general in 1933**1
Collection of minimum tax on all property in parish
mandatory.

The city of Monroe refused to levy, collect, and

deliver to the school board of its parish three mills of the
annual tax which it was empowered to levy.*^

The court

issued a mandamus to compel the city to turn over the amount
in question, stating to the city that this was a debt imposed

*®Howcott V. Smart, state and Parish Tax Collector, et al,,
(1911) 128 La. 155*
Clopinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1922, to May 1, 1 ? ^ , p. 44é.
*&State ex rel. Parish of Ouachita Board of school Directors
V. City of Monroe et al., (1915) 132 La. 82, 60 So* 1025.
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by the constitution and must be paid, even if doing so meant
the closing of its own school for the lack of funds or that
the city would have to cease as a municipality.

Thereby,

the court forced adherence to the constitution and endorsed
support to the schools according to legal provisions, regard
less of the consequences to the debtor.
Many opinions from the state's attorneys have
supplemented the Judicial decision by Insisting that under
the law all incorporated cities and towns which ere exempt
from the payment of parish taxes must levy, collect, and turn
over to the parish school boards the minimum tax required to
be levied in the parish for school purposes.*®
Necessity for proper and prompt delivery.

The law

governing the collection and delivery of parish taxes for
school purposes provides, "The tax so collected shall be
paid over by the collector of parish taxes to the Treasurer
of the Parish Board of School Directors, and shall by them be
apportioned, . . ."*4

Jefferson Perish a situation arose

which involved an interpretation of this statute.

The police

jury had levied for the years 1801 and 1882 a tax of two
mills for school purposes.

The tax was collected by the

sheriff of the parish but instead of paying the funds to the
treasurer of the perish school board, as the law directs, he

*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1910, to May”1, 1911^, pp. ÉVB,"^9; May 1, 191^,’T o May 1,
1920, p. 648; May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 536.
*^Acta of LoulDiana, Extra Session, 1877, No. 23, sec. 28.
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paid them to the parish treasurer who held them and refused
to pay them to the school board treasurer.

Thereupon,

mandamus was applied for to compel the parish treasurer to
comply with the law.*®
In reply to the claim that the parish treasurer
held the fhnda only as an agent of the police jury and could
not pay them put except in compliance with their resolutions
and warrants, the court held that this was generally correct
but did not apply to funds which are assigned by law to the
control and custody of other parish functionaries over which
the police jury had no right of control.

The court maintained:

If the tax collector, through misconception of the
law or otherwise, has paid over these funds to a
parish official different from the one designated
by the law, the duty to pay over the funds to the
latter passed, with the funds themselves, to the
official so receiving, and is a proper subject of
enforcement by mandamus.**
A portion of the funds had previously been paid out
under the direction of the police jury, and a mandamus was
issued compelling the parish treasurer to pay the remainder
in his possession to the parish school board.

Thereby the

Jurisdiction of the school board treasurer as custodian of
the school funds of his parish was definitely upheld.
It appears that the police jury has not only the
right to levy a parish school tax, but that the taxes
collected are to be paid by the treasurer of the police jiury

*®The state of Louisiana ex rel. Gervais Leohe, District
Attorney, et al. v. George Geier, Treasurer of Jefferson
Parish, Left Bank, et al., (1885) 35 La. Ann. 1148.
66 Ibid., p. 1149.
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to the sohool board oontinuously as they come In.

This policy

was upheld when the court sustained the claims of a certain
school board against the parish polio© jury,*?
Since the money for the unpaid balance of the
budget— the claim presented— was practically all in the
possession of the police jury and since the taxes collected
for the us© of the sohool board constituted a trust fund for
which the police jury was liable, the court ordered that body
to pay to the board of school directors the total sum demanded,
with legal interest from Judicial order until paid.

Apparently,

no other decision from the court was necessary to establish
this principle, for all opinions from the attorneys general
on this subject are of the same theory,*®

Thus, the inter

pretations of the law have definitely upheld that all local
school taxes must be given into the custody of the parish
school treasurer and that the police jury is liable for the
school fbnd while it is in its possession and for prompt
delivery of it to the school board,
Minor Sources of the General school Fund
Tax levies furni^ the major part of the state and
local school revenue but there are other sources that are
herein considered minor but which furnish an appreciable
amount of the revenue,

some of these sources have their

*?Board of school Directors of Iberia Parish v. Police Jury
of Iberia Parish, (1909) 135 La, 416, 49 So, b.
*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,

1920, to May

p, 556.
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origin in statutory enactment; others originated in the
organic law.

School lands and their proceeds, having been

treated previously, are omitted from this group.
These minor revenues administered by the state
include mainly the gasoline, severance, and malt tax.

The

gasoline tax*® pays to the credit of the state board of
education approximately one-half cent on every gallon of
gasoline sold retail.

The state severance tax is a tax

placed on natural resources taken from the soil or water.?®
Certain fractional parts are distributed to the parishes
from Tdilch the tax was collected, then the residue after
distributions to certain prescribed funds have been made and
the cost of free textbooks has been met is applied to the
general school fund administered by the state.?^

The malt

tax was provided by statute;?^ its proceeds are credited to
the state board of education for discretionary distribution
to parishes as e means of equalizing the cost of public sohool
support.?®
Less important minor sources administered by the
state are proceeds from vacant successions, the inheritance

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art, 6, sec. 22, as
amended by Act No. 1 of 1950, Extra Session, adopted November,
1930.
?®Constitut ion of Louisiana, 1921, art. 10, sec. 21.

?^Acts of Louisiana, 1928, No. 100, secs. 1-2.
?% b i d ., 1930, No. 34.
?®Ibid., secs. 12-13.
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tax, and the revenue on tobacco,

as

authorized by organic

law,?4 the state does not merely keep the money from vacant
successions on deposit but uses It and must refund it
through legislative appropriation if a rightful possessor
claims it.?®

The entire revenue of the inheritance tax is

allocated to the général school fUnd.?*

The tobacco tax,

having been authorized for a period of four years only,??
may be classified as a term tax.

This was levied on all

forms of tobacco at the rate of one cent on each ten cents
or fractional part thereof of the retail price.?®

The

constitutionality of this tax was tested and upheld.?®
Minor school revenues administered locally include
the poll tax, a fractional part of the state severance tax,
and various fines and forfeited bonds.

The poll tax as a

source of sohool revenue was embodied in the organic lew in
1868, with the direction:

"One half of the funds derived

from the poll tax herein provided for shall be appropriated

?4constitution of Louisiana,1898, art. 254.
?®Opinions_ ^
Attorney
to May, 1898, p. H O .

M

May, 1896,

?*Constitutlone of Louisiana; 1898, art. 235; 1913, art.
235; Acts of Louisiana, 1904, No. 45, sec. 1; Opinions of the
Attorney General of Louisiana; May 1, 1904,to May Ï,.T^Oê,
p. 2li>; May 1, 19Ü5, tl) May 1,1910, p. 249.
??Acts of Louisiana, 1926, No. 197, sec, 16.
?®Ibid., secs. 2, 7.
?®Lionel*s Cigar Store et al. v. McFarland, Supervisor of
Public Accounts, (1927) 162 La. 956, 111. So. 341.
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exclusively to the support of the free public schools through
out the state, end the University of New Orleans."®®

However,

by 1879 the people were willing to devote this source of
revenue in its entirety to the public school fund, as is
indicated by the organic provision;
The funds derived from the collection of
the poll tax shall be applied exclusively to the
maintenance of the public schools as organized
under this Constitution, and shall be applied
exclusively to the support of the public schools
in the parish in which the same shall be collected,
and shall be accounted for and paid by the col
lecting officers directly to the competent school
authorities of each parish.®^
To the parish from dhlch the state severance tax is collected
ttere is paid not less than one-fifth on oil or gas and onethird on sulphur of the amount collected, with the provision
that specified maximums are to be recognized and that dis
tributions are to be made quarterly.®^

A severance tax

collected in one parish must be paid to the police jury of
that parish®® and credited to the general school fund therein.®*
All fines and forfeited bonds in criminal cases must be turned
over to the school board of the parish in which the offonse
occurred,®* and no part is distributable to c municipal school

®®ConBtitution of Louisiana, 1868, art. 141.
®llbid., 1879, art. 227.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1926, No. 301.
®®Ooinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1932, % 'W r i T l ^ , —
9 ^ 5 . --------------------

®*Ibid., May 1, 1932, to April 1, 1934, p. 788.
®*Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 64; Opinions of
the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1914, to 'May~I,

me7 p.
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fund.®*

Another type of fines which goes into the local

perish school fund is that levied for violations of state
conservation laws.®?
By this enumeration it may he seen that the income
from various minor

sources constitutes a substantial part of

both the state and local public school

fund.

Disposition of the public sohool Fund
Oustodiana of the sohool fund,

as

depositary of

the school funds the parish treasurer is the guardian of all
school funds paid in during his term of office,®® end to this
effect his sureties are bound.

In the Clements case, the

court handed down a decision which held the sureties respon
sible for the proper accounting of all school funds which
had been handled by the parish treasurer regardless of whether
his term of office bad ended or of what disposition had been
made by the board.®®
The statute which established the office of treas
urer of the public

school funds of the

parish®* made that

officer custodian of the school funds with the power of

®*Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana; May 1,
1918, tcTTZay^l, 19#0, "p. 412; May Ï, l W 2 , to May 1, 1924,
p. 397.
®?ActB of Louisiana, 1912, No* 127; Opinions of tjie Attorney
General of Louisiana: June 1, 1912, to May 1, i W d , p.
May 1, 1 ^ 8 » to April 30, 1930, p. 157.

88Acts of Louisiana, 1869, No. 121, sec. 36.
®®John Clements, President of the Police Jury of the Parish
of Rapides, V. Eugene R. Biossat et als., (1874) 26 La. Arm. 243.
9*ùCts of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1870, No. 6, sec. 21.
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disbursing them exclusively on the warrants of the board of
school directors, to whom he must render account semi-annually
or "as often as required."

This was held In a litigation

dealing with an indictment charge of embezzlement.®^

Therein

the interpretation of "treasurer" was given by the court as
follows;

"The entrusting of school funds to him 'as treas

urer of the school funds' was necessarily on entrusting for
the purpose of 'safe keeping or disbursement,' because, under
the law, they could have been entrusted to him, as treasurer,
for no other purpose."®®
The parish treasurer is custodian of the funds of
the school board to the extent that his failure to account
for the funds on demand classifies him as guilty of embezzle
ment, regardless of the source of the money.

When a treas

urer of Winn Parish was convicted of embezzlement of the
sohool funds, he was sentenced to pay a fine equal to the
amount embezzled and to be confined at hard labor in the
penitentiary for five years.®®
By section 65 of Act No. 232 of 1908, the parish
superintendent of schools became in each parish (except the
parish of Orleans) the treasurer of school funds and thus
custodian thereof, as was held in an embezzlement suit In
1926.

Money entrusted to this officer as parish superin-

® ^ h e state of Louisiana v. W. F. Lames, (1887) 39 La.
Ann. 966, 3 So. 93.
92lbid.. 39 La. Ann. 989.

V. Mathis, (1901) 108 La. 203, 30 So. 834.
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tendent is entrusted to him as treasurer under the responsi
bility and duty defined by statute.®*
Thus, regardless of what officer is custodian of
the school funds, he must account for those funds according
to the governing statute at the expense of punishment for
embezzlement in case of failure in this respect.
Adherence to legal regulations required,

parish

school boards are compelled to dispose of the funds entrusted
to them as directed by the law.

in answer to a claimant who

sued the president of a school board for the collection of a
warrant practically seven years old,®* Judge W. 0. wyly
reasoned as follows;
We do not see any cause of action against
the defendant.
He never employed the plaintiff to
teach the public school he claims to have taught in
the parish of Assumption in the years 1062, 1863,
and 1864, for which the warrant was given, and the
corporation of which he is president was not then
in existence. Nor is it the successor of the school
board which existed in that parish prior to the
Constitution of 1868. It is well settled that the
powers of corporations of this character extend no
further than the provisions of the act creating
them.
Act No. 6, approved sixteenth of March, 1870,
and act No. 8, approved twenty-fifth of February,
1871, which created the present public school system,
will be searched in vain to find any authority con
ferred on the defendant to settle claims of the kind
declared on by the plaintiff.
It Is made no part
of his duty to pay the outstanding liabilities of
former school directors, or any claims held by
teachers prior to the acts of 1870 and 1871.
on
the contrary, the law in express terms provides
that all such claims "shall be examined by the State

®*State V. Price,

(1926) 161 La. 686, 109 So. 388.

®®F. a. Offut V. A. J. Aoheverra, President of the Board
of school Directors, Parish of Assumption, (1872) 24 La. Ann. 93.
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Board of Public Education and referred by them to
the next General Assembly." Section 51, Act No, Ô
of extra session of 1870.®*
The Judicial conclusion was:

"The school hoard ought not to

be compelled to apply the money confided to it to any other
purpose than that directed by law, and this court will not
require it to be done."®?
The treasurer of the school board must render account
for all school funds expended by him and his account is
acceptable only to the extent that it adheres to the legal
regulations in effect at the time.

When one treasurer sought

to account for an expenditure by claiming that it had been
applied to a debt of the school board, although there had been
drawn no warrant by the president of the school board for
such expenditure, his explanation was held to be insufficient
account and Judgment for the amount was rendered against him
and his surety.

However, it was provided that the treasurer

would be allowed to bring action in a different proceeding
to claim this amount.

The court held that the school board,

not the treasurer, was to determine what application should
be made of funds.®®
This adherence has been consistently advised.

In

1910 the Luchini case®® apparently showed that the sohool
board and the police jury of Caddo Parish had mutually agreed

, pp. 93-94.
''ibid.. p. 94.
®®Oharies K. Ealer, President, ©t al. v. Abraham Millspaugh
et el., (1880) 32 La. Ann. 901.
®®Luehini et al. v. Police Jury et al.,

53 so. 68.

(1910) 126 La. 972,
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that the former body would pay out of the school funds the
rewards for convicted violators of the prohibition lew, since
the money collected from the fines was to be turned over to
the common school thnd.

Chief Justice Breaux pointed out

that sohool boards act under delegated powers and that the
statute^** providing this source of revenue required the
money to be expended for educational purposes only.
The seven-mill tax for schools in Orleans Parish
is divided into two separate funds;

the one, derived from

five and one-fourth mills, is for any use in aid of the
public schools; the other, derived from the remaining one
and three-fourths mills, must be used exclusively for
"purchasing, constructing, repairing, end maintaining
buildings for public school purposes,"1*1

When the sohool

board attempted to pay janitors' salaries from the levy of
one and three-fourths mills, the court decreed the work
of the Janitors not sufficiently "maintenance" to warrant
payment of their salaries out of a fund constitutionally
provided for "maintenance," which term means holding, keeping,
or preserving the buildings in their existing state or
condition,!*®

\

The attorneys general, in handing down opinions on
this subject, have brought practically to date the interpre
tation that the disposition of the public sohool fund must

l**Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No, 814, sec. 64.
lOloonstitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 16.
!*® 0 rleans parish School Board v. Murphy, Commissioner of
public Finance, (1924) 156 La. 935, 101 So. 268.
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not permit of diversion and must be according to controlling
statutory law.1*®
Apportionment of school funds.

From an early date

tbs policy of the court seema to have been to adhere to strict
interpretation of the governing law regerding the apportionment
of sohool funds, not only in the initial distributions, but
to the extent of making corrections of mistakes, where possible.
One illustration of this was the reduction of the share of
Orleans Parish in one distribution by the excess amount which
it had received in a previous distribution, through a mistake
in the treasurer's announcement of the sum to be distributed
by the state.

The parish complained of this action of the

state superintendent of education but the court's answer was
rejection of the plea.!**

Another illustration of the same

principle, but opposite circumstances, was the Judicial order
that St. Landry Parish, which had received less per capita
in one year than its pro rata share, be paid the lacking
amount from the balance on hand for that year or, if necessary,
from the revenues of succeeding years--the amount to be
obtained by deducting on a pro rata basis from the shares of
those parishes which had received an excess when the parish
of St. Landry received a deficient amount.!**

A similar

!*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1916, to m y 1* iWIS, p. 455; May 1, lOTS, to May 1, 1920,
p. 636; May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 522; May 1, 1928, to
May 1, 1924, p. 422; May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 204.
! * * T h e
State ex rel. The Board of School Directors of the
Parish of Orleans v. Edwin H. Fay, Superintendent of Public
Education, (18B4) 36 La. Ann. 241.

10®Andru6 et al. v. Board of Directors
Landry, (1902) 108 La. 386, 32 so. 420.

of Parish of St.
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principle of corrections in apportionment has been upheld by
the attorney general*!**
The right of precedence pertaining to central or
high schools in apportionment was upheld in the Andrus case,
supra 1 in the legal denial of the claim that all the funds
should be used for the support of the district schools,

in

theorizing on the possibilities of distribution on the
pleaded basis, the court maintained that if:
• • • it be held that the central or high schools,
as well as the district schools, must depend for
their support upon the proportion of the school
f\md allotted to the particular districts in which
they are established, the results, as it seems to
us, will be that the children in tlie less populous
districts will be denied the advantages of the
high-school education which it is the idea of the
law to place within the possible reach of all the
children of the parish, and, instead of being able
to establish such schools when or where "necessary,"
the boards will be able to establish them only in
populous and comparatively wealthy districts. We
take it, therefore, that the law is to be construed
as though it read:
"The parish boards shall distribute the school
funds to the several districts in the parishes in
proportion to the number of persons in such dis
tricts between the ages of six and eighteen years:
provided, said boards, with the sanction of the
state board of education, end when suitable sites
and buildings have been otherwise furnished, may
establish such central, or high, schools as may be
necessary, end, for their maintenance, may draw
upon the general school funds before apportioning
the same to the several school districts.
The gradual change in the policy of statutory pro
visions for the apportionment of the parish school funds was

!**Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1910, to Ma y “1, i H ? , p. Sëô.
!*?Andrus et al. v. Board of Directors of Pariah of St.
Landry, (1903) 100 La. 393.

15*
traced in the Martin ease!*®

1910*

The claim therein was

for a shortage because the parish school funds had not been
distributed in proportion to the number of children of sohool
age, as required by section 7 of Act Ko* 81 of 1888.

in

tracing the changes in the various statutes providing for a
system of public schools, the court showed that the provision
for apportionment according to the number of school children
in the several districts, as included in the act of 1888, was
repealed by implication through omission thereof in Acts Nos.
314 of 1902, 167 of 1904, and 49 of 1908.

In the act of 1902

there was express repeal, since it contained provision for
repealing ell laws in conflict with itself, and the provision
of the 1868 act was definitely in conflict.

Where the early

statute provided for apportionment according to the number
of children in the various districts, the later statute made
it obligatory upon the parish school board "to determine the
number of schools to be opened, the location of the schoolhouse s, the number of teachers to be employed, and their
salaries."!*®

The weakness and unfairness of the 1868

statute was pointed to as follows;
. * . it deprived the looal authorities of a very
necessary discretion in the apportionment of the
school funds as between the races, with the result
that in some parishes the colored children received
the bulk of the school funds, although the whole
of said funds, practically, had been contributed
by the parents of the white children; and that it

!*®State ex rel. Martin et al. v. Webster parish Sohool Board,
(1910) 126 La. 392, 52 So. 555.

!*®Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 8*
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also had the effect of making it impraotioable
to maintain schools in the sparsely settled parts
of the country.!!*

The court held that a "discretionary control of the sohool
funds is absolutely necessory, because schools cannot be
established end maintained wi thout funds.

Discretionary

control of the one necessarily carries with it discretionary
control of the other."!!!

The same policy was reflected In

Act No. SI 4 of 1912, which granted the sohool board discretion

ary powers in the apportionment of the general school funds.!!®
According to the interpretations which attorneys
general have placed upon later legislation— section 9 of
Act No. 120 of 1916,!!^ and section 21 of Act No. 100 of 1928—

the lawmakers seemed to have changed the policy of apportionment
from that of leaving the basis of distribution to the discretion
of the parish board of school directors to that of specifying
that there âiell be distribution so as to provide equal sessions
for all schools in the parish.

In the letter act it was

provided that:
No special advantage
General school Funds
Conanunities desiring
sessions than can be

rel. Martin et al. v. Webster Perish School
(1910) 126 La. 597.

! ! * S t a t e

Board,

shall be given out of the
to the High Schools . . .
better facilities and longer
provided by a distribution

ex

!!! l bid.

!!®Opinions of tha Attorney General of Louisiana, June 1,
1912, to May If lHî,~ p. SSÏ.
Ü ^Ibid» , May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 417.
Ü ^ I b i d . ; May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, pp. 204, 469; May
1, 1928, to April 30, 1930, p. 543; May 1, 1932, to April 1,
1934, p. 515.
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of the general funds giving equal session® to all
schools shall secure same by voting special taxes
or obtaining funds from other sources than the
current or general funds*!!®
Disbursement of unwarranted tax already collected.
An unusual case Wdloh involved the disposition of taxes
illegally collected was before the courts in 1896,!!*

The

municipal corporation of Shreveport had levied and collected
annually a tax for sohool purposes, even to the extent of
placing such tax in the budget and having partially disbursed
it accordingly*

subsequently, the city declined to make

further disbursements to the school board on the ground that
the authority for the tax was not included in the city charter*
The plaintiff alleged that since the tax had actually been
levied and collected, the schools should benefit therefrom.
In rendering the decision the court reasoned as follows:
It may be conceded for the argument that
the city was altogether without authority to levy
or collect the tax in question; but having already
levied and collected it, the plaintiff has undoubtedly
the right to institute suit for its recovery for
school purposes.
Forsooth, a tax that has been
illegally or unwarrantably collected does not confer
on the municipality the right to appropriate and use
the fund collected at will#

In our conception It is of no consequence
that the city charter conferred no such authority
to levy and collect the tax. The taxes have been
collected.
The people have paid them without
objection.
The authority to tax is an accomplished

!!*Aots of Louisiana, 1922, Ho, 100, sec. El.
! ! ® T h e
Parish Board of School Directors v. City of Shreveport,
(1895) 47 La. Ann. 21, 16 So. 563.
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faet. The funds are in the treasury and already
destined to sohool purposes* This fund Is a quasi-"
trust in defendant's hands, for the us© and benefit
of the plalntlff.il?
The disposition of the suit was that it was remanded for
trial.

Again it came to the supreme c o u r t . A n

added

defense by the defendant was that of prescription, but the
court held that prescription would not protect the corpo
ration in such liability.

The claim was for the budgeted

amounts from 1881 to 1891; evidence showed that the amounts
for 1884, 1886, and 1891 had been paid In full to the school
board and this deduction was made by the court.

Otherwise,

the first decree was controlling— that is, when a municipality
has collected money from its taxpayers to meet a budget, the
amount is a trust fund and the municipal corporation will be
liable for any diversion from application to the purposes
specified,
Proper issuance of warrants requirement for validity.
Several times has the court been requested to interpret
concerning the law on disbursement by warrants, end In every
instance payment of warrants in any way or by any authority ,
other than that prescribed by law rendered the transaction
void.

Very early in the supreme court's hlstory^^^ treasurers

47 La. Ann. 24.
Parish Board of school Directors v. The City of
Shreveport, (1895) 47 La. Ann. 1310, 17 So. 823.

^l^Ibi d.
iBOgtate ex rel. I, lîewman v. R, m . Lusher, Superintendent
of public schools, (1877-1880) Man. iJnrep. Cas. 189,
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of the perish hoards of sohool directors were prohibited
from pledging t ÎB school funds or warrants for a loan of
money without proper authorization from the board of school
directors, for, according to the decree, the governing
statute so regulated, and such warrants were not coiomerolal
paper.
The same point was at issue in 1902,121

qxiû

again

the court said the methods of disbursement prescribed by
statute must be followed.

The governing actl2& at that time

provided that the treasurer shall pay out the school ÜUnde
only on warrants drawn by the president and countersigned by
the secretary of the parish school board.

Concerning a

treasurer who had violated this lew, the court reasoned:
*. . . but why the treasurer should take it upon himself,
and why he should be permitted, in the face of a direct and
positive prohibition of law, to pay out thousands of dollars
for which the board has issued no warrants, we are unable to
understand.*123

The drawing of warrants except against cash actually
in the treasury is prohibited.

Therefore, warrants drawn

by a police jury in April, June, and July for the proportion
of the parish taxes devoted to the school fund must be
considered as drawn against the proceeds of the taxes levied

IBlAndrus et al. v. Board of Directors of Perish of St
Lem dry, (1902) 108 La. 386, 32 so. 420.
122^0ts of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 59.
Landry,

et el. v. Board of Directors of Parish of St.
(1908) 108 La. 394.
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during the preceding year, for in those months the taxes of
the current year are not even collectable, and much less
collected.124

The incurring and 11quidation of debts.

The amount

of debt which may be incurred by parish boards was delimited
by statute in 1888 as follows;
That the different boards of directors
shall not be empowered to make contracts or debts
for any one year greater than the amount of revenue
provided for according to this act, it being the
intent hereof that parties contracting with said
board, shall take heed that due revenue shall have
been provided to satisfy Üie claim, otherwise they
may lose end forfeit the same, and no action or
execution shall be allowed in aid thereof, and
that the board shall not exceed their powers in
incurring the debt.128
Various interpretations of this provision were rendered in the
Andrus case,12^ chief of which were that since the calender
year basis of budgeting afforded very little revenue early in
the session, the borrowing of money to pay teachers* salaries
was Justifiable, and that in the financial records there must
be a clear distinction between the funds of one year and
those of mother.
An attempt to readjust the financial basis satis
factorily was made in the 1922 actl2? which required schools

124papQerville state Bank v. Police Jury of Union Parish
(Board of Directors of Public schools, interveners), (1915)
138 La. 835, 70 So. 852.
Act8 of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 73.
l26Aadru8 et al. v. Board of Directors of parish of St.
Landry, (1902) 108 La. 386, 32 so. 420.
127Aot3 of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 32.
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to arrange their finances^ ®o as to be on a fiscal year basis
beginning July 1, 1928.

The same act broadened the powor of

the sohool board in borrowing money— in cases of emergency,
loans could be made in excess of the budget of probable
revenue, if authorized by a two-thirds vote of the entire
membership of tbs

b o a r d .

^28

^he constitutionality of this

act was upheld in a litigation occasioned by the attempt of
one parish board to close certain schools for a session in
order to adjust its finances to a fiscal year basis.^^9
Also it was held that the board lacked authority to close
the schools, even In case of emergency, but to the board the
court pointed out the proper alternative in such cases—
that is, the authorizing by a vote of two-thirds of its
membership of loans in excess of its budget of probable
revenues.
A similar policy of forbidding the borrowing of
money in excess of the budget of probable revenues, except
in case of emergency, has been upheld by the state's legal
council.150
The liquidation of general indebtedness legally
incurred by a sohool board has been provided for by legis
lative enactment.

The Constitution of 1921 made provisions

for enabling the various subdivisions of the state, through

126jbid.
iBOgtate ex rel. Day at al. v. Rapides Parish Sohool Board,
(1925) 158 La. 251, 103 So. 757.
l^Oppinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1928, to AprTl*30, l9S(i, p . bO-4; May 1, 1^327 to April 1,
1934, pp. 317-319.
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the voting of re fundi

bonds, to pay or to extend their

indebtedness, bonded and otherwise, existing prior to
January 1, 1921, so as to place those bodies upon a sound
financial

b a s i s .
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legislature realized the need in

1928 of a similar provision to take care of the general
indebtedness of subdivisions prior to January 1, 1929.
Aocordlngly, it provided an enactment to the effect that;
. . the parish police Juries and school boards,
and municipal corporations throughout the state,
the City of New Orleans excepted, shall have the
right and authority to dedicate, appropriate, and
pledge not more than two (2) mills of the taxes
respectively authorized to such police Juries,
school boards end municipal corporations by the
Constitution and laws of the State of Louisiana,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five (2b) years,
for the payment of any indebtedness, matured or
unmatured, exclusive of bonded indebtedness, of
such police Juries, parish school boards, and mu
nicipal corporations, which may have been lawfully
incurred prior to January 1, 1929.
That, for the purpose of evidencing such
indebtedness, the governing authorities of such
police Juries, parish school boards and municipal
corporations shall have the authority to issue to
any creditor, his representative or transferee, a
certificate or certificates of indebtedness for
the amount of the debt due said creditor; provided,
that two or more debts may be combined and a cer
tificate or certificates issued for the whole.
Such certificates shall be issued only when author
ized by an ordinance or resolution, passed by the
governing authority issuing them, and shall be
secured by dedication, appropriation, and pledge
of such portion of the taxes authorized respectively
to such police Juries, pari ^ sohool boards, and
municipal corporations by the Constitution and laws
of the state of Louisiana, not exceeding two (2)
mills, 8 8 may be provided by the governing author
ity . . • They shall bear such rate of interest,
not exceeding six (ô^) per cent, per annum, payable
annually or semiannually, as may be fixed by said
governing authority, shall run for a period not

ISlconstitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 14, sec. 14
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exceeding twenty-five (2b) yeers, and shall be raade
payable at such times and places as may be determined
by the governing authority.
Such certificates shall be executed and
signed by the President and Secretary or Clerk of
the police jury or sohool board, or by the Mayor,
secretary or Clerk of the municipal corporation,
issuing the same, or other o f f i c i a l s . p o s i t i o n s
correspond to those mentioned; . ,
The constitutionality of this act was the point of
contest in a suit to compel a bank to accept such certificates
of indebtedness in exchange for school board notes which it
held, as per an agreement previous to the issuance of the
c e r t i f i c a t e s .

^^5

chief of the attacks on the constitutionality

of the legislative act were that it sought to change the date,
as named in the constitution, prior to which lawfully incurred
indebtedness may be funded, and to authorize the funding
without an election.

To these the court replied;

It would be most unreasonable to construe
this section as a perpetual prohibition against
the funding of the general indebtedness of the
subdivisions of the state out of the alimony tax,
except for debts existing prior to January 1, 1921,
and then only upon observance of the conditions
prescribed in said section. A special election is
not necessary in such a case, as no special tax is
to be voted or is needed. Nor is there any
necessity for obtaining the consent of the tax
payer either to incur, or to pay out of an alimony
tax, any indebtedness arising from the current
expenses of a oolico jury, parish school board, or
municipality.154

^^^Aots of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1920, lio. 18, secs. 2-3.
^55Assumption Parish school Board v* Bank of Napoleonvllle,
(1929) 168 La. 1118, 123 So. 802.

IB^Ibid., 160 La. 1124-1125.
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Thus, the court sanctioned the legislative provision
for the liquidation of school debts and thereby held that It
is sound public policy fbr police juries, parish school boards,
and municipal corporations to fund into interest-bearing
certificate6 their general indebtedness.

SUMMARY

The general school fund has been one of the chief
sources of public sohool support end the policies which have
governed its administration seem to be as follows;
1* Louisiana's belief in the support of education
is evidenced by the fact that $1,710,559.40 was spent for
this purpose before the organic law made any provisions for
a public school system.
S.

After much contest the Constitutional Convention

of 1345 accepted the principle of state support of free
public schools; by 1847 the source of this support was a tax
of one mill on all property and the proceeds from fines and
forfeitures.
3. The Constitutional Conventions of 1064 and 18671668 reflected the influence of Congressional Reconetructionists
in their provisions for the support of public education for
all children regardless of color.
4. Since 1845 the state has edhered strictly to the
policy of giving financial eid to public schools only.

X4Ô
5. The ata te seems to have assumed a liberal attitude
toward the support of her public schools, as is indicated by
the Constitution of 1921, which provided that the general sohool
fund shall consist of:

(a) the proceeds from an ad valorem

tax of two and one-half mills levied and collected by the state;
(b) the money derived from the poll tax; (o) the Interest on
the proceeds of school lands or the revenues derived from those
which remain unsold; (d) proceeds of lands bequeathed or
escheated to the state; and (e) any funds that the legislature
may designate,
6. The school treasurer for the parish is empowered
to collect whatever money is due the parish from the state,
7. The policy of the state has been to delegate a
portion of the responsibility of public sohool support to
local authorities.

In 1870 the police Juries were authorized

to levy a maximum of two mills on all property in their
respective parishes for the support of public schools.

In

1879 local levies were given organic sanction, and since 1888
they have been compulsory,
8. The constitutionality of local levies has been
consistently upheld by the courts; however, the levying must
be in accord with the governing statute, end since 1908 a
valid tax thus levied must be included in the budget,
9. Police Juries not only have the right to levy
and collect the minimum tax on all the property of their
respective parishes, but also when such money is collected
they must deliver it promptly to their respective perish
school treasurers.
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10. Appreciable support of public education is
derived from minor sources.

These sources administered by

the state include the gasoline, severance, malt, inheritance,
and tobacco (a term tax only) tax and proceeds from vacant
successions.

Such sources under local administration include

the poll tax, a fractional part of the state severance tax,
and various fines and forfeited bonds.
11. The parish school treasurer is custodian of the
sohool fund and the courts have held h i m and his sureties
responsible for his proper accounting of these public funds.
12. Parish school boards ere required to adhere
strictly to the governing law in their disposition of public
s ^ o o l funds.
15. T'iQ policy of apportionment of school funds is
that the distribution must be as specified by controlling
legislation, even to the extent of correcting mistakes when
a parish has received either more or less then its pro rata
amount and o f requiring disbursement when a tax has been
collected though illegally levied.
14. No school funds may be distributed except
through the issuance of warrants as directed by law.
15. The policy of the state has been to hold current
educational expenses within the bounds of the current revenues.
When money is borrowed, the amount must not exceed the antic
ipated rovenues for the year except in cases of emergencythen by authority of a two-thirds vote of the entire board
the amount may be greater.
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16.

The courts hava upheld the legislative provision

whereby local authorities may liquidate school debts by
funding tham Into interest-bearing certificates.

CHAPTSE VI

FOELIC SCHOOL SDFPOST IHRODGH SPECIAL EDimS

CHAPTER VI

P D B U C SCHOOL SUPPORT THROUGH SPECIAL FUNDS

Looal autonomy is one of the fundamental prinoiples
of the Ameriean Government.

The levying of taxes by a state

for the support of its public functions is a long established
policy, but the delegation of the taxing power by the legis
lature to the people of a subdivision of the state is of more
recent origin.

In this chapter an attempt is made to show

Louisiana’s law of public sohool support throu^ the various
types of funds authorized by the taxpayers of the sohool dis
trict.

SCHOOL FUNDS AUTHORIZED BT TAXPAYERS

For more than a century Louisiana has theoretically
legalized local autonomy in the support of public education.^
This power, delegated by the legislature to the qualified
electors of a school district, was reluctantly accepted by
the people until after the War for Southern Independence.

An

illustration of this permissive legislation was the law of
1869 which gave the voters of each district the right to levy

of the
means
Territory,** ch. vii.

parishes
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a maximum of three mills for public school expenses in general.&
The next year this act was amended so as to permit sohool dis

tricts to levy by vote of the taxpayers a maximum of ten mills.®
The principle of local taxation by the voters of a district
to supplement the public school fund and provide for school
buildings has been reflected in the constitutions of the state
since 1879.^

From the beginning of the present century, par

ticularly, local taxation has become one of the chief sources

of public school revenue.
School districts from their beginriing were permitted
to levy special taxes for the needs of the schools, but no
feasible provisions were made whereby bends might he issued
for building purposes until the 1906 amendment to the Constitu
tion of 1898 permitted the property taxpayers of a school

district to hold an election for determining their census
with respect to levying a special tax upon which to issue
bonds.®

This modern method of c a n y in g out a building pro

gram was greatly improved under the Constitution of 1921,
which specified that school districts might issue bonds for

"acquiring lands for building sites and playgrounds, and for
purchasing, erecting, enlarging or improving school buildings
and teachers' homes, and acquiring the necessary equipment

^Acts of Louisiana, 1969* No. 121, seo. 60.
®Ibid.. Extra Session, 1870, No, 6, sec. 27,
Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 209,
®Ibid.. 1898, art. 281, as amended by Act No. 122 of 1906,
adopted November, 1906.
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•Bd fuzBishlBga therefor."®
That the people of Louisiana have oome to azeroiae
the right of suffrage for the benefit of publie education in
their respective districts may be indicated by the fact that
in 1950-1931 special taxes for current operation of public
schools amounted to $6,047,128
$5,279,428.7

and for capital outlay,

It is reasonable to expect differences of opinion

to arise concerning the law for ascertaining the will of the
people of the various districts when an increase in educational
facilities is sought through this autonomous privilege*
Legal Bases for Special Tax Levies Approved
The law governing the levying of special taxes which
elections only can authorize can best be shown by those con
tested elections vdiich were carried to the supreme court
because of various alleged irregularities and which were de
clared to be legal and the tax levy and other appurtenances
pertaining thereto valid.
Const!tutionalitv of special taxes. The existence
of the condition under which taxpayers in one district of a
parish pay a special school levy differing in amount from that
paid in another district of the parish seems to have been the
basis of considerable misunderstanding among those who pay

^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 14, sec. 14(b).
?State Department of Education of Louisiana. Eighty-fourth
AiriwtiaT^ e p o r t . for ine Session 1932-53 \ Eat on % u g e T 1935 ).
p. 14.
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the taxes.

The charge has been that such practice Is in viola

tion of the constitutional right which assures unifcrmlty of
taxation.

In 1915® this issue came to the court for adjudication

when one district which was created from a part of another voted
a levy with the effect that the rate in the new district was
higher than that in the old district.

In the court's decree

it was held that by article 281 of the Constitution of 1913,
special recognition was given to school districts on matters
pertaining to taxation for schools.

Also, the constitutionality

of such taxes, although they may be levied to different amounts,
was upheld by the following explanation;
While article 225 provides that "taxation
shall be equal and uniform throughout the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax," the several
parish boards of directors of the public schools
throughout the state are authorized to impose addi
tional taxes for the support of the public schools
in the school districts of the parishes. The property
taxpayers in any one school district of a parish may
authorize additional taxation within their district
for additional support of the public schools, and
for the purpose of erecting sohoolhouses in such
district, although taxpayers in other sohool dis
tricts, in the same parish, may not Impose upon
themselves the same or an equal amount of taxation.
The objection of plaintiff, therefore, that the tax
in district No. 50 is not equal and uniform with
the tax imposed in sohool district No* 37, or other
districts in Avoyelles parish, is not well founded.*

In 1930^® a very similar complaint was made to the effect that
by the enlargement of a sohool district and the laying of a

®Drouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools
of Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So, 191*
*Ibid.. 136 La. 395.
lOwoodard et al, v. Bienville Parish School Board, (1930)
169 La. 831, 126 So. 207.
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levy in the newly created district the property owners in the
old area were subject to a higher levy than those in the newly
added territory.

Again, the court held this as not being in

equality of amount of taxation within the meaning of the con
stitution.
In the Gulf Refining c a s e H a parish tax, for school
purposes had been voted by the people and assessed against
certain oil held in storage by the appellant.

This tax was

contested on the ground that it constituted an abuse of the
taxing power by taking the appellant’s property without due
process of law for the benefit of persons, including property
owners, other than the appellant.

The Federal Court held not

only that neither the appellant nor his property was discrimi
nated against, but also that the tax was for a purpose which
was beneficial to property and persons located in that dis
trict and was not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that
it may not have resulted in the same measure of benefit to
the appellant or his property as to other persons or property
located in the district.
When the creation of the Ouachita Parish Junior
College was attacked on various grounds of unoonstitutionality
of the supporting tax, the legality of a tax for the upward
extension of secondary education was held.^®

Such tax is not

violative of the uniform taxation clause, for it is levied on

^ ^ u l f Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Phillips, Tax Collector,
Same v. Sandlin, Tax Collector. (1926) (Cir. Ct, of App.)
11 Fed. (2d) 967.
^^cHenry et al, v. Ouachita Parish Sohool Board, (1929)
169 La. 646, 125 So. 841.
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all taxable property in the district, which must compris© an
entire parish.

It falls within the classification of special

taxes, as does the tax voted for a high school.

The tax Is a

local one voted for the support of a purely looal institution.
Since the particular city, Monroe, was no longer exempt from
general parochial taxation, the parish school board had author
ity to tax property within the city for the support of the
junior college of the parish.

The statement of the purpose

of the tax included, " ’for acquiring, erecting, constructing,
establishing, operating, and maintaining a Junior College in
said Junior College District’";^® this was held to be not
several purposes but practically a single proposition, since
the purposes of construction and maintenance are essentially
interwoven.

The court’s conclusion was that the levy and

assessment of the special Junior college tax "do not deny to
plaintiffs the equal protection of the law, nor deprive them
of their property without due process of law."14

Herein was

legalized the support of parish Junior colleges by local taxa
tion.
Necessity for limitations of levy to consider taxing
areas as distinct entities.

Frequent controversies have arisen

over the constitutional limit of special taxation for school
purposes, especially with regard to a
in connection with a district tax,

subschool district tax

a district tax in connec

tion with a parish tax, and tax on land lying in overlapping

169 la. 663,
p. 664.
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districts.15

The Constitution of 1921 defines the limitation

as follows:
For the purpose of constructing or im
proving public buildings, school houses, roads,
bridges, levees, sewerage or drainage works, or
other works of permanent public improvement, title
to which shall be in the public, or for the main
tenance thereof, any political subdivision may
levy taxes, in excess of the limitations otherwise
fixed in this Constitution, not to exceed in any
year five mills on the dollar for any one of said
purposes, and not to exceed in any year twenty-five
mills on the dollar, on any property, for all of
said purposes; and for giving additional support to
public schools, any parish, school district or subschool district, or any municipality, which supports,
or contributes to the support of, its public schools,
may levy taxes, in excess of the limitations other
wise fixed in this Constitution, not to exceed, in
the aggregate, on any property, in any year, eight
mills on the dollar; provided, no special tax
authorized by this section shall run for a longer
period than ten years, and provided further, that
the rate, purpose and duration of any such special
tax shall have been submitted to the resident prop
erty taxpayers qualified to vote in the subdivision
in which the tax is to be levied, and a majority of
those voting, in number and amount, shall have voted
in favor thereof. The provisions of this section
shall not affect the validity of any tax levied by
authority of an election held prior to the adoption
of this Constitution.16
The limitations provided for were the bases of issues
brought in 1925 by coBpanies having investments In districts
and

subschool districts of the parish of Webster.1?

Due to

the location of the lands the levy of a parish-wide two-mill
school tax raised the total special levy on some of their

^®OT>lnlons of the Attorney General of Louis^iana; June 1,
1912, to kaÿ“l, l9l4, p. 213; May 1, 19T87~tol^y 1, 1920, pp.
313, 427.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art, 10, seo. 10,
^^Loulsiana & A, %r, Co. et al. v. School Board of Webster
Parish et al., (1925) 157 La. 1046, 103 So. 318.
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property to twenty-seven mills and the total school tax to
more than eight mills; on this basis they contested.

The

court pointed to errors in their contentions as follows:
(1) It was not correct to add the various levies in districts
and subdlstrlots to determine whether or not the total special
levy limit had been exceeded.

In 1984 it had been explained

that a "parish-wide school district and the smaller school
districts within its limits are separate and distinct political
subdivisions of the state, and may therefore exist at the same
time, and independently of each other, for purposes of special
taxation in giving additional aid to public schools."I®
wise, the court here said,

Like

, . each subdivision shall remain

unaffected In its right by the taxes imposed under the section
by other political subdlvisicns in the same territory.
(8) The addition of levies in districts and subdistricts to
determine whether or not the total levy for giving additional
support to public schools exceeded eight mills was not proper.
The possible outcome of such a method was pointed to by the
court as follows:
If the interpretation contended for by plaintiffs
is correct, the result would be, as we have here
tofore indicated in discussing the 85-ml 11 limita
tion that, because some enterprising school district,
perhaps in a remote c o m e r of the parish, had voted
and was levying an 8-mill tax for the support of
the schools, a parish wide school district or a
parish in which the remote district is located,
which saw the need for a parish wide tax for the

^%inton et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924)
155 La. 675.
^^Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. et al. v. Sohool Board of Webster
Parish et al., (1925) 157 L#a. 1051.
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seme purpose, oould not vote and levy it. It seems
obvious to ua that the oonstitutional oonvontion
intended no such result,&0
(5) The inclusion of the eight-mill limitation for additional
support to public schools in the limitation of twenty-five
mills for all of such purposes was in direct violation of the
plain words of the section of the constitution providing for
both limitations.
This recognition of the distinct entity of districts
was later manifested by the explanation to the school authori
ties of West Carroll Parish that the levying of an eight-mill
tax for the support of the public schools in the parish-wide
district would not prohibit a similar levy
district created out of a portion of the

a sub school

p a r i s h . 21

In 1930 the theory of the distinct entity of dis
tricts was again upheld when the court called to the attention
of complainants tha% the tax in a certain old district was
equal and uniform and that likewise it was equal throughout
the district as

e n l a r g e d . 22

was thus defined:

The status of the new district

"The enlarged district is a separate and

distinct legal entity from the several sohool districts as
they existed before being merged into o n e . "S3

pp. 1055-1056.
21

Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. llay 1,
1998, to April SOTToiO, p. 506.
^^oodard et al. v, Bienville Parish School Board, (1930)
169 l a . 831, 126 So. 207,
*®Ibid., 169 La, 837.
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Again, in the year 1932, the eight-mill limitation
of special sohool taxes was

c o n t e s t e d #^4

2n

the instant case

the excess resulted from overlapping districts and the theory
established was that the total constitutional tax which may
affect a parcel of property is limited only by ei^ht mills
multiplied by the number of taxing districts having jurisdic
tion over it*
Thus, in interpreting the limitations on special
school taxes prescribed by the Constitution of 1921, the court
has upheld definitely and continuously the policy of recog
nizing each parish, school district, or subschool district
as a distinct entity, the one having the privlege of levying
taxes up to the limit regardless of such taxes levied by the
others *
Levying and collecting the voted tax* Various con
troversies have arisen concerning the levying and collecting
of the tax voted for the benefit of the public schools and
in the decisions thereof several principles governing this
practice have been established as follows*
The title to the sohool property Involved in the
levying of a special tax— for example, the lot on which a
school building is to be constructed— must vest in the public*
This principle was upheld when same taxpayers charged violation
of this regulation but in which case evidence was accepted as
showing that there was public ownership of the lot in question.

^^Delta Land & Timber Co. v. Beauregard Parish Sohool Board,
(1932) 174 La. 357, 140 So. 502,
®®Baucum et al. v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1907)
119 La, 632, 44 So. 289.

160
There seems to he no final date on which a tax on
the current aesesament may he voted and l e v i e d , I n reply
to the complaint that certain taxing ordinances were illegal
because they Imposed taxes for a year that had already well
elapsed, the court established this principle by stating;
We know of no statute %dilch forbids the
levy of special school taxes on the assessment of
the current year. It is the mandatory duty of the
police jury, whenever a petition is presented by
the required number of ta3q>ayers, to order a special
election, and when the special tax is voted, to
immediately pass an ordinance levying such tax,
for the year or years designated in the petition
of the taxpayers. Act 131 of 1696, p. 200; Act
No. 174 of 1908, p. 327; Act No. 145 of 1904,
p. 317.2?
Whether a formal resolution of the board of sohool
directors is necessary to authorize the assessment of a tax
was one of the questions in the Gulf Refining case.®®

There

in the secretary of the board directed, in writing, the tax
assessor to assess a tax which had been duly authorized by
the taxpayers.

The attack was that the validity of the tax

depended upon its formal levy by resolution of the board,
but the Federal Court held that this was not necessary and
that the action of the board sufficiently indicated its pur
pose to have the voted tax assessed and collected.

2®Argyle Planting & Mfg. Co., Limited, v. Connely, Sheriff,
et al., (1910) 125 La. 685, 51 So. 687.
87 Ibid.. 125 La. 687.
2®Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Phillips, Tax Collector.
Same v. Sandlin, Tax Collector. (1926) (Cir. Ct. of App.)
11 Fed. (2d) 967.
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The law pertaining to the oommission for collecting
speoial aehool taxes was established by the court In 1916*^^
The sheriff involved in the litigation had failed to turn
into the treasury a part o t the special sohool taxes %&iloh
he had collected.

This amount was claimed by him as his

commission granted under article 120 of the Constitution of
1896, vdiich read in part:

"The compensation of sheriffs as

tax collectors shall not exceed five per cent on all sums
collected and paid over."

As a basis for its decision, the

court cited the controlling statutory law:

^

• • • provided further that no sheriff and ex
officio tax collector shall receive any compensa
tion for the collection of spécial school taxes
except in parishes where the total amount of
state, parish, levee end poll taxes and licenses
collected do not amount to $50,000, Be it fur
ther provided that in parishes where the col
lection of state, parish, levee and poll taxes
and licenses do not amount to $50,000, the
sheriff and ex officio tax collector shall receive
five per cent, on amount collected and actually
paid into the state and parish treasury or to
the authority designated to receive the same.®®
The total state, parish, poll, and license taxes, as deter
mined by the court, exceeded $50,000, hence there was the
interpretation that the sheriff should not be allowed
commission on the special sohool taxes collected in the year
in question.
Regulations in elections.

Lay opinion in interpreting

the constitutional and statutory provisions of regulations In
electims to vote special sohool tax levies has been varied.

2®Board of Sohool Directors of Jackson Parish v. McBride,
Sheriff, (1916) 138 La. 598, 70 So. 627,
30Acts of Louisiana, 1908, No. 161, seo. 1.
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In establishing the law pertaining to such elections, the
court has pointed out the governing principles, the chief
ones of which are here presented,
1, Voter# Qualified by election laws of the state.
In 1907®! it was judicially decided that those who vote at
school tax elections must be duly qualified under the election
laws of the state, including the general regulation pertaining
to the payment of poll taxes*

The court expressed its opinion

with reference to the voter thus:

"We think that he should

produce his poll tax receipt, as in every other election,
nAether special or general, if not exempt on account of age,"®®
Also attention was called to the direction in article 232 of
the Constitution of 1896 that the tax "shall" be submitted to
a vote of the property taxpayers entitled to vote under the
election laws of the state— that one of those laws required
a recognized voter to have paid liis poll tax for the two
years preceding.

A statute®® enacted later, 1921, was inter

preted to require the payment of the poll tax as a prerequisite
for voting in such elections.®4

In 1933 the qualifications

were defined to include poll tax payment as follows:

"The

actual present owner of the property on the day of the election,
provided he possesses the other requirements to vote, that of

^^Gruner et al. v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1907)
119 La. 651, 44 So. 295.
S^Ibid.. 119 La. 553.
®®Acts Of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1921, No, 46, seo, 13,
^^Oninlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1922,
to May 1,
pT%9b.
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reslde&oe, registration, and poll tqx payments, can vote the

proper^ *"35
In general, it seems that the dominant policy of the
state has been to adhere to the general election laws in deteimining who may be eligible to participate in special school
tax elections,36 except that the property qualifications are
fixed by special statutes®? and that permission to vote is
granted to women who are the owners of property or widows who
may be able to establish usufructuary interests in their
deceased husbands’ property.®8
2. Reasonable onnortunitv to register sufficient.
To follow the letter of the law with regard to the registration
of voters preceding special elections is sometimes very dif
ficult and not possible, the court has admitted, therefore
the interpretation which is practical is the one which has
often been rendered.
provision is made for:

By Act No. 122, Extra Session, 1921,
the registration of voters, pariah of

Orleans excepted, every four years, commencing on the second
day of January, 1922; prohibiting registration during the
thirty days immediately preceding a speoial, general, or pri
mary election; and keeping the registrar’s office open for
the thirty days, Sundays and legal holidays excepted, im

®^Ibid*. May 20, 1958, to April 1, 1934, p. 362.
May 1, 1902, to M.y 1, 1904, p. 191; May 1, 1914,
to May Ï, 1916, p. 438; May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 456.
®?Ibid.% May 1, 1910, to May 1, 1912, p. 296; May 80, 1932,
to AprTTl, 1934, p. 362.
®®Ibld.: May 1, 1906, to May 1, 1908, p. 298; Méy 1, 1914,
to Way l y 1916, p. 438; May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 456.
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mediately preceding the cloelng of the regiatratlon rolls*
Section 8 of Act Ho« £86^of 1910» governing the notice of
epeoial elections» requires that after the resolution ordering
the election is passed» notice of the election Shall he given
for thirty days hy publication in a weekly newspaper once a

week for four weeks» and if there be no newspaper in the par^
ish» then by posting the notice fbr that time*

To fulfill

the requirements of the act concerning registration it would
be necessary for the notice of the special election to be
published stmething more than sixty days prior to the date
for holding the election» but the act governing the pub»»
lication of the notice of election has not that requirement #
The court was presented the problem of clarifying
these two seemingly conflicting statutes when some taxpayers
in the parish of Natchitoches sought to annul an election on
the ground that a sufficient time within which to register was
not allowed those entitled to qualify in order to v o t e , 89
election in question was set for Ifdrch 18, 1986» and the first
publication of notice was made February 5» 1986,

It was shown

that althou^ the voters were not permitted to register for
the thirty days immediately preceding March 15» they could
have registered at least every Friday and Saturday» with the
exception of one Friday» which was a legal holiday, from Ian**
uary 1» 1926» to February 5» 1986, those being the days, even
sdien there is no election approaching, on which the registrar’s
office was required to be open.

Also there were from the day

^*Bonds et al, v, Natchitoches Parish School Board, (1987)
164 La, 584, 114 So. 166.
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Of publication of the notice, February 5, to the day of the
closing of the registration rolls, February 13» six legal days
in which to register» for the registrar’s office was required
to be kept open dally during that period.

The court said!

**As a practical proposition» we think that this was sufficient
time for the approximately 840 voters in the district to regis
ter, even assuming that all of them» as property taxpayers»

were entitled» on registering, to vote in the d i s t r i c t , I t
was admitted, however » that this decision was not according to
the letter of the law prescribing the length of time registra
tion rolls were to be kept open preceding an election of this
nature, but it was pointed out that the two statutes must be
construed together to reach a fair interpretation.

On that

basis the court explained:
• • « idiat is meant is that the registrar, in such
elections as the present, shall keep his office
open for the 30 days immediately preceding the
closing of the registration when he learns of the
election in time to do so, after learning of it,
during what remains of that period. The law is
satisfied if the voters have had a reasonable
opportunity to register. In this instance, we
think they have, 41
3, Current assessment proper one for determining
list of voters. When an attempt was made to annul an election
on the grounds that it was held on the basis of the incomplete
assessment rolls of the current year instead of on the completed
rolls of the previous year, the court upheld the contentions

xaa
of those responsible for the e l e c t i o n T h e i r defense was
article 238 of the Constitution of 1898 which provided that
those who were privileged to vote on questions of this nature
were those property taxpayers of the school district entitled
to vote under the election laws of the state.

As judicially

interpreted, the organic provision contemplated that the
voter should be a property taxpayer at the date of election,
which qualification could be shown only by an assessment,"^®
The court admitted that had there been no assessment for 1905,
the assessment of 1904 would have governed.

There was judg

ment for the defendants; it declared that "The transcription
of the lists and the filing of the rolls cannot affect the
assessment of property already made, and final unless re
versed by judicial

action.*44

Consequently, it was held that

the names of the taxpayers and the valuations of property
were properly taken from the current assessment,
4, Bases for the voting of property. The carrying
of a special tax election depends upon the affirmative vote
of the majority in number and amount of property valuation.
The officials in charge are called upon in practically every
election to rule in some respect concerning the voting of
property.

^^Flores et al, v. Police Jury of DeSoto Parish at al,,
(1906) 116 La. 428, 40 So, 785,

^Ibid.
116 La. 430.
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The chief principle established by the courts in
litigations on this subject seems to have been that one who
votes property must be owner at the time of election.

The

court rendered this interpretation when there was contest
because the oommissloners refused permission to vote to a man
who was assessed with property the year before but who had
sold said property at the time of the election.

The court en

dorsed the commissioners’ action as correct and dismissed the
question by saying:

*He was not the owner of that property

at the time of the election— he had sold the seme.”^®

The

same principle was maintained In 1983 in an opinion which
declared that the property must be possessed at the time of
election by the one who offers to vote*46

concerning the

voting of partnership property the courts and legal advisers
have upheld the correctness of permitting the individual mem
bers to divide the easessment upon the assets of their firm
and each to vote upon his pro rata Interest therein.4?
5. Mere error in judgment of o o m l sa loners not
sufficient cause alone for nullifying election.

Commissioners

at special tax levy elections have many detailed and widely
varied rulings and decisiona to make in determining who may

4®smith V. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) ISS
IrS• 1005.
4^0pinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 20,
1932, vo Aprri'T[,'T^34, p. 568.
4Tsmith V. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125
La. 987, 52 So. 122; Opinions of the Attorney General of
Louisiana: May 1, 19ÔÎ," lb May 1,
p. 238T May 1, 1914,
to May 17 1916, p. 243; May 1, 1922, to May 1, 1924, p. 601.
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or a«y not vote.

In this connection the court seems to have

been eonslderate in oontests brought for its jurisdiction.
Brror in the judgment of the commissioners was charged by one
plaintiff when he alleged that a number of persons trere in
correctly permitted to vote*

In the trial of the case^S

defendant showed that some of the voters in question were
legally authorized to vote and the court ruled, as it had
done in otherinstances,49 that

this mere error in judgment

was not sufficient cause within itself to annul the election.
In another charge the plaintiff admitted that the votes im
properly received and improperly excluded would not have
changed the result of the elections*

Again, the court said

that since the commissioners acted in good faith, the elections
should not be set aside for their errors of

j u d g m e n t . S O

Regulations in petitions, resolutions, and ballots.
A parish school board may order an election to vote a tax
without being

petitioned by the voters;51 if such board Is

petitioned by

one-fourth of the qualified property taxpayers,

4®Snilth V. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 La.
987, 52 So* 122.
4®Wldow Conant et al. v* L, Mlllaudon et al., (1050) 5 La.
Ann. 542; C. C. Duson v. G. M. Thompson, (I860) 32 La. Ann.
861; H. MbKhlght v. A, V. Ragan, (1881) 33 La. Ann. 398; L, J.
Luokey et al. v. Police Jury of Bienville Parish et al., (1894)
46 La. Ann. 679, 15 So. 89.
^Florae et al. v. Police Juiy of Be Soto Parish et al.,
(1906) 116 La. 428, 40 So. 785.
®^Ouiniona of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1,

1930, to^#Fri"?o7T:9%Tp. kF:-----------
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it must call the elaotioa.®^

Statutory provision as to the

content of the petition semas to have ohanged from the object
and the amount of the tax In 1696 to the object and the rate
of the tax in 1904.55

The place and manner of recording a

petition requesting the call of an election have not been
specified by statute; the court has held that inclusion of
such record in the minutes of the proceedings of the parish
board of school directors fulfills all the requirements of
the law in this respect.54

The board’s resolution which calls

the election requested by the petition meets statutory require
ments if it includes the rate, object, and purpose of the tax
and the number of years it is to run, with the addition of
the rate of interest to be paid when a bond issue election is
being called.55

If a ballot has the form prescribed by the

governing statute and gives the voters all the required in
formation, there is no necessity for the proposed location of
the school building to be stated on the

b a l l o t .56

Regulations in contesting special tax elections.
Those who contest special tax elections must bring their suits

^^Ibid.2 Hinton et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924)
155 iZT^ee, 99 So. 525.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1898, No. 131, sec. 2; Ibid., 1904,

No. 145, sec. 2; Baucum et al. v. Police Jury of dSlalborne
Parish, (1907) 119

La. 532, 44

So. 289.

54rho$as et al. v. Board of School Directors
Webster, (1915) 136 La. 499, 67 So. 345.

ofParish of

®5i>pouin et al.
v. Board of Directorsof
PublicSchools of
^ r i s h of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So, 191; Thomas et
al. V. Board of School Directors of Parish of Webster, (1915)
136 La. 499, 67 So. 345.
55BioWilliams et al* v. Board of Directors of Iberville
Parish et al., (1911) 128 La. 422, 54 So. 928.
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within the time preeorihed for sueh action if their complaints
are to be considered by the court.

When the plaintiffs in a

case®? involving this regulation objected to the defendants’
plea of prescription of three months on the ground that there
was no statute in force authorizing such prescription, the
court pointed to their error in reasoning as follows:
The same reasons which plaintiffs assign for urging
that there is no prescription applicable to the case
would carry with them as a result the destruction of
any right of action in plaintiffs to contest the
election held under authority of the police Jury on
April 9, 1907, for the statute upon which plaintiffs
base their right of action to contest the election
limits in its second section the right of action to
three months. If plaintiffs are forced (as they
are) to invoke the statute to sustain their right
to such an action, defendants have the undoubted
legal right to resist such an action on the ground
that it was not instituted within the time limit.®®
Thus, the court not only upheld the right of prescription,
but also emphasized the preservation of the balance of power
through the right of contest to carry with it the right to
protect by prescription.

The statute upon Wiich the action

in the previous case was founded was Act No. 106 of 1892 based
on the Constitution of 1879.

When the seme objection— that

this statute did not apply to elections held under the Consti
tution of 1898— was later pleaded by other plaintiffs,®^ the
court, after having reviewed all the statutes enacted since
the adoption of the later constitution, said:

5?Folse et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1910) 125 La. 603,
51 So. 658.
5®Ibld., 125 La. 617.
®*Waggner .t al. t . Polio. Jury of Pariah of Jefferson et
al., (1910) 125 La. 863, 51 So. 1016.
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The General Assembly has never made any
provisions for contesting elections held under
article 232 of the Constitution, nor has passed
any statute of limitations with respect to such
elections. This Inaction can be explained only
on the theory that the lawmaker considered Act No.
106 of 1892 as applicable to such e l e c t i o n s . 60
By these decisions the court upheld very definitely that those
who charge irregularities in a special tax election must abide
by the prescriptive provision in force at the time.
Also, the court has found it necessary to maintain
some other regulations concerning a contest.

After a plea

is made, it must confine Itself to the specific grounds of
contest• Upon this principle no heed was given a plaintiff
who alleged that an inspection of the ballot box end its con
tents, which he prayed to be brought into court and examined,
would reveal other irregularities and illegalities.61
Upon those who contest rather then upon the court
rests the responsibility of proving their contentions.

Where

plaintiffs charged irregularities in the content of the ballot
boxes without producing the boxes in evidence and declared
that elections were not held in two of the precincts without
submitting any records to that effect, the court ruled that
in the absence of proof to the contrary the election must be
decreed as having been properly held.68

Plainly it said to

the plaintiffs that the burden of proof was on them when they
made accusations.

.. 125 La. 868.
*^Ëtaltb T. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 La.
987, 52 So. 122.
S^Bonds et al. t . Natchitoches Parish School Board, (1927)
164 La. 584, 114 So. 166.
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Disposition of Funds Derived from Special Levies
When taxpayers feel sufficiently the need for better
schools within their district their statutory right of expression
to that effect is by means of special levies voted upon their
property.

Consequently, the levy which they authorize is for

a specific purpose and they have protection in the legal theory
that the fund so derived must be spent as directed by them.6®
For

example, the court said in 1931, "When a special tax is

voted to erect a public school building, the proceeds of such
tax can be used for that and no other purpose.*@4

Also, the

tax which is voted in one ward is considered as sacred to the
use of that ward and is not to be diverted to the use of an
other. 6®

In this connection, the court has said:

It is clear . . . that special taxes
voted by a school district constitute a fund which
is dedicated by law exclusively to the use of that
particular district. 3uch special fund forms no
pGLTt of the general or current school funds, and
the only authority that a school board can exercise
over such fund is to levy and pay it, when col
lected, to the school district voting the tax.66
Expenditure in district of special maintenance tax.
In the disposition of this type of special tax voted to give
"additional aid to the public schools," as usually expressed,
the school authorities seem to have needed frequent assistance,

®®Oninions of the Attomev General of Louisiana. May 1, 1908,
to May 1 , 1 9 Ï0, p. SdS.
®%atkins V. Ouachita Parish School Board, (1931) 173 La. 267.
®®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1914,
to May 1, ïiÎ6, p. 246.
®6HintOR et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924) 155 La. 675
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particularly, when a gnirplua has accumulated from the col
lection of the tax so authorized.

With the explanation that

such action la in violation of the letter of the latr but in
keeping with the spirit, school officials have been advised
that a sufficient amount of the excess revenue might be used
for putting down wells.®?

With more hesitancy, and in case

of a clear excess of funds beyond the m o u n t needed for maintenanoe, legal opinion has sanctioned the expenditure of such
funds frr the building of schoolhouses.®®

Other purposes for

which the proceeds of this tax may be used include the defraying
of the coat of pevlnr, the highway which abuts the property of
the school®^ and the meeting of expenses arising from conatmoting, equipping, or maintaining the plant and buildings
at a new location of the school In the district— the latter to

be expended from the balance accruing from the tax.?®

Also,

the surplus may be expended as necessary for tren.sportlng
elementary children within the district to the elementary
school therein.71
Effect of consolidation upon tax of original districts,
The consolidation of school districts has presented the ques
tion as to what disposition should be made of the funds of an
old district after it consolidates with another.

In reply to

S7
Oninions of the Attorney General of loulslanq, May 1, 1906
to May l.-ïSüa, pTWgv.

°^Ibld.. May 1, 1016, to Wtigf 1, 1018, p. 448.
**Ibld.. Kay 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 441.
May 1, 1932, to April 1, 1934, p. 1008.
p. 288.
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those who were oontempleting consolidating two districts and
edio wished to know if they might use for the new district the
special levies which were existent in the original districts
the attorney general advised:
. • • in the absence of expi*ess statutory authority,
or a clear rule of jurisprudence, in Louisiana it
is extremely doubtful whether special taxes previ
ously voted for the express purposes of giving
additional aid to the schools of a particular dis
trict could be thereafter devoted toward maintaining
schools of a thereafter consolidated district*72
The following reasoning was adopted in solving the
problem nAcre two districts had been consolidated, with only
one school to continue, and there had been voted In the district
Of the discontinued school a special tax for building and im
provements, which had acc’raîlated a fair sum.

The money could

have been used to improve or increase the buildings in the
original district, and the board had authority to cell such
buildings and reinvest the proceeds in the erection of a
building at another location.?®

In that way a bulldlnr in

the consolidated district could have been made to derive the
benefit of the fund.

The attorney general saw this action to

produce the same re milt as devoting the avails of the tax
directly to the school in the consolidated district; there
upon, he ruled, although admitting that there was not freedom
from doubt, that the money could be used for the consolidated
district.?*

Very recently this opinion was upheld, when it

7fi
Ibid.* m y 1, 1926, to April 50, 1929, p. 297.
7S
Acts of Louisiana, 1922, No* 100, see* 20.
?^Ot>iniono of the Attorney General of loulsiane. Mcv 1. 1928.
to Kby düV ïSsüT F T B # ;
--------------------

175
was advised that the balance of funds belonging to the old
district could be used in the consolidated district for all
or any of the purposes for which the tax

levied in the

original district.?®
Expenditure through certificates of Indebtedness.
An attack on the method which a parish school board used in
securing building funds brought before the court?# the issue
as to whether or not the board " ’had the right to so antici
pate its revenues under the special tax, by borrowing money,
pledging apportion of said tax and issuing certifieotes of
Indebtedness, to the extent end under the terms of payment
as set forth in the ordinance of the School Board*’"??

After

having defined the status of the school board as that of a
body corporate in law and a s the governing authority of the
junior college district, in question, the court said with
reference to the constitutional provision?® under which this
action by the board was contonplated:
There is nothing in this article of the
Constitution nor in Act 173 of 1928, the Junior
college law under which the tax in the instant case
was voted, which prohibits school boards from antici
pating the revenues to be derived from the levi^ of
suoh taxes or the pledging of them in advance of
their collection in order to obtain funds with
which to construct the buildings, nor is there any
thing to indicate that it was intended that the

’^Ibld.. May 1, 1938, to April 1, 1934, p. 290.
’®Watkin8 V. Otiaohlta Parish School Board, (1931) 173 La.
259, 136 So. 591.
173 La. 865.
^^Coostitution of Louisiana, 1981, art. 10, seo. 10.
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boards should postpone the erection of suoh
buildings until sufficient funds for that purpose
shall have been collected.?*
The statutory conditions under which this debt might be in
curred were outlined as follows:
The anticipation of the avails of a
special school building tax voted to run for a
series of years to be collected annually and
the issuance of certificates of indebtedness to
be paid annually from the tax as collected, and
the pledging of the tax to secure the payment of
the certificates, is not violative of section 32,
Act 100 of 1922, as amended by Act 19 of 1926,
where the aggregate amount of the certificates
does not exceed the net avails of the tax and
where the net proceeds of the tax collected each
year are sufficient to pay the certificates, and
all interest, as they mature*®®
In upholding this method of disposition of funds
through certificates of indebtedness, the court decreed:
The proceeding taken by the board makes
it perfectly clear that it did not intend by the
issuance of these certificates and the borrowing
of money to erect the building, to create a general
outstanding indebtedness which it would be uncon
ditionally obligated to pay out of its general
revenues, but only to bind the board to the extent
of its ability to pay from the revenues derived
from the tax. These certificates are to be pay
able only out of the avails of the tax with
reference to which they are to be issued end the
holders of them will be charged with legal notice
that they are not unconditional obligations of
the board.®!
Irregularities Sufficient to Nullify Special Tax Levies Proposed
The division here presented deals with the Issues
involved in oases on contested elections which the courts

?®Watkins v. Ouachita Parish School Board, (1931) 173 La. 270.
Q®Ibld.. p. 272*
®!lbid.. p* 274.
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have seen proper to declare null and void*

The prlnoiples

pointed out by the court’s decision* herein may be taken
cognizance of by those who wish to conduct their special
school elections according to law; too, those who may feel
that justice has not been meted out in the proceedings
connected with an election have herein a partial guide to
judicial endorsement of their allegations*
Practically all cases in this section involve
several minor points each— most of which could be dismissed
with a statement of the policy that irregularities and
failure to comply with governing regulations render an
election void; also, many of the points at issue appear in
several cases.

Since this is the condition, adjudications

establishing the law are presented in groups and treated
mainly by mere statements of the court’s ruling with the
addition of facts Involved where the alleged violation is
not sufficiently implied In the decision to clarify the
ruling.
Unauthorized voting areas and amounts of levies *
In general the organic and statutory law and interpretations
thereof have established that only those duly constituted
school districts may vote additional taxes for school
support *

Both the parish precinct®® and the ward®® have

been definitely decreed as not being acceptable voting

®®Regard et al. v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, (1906)
117 La. 952, 42 So. 438.
®®Onlnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. M&y 1. 1926.
to

A p r i l S’
0“

i9 5 8 , p . m

i

:
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areas for this purpose.

With respect to the parish as an area,

it has been said recently, **. . . w e think it clear that if
the Parish . . . has been created into a school district in
accordance with existing laws, that it could vote a special
tax • • • for the support of the public schools of the par-

l*h."84
Constitutional provision in 1921®5 fixed the maximum
levy for special maintenance purposes at eight mills and for
building purposes at five mills.

Elections which violated

these regulations by voting ten mills for the former®® and
eight mills for the latter®? purposes, respectively, were
consequently declared null and void, with the advice that the
only rwnedy would be to hold other elections with oonstitutioneü. limits observed in the amounts of the levies.

However,

the provision was not retroactive— a larger tax voted prior
to the adoption of this constitution was not affected thereby.®®
Ambiguous statement of purpose not permissible.

If

special tax levies are to withstand contest, the purpose for
idiich the proceeds are to be used must be of an authorized
nature and must be so stated in definite propositions that

H ay

1, 1988, to April 30, 1930, p. 507.

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1981, art. 10, seo. 10.
to

Oninions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1. 1920.
hSsrpT^"*
---®?Ihid.. May 1, 1982, to May 1, 1924, p. 453.
®®Ihid., p. 730.
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the taxpayer in voting for one phase will not be entrapped
into approving another#

In terms of the ordinance ordering

a certain election, the proceeds were "to be used in issuing
certificates of indebtedness and equipping the public school
building in said district"; as expressed on the ballot, the
use was for "issuing certificates of indebtedness to build
and equip a public school building in said school district.
Evidence showed that the purpose was to issue certificates
as a means of securing money to pay the balance due on a
building already practically built and to defray costs not
disclosed to the taxpayer or to the courts, there being pro
vision for a balance much more than sufficient to retire the
indebtedness of the building.

On the grounds that the pur

pose was misleading, was not lawfully permitted, and had not
been submitted in full to the taxpayers, the levy was declared
void#

In issuing its decree the court emphasized some of the

fundamental policies it has upheld with respect to special
levies as follows;
As we have seen, however, the law does
not centupla te, or authorize, the incurring, by
the school boards, in one year, of debts to be
paid from the revenue of another year; nor does
the constitutional grant of author!^, to levy
special taxes for the additional support of the
public schools and the erection of public schoolhouses, authorize such a tax for the payment of
a debt already incurred, in disregard of the law
Which requires the budgeting of both revenues
and expenditures, and the keeping of the expenditurcs of each year within Its budgeted revenue

Walmrortli et al, t . J’aokson Farleh School Board et al.,
(1981) 149 La. 264, 88 So. 815.

149 La, 273.
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Irregularities in petition. resolution, and notiee.
When a petition tor a speoial election is properly presented
to a police jury or municipal authorities by at least onethird of the property taxpayers, it designates in writing
the object and amount of tax to be levied each year and the
number of years it is to run.^!

Upon the police juries or

the municipal authorities falls the responsibility of levying
each year a tax sufficient to pay the specified amount— the
rate is only to an extent sufficient to realize the necessary
amount#

Consequently, the court has held that failure of the

petition to specify the amount is sufficient error to annul
the results of an election.G8
The resolution calling an election— which election
according to statutory provisions in 1910®® is mandatory if
petitioned ^

one-fourth of the qualified property taxpayers

— is not valid if issued by minority board proceedings, and
a tax voted at an election so called is null and void.®*

The

minority proceedings in the ease at bar resulted from a par
tial attendance at the board meeting^ but the court did not
see this as any justification of illegal action and expressed
its policy thus:
The calling of the special meeting of
the board of school directors to be held within a

^^Acts of Louisiana, 1896, No. 131, secs. 1-8.
®®Bennatt et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1904) 113 La. 60,
36 So. 891.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1910, No. 856, seo. 8.
®*Pryor et al. v. Board of School Directors of Olaiborne
Parish, (1917) 141 La. 301, 74 So. 1002.
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time too short to permit all of the members to be
notified was not done with any improper motive in
this instance. The purpose in hurrying the pro
ceedings was to hold the election at the earliest
date possible, in order to have the speoial tax
extended upon the assessment rolls before they
would be closed. But we have to deal only with
the deed, not the motive. It will not do to sanc
tion proceedings whereby a minority of the members
of an executive board controlled its affairs by
voting at a special meeting of which the members
sdio did not vote against the proceedings were not
allowed an opportunity to vote at all.”®
Another defect in resolutions which rendered an accompanying
election null was the failure to describe the boundaries of
the contemplated district in suoh manner that the location on
an official parish map might be clearly determined.®®
Petitions, resolutions, and notices concerning
special tax levy elections may have varying requirements
according to the governing legislative acts, but idien they
treat of the same things they must be consistent.

In one

case®? brought before the courts, the resolution ordering
the election and the proclamation to be published named a
certain schoolhouse as the polling place, but in the publi
cation of the notice during the required thirty days®® no
polling place was named and the voters were left to find it
as best they could.

Also, the resolution stated the rate of

taxation to be used on the ballot as five mills but did not

141 La. 304.
**D.bll.uz at al. v. Board of Sohool Directors of
Natchitoches Parish, (1917) 148 La. 147, 76 So. 590.
®?Capps et al. v. Parish Board of School Directors of Winn
Parish, (1915) 138 La. 348, 70 So. 322.
®®Aets of Louisiana, 1910, No. 256, sec. 3.
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state the period of levy; the published notice of the election
gave the rate as ten mills and the period as ten years.

The

court held that these inoonsistenoies were errors and omis
sions amotmting to nonohservanoe of essential requirements
and that they placed the election outside of the law under
authority of tdiioh it was assumed to have been held; there
fore, the election was declared as of no legal effect.
Similar omlseione— failure to designate definite
voting place, the day, hour, and place when and where returns
would be received, ballots counted, and result declared— were

Bcasa of the principal reasons that a certain election held in
1912 was rendered illegal.®®

In a case in 1906 the failure

of the police jury to publish its resolution ordering the
election more than once, as provided In the governing act,100
was declared an irregularity.!®!
Although the courts may have decided that as a whole

an election was illegally and irregularly held and therefore
rendered null and void, they often point out that certain
allegations brought are Insignificant or not violative of any

law or regulations.

An illustration of this was the judicial

reply to a complaint!®^ against a notice idiloh read, "’For
the purposes of said elections the polling places will be

^^Davis et al. v. Board of Directors of Parish of Bienville,
(1912) 150 La. 786, 58 So. 572.
^®®Aets of Louisiana, 1886, No. 35, sec. 1.
^^^egard et al. v* Police Jury of Avoyelles, (1906) 117 La.
952, 42 So, 438.
!®^Slkins et al* v* Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
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the sehoolhouees of the respective school districts.’"!®®
It was shown In evidence that there was only one schoolhouse
in each district.

The court held that although the notice

applied to two elections, it was explicit and not confusing
and therefore was no fatal irregularity.

In another case,!®*

a similar minor irregularity was alleged to the effect that
the resolution contained two propositions while the ballot
contained only one.

By interpreting "or" es having an explana

tory meaning, equivalent to "in other words" and euoh phrases,
singleness of the proposition in the resolution was established.
However, the court criticized the resolution as not having
ideal precision but accepted it as being sufficiently definite
to serve the purpose.
Illegalities pertaining to election officials and
the polls. Upon the police jury falls the responsibility of
appointing one of the supervisors of an election; the other
two members are the registrar of voters and a person appointed
by the governor.

The failure of a police jury to perform this

duty is considered a disregard of policy and a lack of com
pliance with law by a subordinate authority.!®®

Although the

appointment of a person other than a school board member as
an election commissioner might be preferable, there Is no legal
regulation!®® which disqualifies the sohool board member to serve

138 La. 211.
et al. ▼. Board of Directors of Public Schools for
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 66 So. 629.
!®%hite Hall Agr. Co. et al. v. Police Jury of Concordia
Parish et al,, (1911) 128 La. 668, 55 So. 11.
106
Elkins et al. v. Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
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in this capacity#

The oommissionera and clerks of elections

must be sworn to perform all the duties encumbent on them as
such.

The failure of these officials to take the oath in the

manner prescribed by the governing statute!®? is classified
as a most serious irregularity.!®®
Legislation pertaining to the time of the opening and
closing of polls Is ordinarily considered directory— that is,
%Aen there are unsubstantial departures from the law, but this
does not apply sdien the omissions are so radical that it may be
proved that voters were thereby deprived of their votes suffi
cient in number and amount to change the result of the elec
tion,
those

In a contest on this point it is not necessary that
1&0

were deprived of voting specify the way in which they

would have voted; only is It necessary to establish that the num
ber was sufficient to have changed the results of the election.!^®
A lack of necessary commissioners, officials, and voters is no
Justification for irregular removal of the boxes from the polls
by those in charge.

In this connection the court has said*

Because a few voters at these two pre
cincts declined to act as commissioners is no good
or valid reason udiy these boxes should have been
removed before the hour for closing the polls ar
rived. Other voters appearing there might have

!®?Aets of Louisiana, 1910, No. 256, sec. 10.
^®®Oain et al. v. Vernon Parish School Board,(1918)
744, 77 So. 584.

142 La,

^®®Wiatley et al. v. La Salle Parish Sohool Board, (1924)
155 La. 797, 99 So. 603; TNhite et al. v. LivingstonParish
Sohool Board, (1927) 163 La. 266, 111 So. 700.
^®Whatley et al. v. La Salle Parish School Board, (1924)
155 La. 797, 99 So. 603.

185
elected oosmilseioners and proceeded with the elec
tion, had the boxe* been kept at the polling places,
and made accessible to the voters.!!^
Violative JBSsag-feSfflS la

a M voting.

Con-

o e m l % proceedings at the polls where elections for the levy
of speoial school taxes were being held the courts have had
to deal with some major and many detailed problems allegedly
violative of valid proceedings.

From the reasoning In the

various cases it appears that the court has striven to give
always the interpretation that is fairest to all parties in
volved and in so doing it has often disregarded minor irregu
larities; on the other hand, the court seems to have been
hesitant to establish precedent decisions which have a possi
bility of being reversed in subsequent oases.

Outstanding

among those procedures iMilch have been declared violative by
the courts are the following.
1• Failure to prepare list of voters correctly.

The

statute concerning the list of voters, as Involved in the Elkins
case,l!B prescribes as follows:
That it shall be the duty of the registrar of voters
to furnish the commissioners appointed to hold suoh
elections with the lists of taxpayers entitled to
vote in person or by proxy at such elections, to
gether with the valuation of each taxpayer’s property
as shown by the assessment roll last made and filed
prior to each election: provided that, when any
taxpayer’s name and valuation of property bh&ll be
omitted from suoh list or erroneously entered thereon
the commissioners of election shall have authority
to receive affidavits of such taxpayer’s right to

White et al, v, Livingston Parish Sohool Board, (1927)
163 La, 271.
^^Elkins et al, v. Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So, 99,
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vote and of the proper aaaeased valuation of his
property, which affidavit shall be attached to
auoh taxpayer’s ballot.!!®
Sridenoe disclosed that:
. . , a list of names without any valuation of
property, was furnished by a deputy elerk of court
to the local superintendent of the public schools,
fdio copied it, and, with the assistance of the
assessor, put the assessed valuation of the prop
erty of each taxpayer on the copy of the list,
and gave it to the commissioners of election.
After this unauthorized list or copy of the list,
containing only 28 names, furnished by the deputy
clerk of court, was delivered to the commissioners,
10 names were added with a pencil by an unauthor
ized person. And it does not appear that the
commissioners required any voter ^ o s e name was
thus added to the list to furnish an affidavit of
his right to vote,!!*
On the first hearing the court did not decree the election
null; it explained its decision thus:
There is very grave irregularity here,
the like of idiioh might, in an election on a
larger scale, give rise to endless difficulties
and complications at the poll; but in the election
in the small school district here in question (the
total list including the names added in pencil
coxsprising only 38 persons), where, doubtless,
every voter was acquainted with every other voter
and knew idiat property he had, no complications
arose, but the voting went on as regularly as if
the list had emanated from the true legal source
and had been duly certified, and no harm was done.
There is no allegation or contention that the
defectiveness of the list had any influence at
all upon even a single vote. Under these cir
cumstances we can see no sufficient reason why
the election should be set aside because of this
irregularity. There is no contention that the
persons whose names were added in pencil were not
entitled to vote at the election, and, no sugges
tion of fraud or ill practice, or of bad faith.ü ®

^^®Xcts of Louisiana, 1910, No. 256, sec, 6.
!!*Elkins et al. v. Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 218.
!!®Ibid♦. pp. 213-214.

187
In connection therewith several similar decisions were cited
in idiich the results of an election were not set aside where
votes irregularly received were later shown to be legal or
were not sufficient to change the announced result of the
election#!!®

However, on a rehearing, seven months later,

the court reversed its decree, explaining its action as
follows:
On reconsideration of the plaintiff’s
complaint, that the list of property taxpayers,
hy which the commissioners were governed in con
ducting this election, was made and furnished by
an unauthorized person, we have concluded that,
although no actual fraud has been shown in this
case, our approval of the illegal or irregular
proceedings by which this tax was imposed might
establish an unwise and harmful precedent#

This illegality in the proceedings
warrants the annulment of the tax#!!”
Very similar irregularities in the preparation of
the list of voters and in allowing those with questionable
rights to vote without attaching affidavits of their rights
to their ballots were practiced in an election the results of
idiich were brought for adjudication in 1918#!!®

% e court,

Smith V# Parish Board of Sohool Directors, (1910) 125 La#
987, 52 So# 122; McWilliams et al# v# Board of Directors of
Iberville Parish et al#, (1911) 128 La# 422, 54 So# 928; Endom
et al. V. City of Monroe et al*, (1904) 112 La. 779, 36 So# 681;
Flores et al# v# Police Jury of De Soto Parish et al#, (1906)
116 La# 428, 40 So. 786.
^?Sllclns et al. v. Board of School Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 217-218#
^ ® C a i n et al. v. Vernon Parish Sohool Board, (1918) 142 La.
744, 77 So. 584.
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in decreeing this election null, explained the serioueneea of
such Tiolations thus:
Suoh a gross yiolation of the election
law is so flagrant, and admits of suoh opportunities
of fraud, idiere every provision of the law should
be adhered to, so as to insure the solemn decision
of the taxpayers at the election, that it vitiates
the election, although no fraud is shown
8. Xrregularlties in ballots and balloting. When
there is statutory prescription of the form of ballot to be
used in special tax elections, this regulation must be met.
If a board disregards this and uses a form of its own devising,
sueh violation is considered one of the grounds sufficient
for annulling the election.!®®
Although

statutory enactments concerning special

school tax elections have changed from time to time, both
these and the constitution have always contemplated that each
elector shall do his own voting, without advice, suggestion,
or interference from the commissioners or other persons.
Exceptions for various groups have been made— for example,
Act No# 131 of 1896 permitted women taxpayers to vote by
proxy.

Gross abuse of voting rights was practiced et an

election where the property valuations voted on, with the
exception of two affirmative votes totaling $570 and 64 nega
tive votes totaling $83,667, which had their valuations upon
the ballots, were entered upon the tally sheets after the
closing of the polls.

The entry was made by one of the com-

Ü ^Ibld.. 142 La. 746.
!®®Davis et al. v. Board of Directors of Parish of Bienville,
(1912) 130 La. 786, 58 S o * 572.
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ml88lomer8#"^the other two having previously retired^-the clerk>
and soae other persons; the amounts were ascertained, not from
the then existent assessment rolls, hut from a proposed assess
ment whleh one of the commissioners^ who was also a deputy
assessor, had in his possession*

One amount was filled in the

next day by the clerk and an outsider, after conference with
the voter.

The statute in force at that time, Act î^o* 151 of

1698, did not specifically require that the amount of the prop
erty valuation he expressed upon the face of tie ballot, but
It was certainly Intended that the pecuniary vote should be
determined by the voter, or at least by the public records,
and not by the commissioners of election.

In issuing its decree

the court said that while no fraud was imputed to any of the
parties concerned, in the Interest of Justice and from a proper
regard for the principles of our government the result should
not be allowed to s t a n d S i m i l a r abuse but in a milder
degree, perhaps, was the charge in a case about three years
later.
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Therein the voters placed their names upon the

ballots, and the commissioners at the close of the election
by reference to the assessment roll ascertained the amount of
property voted by each.

With respect to this the court said;

In com%)liance with the spirit of the law,
the voter should, at the time he presents himself
to vote, satisfy the commissioners regarding the
amount of property he desires to vote. He should

^ ^ B e n n e t t et al. v. Staples et al., (1903) 110 La* 847, 34
So. 801.
962,

et al. v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, (1906) 117 La.
42 So. 438.
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specify or cause to be specified on hie ballot the
property which he wishes to have counted as a part
of his vote as a property taxpayer.
It seems that the legislature in 1910, having seen
the trouble which had arisen from time to time over the proper
method of deteimining the amount of property valuation voted,
sought to reduce litigation thereupon and uncertainty of pro
mulgation by incorporating in section Ü of Act Ho. 256 the
requirement that the amount voted ^ o uld be stated on the
ballot#

The court upheld the letter of the law in that respect

when, in correcting the returns of an election, it held that
the amount voted must have been stated in the blank left on
the ballot for that purpose but not ascertained by some in
ference,1^4
3.

Controversies pertaining to voting of property.

for determining the valuation of property of those seeking to
vote, the 1910 legislature made definite provision by specifying
the last assessment roll as the legal

b a s i s ,

^^5

Concerning

the establishment of the ownership of property there has been
enacted no such definite and simple provision; therefore, to
the commissioners and often to the courts is left the problem
of determining who is entitled to vote as a "property taxpayer.”
By the constitution and by legislative enactments the voters
are required to be property taxpayers, and the meaning as In
terpreted by the courts is that he who votes must be a property

123pbia,, 117 La. 956.
et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 68 So. 629.
^2^Aots of Louisiana, 1910, Ho. 256, sec. 4.
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taxpayer at the time of voting and not. merely assessed with
the property he offers to vote.^2®

Thus, often the commis

sioners have the responsibility of determining ownership to
property before permitting a vote thereon.

The legislative

aots have provided that affidavits establishing a claimed
right to vote may be accepted by the commissioners for veri
fication by proper authorities.

Nevertheless, many disagreements

have arisen at the polls concerning the amount individuals were
entitled to vote and not infrequently^ some have found their way
through the lower courts to the higher court for adjudication*
Illustrations of this are the following decisions which have
been pronounced in various cases.
The surviving spouse, whether husband or wife, who
is the usufructuary of the property belonging to the community
of acquêts and gains at one time existent, and in whose name
it is assessed, is entitled to vote the same*

This holds when

the oecmunity is unsettled and when no proof is made that the
community owes any

d e b t s , ^ 2 7

However, a surviving husband may

vote only cne-helf of an assessment in his name representing
community property which was acquired by his deceased wife
during marriage and v/hich estate has been settled; the other
half vests in the heirs of his wife.128

Smith V, Perish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 La*
987, 52 So. 122; Elkins et al* v* Board of School Directors of
Parish of Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
127peck et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 68 So, 629; Elkins
at al. V. Board of School Directors of Parish of Union, (1915)
138 La. 207, 70 So, 99.
^28peck at al* v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 68 So. 629.
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A married woman la entitled to vote property asseased
in her name where it is not shown that it waa acquired during
the existence of the c o m m u n i t y , b u t her husband is not al
lowed to vote such property except when properly authorized
The etatute^®^ governing this authorization provides that bal
lots voted by proxy shall be signed by both the taxpayer and
her proxy; in one instance, however, the attachment of the power
of attorney to the ballot was held as sufficient identification
when the proxy had failed to endorse the b a l l o t , I f the
description on the assessment role indicates that property Is
situated outside the district, parol evidence may be admitted
to show error in the situs of the real estate,^®®

The proper

method of determining the value of a deduction, made necessary
by an incorrect inclusion of a number of acres in a tract
valued ^

globe, is— in the absence of proof of the assessed

value of the particular acreage— by means of aggregation In
terms of the average assessment per acre.l®*
That the adjudication of questions Involving property
vote at special tax elections had become burdensome to the

^®*Bennett et al# v# Staples at al,, (1903) 110 la, 847, 34
So, 801.
^®®Slkins et al, v. Board of School Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
^^Acts of Louisiana, 1910, Ho, 256, see, 11.
^®Slkins et al, v. Board of School Directors of Parish of
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So, 99.
l®®Ibid.
^ t p e c k et al, v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La, 334, 68 So. 629.
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courts Is shorn hy the statement of Justice Olivier 0*
Provosty in 1915, as follows:
Out of 76 votes cast at this election 24
were contested, necessitating an investigation of
the land titles of the voters, and, incidentally,
examination and study of succession settlements,
community of acquêts and gains settlements, and
tutorship settlements, Fortunately for this court
the number of contests was reduced by the sifting
process through which they passed in the lower
court to the comparatively few hereinabove consid
ered, Would that the Constitution could be so
amended as to preserve the courts from the burden
of these tax election oases by letting the regis
tration and assessment rolls be, in the absence
of fraud, the sole and final tests of the qualifi
cations of the voter; and would that political
election cases could be relegated to some other
more appropriate tribunal
Restrictions concerning promulgation of election
and the levying ordinance.

Consistently the court has held

that the police jury is the authority to promulgate special
tax elections for schools.

When an attempt was made to secure

the ruling that the secretary of state is the proper authority
for such promulgation, the response was;
This court has never held heretofore that the
Secretary of State Is the officer
should make
the promulgation in special tax elections for
schools, • • • In order to decide that the police
jury is not the proper authority, but that the
Secretary of state should make the promulgation,
we would have to find that the general election
law is all controlling, • • • We think that the
promulgation by the Secretary of State in a gen
eral election or in an election under a general
law is one of those not applying to special elec
tion laws.*®®

137 La. 348.
Hall Agp. Co. et al, ▼. F o U e e Jury of Concordia
Farlah at al., (1911) 128 La. 676.
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Also, the polios jury has no authority to delegate its power
of promulgation; it must perform this duty Itself,1®?

When

ever a promulgation is contested and there is the claim that
the attack is prescribed, the term of prescription must begin
with the date of promulgation which is legally accepted, and
idien the police jury has recognized one date of promulgation
it ean scarcely be heard to claim another,^®^
In answer to the charge that a tax ordinance failed
to specify the term, or designate the year, or years, for which
the tax was to be levied, the court gave interpretation to the
governing statute— sections 3 and 3 of Act No* 151 of 1698, as
amended and re-enacted by Act No, 145 of 1904— as follows:
Construing the two sections together, we interpret
them to mean that, immediately upon obtaining the
authority of the taxpayers, by means of the special
election, it was the duty of the police jury to levy
the special tax so authorized, for the period of time
specified in the petition of the taxpayers, with des
ignation of the years included in such period; and
thereafter, annually, in conformity with section 5,
to levy and collect the tax for each of the years so
designated* It would, of course, be impossible to
hold that the police jury are not required to conform
to the law, since they have no authority to act in
the premises, at all, save to the extent, and in
the manner, that the law authorizes.1®#
Since it was sustained that the ordinance was lacking in the
respects alleged, the court decreed it void and of no effect.
Failure of tax consequent to failure of purpose,
The effect which the abolition of a district has upon the levy

128 La. 868, 58 So. 11.

^®®ïols* at al. ▼. Folio* Juiy and School Board of Iberville
Parish, (1911) 128 La. 1086.
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lAiloh its taxpayers have authorized was established in 1911.140
After the school board of Sabine Parish had consolidated three
school districts into one high school district, it found that
the ten-mill special levy voted would not be sufficient but
failed in the passage of an additional five-mill tax necessary
for support*

The board, finding itself without the necessary

funds for carrying out the high school project, and under im
plied authority of the actl^l which empowered it to create the
district, rescinded its action of creation.

However, it et-

tenpted to continue collecting the voted ten-mill levy until
legally enjoined from so doing*

The court pointed out that

the power to abolish the district carries with it as a neces
sary consequence the power to abolish the tax, since the tax
remains without an object after the school district has been
abolished and that a tax without an object is a legal impos
sibility.

Thus, It was established that vhere a district has

been dissolved, the special tax levied for it falls and must
not be collected; otherwise, the proceeds would accumulate in
the treasury from year to year without its being possible to
put them to any use.
The Law Governing the Issuance of Bonds for School Purposes
Since the beginning of the present century the is
suance of bonds for "acquiring lands for building sites and

^^^Moore V. Board of Directors of Sabine Parish, (1912) 131
La. 757, 60 So. 234.
lêlj^Qts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 15.
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playgrounds, and for purchasing, erecting, enlarging or im
proving school buildings and teachers* homes, and acquiring
the necessary equipment and furnishings therefor"^42
an established practice,143

become

The parish school boards, as they

are authorized by the law and directed by the qualified voters
of their respective territories, are the governing bodies in
b o M issuing procedures.^44

significant this phase of

educational finance has become is shown by the facts that the
state sold only $268,673 worth of such bonds In 1910-1911 as
compared with $4,633,749 in 1929-1930, and that In 1931-1932
her total indebtedness for outstanding bonds was $28,076,286.^45
Constitutiona 1 authority.

The constitutionality of

school bonds in general and of the accompanying tax levy was
attached in 1913.^46

The court, in establishing the validity

of the bonds and in answer to the contention that article 281
of the Constitution of 1898 did not authorize school districts
to incur debt and issue bonds at all, presented article 281 as
originally enacted, and explained the successive amendments
proposed through Acts Nos. 186 of 1904, 122 of 1906, and 197

^4®Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 14, sec. 14(b).
^4®opinipns of the Attorney General of Louisiana; May 1,
1906, to May 1, ltfl6, pp.™ 280, 1&64; I k y 1, 1930, to April 30,
1932, p. 471.
^44jy^,s May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 479; May 1, 1930,
to April 50, 1932, p. 474.
^4®gtate Deuartment of Education of Louislana. Eighty-fourth
Annual Èêuort. for the Session 1"5?2%33T in. 14-15.
^46goard of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Lincoln

V. Huston State Bank, (1913) 133 La. 109, 62 So. 492.
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of 1910,

The act of 1906 added school districts to the list

of districts that might avail themselves of the opportunity to
issue bonds; the act of 1910 amended to the extent that the
article was practically recast.

Since many of the contested

points in bond issues have foundation or explanation in the
revision according to the 1910 act, the part p^taining to
the authorization of bonds and their accompanying tax levy is
quoted in full, as by the court:
Municipal Corporations, parishes or school,
drainage, subdrainage, road, navigation, "or sewerage
districts, the City of Hew Orleans excepted, herein
after referred to as subdivisions," when authorized
to do so, by a vote of a majority in number and
amount of the property taxpayers, qualified to vote
under the Constitution and laws of this State, who
vote at an election held for that purpose, after
due notice of said election has been published for
thirty (30) days in the official journal of the
munieipal corporation or parishes, and where there
is no official journal, in a newspaper published
therein, may "through their respective governing
authorities," incur debt and issue negotiable bonds
therefor, and each year while any bonds Issued to
evidence said indebtedness are outstanding, the
governing authorities of such subdivision shall
levy and collect annually, in excess of all other
taxes, a tax sufficient to pay the interest, annu
ally or semi-annually, and the principal falling
due each year, or such amount as may be required
for any sinking fund provided for the payment of
said bonds at maturity provided, that such special
taxes, for all purposes, shall not in any year ex
ceed ten (10) mills on the dollar of the assessed
valuation of the property in such subdivisions.
No bonds shall be issued for any other
purpose than that stated in the submission of the
proposition to the taxpayer, and published for
thirty (30) days as aforesaid, or for a greater
amount than that therein mentioned; nor shall
such bonds be issued for any other purpose than for
constructing, improving and maintaining public roads
and highways, paving and improving streets, roads
and alleys, purchasing or constructing systems of
waterworks, sewerage, drainage, navigation, lights,
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public parka and buildings, together with all
necessary equipments and furnishing, bridges and
other works of public improvement, the title to
which shall rest in the subdivision creating the
debt, as the case may be; * , ,*47
The conclusion of the court was that school districts have
constitutional authority to incur debt and issue bonds.
Although the issuance of bonds is recognized as a
constitutional privilege, an issue is valid only as long as
it meets the requirements of the constitution under which it
was made.

By 1921 there was no constitutional specification

of the limit of special taxes to be levied for bonds.

Charges

presented in 1928^48 were against the attempted levying of a
special property tax of two mills in addition to an admitted
ten-mill special property tax to pay certain bonds issued in
1920,

The court’s decree upheld the plaintiffs* contention

and there was the explanation that since the bonds were issued
under the authority of the Constitution of 1913,149 which
specified a ten-mill limit, that limit continued with the
bonds in question,
Unoonstitutionality of bonds based on a tax levy for
another purpose.

The right and duty of the legislature to

provide for the administration of the issuance of bonds is
recognized constitutionally, but its enactments must not be
in conflict with the constitution.

One act dealing with bonds

^4^Const!tution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 281, as amended by
Act No. 197 of 1910, adopted November, 1910,
^48Tremont Lumber Go. v. Bond et al,, (1928) 166 La, 125,
116 So, 723; Tremont & Gulf Railway Co, v, T, H, Bond et al.,
(1928) 166 La. 128, 116 So, 724,
149
Constitution of Louisiana, 1913, art. 281.
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seemfi to have been the eause of much confusion end mi sunderstanding.

This was Aot No. 04 of 1906 which authorized parishes,

municipal corporations, and parish boards of school directors,
Orleans Parish excepted, to issue bonds for certain public pur
poses to be secured by special taxes voted under article 23S of
the Constitution of 1898.

That article provided for special

taxes to give additional support to public schools and to meet
the cost of the construction of public schoolhouses when voted
by a majority of the property taxpayers of the school district*
In several cases the unconstitutionality of this aot
was alleged, but it was not acted upon by the court because
of various technical errors in the presentation of the con
tention.^®®

Finally, in May, 1911, the attack was properly

presented to the court*

The objection which was charged was

that the aot conflicted with article 361 of the Constitution
of 1898 which alone authorized the issuance of bonds by school
I

d i s t r i c t s A f t e r presenting the pertinent parts of each
article, the court gave the comparison:
Construing these provisions as parts of
the same instrument, it is clear that, although
article 232 permits property owners by a majority
vote to impose taxes on their property to an un
limited extent, for the support of schools and the
building of schoolhouses and other works of public
improvement, article 281 confers upon the corpora
tions and quasi corporations, of which such property
owners may be members, the power to incur debt and
to issue bonds by an affirmative grant, which im
plies that they would not possess that power unless

Folse et al. V. Polloe Juiy et al., (1210) 125 La. 603,
51 So. 650; Waggnep et al. t . Felloe Jury of Parish, of Jefferson
et al., (1910) 125 La. 863, 51 So. 1016.
IGlfoiae et al. t . Felloe Jury and School Board of Iberville
Parish, (1911) 128 La. 1080, 55 So. 681.
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it was so conferred I and idiloh power, as thus con
ferred , is restricted and regulated in several im
portant particulars, so that no one could reasonably
argue that the power of the corporations and quasi
corporations to incur debt and issue bonds is as
broad as the power of the property owners to impose
taxes on their property.*®®
Continuing, it showed the conflict of the aot in question as
follows:
The Act No. 84 of 1906 appears, however,
to ignore that difference, and purports to confer
on "parishes, municipal corporations and parish
boards of school directors" the power to fund into
bonds the proceeds of all taxes which the taxpayers
may impose upon their property under article 232
of the Constitution; and, as that article does not
purport to deal with the questions of the incurring
of debt and the issuing of bonds by such bodies,
and hence imposes no restrictions with regard thereto,
neither does the aot impose any restrictions, save
that it limits the interest on the bcmds which it
authorizes to be issued (up to the amount to be
realized from the special tax, whatever that amount
may be) to 5 per cent., requires the interest to
be paid emnually, or semiannually, and requires
that the special tax shall be dedicated to their
payment^and shall not be diverted until they are
Therefore, it was concluded that Aot No. 84 of 1906 was in
irreconcilable conflict with the constitution and void.

In

general, this meant that bonds could not be issued upon the
basis of a special tax authorized by the taxpayer, but that
the issuance of bonds must be according to controlling or
ganic law.
Necessity for legal creation of district.

Prior to

the issuance of bonds the school district must have been
definitely created and identified as such.

IG&ibid.. 188 L a . 1088.
pp. 1088-1089.

In article 381 of
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the Constitution of 1913 eohool dletriots are expressly named
as authorized to issue bonds, and under an act of 191S^®4
school board has authority to divide a parish into school
districts with limits fixed as its discretion deems best.
However, the mere conferring of the power upon the school board
does not within itself create districts— definite action must
have been pursued and records made to establish the fact that
a territory is a school district.

In one contest^®® on this

point the court admitted that the term, "district," is broad
enough to include a ward, in the sense that the limits of a
school district may be as extensive as those of a ward, but
explained that a police jury, or justice of the peace, or
municipal

ward, cannot possibly be brought within the meaning

of the term, "school district," and emphasized that it is the
"school district" which is authorized to issue bonds.
In another case the court decreed of no effect the
election held in, and the bonds Issued by, an illegally created
district.

The districts involved overlapped existing districts

within the parish; districts thus located were held to be
violative of section 2 of Act Ho. 152 of 1920.^®®
When the validity of bonds has been questioned, the
court has placed upon the defendant school board the respon
sibility of proving the legal creation of the district which

^®4j^ots of Louisiana, 1912, No. 214, sec. 13.
^®®Eemler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La.
133, 76 So. 585.
l**Elnton et al. v. Winn Parieh School Board, (1984) 155 La.
666, 99 So. 583.
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it was u p h o l d i n g o n the other hand, plaintiffs have h e m
held responsible for proving the illegality of creation after
they had recognized the district in their petition.

Valid purposes for bond issues.

The court’s theory

seems to have been that since laws authorizing a debt to be
created against the taxpayer, or his property to be taken,
without his consent, are in derogation of common right, they
are to be construed strictly.

In 1913 legal sanction was given

to the issuance of bonds for the purpose of financing the con
struction end equipment of an agricultural and domestic science
building and for purchasing a site for it.

The court held

that this purpose, "school buildings," was sufficiently im
plied in the statute authorizing the issuance of \)onds and
that the authority for construction necessarily carried with
it the authority to buy the site.I®#

Again, in 1922,^®® the

school building was decreed as a valid puxpooe for a bond
issue.
Adherence to the law in the opposite sense— that is,
in forbidding bond issuance for an unauthorized purpose— was
upheld by the oourt^®^ in its refusal to recognize the purchase

^®%#mler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La.

133, 76 So. 585.
^®®Milton et al. v. Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922)
152 La. 761, 94 So. 386.
^^Boerd of Directors of Public Schools of Perish of Lincoln

V. Buston State Bank, (1913) 133 La. 109, 62 So* 492.
^®®Mllton et al, v* Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922) 152
La. 761, 94 So. 386.
^®%©mler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La.

133, 76 90. 585.
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Of an agriouXtwal faim as a valid basis of a bond issue,
% e r e m s the explanation that the levying of taxes for such
purposes was granted neither hf article 261 of the Constitu
tion of 1913, authorising bond issues, nor by article 232 of
the same constitution, providing for giving additional support
to publie schools.

The principles of agriculture as a

quired subject^®® was interpreted to have reference to the
theoretical part as contained in the scdiool books, and this
requiremwit was held to be no more justification of the Issu
ance of bonds to purchase an agricultural farm than the teaching
of zoology would justify the purchase of a zoo for instructional
purposes.

In the court’s expression of its views there was

nothing to indicate that it did not see the merit of highly
specialized equipment for public school instruction; it merely
stated, "The time may come when these extensions will be in
cluded in our public school system but It has not yet ar-

riT,a."l*3
limitations pertaining %o bond issues,

^ e bond

issue article of the Constitution of 1896 as amended in 1910^®^
provided that the governing authority issuing bonds should levy
and collect annually in excess of all other taxes a tax suffi
cient to pay the principal end interest falling due each year,
such special taxes not to exceed in any year ten mills on the
162
Acts of Louisiana, 1910, Ho. 306, sec, 1.
^^Eemler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La. 137,
^®*Constitution of Louisiana, .1696, art. 281, as amended by
Act Ho. 197 of 1910, adopted November, 1910.

204
dollar of the assessed valuation*

This provision was legalized

in 1913 in the decree that there was no violation in a levy of
seven and one-half mills laid for such purposes, although there
was in existence a five-mill tax for schools levied under ar
ticle 238.

The bond issue provision was held not affected by

a levy under another organic authorization*^®®

The regulations

of the amendment were continued through incorporation In the
Constitution of 1913*^®®

The annual bond issue levy on this

basis was not affected by the constitutional amendments of
1918 delimiting special taxes, for, as interpreted by the
attorney general, the first of the amendments specifically
excepted a levy for this purpose, and the second dealt with
taxes authorized under another article of the constitution*!®?
Before the passage of the 1910 amendment electors
were duly authorized to specify the annual levy at the time
they authorized the issue.

When as a result of increase in

the valuation of the property, this levy produced a surplus
sufficient to retire the bonds, the authorities were advised
to discontinue the levy although the term had not expired—
the purpose of the levy had been served and the fund could not
be diverted*!®®

However, in the Instance of a surplus acou-

!®®Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Lincoln

V. Ruston State Bank, (1913) 133 La. 109, 62 So. 492.
IddConetitution of Louisiana, 1913, art* 281.
!®?Ibid., as amended by Acts Nos, 191 and 218 of 1918, adopted
November, 1910; Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana*
U a j 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. %95*
IdSp-piniona of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1910,
to M a y 1, iéÏ2, p. 466,
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mklated on an issue authorized after tbs 1910 enactment, the
governing officials were told that they had violated the law
in specifying an annual levy— that had the "sufficient amount"
been laid each year there would have been no surplus*

As a

solution for the situation, they were advised to apply the sur
plus to payment of the first bonds that matured and to modify
the method of levying so as to provide only the amount needed
annually,!®®
The amount of bonds which a district may vote upon
itself is regulated by the constitution of the state— the
maximum must not exceed ten per cent of the assessed valuation
of the taxable property of the school district according to
the current assessment,!?®

This provision was the basis of

an attack on a proposed bond issue of #60,000,

Evidence sub

stantiated the valuation of all the property within the dis
trict to be #710,000,

Consequently, the court held the amount

of issue as clearly within the constitutional limits,!?!
Interpretations of bond elections,

Many controver

sies on various phases of the bond election seem to have been
brought both to the courts and to the attorneys general of
the state.

Some of the adjudications based thereon have been

merely that there must be compliance with the governing statute;
in other oases the decision has depended almost entirely on

May 1, 1914, to Mey 1, 1916, p. 390.
^

Ooastltutlon of louiaiane, 1921, art. 14, see. 14(f)

l^^Gauthlar et al. ▼. Farlah Sehool Board of Farlah of
ATOyalles, (1928) 165 La. 256, 115 So. 479.
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the oourt’s view of the point in contest.

The following are

those which seem to he the chief laws on this subject as thus
established.
The official publication of the voting date for
t h i r ^ days prior to the time of the election is an essential
feature.!?®

In fact, this notice "is so indispensable that

the absence of it is not a mere irregularity, but a nullity."!?®
On the other hand, harmless errors, such as the use of the
wrong year in the notice when there were several indications
of the correct date, have received no consideration in deter
mining the validity of the election.!?^

The designation of

certain small settlements as polling places without naming
any particular house or lot is sufficient notice of place of
election idiere it is not shown that this method resulted in
confusion for anyone who wished to vote.!?®
Upon the registrar of voters rests the responsi
bility of furnishing the official list of voters for a bond
election.

When the law required merely that the registrar

should furnish such list, the attack that the list was not
signed by the registrar tut by one who prepared it and signed
as "deputy registrar" received no consideration from the court

!?®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1,
1918, to gay lT"!5M, p. l78^.
!?®St. Landry Parish School Board v. Laroade, (1921) 148
La. 785.
!?^Ibid.. 148 La. 738, 87 So. 726.
!?®Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1923)
154 La. 242, 97 So. 430.
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after it was determined that no harm had resulted therefrom.!?®
The governing statute declared as follows in regard to such
irregularities j
No defect or irregularity in or omission
from the list of voters furnished by the registrar
of voters hereunder shall affect the validity of
the election, unless it be established that voters
were thereby’deprived of votes sufficient in number
and aigoÿnt to have changed the result of the elecWhenever the registrar examines a list prepared by another—
for example, an abstracter^-then makes the necessary corrections
end additions, and signs it, his signature is considered as
sufficient evidence of his approval^ and such action is held
to comply with statutory requirements,!?®
The qualification of residence of those who vote
at bond elections is that required by the statute In force at
the time,

A voter who spends a considerable part of his time

within a precinct and retains his citizenship there is entitled
to vote at an election therein, although he may remain the
greater part of the time outside the precinct.!?®

The time

limit of residence must be that required by statute, but the
territorial limits of a voting precinct for a bond election
may vary at the discretion of the governing board, for in
that body’s power to name polling places is Implied the power

l?*Ibid.
!??Acts of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1921, No. 46, sec. 14*
^^®8ylvestre et al, v. St, Landry Parish School Board, (1927)
164 La. 804, 113 So. 816.
!?^Ouimlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1922,
to Ifey 1, Ï9 S 4 , p, 461.
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to define the preoinots therefor.

He who has the required

residence in the territory of the improvised precinct is en
titled to vote, even If the polling place is outside his police
Jury precinct.!®®

This applies only when the polling place

is within the parish in which one has residence, for neither
is the school hoard empowered to create a precinct composed
of parts of two parishes nor is the voter permitted to leave
his parish to vote.!®!
Several occurrences at the polls have been upheld,
condemned, or treated as minor irregularities.
to the oath of commissioners, one decree was;

With respect
"The failure of

the commissioners to take an oath before the proper officer,
or to take one at all, will not vitiate an election; it is a
mere irregularity."!®2

The statement on the ballot of a propo

sition to levy a special tax for the issuance of bonds is
considered single and to be voted for or against as a whole.!®®
The court pointed to the error of submitting such a question
in two propositions thus:
While it is true as an abstract proposition that
the tax may have been authorized without the bond
issue, such a tax without a bond issue would have
defeated the purpose of the taxpayers to provide
funds for the immediate construction of a high
school building.!®4

^®8ylvestre et al. v. St. Landry Parish School Board, (1927)
164 La. 204, 113 So. 816.
!®^Milton et al, v. Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922) 162
La. 761, 94 So. 386.
!®®Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1923)
134 La. 242, 97 So. 430.
!®®McWilliams et al. v. Board of Directors of Iberville
Parish et al., (1911) 126 La. 488, 54 So. 928.

128 La. 425.
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Advice relative to the eomtemt of the proposition for a bond
issue has been to the effeet that it must state with regard to
the debts

the object, the number of years it is to run, and

the Mste of interest.!®®

He who votes mist own the property

voted at the time of the election*!®®

One who does not know

how to sign the ballot may vote a valid ticket by having his
vote properly signed by another in his presence#!®?
A bond issue requires for its passage the affirmative
majority vote of both the qualified taxpaying electors and of
the valuation of the property voted#

The policy of the court

has been to decide upon the validity of contested votes when
a change in the status of those votes could in ax%y way affect
the results of the election#

In the Milton case corrections

by the court changed the results to the extent that a question
vhich had been announced as having carried was pronounced as
defeated.!®®

On the other hand, the validity of contested

votes has not been passed upon udien those votes were so small
in number and property valuation and so cast that the results
of the election would have remained the same regardless of the
decision about the validity of the various votes.!®*

The

Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1. 1916.
to Meÿ ï r W ï a 7 " p T T 2 & ; ' "
^®Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1923) 154 La,
842, 97 So. 430.

^ *Ihid.
^ ^ M l t o n et al. ▼. Linooln Parish School Board, (1922) 152
La. 761, 94 So. 386.
!®^Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1935) 164
La# 242, 97 So. 430% ^Iveetre et al. v. St. Landry Parish
School Board, (1987) 164 La# 804, 113 So# 818*
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failure of the hoard to execute the formal prooese verbal at
the time the return a are canvassed and promulgated does not
annul the election.

Mandamus would lie to compel the board

to perform such duty but only after the failure to perform in
the time stated*!^®
Legal limitations of oomnlaints.

Persons who vote

for bond issues have no right under the law to complain later
of illegal!ties therein,!®!

The legal policy in this respect

has been thus explained:
Thie court has often recognized, as a sound princi
ple, that it would be inequitable and unjust to the
public to allow one who has voted or petitioned for
the levy of a special tax to complain afterwards
that the proceedings were illegal,!®8
Before a parish sehool board determines the tax levy necessary
for a certain year to pay the principal end interest falling

due, complaints that the tax is excessive cannot be considered,!®^
When bids to purchase school bonds have been accepted
by the sehool district as a contract, the law compels the purA a e e r to cosily with his bid.

The purchaser’s right to refuse

compliance on the basis of illegalities involved is granted,
of course, but in that, even, there must be conformity to the
law.

Thus, did the court reason in a case on this issue where

the bidder for the bonds did not bring his charges within the

!®®Bradford et al, v. Grant Pariah School Board, (1923) 154
La, 242, 97 So, 430.
!®!pya2 ler et al# v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of
Parish of Franklin, (1923) 163 La, 1083, 97 So. 199.
^ Slbld.. 153 La. 1086,
Gauthier at al. ▼. Parish Sohool Board of Parish of
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La. 256, 115 So. 479.
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sixty days prescribed for that purpose and thereby lost the
opportunity of resoinding his purchase.!®^
Preaeription on bond elections.

Legal provision

lAiah would make bonds secure after a reasonable length of
time— that is, by prescription— is but fair to those who issue
them and those who buy them.

In the absence of suoh provision

a bond election is definitely promulgated only after it has
been adjudicated by the court*

The number of protests which

have reached the courts is clearly indicative of the need for
clarification of the law by fundamental provision rather than
by supreme court decisions.
In a case of lOSS^^® the court took opportunity to
review the development which led to the prescriptive provisions
of the 1921 Constitution with respect to bond Issues; according
thereto the following were the chief contests and legislative
measures which seem to have prompted organic action on this
question.

In 1909 a bond issue for a certain railway enter

prise was declared null and the collection of the taxes was
thereby forbidden after a lapse of more than two years from
the date of election and after the railway was in operation.
In this connection, the court said:

"Thus the railroad did

not get its taxes; but the people of the ’police jury ward’
got the railroad, since it could not move away*"!®®

The next

!®^St. Landry Parish School Board v. Laroade, (1921) 148 La.
733, 87 So. 728.
!®®Roberts et al. v. Evangeline Parish Sohool Board, (1923)
155 La. 331, 99 So. 280.
!®®Ibld.. 156 La. 334.
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year the legislature attempted to prevent such occurences in
the future by providing a prescriptive term of sixty days from
date of promulgation of the election*!®?

Recognition of this

statute by some court oases and disregard of it by others when
the constitutionality of a tax was involved were pointed out.
Although it was not included in the court's summary, another
ruling in point was when the plaintiffs contesting a school
bond election In 1921 were met with the decree that they had
delayed too long in bringing their charges against an election
held in January, 1919.!®®

with respect to the problem which

thus confronted the Constitutional Convention of 1921 and its
action thereon, the 1923 court said:
It was in this condition of uncertainty,
and of vacillation on the part of the court, that
the convention of 1921 met. It was as well known
to the members of that convention as it is to the
members of this court that no bond issue by any
public body in this state could be negotiated unless
and until this court has passed finally upon that
particular bond issue; as fully appears from corre
spondence in this transcript and in others that have
come before us.
Accordingly, that body, vdiich alone had
power to give jurisdiction or withhold it from the
courts, adopted paragraph (n) of section 14, art,
14, aforesaid. And that paragraph, in terms too
plain to be mistakable, clearly withholds Juris
diction from the courts of this state after 60 days.

The Constitution therefore declares in
plain terms that after 60 days the bonds and taxes
shall be conclusively held to be valid, that no one
shall have the right to question their validity,
that no court shall have authority to entertain
any controversy over their validity.

!®?Acts of Louisiana, 1910, Ho. 256, sec. 17.
!®®St, Landry Parish School Board v, Laroade, (1921) 148
La. 733, 87 So. 728.
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And it seems to us that language oould
not be used to express more strongly the very patent
intention of the constitutional convention, to wit,
that after 60 days have jslapsed without any attack
upon a bond issue and tax voted by property taxpayers
under color of law. any person may safely purchase
such bonds and feel secure that the taxes levied to
pay them will be sustained by the courts of this
state. The constitutional convention had the right
to say this: it did say it, end that is the end of
the matter.!*®
This review of the development of prescription as
a measure of safety came by way of explanation when a major
ityof the supres» court sustained the plea of prescription
made by a defendant school board to bar the action, of plain
tiffs idiose suit against an election and bond issue was
#

brought more than sixty days after the promulgation of the
results of the election.®®^

Thus, it seems that the pro

visions for protection end permanence of special levies and
bonds were not satisfactorily made until the action by the
Constitutional Convention of 1921, but that the organic law
idiich came into existence thereby is unhesitatingly recognized
by the courts as a definite means to prevmt the Jeopardizing
of the bonding interest of the state.

SOMMAST

Sohool funds authorized by the taxpayers have con
tributed a large portion of the revenue for the support of
public education.

% e underlying principles governing this

!®®Roberts et al. v, Evangeline Parish Sohool Board, (1923)
156 La. 336-337.

200Ibid.. 155 La. 331, 99 So. 280.
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apeoial typa of sohooX fuad appear to be the following?
1« looaX autoaoffly in the support of public education
has been a legalised principle in the state for more than a
century.
S. Since 1879 the organic laws of the state have
provided for special school tax levies at the discretion of
the qualified voters of a district, and consistently the courts
have upheld the constitutionality of such levies.
S. That the people of Louisiana believe in special
revenues for the maintenance of public schools is evidenced
by the fact that this type of support for the year 1930*1931
amounted to $6,047,128.
4» Â local district has the right to tax itself for
the support of junior college work as a part of the program of
public education; this was established by the courts in 1932.
5. In the levying of special taxes districts are
considered as separate and distinct entities.
6. The controlling statutory requirements must be
met in levying and collecting the voted tax.
7. Â special tax levy

be authorized any time

during the year.
8. % o s e who are eligible to vote in a special tax
election are those «dio meet the general voting requirements
of the state and who are property taxpeyers at the time of
the election.
9. A reasonable opportunity to register preparatory
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to a spécial election ia considered sufficient compliance
with the law*
10, A special tax election is considered carried only
when it receives a majority of both the votes and the property
correctly voted*
11, Mere errors in the judgment of oommlssioners are
not sufficient grounds alone for invalidating an election,
12, The parish school board has a right to order a
special school tax election without a petition from the voters,
hut when a petition is presented by the legally required num
ber of qualified voters, the board nrust order the election*
13* Elections may be contested but only on specific
grounds and within the prescriptive period in force at the
time*
14* Funds raised by special tax levies in a partic
ular district must be spent as the voters have directed, and
in the event of unforeseen irregularities the expenditure
must be as the lev/ prescribes*
15, A school board may issue certificates of in
debtedness for building purposes where the special tax there
for has already been voted*
16. Irregularities which seem to have been con
sidered sufficient to invalidate a proposed tax levy are;
(a) ill-defined voting districts; (b) failure to observe the
constitutional maxima for various levies; (c) ambiguous
statements of the purpose; (d) failure of the petition to
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specify the amount accessary to be realized from the tax
aaaually; (e) minority board proceedings in the issuance of
the resolution ealliag a special election; (f) inconsistences
in petitions, resolutions, and notices; (g) failure to desig
nate definitely the place and time of an election; (h) lack
of compliance with the law in the choice of election officials;
(1) the opening and closing of polls Irregularly to the extent
that voters are prohibited from exercising the suffrage right
suffleient to change the results of the election; (j) use of
an inoorreotly prepared list of voters; (k) use of incorrect
form of ballot lâien there is a form prescribed by statute;
(1) determining the amount of property voted by inference
rather than by valid statements from the voter; (m) incorrect
decisions by commissioners regarding ownership of property to
the extent that correction thereof would change the results
of the election; (n) promulgation by an authority other than
the police jury; (o) significant omissions In the levying or
dinance; (p) attempt of a school board to contimxe collecting
a tax after the district has been abolished.
17. The bond issue as a means of support of public
education has become a significant move of the present cen
tury, as is shown by its rapidly increasing use,
18. Taxpayers may vote bond issues upon themselves
for the purpose of building schoolhouses and teachers* homes,
and purchasing the necessary grounds and equipment therefor,
19. Bonds for school purposes have constitutional
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authority and an iaaua continue# to he governed hy the provialona of the oonatitution under which it was voted#
20.

Bond# iseued on a tax levied for another pur

pose are null and void m ù # e statute proposing to authorize
such action is o<m#idered unconstitutional.
SI. the legal creation of a district is a prerequisite
to a bond issue.
SS. Strict interpretation of the law seems to govern
the purposes f o r which bond issues are sanctioned.
£3. The amount of bonds a district may issue is based
on the assessed valuation of the property end the limitation
as fixed by the constitution.

The annual levy is determined

by the governing authority on the basis of what is necessary
to produce the principal and interest falling due.
24. The failure to make public the voting date thirty
days prior to the election invalidates a bond issue #
25. The required qualifieati<ms of those wdio partic
ipate in bond elections are determined by the laws of the
state.
25. Precincts smy be improvised at the discretion of
the school board, but the arrangement must not require voters
to go into another parish.
27. A bond issue to be valid must receive a majority
vote of both the qualified taxpaying electors and of the
valuation of the property voted.
28. Minor irregularities such as the failure of
commissioners to take the oath of office will not vitiate an
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election unless it can be shown that results were changed
thereby.
29. Persons who vote for a bond issue have no right
under the law to complain later of irregularities therein.
30. Protection and permanence of special levies
and bond issues are attempted to be provided for through pre
scription which denies recognition of complaints after the
expiration of a specified period.
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CHAPTER VII

EDUCATIONAL CONTROL BY NONPROFESSIONAL AGENCIES

The interpretation of the Federal Constitution and
of other legal documents, as presented in the previous chapters,
shows oonolusively that education is one of the reserved powers
of the state.

Since the state has the right to establish and

maintain a system of free public schools, it may reasonably be
assumed that the state is empowered to provide for the necessary
agents to execute properly that function of government and to
entrust to them the organization and administration of the
state's program of public education.

The functioning of such

officials, fTcm the local trustees of a small school to the
legislature in its relation to public education, is influenced
by the court’s interpretation of the law.

The purpose of this

chapter is to show what effect those adjudications have had
in A s ping the policies of control pursued by the nonprofessional agencies of public education.

POLITICAL AGENCIES

The Legislature
The legislature la the principal agency throu^ which
the state executes the mandates of the organic law providing
220

âsi
for the establishment and maintenance of a public school
system,^

In the absence of constitutional restrictions the

"legislature may determine the types of schools to be estab
lished throughout Uie state, the means of their support, the
organs of their administration, the content of their curricula,
and the qualifications of their teachers,
That the lawmakers of early Louisiana held similar
views is evidenced by their provisions for public schools^
long before the organic law sanctioned education as a function
of government.
Constitutional mandates and restraints.

In 1845

the legislature was directed by the constitution to create a
system of free public education.^

At the same time it was

authorized to prescribe the duties and emoluments of the
state superintendent's office^ and by the Constitutions of
1852* and 1864^ it was given discretionary power to abolish

H e r m a n n H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public school
as a State institution (Blooming16n%^
STT P# SUI

%ewton Edwards, The Courts and the Public schools
(Chicago, 1955), pp. F-6.
®Acts of Louisiana; 1819, "An Act to amend the several
laws enacted on the subject of Public Schools within this
State, and for other purposes," pp. 52-54; 1820-21, "An Act
to extend and Improve the system of Public Education in the
State of Louisiana," pp. 62-68; 1027, "An Act to provide for
the support and administration of parish schools and for
other purposes," pp. 80-08; 1855, "An Act supplementary to
the several acts relative to public Education," pp. 141-144.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art. 154.
^Ibld., art. 153.
^Ibld., 1852, art. 155.

?Ibld.. 1864, art. 140.
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said office,

in 1879 the general assembly was authorized to

provide for the creation of parish school boards who were to
provide for parish superintendents at a salary not to exceed
two hundred dollars annually,® while in 1898 it was directed
to provide for a state board of education.®
Another aspect of indirect control by organic law
is the restraint placed upon legislative enactments,

for

example, in 1845 the constitution limited the controlling
power of the legislature \Tlth respect to support by requiring
that the proceeds from school lands remain a trust fund and
providing that only the income might be used for public
schools;!® in 1864 it prohibited the support of any private
school by public funds,!! while in 1679 schools of a sectarian
nature were added to the prohibited list.!®
Delegation of powers.

The Supreme Court of the

United states has held that "one of the highest attributes
and duties of a legislature is to regulate public matters
with all public bodies, no less than the community, from
time to time, in the manner which the public welfare may
appear to demand."!®

One method which the legislature has

used in regulating public school matters with public bodies

^Ibia.. 1879, art. 225.
9lbla.. 1898, art. 250.
lOlbld.. 1845, art. 135.
lllbld., 1864, art. 146.
l^lbld.. 1879, art. 228.
IS^he Town of Eaet Hartford, Plaintiff In Error, v. The
Hartford Bridge Company, (1850) 10 How. 534.
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has been to delegate to those bodies certain designated
powers*

For example, the court has recognized that the

power of taxation has been delegated largely to local author
ities— the school directors and the police juries,!&

The

qualified voters themselves possess the sole power of levying
special taxes for school purposes.
Police juries
In the early history of the state these corporate
bodies were empowered by the legislature to assume control of
the public schools in their respective parishes,!®

Later

this power was partially transferred to parish school boards
who were appointed by them,!*

In 1847 police juries, in

collaboration with the parish superintendents, were given
the right to divide perishes into school districts,!?

In

1877 they were authorized by the legislature to levy in their
parishes a maximum of two mills for school purposes,!® and in
1879 organic sanction was given for such levies*!®

The

! ^ illeneuve Bordelon et el, v* Thomas H, & W* B, Lewis,
(1852) & La. Ann. 472.
!®Àcts of Louisiana, 1819, "An Act to amend the several
laws eiuieted on the subject of public schools within this
State, and for other purposes," secs, 1-5, p, 52,
!*Ibid,, 1827, "An Act to provide for the support and
administration of parish schools and for other purposes,"
secs, 2, 5, pp. 80, 82.
!?Ibid., 1847, No, 225, sec. 18,
!®Ibid,, Extra Session, 1877, No, 23, sec. 28.
!®Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 229.
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legislature in 1888 required them to levy at least one and
one-half mills on the parish assessment for public education,^®
but the Constitution of 1921 raised that amount to three mills.
Also, they were the governing bodies for special tax elections
until 1914 when this responsibility was transferred to the
parish boards.®®

Thus, it may be seen that although they are

not considered as educational officials, the police juries of
the state have wielded an Influence in shaping the policies
of educational control.

BOARDS OF EDUCATION

State Board
The people of the various states, through appropriate
legislation, have delegated to their boards of education a
large share in the making of educational policies.

The

significance of this practice has been evaluated as follows;
The fundamental character of public
education in the United states is, in the last
analysis, determined by the board that controls
the school. To be sure, back of the board stands
the state, but to the board the state has dele
gated the practical control of public education.
Within the wide limits created by legislative
enactment, the broad outlines of policy are shaped
by the members of this body. . . . To a degree
and in a fashion seldom grasped, the content.

®®Acts of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 54.

®!constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 15.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1914, No. 17, sec. 1.
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spirit, and purpose of oublie education must
reflect the bias, the limitations, end the
experience of the membership of this board* The
possibilities which the school possesses as e
creative and leavening social agency are set by
the good will, the courage, and the intelligence
of that membership* The qualitative advance of
public education must depend as much on the
decisions of the board of education as on the
development of the science and philosophy of
education*®®
That the public school system of Louisiana was established
without organic sanction of this particular type of centralized
control is evidenced by the fact that no constitution prior to
the War for southern Independence dealt with the subject of
the state board of education*
Constitutional end statutory provisions*

This agency

of educational control in Louisiana was given legal recognition
in 1869, when its personnel was specified as being composed of
the state superintendent, one member appointed by the governor
from each of the congressional districts, and two members
from the state at large, with the power to supervise the
school system and to appoint parish and municipal boards.
AS a pert of the plan of Reconstruction, this act was amended
the next year so as to provide that the membership should
consist of the governor, ex offioio, the state superintendent,
and the six divisional superintendents appointed by the
governor; the duties of the board were to include the selection
of parish, incorporated town, and village boards of education,

®®George s. Counts, The Social Composition of Boards of
Education (Chicago, 192Vy,' p. 1."
®^ACts of Louisiana, 1869, No* 121, sees. 1, 9, 10, 22.
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and general supervision of the schools of the state.®*

In

1877 the personnel of the board changed again to consist of
the governor, the lieutenant-governor, the secretary of state,
the attorney general, the state superintendent of public
education, and two members appointed by the governor.®*

In

the Constitutional Convention of 1879 an unsuccessful effort
was made to embody in the organic law provision for a state
board to consist of the governor, the auditor, and the
secretary of state.®?

However, the next convention granted

constitutional approval for a state board whose creation was
to be provided for by the legislature.®®
The power of this board was expanded by the Burke
Bill which added to its duties the control of certification
of teachers.®*

However, it seems that there were too many

ex-officio members, for the Johnson Act provided for a board
to consist of the state superintendent and five members
appointed by the governor so as to have overlapping terms.*®
Tne Constitution of 1921 reorganized the state
board of education end increased its power to control the,
public schools of the state as follows:

®*Ibid., Extra Session, 1870, No. 6, secs. 1-8, 4-5, 16-18.
®*Xbid.. 1877, No. 23, sec. 1.
®?Offlcial Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Louisiana, Ï Ü 7 ^ pp. T75-T74.
® ® C o n s t itution

of Louisiana, 1898, art. 250.

®*Acts of Louisiana, 1912, No. 214, secs* 47-51.

*®Ibid., 1916, No. 120, sec. 1.
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Section 4. There is hereby created a
State Board of Education to be composed as follows;
three members to be appointed by the Governor for
terms of four years, one each from districts co
extensive with the present Railroad Commission dis
tricts, and eight to be elected for terms of eight
years, except as herein provided, from districts
corresponding to the present Congressional districts.
The Legislature shall provide for the organization
of said board so that two of the elected members
shall be chosen at each Congressional election.
The first board shall be elected in 1922 and begin
office the second Monday in January, 1923, and the
term of two of whom shall expire in two, four, six
end eight years respectively.
The members appointed by the Governor
shall be persons experienced in educational matters,
and all members âiall serve without pay, except such
per diem and traveling expanses as shall be fixed
by the Legislature.
The Legislature shall prescribe the duties
of said board end define its powers; provided, that
said board shall not control the business affairs
of parish school boards, nor the selection or removal
of their officers and directors.

Section 6. The State Board of Education
shall have supervision and control of all free public
schools.

Section 7. . . . It shall prescribe the
qualifications, and provide for the certification
of the teachers of elementary, secondary, trade,
normal end collegiate schools; it shall have author
ity to approve private schools end colleges, whose
sustained curriculum is of a grade equal to that
prescribed for similar public schools and educa
tional institutions of the state; end the certificates
or degrees issued by such private schools or insti
tutions 80 approved shall carry the same privileges
88 those issued by the state schools end institutions.
Section 8. It shall not create or main
tain any administrative department in which salaries
or expenses are payable from State funds, unless
authorized by the Legislature. The Legislature shall
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prescribe the terms under which funds offered for
educational purposes shell be received and disbursed.^!
Acting upon this authority, the legislature declared that;
The state Board of Education shall prepare courses
of study, rules, by-laws and regulations for the
government of the Public Schools of the State, which
shall be enforced by the parish superintendents
and the several parish school boards.®®
Established power.

Seldom has the vested power of

the state board of education been questioned seriously enough
to demand the attention of the supreme court.

Almost Imme

diately after the board was authorized by the legislative
acts of 1869 and 1870 a contest involving the allocation of
the right of removal of subordinates recognized its power.
The law established was that school directors may be removed
from office by the state board of education only and that
such removal must be preceded by a due hearing and a fair
trial on charges of negligence, incompetency, or violation
of law.
An illustration of the extended powers of the state
board is an opinion by the attorney general in 1950 to the
effect that no public high school may be established, or
the building therefor be constructed, without the approval
and supervision of the state board of public education.**
In general, it is legally recognized that the state board
has broad powers in the development of a program of public

^^constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12.
*®AOts of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 4.
**Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1930, to AprTl307 l 9 M , p. 402.
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education for the state,
Parish Boards
Legal developments.

Parish school hoards existed

in the state prior to constitutional sanction, for in 1821
police Juries were authorized to appoint five trustees to
aastme supervision of public education in their respective
35
parishes,
six years later, these school boards were
authorized to select parish treasurers and ward trustees to
assist la the organization and administration of public
education in the various parishes and wards,**

By 1833 they

were required to report regularly to the secretary of state,
as state superintendent of public education at that time,
the educational conditions of their parishes,*?

There was

curtailment of their power, in 1847 by the transfer of the
selection of district trustees to the people living within
tbs parish,*®

In keeping with the centralizing policy of

control during Reconstruction, the state board of education
in 1870 was given the right to select both the parish and

^ I b l d .. May 1, 1926, to April SO, 1928, p. 284.
^^Aota of Louisiana, 1820-21, "An Act to extond and Improve
the system of Public Education in the State of Louisiana,"
secs, 1-2, p, 62.
**Ibid ., 1827, "An Act to provide for the support and
admini si rat i on of parish schools and for other purposes,"
sees. 3, 5, pp. 80, 82.
*?Ibid., 1833, "An Act supplementary to the several acts
relative' to public Education," sec, 4, p, 142.
38 Ibid., 1847, Ho. 226, sec. 20.
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tk# district boards.**

In 1877 the parish school boards

assumed the responsibility of oertifioation of teachers and
the general control of the public schools of their respective
parishes;^ in 1879 each was given organic authority to
select a parish superintendent of schools who should serve
as secretary of the board.Resolutions and petitions were
presented to the Constitutional Convention of 1898 recommending
"that the Board of Directors of the public achools of each
parish" be elected by the voters of the parish.4®

To some

extent this resolution was reflected in the constitution,
for provision for the creation of parish boards was left to
the legislature.48
In 19IS parish school board members were made
elective by the qualified voters from each of the police jury
wards, one to be chosen for each police Juror in said ward,44
and in 1914 the board was m d e the governing body of all
special tax elections for school purposes.4*
That the parish school boards havebeen given from
time to time increasing opportunity to influence the type of
39
Ibid.. Extra Session, 1670, No. 6, secs. 16, 18.
4®Ibid., Extra Session, 1877, Ko, 23, sec, 4.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 885,
4®0fficial Journal of ^ e Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the Atate of IcSTsian a . M 9 8 . pp. 40 , 58,
4®Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art, 850.

44Aets of Louisiana, 1912, No. 214, sec. 5.
4*lbid.. 1914, No. 17, sec. 1.

251
person selected as parish superintendent may he indicated by
the salary ranges authorized by statutory and organic law.
In 1902 the parish board had the right to pay a superintendent
anywhere from $200 a year to $1200,46 while In 1912 the range
was from a $600 minimum to an unlimited maximum.4?

Under the

Johnson Act that officer might be paid from $900 to $4000 per
year. 4®

in 1981 the board was given complete freedom In the

selection of a parish superintendent with no mention of
salary stipulations.49
Pertaining to the complete status of the parish
sehool board the Constitution of 1921 authorized;
Section 10. The Legislature shall pro
vide for the creation and election of parish school
boards which shall elect parish superintendents
for their respective parishes, and such other offi
cers or agents as may be authorized by the Legisla
ture. The state Board of Education shall fix the
qualifications and prescribe the duties of parish
superintendents, who need not be residents of the
parishes. Wherever a parish contains a municipality,
the population of wnieh is more than one-half of that
of the entire parish, it shall have representation
on the parish school board proportionate to its
population.
Section 11. Municipal or parish school
boards and systems now in existence by virtue of
special or local legislative acts are hereby recog
nized, subject to control by and supervision of the
State Board of Education, and the power of the Le{
lature to further control them by special laws,50

4*lbid., 1902, No. 214, sec. 35
4?ibid., 1912, Ho. 214, sec. 27
4Qlbid., 1916, No. 120, sec. 27

49oonstitut ion of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 10.
*®lbid., art. 12.

232
Composition end selection of personnel,

in 1908 the

legislature provided that in each parish of the state having
a population of lesa than 50,000 there should be in each ward,
"in addition to the police juror to which said ward is entitled,
an additional police juror for each 5,000 inhabitants which
said ward contains; also, one additional police juror for each
additional 5,000 Inhabitants or part thereof in excess of
2,500 inhabitants."*!

An act of 1922 provided that there shall

be elected by the voters of each police jury ward of the various
parishes of the state a member of the school board of the
parish for each police Juror in said ward and whose term of
office shall be six years.*®

Section 18 of the same act

incorporated the organic provisions for the representation of
municipalities®* but limited the total parish school board
membership to fifteen,
k legal interpretation of the law governing the

method of Increasing school board membership was sought in
1 9 2 7 .*4

In the cese brought before the court an effort was

made to oust a school board appointee who, by virtue of the
ward’s increased population, was entitled to membership by
the provisions of the acts as stated above.

The court held

that the formal finding of the police jury to the effect that
the ward was entitled to an additional school board member by

®!Aots of Louisiana, 1908, No. 279, sec. 1.
52ibld.. 1922, NO. 100, seo. 17.
^^constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 18, see. 10.
S^homas et al. v. Doughty, (1927) 165 Le. 815, 111 So. 681.
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virtue of Its increased population gave the person appointed
by the governor prima feole right to membership.
In another case** a vacancy had occurred in the
Orleans Parish school board and the governor, acting under the
law, filled such vacancy by appointment.

At the regular

Congressional election in November another would-be member
was elected for the balance of the unexpired term.

Suit was

brought by the attorney general and the elected member to
oust the member appointed by the governor.

The former claimed

that under section 64 of Aot No. 120 of 1916 the appointment
of the latter was for the period before the Congressional
election only, and that he--the one chosen by the people at
the election— was therefore entitled to the office for the
remainder of the regular term.

The governor's appointee based

his refusal to surrender the office on his having been named
under authority of section 1 of Act No. 236 of 1916, which
provided that a school board member appointed under such
circumstances as in the situation Involved was an appointee
for the remainder of the term.

Since the later statute

declared, in section 2, that all laws or parts of lews in
conflict with the act were thereby repealed, and since the
parish of Orleans was not expressly exoopted, t ho court held
that the member appointed by the governor under the later act
was the rightful possessor of the office.

55State et al. v. Schaumburg, (1921) 149 La. 470, 89 So, 536,

234
More recently, 1931, the right of the governor to
fill vacancies on parish school boards was upheld.
controlling statute states;

The

"All vacancies in the membership

of parish school boards caused by death, resignation, or
otherwise, shall be filled by appointment by the Governor."®*
The court established this by declaring as legal office
holders the members appointed by the governor when the
offices had been rendered vacant by the acceptance of some
members of postmasterships and by the failure of another
member to qualify within thirty days from the date of his
commission.*?

Other legal counsel has been to the effect

that whenever a vacancy occurs, regardless of the cause, the
governor has the power to fill it by appointment.*®
The secretary of the parish board is the parish
superintendent by virtue of his office, and, as may be seen
from the section dealing with the parish superintendent in
Chapter VIII of this study, this officer of the board has
been involved in several controversies sufficiently serious
to reach the supreme court.
Concerning the president of the board, however,
there have been fewer litigations.

In 1909 the court had

®*Acts of Louisiana, 1932, No. 100, sec. 17.
*?3tate ex rel. Kimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel.
Gray v. pipes et el. state ex rel. White v. Mason et al.
(1931) 173 La. 488, 137 So. 862.
58opinlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1932
--------------------2,
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occasion to establish some regulations pertaining to the
presiding officer os follows;

"The president of the board

must be elected from among the members, end the expiration
of his term as president is necessarily synchronous with the
expiration of his term as a member.**

His duties are those

of the chairman of any ordinary board, but he does not possess
dual voting privileges.*®
Status of a body corporate.

Two years after Louisiana

became a member of the Union her supreme court was called upon
to determine the legal status of the school board.*!

The

plaintiffs* attorney pointed to the corporate existence of
the school administrators as provided in the statutory enact
ments pertaining to public education, thus;
This act enlarges and extends the first act of
incorporation to the schools in the different
counties, and constitutes them an integral part
of the first body corporate, vested with all the
privileges, capacities, and powers over the
subjects committed to their administration, in
as full and perfect a manner as was given to the
original institution, and consequently they can
proceed in the discharge of their functions in
the same manner as the first body corporate can

do.G®
The cause which had brought interpretation on this subject was
a suit by two of the school administrators to recover from the
third administrator money which had been borrowed from the school

*®State ex rel. Wilson v. Hardin, (1909) 123 La. 741.
*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana : May 1, 1928,
to April 3(), l930, p. 4 9 È ; May T, 1932, to April X, 1934, p. 306.
*!paillette et al. v. Carr, (1814) 3 Mart. (0. S.) 489.
*®Ibid., pp. 490-491.
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fund for his privets use.

The borrower contended that action

must be taken by the whole board— that two members could not
act against the third member.

The court held that:

"in all

bodies corporate, the majority must rule, end there is no
doubt that two of the three administrators of this school had
a right to sue in the name of the board."*®

The immediate

outcome was that the third board member was required to
return all money borrowed with interest, concerning which the
court said:
In a case of this nature, where the deposit
of public funds, destined for the most useful of
purposes, has been unwarrantably detained— where the
obligation to return them at sight has been eluded
during such a length of time, it is Just that we
should allow to the plaintiffs, not only the interest
of the money since the judicial demand, but also the
full amount of damages which the lew permits to give.64
Most important was the establishment at this time of the school
board as a corporate body in the law end thereby vested with
the right of majority rule.
Many years later, 1871, the court had occasion to
refer to the fact that the perish board Is constituted a body
corporate and politic in law, with powers to sue and be sued.**
Since the parish school board is a corporate body,
one such board may stand in court to recover from another any

®®Ibld., p. 495.
*^Ibia.. p. 496.
®*Thlrd Ward school District of New Orleans v. City Board
of School Directors. Van Norden, Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas
W. Conway, State Superintendent. Thomas Vif. Conway, State
Superintendent, v. The City Board of school Directors. Van
Norden, Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas v/. Conway, State super
intendent.
(1871) 23 La. Ann. 156.
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funds illegally obtained.

This principle was established by

a case** dealing with the efforts of one school board to
recover from another a sum of money which had been paid by
the state to the defendant when it should have been paid to
the plaintiff.

The defendant board had invested the funds

in a school lot and building.

The court held that the plaintiff

board was entitled to recover the money in question, even if
it became necessary to seize and sell the property which had
been purchased by such funds, and that action to recover under
the circumstances was not barred by the prescription of five
years or less.
In a legal decision in 1909, which confirmed an
appointment to parish superintendency, it was held that parish
boards "are corporations, and a corporation is a body which
’continues always the seme notwithstanding the change of the
an

individuals who compose it’ (Rev. Civ. Code, art. 42?)."
That school boards are quasi corporations and that
they must stand in court as such were indicated in the White
Hall Agricultural Company case,*® in which the president
instead of the board itself was cited.

Chief Justice Joseph

A. Breaux referred to decisions previously rendered which were
consistent in maintaining that a corporation should be

**Sohool Board of East Carroll Parish v. school Board of
Union Parish, (1864) 3Ô La. Ann. 8ÛÔ.
*?3tate ox rel. Wilson v. Hardin, (1909) 123 La. 740.
*%hite Hall Agr. Co. et al. v. Police Jury of Concordia
Parish at el,, (1911) 127 La, 1022, 54 So. 337.
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represented ia court by its corporate name or by some one
designated by law to represent such corporation.**
A case in 1927 maintained that the parish school
board is a corporate body with power to sue and be sued and
that when judgment has been obtained against it by proper
procedure, taxpayers have no right to attack that judgment,
although the execution of It may involve the sale of the
school building to satisfy a creditor’s legal rights and
demands.?®
Rank of member as an officer under the state.

For

many years the parish school board member has been considered
an officer under the state.?!

This status was upheld by the

court in a combination case which reviewed three court of
appeal cases pertaining to dual office holding.?&

The four

fold purpose of the case, as based on the merits, was to
determine;
. . . whether or not a member of e parish school
board is an officer under the state within the

**State ex rel. New Iberia Telephone Exchange Co. v. Voorhies,
Judge, et al., (1898) 50 La. Ann. 671, 23 So. 671; State ex rel.
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company v. James A. Montegudo,
Justice of the Peace for the Fourth Ward of the Parish of East
Baton Rouge, (1896) 48 La. Ann. 1417, 20 so. 911; Gubel v. Town
of Lafayette, (1907) 118 La. 494, 43 So. 63.
?®Hewthorne et al. v. Jackson Parish School Board et al.,
(1926) 5 La. App. 508.
?!opinions of the Attorney General of Loul siane ; June 1,
1900, bo May 1, l9UH, p. ill; May X,^11JI4to 'May 1, 1916,
p. 367; May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 495.
?^State ex rel. Kimberly v.
Barham et al. State ex rel.
Gray v. pipes et el* State ex rel. White v. Mesonet el.
(1931) 173 La. 4 8 8 , 137 So. 852.
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oontaiaplation of section 4 of article 19 of the
Constitution of 1921; whether a person may qualify
lawfully as a member of the school board while
holding the office of postmaster; the effect of
accepting and holding a postmastership after one
has qualified as a member of a parish school board,
and while he is still holding such membership; and
the effect of resigning as postmaster upon the
right to continue to hold membership on the school
board, the resignation being accepted after the
institution of an ouster suit, but before the
rendition of judgment therein by the trial court. ^
In response to the four questions presented, the court analyzed
closely the constitutional and statutory provisions and the law
previously interpreted by itself.
In determining that the school board member is an
officer the court said:
A member of a parish school board is also an officer#
Ha exercises a part, though small, of the sovereign
power, in the interest of the public, under authority
vested in him by the state. He is elected by the
people, save when, by reason of a vacancy caused by
death, resignation, or otherwise, it is made the duty
of the Governor to appoint some one to fill the
vacancy. His qualifications are prescribed by law.
The Legislature refers to his position as an office.
Section 17 of Act 100 of 1922.
To show that the school board member is an officer
under the state the court reasoned as follows:
AS each parish school board constitutes part of the
educational system of the state, which is a state
institution, it would appear that the members of
each such board, who, as we have seen, are officers,
their offices being created by the Legislature,
under a constitutional mandate, are officers under
the state, laboring In the service of the state,
although their duties as members of the respective
parish boards are confined to limited territories.
This conclusion finds support, by parity of reasoning,
In state ex rel* Smith v, Theus, 114 La. 1097, 36
So, 870, . , ."9

?5lbld.. 17S La. 492-493.
?*Ibia., p. 493.

, p. 495.
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With respect to dual office holding the principle
included In section 4 of article 19 of the Constitution of
1921 was upheld and-the Interpretation was made that since
a postmaster is an officer under the United States and a
parish school board member is an officer under the state,
one person cannot be both officers at the same time.
In determining whether a person may qualify lawfully
as a member of the school board while holding the office of
postmaster— the second question brought by the oases— tha
court relied upon decisions under similar conditions'^^ and
upon other legal explanation to the effect that one holding
a Federal office of profit is not ineligible to election to
a state office but that he cannot qualify for the state
office as long as he retains the Federal position.

The

conclusion was that the act of qualifying as a member of the
school board was ineffective and null because the person did
not surrender his office as postmaster before attempting to
qualify as a school board member.
In the reverse situation— the third question of
office holding involved— it was maintained that if one accepts
and holds a postmastership after having qualified as a member
of the parish school board and while still holding that
membership, such action renders the office of school board
member vacant, since the holding of a position under the

76state of Texes v. J. C. De Grass, (1880) 53 Tex. 307;
Bunting V. Willis, Judge, (1876) 27 Gret. (68 Va.) 144, 21 A
Rep. 388; Foltz v. Berlin, (1886) 105 Ind. 221, 5 N. E. 672,
55 Am. Rep. 197.
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Federal Government automatically vacates an office held by
the same person under a state government.
The law concerning the time limit for qualifying
as a school board member from the date of one's commission
was handed down In answer to the fourth question involved.
It was to the effect that one may not qualify legally after
the expiration of thirty days from the date of one's commission
and that a failure to qualify within the time limit renders
the office vacant.
Established and forbidden powers.

The law of

Louisiana confers almost unlimited power upon the parish
school boards of the state in matters pertaining to public
education.

After delegating to the parish boards such powers

as the creation of districts, determining the location and
number of schools therein, specifying the number of teachers
and their salaries, making final selection of teachers,
election and removal of the parish superintendent, and
enforcing compliance to the state school laws, the legis
lature , in section 20 of Act No. 100 of 1922, as amended by
Act No. 110 of 1928, declared that:

"Each school board is

authorized to make such rules and regulations for its own
government, not inconsistent with law or with the regulations
of the Louisiana State Board of Education, as it may deem
proper.*'

Also, the school board is empowered to watch over

the school funds, serve as custodian of the school property,
and establish with the state board of education schools of
whatever nature necessary for providing adequate school

242
facilities for the children of the perish.??
prom tin» to time various phases of the school
board's power have been questioned to the extent of requiring
Judicial interpretation.

As may be seen from the following

principal phases dealt with, the courts have established many
powers but have declared some as definitely unauthorized and
forbidden.
1. Records of proceedings.

That records of school

board proceedings be in writing has been declared essential.
7Ô
In 8 ruling
on this phase, it was pointed out that the
president of the school board with whom a verbal agreement
was claimed to have been made had no authority to make verbal
grants of any kind affecting the school land sections— that
the sections are not in his charge but in the trust of the
board of school directors of which he is only the presiding
officer.

With respect to the board’s method of keeping

records, the court summarized:

"Their proceedings are

required to be in writing— and a record should be kept."?®
Constitutional and statutory legislation empowering
school boards to meet for various purposes has included
regulations as to the acceptable places of meetings and as
to records thereof.

Those who contest the legality of a

place of meeting must definitely establish that the meeting

??Acts of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, secs. 19*21.
?®Frenoois D. Broussard v. Anatole Verrat et al., (1891)
43 La. Ann. 929, 9 So.. 906.
?®Ibid., 43 La. Ann. 930.
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was held as claimed— the court will not presume that a
meeting was held at an unauthorized place.

Also, when

minutes of the proceedings of a board are offered as
evidence of a place of meeting, the record thereof must be
officiel.80
2.

Selection of parish superintendent.

The state's

policy has been to clothe the parish school board with broad
discretionary power in the employment of the parish superin
tendent of s c h o o l s . T h e

term of office Is fixed®® but; the

date mining of the amount of salary is left to the judgment
of the parish school board.®®
question has been:

An important controversial

How long may a parish school board elect

a superintendent before his term of office actually begins?
This principle was Involved in the Russell case®*
in which the court;

declared premature the selection of a

superintendent made approximately one year before the
expiration of the term then current, endorsed as proper
action the rescinding of the election some six months before
the beginning of the new term end advised that the time for
selection should be just prior to the beginning of the new

®®HIilton et al. v. Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922)
158 La. 761, 94 So. 386.
®^Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana; June 1,
1912, to liay 1, 1914, p. 338; M y 1," 1FE8, to April 30, 1930,
p. 497.
82lbld.. May 1, 1930, to April 50, 1932, p. bOl.
83it>ld., May 1, 1914, to May 1, 1916, p. 368.
®*State ex rel. Ruasell (La Salle parish School Board
Intervener) v. Richardson, (1934) 170 La. 1029, 152 So. 748.
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term.

The court gave Interpretation of the controlling

fiB

atatttte

and pointed to the dangers of holding otherwise

as follows:
However, we are satisfied it was the legislative
intent that a parish school superintendent should
be elected or appointed at some reasonable time
before the beginning of his term of office.

While it may be true that a school board
is a continuous body because of the overlapping
terms of its various ward members, that fact does
not authorize the board to elect or appoint a parish
superintendent so far in advance of his term, as
was done in this case. If this were permitted the
board could elect or appoint a parish superintendent
at any time the majority of its members saw fit to
do 6 0 , and thereby perpetuate a favored person in
the office. We think the better practice would be,
and one more in consonance with the purpose of the
law, to impose the duty of timely electing or
appointing a parish superintendent upon the school
board as constituted just prior to the beginning of
the new term.®®
Also, it was pointed out in this case that the bond
a superintendent gives is no concern of hia predecessor but
that the form, manner, and regulations pertaining to the bond
lie wholly within the province of the school board.
3.

Employment of assistant parish superintendent

discretionary with school board.

By section 43 of Act

no.

100 of 1922 the parish school board is empowered to appoint
such assistant superintendents and other employees as may be
necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the schools,
with which objective it Is charged.

8 5^ACts

No mention is made of

of Louisiana, 1922, NO. 100, sec. 19.

®®Stat© ex rel. Russell (La balls Parish school Board,
Intervener) v. Richardson, (1934) 178 La, 1039.
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the power to prescribe e term of office.

The strength end

the effect of this omission were tested by e plaintiff employed
as assistant superintendent for s period beginning January 15,
1932, end ending June 30, 1933, but who was discharged July 14,
1952, because there was no further need of his services.®?
By fixing, through resolution, the tenure of office of the
assistant superintendent, the school board tended to divest
itself of its discretionary power, conferred upon it by stat
utory law, to terminate plaintiff's employment before the
expiration of the term,

in this regard the court said:

The universally accepted rule is that,
where the tenure of the office is not prescribed
by lew, the power to remove is an Incident to the
power to appoint. The tenure not having been
declared by law, the office is held during the
pleasure of the authority making the appointment.
22 R. 0. L. Sec. 266, p. 562; 46 C. J. Sec. 146,
p. 985.

The implied power to remove cannot be
contracted away so as to bind the appointing author
ity to retain a minor officer or employee for a
definite, fixed period.8#
Various decisions®® were cited as controlling in these respects.
The court pointed out that the legislature, in conferring the
power of such appointments on the school board, certainly did

®?Potts V. Morehouse Parish School Board, (1933) 177 La.
1103, 150 So. 290.
. 177 Le. 1106-1107.
®®Peters T. Bell, (1898) 51 La. Ann. 1621, 26 So. 442;
Short V. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson, (1915) 136 La*
391, 67 So. 176; Kirkpatrick v. City of Monroe, (1925) 157
La. 645, 102 So. 822.
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not intend that a board through oohtraot with an employee
fihould delimit its own power of removal end perhaps deprive
its suocessor of the specified power of appointment, of the
incidental power of removal, end to this extent of the
general supervision and control of the schools as granted by
statute.
4.

Administration of the public school fund.

cerning the power of the parish board with respect to the
school funds, Justice John St. Paul warned against accepting
as a precedent a certain decision in which the action of a
parish school board in the disbursement of funds was not
upheld.^®

He concurred in the opinion of the case as decided

in the main issue, but called attention to the adjudications
and constitutional provisions in which It had been affirmed
that the board of school directors in each parish is charged
with the control, administration, end disbursement of school
funds and is the body empowered to order the treasurer to pay
out these public funds.
The court had opportunity in 1910®® to specify
definitely one forbidden power in the administration of funds

®®Orleans Parish School Board v. Murphy, Commissioner of
Public Finance, (1924) 156 La. 925, 101 So. 268.
®^Charles N. Laler, President, at al. v. Abraham Millspaugh
et al., (1880) 38 La. Ann. 901; The State of Louisiana v. IJV. F.
games, (1887) 39 Le. Arm. 986, 3 So. 93; Mrs. M. M. Fisher and
Husband v. Board of Directors of City schools of New Orleans
et el., (1092) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 So. 494; Constitution of
Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 16.
®®Luchini et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1910) 126 La. 972,
65 So. 68.

Con
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by the sehool board— that la, the offering of rewards for the
détection and punishment of orime, although the fines derived
from tha convicted violators were to be paid into the school
fund.

Rather, the court said:

"School boards are created for

the purpose of furthering the education of the youth of the
state," and that they are not authorized to offer such rewards.
In a case which dealt with an attempt at garnishment of a
teacher's salary®^ the court again pointed out that the board
is forbidden to divert school funds from their created purpose.
It was reasoned that the responsibility of maintaining public
schools in the parishes must be assumed by the parish school
boards*

The state has entrusted to them all the school funds

provided for tha support of public schools.

They are especially

charged with the responsibility of employing capable superin
tendents and teachers for whose salaries they dedicate a
portion of the school funds entrusted to them.

Funds so

dedicated cannot be diverted to any other purpose except as
authorized by the boards themselves.
5.

Creation and abolition of districts. Power to

create school districts In connection with the exercise of the
power of special taxation was conferred on the parish school
boards by the legislature in Act No. 152 of 1920.

In 1927®^

court interpretation revealed that the school board has by
implication the power, where circumstances permit, to abolish

®®Benk of winnfield v. Brumfield et al., (1929) 11 La. App.
647, 124 so. 628.
®*8ylvGStre et al. v. 3t. Landry Parish school Board, (1927)

164 La. 204, 113 So. 818.
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a district created by It.

Also, it may extend Its power to

include such action as the creation of districts of smaller
area and amending boundaries so as to enlarge or contract a
district, as long as controlling statutory requirements are
not violated.
6.

Location of schools.

For many years the parish

school board in cooperation with the perish superintendent
has been given broad discretionary power in tha location of
schools within its created districts.®®

This power was

endorsed by the court in 1933 in a case dealing with the
consolidation of schools in De Soto Parish,®® which consoli
dation was in accord with the suggestion of a special state
committee of investigation requested to recommend changes
and consolidations in order to save expenses.

The plaintiffs

entered suit to enjoin the parish school board from consoli
dating the two high schools involved.

Because of technical

errors the appeal was without merit, but the court explained
that since the involved issue was of interest to the public,
the case would receive attention.
The court presented the pertinent parts of the law
relating thereto— chiefly Act No. 100 of 1982 and Its amendments—
end held:

(1) that the establishment and the location of high

schools are left entirely to the discretion of the parish boards,
subject to state board limitations; therefore, the functions

®®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1, 1908,
to May 1, 1^0, p. 282; May 1,~K10, 'to May T, 19X2, p. 326.
®*H111 V. De Soto Parish School Board, (1933) 177 La. 329,
148 So. 248.
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of the parish boards la such capacities will not be interfered
with by the courts unless the manner thereof was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or fraudulent; and (2) that there was no abuse
of discretion, the board having taken action when compelled
by an emergency, end having afforded to the children of the
consolidated school district represented by the plaintiff
educational advantages as good as, if not better than, before
the consolidation.
7. Proceedings by de facto and minority boards,

it

is generally admitted by legal authorities that the acts of a
de facto school board member are as legal with respect to
third parties end the public as the acta of a de jure board
97
member.
De facto school board members are officials of the
board and empowered to participate in all the duties thereof.
The court upheld this principle in answer to a charge that
majority action was lacking in the passage of a certain
resolution because one of the five members voting affirmatively
98
was not a legal member.
In the records touching upon this
member's right to sit on the board, there was nothing to
show that he had secured same illegally or that his commission
was issued irregularly.

In this absence of such proof, the

court held that the particular member must be recognized, at
least as a da facto member, end that effect must be given to
his vote.

®?Newton Edwards, op clt., p. 98.
®®State ex rel. Floyd v. Hodges, (1920) 165 La. 552, 115
So. 747.
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The attempt of the minority of a board to repeal a
resolution adopted by the majority was pointed to by the
court as a type of action which carries no power.

The

explanation to the contending parties was that since a
majority of the board passed the resolution, it could be
repealed only by majority action and that the attempted
repeal by the minority was of no effect.®®
Relationship with parish treasurer.

For more than

a century the parish school treasurer, although ho may have
been another official, has been legalized as an accountant
for the receipt and expenditure of the school funds as
directed by the parish school board.^00
1, Responsibility of sureties on official bond.

To

assure the faithful performance of his duties as this accountant,
the parish treasurer is required to give official bond.

The

sureties on his bond are solidarity responsible for his ac
counting for and paying over all school funds coming into his
hands as parish treasurer.

A ruling in 1874 held that they

were thus bound and that the parish board could not release
them, either directly or indirectly, before the treasurer had
fully complied with the requirements of properly accounting
for all funds.101

of Loulsicua, 18B7, "An Act to provide for the support
and administration of paridi schools and for other purposes,"
sec. 5, p. 80.
l^ljohn Clements, President of the Police Jury of the Parish
of Rapides, v. Eugene R. Siossat ©t als., (1874) 86 La. Ann, 843,
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In 1361 seme sureties on e parish treasurer's bond
pleaded that tha failure of the board of school directors to
require regular accounts and settlements from their treasurer,
who had defaulted in the handling of the funds, discharged
them as sureties.

The court saw no merit in this and declared

also that mere failure to sue while the treasurer was in office
did not discharge the sureties. 1®®

In the same case it was

established that the school board had a right under the law
to sue on the official bond of a deceased treasurer for money
improperly accounted for by him, even when the claim extended
to the curator of the treasurer and to the widow of one of
the sureties who had accepted the community of her and her
deceased husband.1^®

Another feature which fails to release

a surety of his responsibility to the school board is that he
is a citizen of another

s

t

a

t

e

.

legislative act pro

viding for the bond requires that the sureties be residents
of the state.

At the time of the acceptance of the bond the

beneficiary may object to a

nonresident as surety, but after

acceptance, the surety himself will not be heard to claim this
irregularity as releasing him from the bond.
2.

Financial settlements.

It is generally admitted

that since the school treasurer is a product of the parish
school board and subject to its direction, a settlement between
the two should be final.

The question at bar in a case in

lO&Boerd of School Directors of the Parish of Madison v.
A. V. Brown et al., (1881) 55 La. Ann. 585,
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1881^®® was:

May su oh settlement be reopened and declared

null and void because of alleged irregularities?

in this

oonneotion the court aaid:
This being an action for the rescission
of a settlement between a school board and an officer
thereof, and of a discharge given the officer after
such settlement, it is clear that, as these acts
and proceedings of the board related to a matter
within the scope of its authority, the settlement
and discharge in question must be presumed correct,
and held as conclusive, both as to the board making
t M settlement and its successors, unless the acts
complained of were in violation of the provisions
of the law bearing thereon, or done in fraud or
error; and to annul them on such grounds, the
causes of nullity must be clearly and satisfactorily
established.10®
However, it was conclusively shown that the board abused its
power of discretion and failed to take cognizance of the
positive prohibitory laws directing it in making such settle
ments.

For example, it was shown that claims for contingent

expanses and compensation were paid from the general school
fund, since there was no local fund; this was considered a
palpable infraction of the law.

Another error was that the

board allowed credit for amounts evidenced by receipts given
by the treasurer to himself, vhen the law plainly states
that such disbursements must be evidenced by warrants drawn
by the president of the board on the treasurer.

The defendant

pleaded estoppel on the grounds that the accusing board was
basing its complaints without his books, papers, and vouchers
used while he was treasurer.

He was refused estoppel on this

lO&phe school Board of Union Parish v. J. E. Trimble, (1881)
35 La. Ann. 1075.

. p. 1076.
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claim because the records of the settlement left It a matter
of dispute as to whether any, books and vouchers were produced
at that time.

The court criticized the authorities for this

laxity in the preservation of records end refused to hear the
defendant on any such claim.

The final result was that

Judgment was granted for the recovery of the money improperly
credited to the treasurer.
In 1890 the supreme court was called upon to decide
if the school .board was acting within reasonable bounds of
its discretionary power to accept a settlement with its treas
urer when the bookkeeping was irregular but in which all
moneys were accounted for.

It had been held previously

that faulty bookkeeping alone does not invalidate settlements
with the parish t r e a s u r e r . I n the case at bar the treas
urer had made settlements at various times.

His action was

upheld by the court thus:
The evidence convinces us that the
defendant honestly and faithfully accounted for
all the school funds received by him, and the
quietus granted him by the school Board was given,
after careful end patient examination of his
accounts as treasurer of said board.10®
Removal of members and vacation from office.

Pro

visions have been made, and interpreted when necessary, not

10?Pari8h school Board
Packwood at als., (1890)

of
42

East Feliciana v.GeorgeH.
La. Ann. 466, 7 So. 537.

A. Simmons, President Police Jury, and Charles Leroy,
Treasurer, Parish of Natchitoches, v. D. H. Boullt, Tax
Collector, (1874) 26 La. Ann. 277.
lOGparish school Board
Packwood et als., (1690)

of
42

East Feliciana v.GeorgeR.
La. Ann. 471.
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only for tha so curing of membership on the parish board but
also for the removal of members by those in authority, those
whom they serve, and by acts of

vacation whether through

acceptance of another office or

by their own volition.

cial interpretation has beenrequired at

Judi

times to assure

removal when advisable and to protect members from unfair
removals.
Parish school boards are subject to removal under
tha provisions of an act of 1902 which states:
Be it further enacted, etc., that for incompetenoy,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, the
Governor may remove a member or members of the
parish boards of school directors, subject to the
ratification of the State Board of Education.
However, this does not give the governor the right to remove
the members of a parish school board from office and appoint
a new board without a legal hearing where the members of the
old board are unwilling to surrender their rights; the court
has ruled in such situations that ejection may be made only
through an intrusion into office suit.^^^

Similarly, if

two persons hold commissions from the governor for the same
office as school board member, the one who is a de facto
wsmber and whose commission has not expired is entitled to
the office; the one Who holds a commission by competent
authorities but of subsequent date has recourse only to an
ouster suit and until decision thereon has been made by the

ll^Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 6.
Hljackson et al. v. Powell at al., (1907) 119 La. 882,
44 so. 689.
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courts the ^

facto member may seoure protection by an

Injunction restraining the later claimant from Interfering.^^®

A closely related ruling involved principally the question
of whether the right to appoint implied the right to ascertain
the existence of a vacancy.

The court decided affirmatively

and explained that if an incumbent concludes that no vacancy
existed at the time of appointment, he has recourse to the
forcing of a judicial interpretation, each claimant to abide
thereby.113

Other interpretations of the removal statute

have bean that the causas named therein are restrictive and
not to be replaced by "the deplorable condition of the school
affairs of the parish" and that the state board of education
does not have the power of removal, although the governor
may have voted as a member thereof— removal must be a respon
sibility of the governor.114

Also, a petition presented by

residents and taxpayers to have a school board member removed
on the charge of his being in illegal possession was not
granted; the court declared that citizens of a ward without
a claim to the office in question and having no special
interest therein had no right to oust or to petition for a

l^%îaxwell V. Randall, (1928) 8 La. App. 686.
Hastate ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel.
Gray v. Pipes et al. State ex rel. White v. Meson et al.
(1951) 175 La. 486, 137 So. 862.
Hastate ex rel. Muller, List. Atty., et al. v. Cyr et al.,
(1909) 124 La. 603, 50 So. 595.
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re straining order to an appointee who had an apparent title
to the office of parish school board member.
The right of resignation of a member appointed by
t W governor has been held^^® to be based on section 17 of
Act No* 100 of 1922 which reads in part:

"All vacancies in

the membership of parish school boards caused by death,
rqsignation, or otherwise, shall be filled by appointment by
the Governor."

After resignation is accepted by the governor,

the member's claim to the office is finally terminated.

How

ever, this member who has resigned, if having been holding
Office legally, is duty bound to continue the exercise of the
functions thereof until his successor be inducted into office,
for the pertinent organic provision is:
All officers, state, municipal and parochial,
except in case of impeachment or suspension,
shall continue to discharge the duties of their
offices until their successors shall have been
inducted into office.11?
Although he is required to function thus in official capacity,
this school board member is not considered as an "usurper or
intruder into office" so as to be required to litigate a case
involving the right to such office, as for example, when a
former occupant attempted to gain reinstatement by injunction.
The court ruledH® that the contest should have been brought

^l®Thomas et al. v* Doughty, (1927) 163 La. 213, 111 So. 681.
ll®State ex rel. Bolin v. Webster Parish School Board et al.,
(1953) (La. Crt. of App.) 150 So. 446.
11?Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 19, sec. 6.
ll % ta t e ex rel. Bolin v. Webster parish school Board et al.,
(1954) (La. crt. of App.) 157 So. 142.
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while ths one who resigned was a ^

faoto claimant to the

office.
Local Boards
General bases.

The school board of a local nature

was significant in the early development of public education
in the state.

In 1627 the parish school administrators were

authorised to appoint three trustees for the schools in each
of the police jury wards of the parish.

These boards were

entrusted with the employment of teachers and the performance
of other detailed duties pertaining to supervision of the
schools in % e l r respective wards.H®
Provisions were made in 1847 whereby each school
district in mass meeting assembled was privileged to elect a
district school board with general supervision of the school
or schools therein.180

In 1869 the state board of education

was empowered to appoint at its discretion local school
directors to assist in the detailed management of their
particular schools.1®1

By 1904 the power of the local boards

was on the decline,1®® and since 1912 such boards have had a
nominal existence with advisory responsibilities.1®®

11 Acts of Louisiana, 1827, "An Act to provide for the
support and administration of parish schools and for other
purposes," sec. 5, p. 82.

, 1847,

No. 825, sec. 80.

. 1869,

NO. 181,

8.0. 10.

^ 1904,

NO. 167,

aeo. 8.

, 1918,

NO. 814, 8.0.

18.

258
In 1916 a complaint against the creation of over
lapping districts was presented to the effect that confusion
might arise from having three visiting trustees from each
d i s t r i c t . T h e court called attention to the provision
for three auxiliary visiting trustees in each district, to
he selected hy the patrons thereof, in the manner provided
hy the board, and expressed belief that the selection would
soon be made for the newly created district.

The attorney

general had previously held that the aot^®® requiring the
selection of such trustees was practically directory#!®®

The

duties of the visiting trustees were held by the court to be*
"They shall visit the schools of their
respective district and shall make quarterly
reports to the board of directors of the actual
condition of the schools, and shall make needful
suggestions in all matters relating to the schools
of which they are trustees."!®”
An act of 1922 made provision whereby local school boards
might be appointed by the parish boards.!®®
Thus, it may be seen that the local boards of
trustees or directors influenced the early development of
public schools in the state, but that toward the close of
the nineteenth century their influence was being replaced
by the increasing power of the parish school boards.

!®4jbfouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of
Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So. 191.
!®5Aetg of Louisiana, 1912, Ko. 214, sec. 18,
!®®Onlnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. June 1.
1912,

'T

O

.

------------

!®?Drouln et al* v. Board of Directors of Public Schools
of Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 400,
!®®Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Ko, 100, sec, 24.
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The Constitution of 1981 rooognized the nominal existence of
suoh local boards but circumscribed their power, thus:
Municipal or parish school boards and
systems now in existence by virtue of special or
local legislative acts are hereby recognized,
subject to control by and supervision of the
State Board of Education, end the power of the
Legislature to further control them by special

laws.!®®
Issuance of warrants.

Local school directors may

issue warrants for the disbursement of funds belonging to
their particular district.

This power was questioned In the

Miahle caaelBO where the treasurer had refused to honor a
warrant drawn by the school board in one of the districts of
St. Martin Parish on the grounds that the school director®
subscribing and delivering it were never elected, and, if
elected, never qualified as directors*

The law governing

the issuance of warrants declares, "That the money which
may be received by the several parish Treasurers, shell be
held by them and paid out to the various school districts
upon the warrant of a majority of the School Directors in
each district,"!31
In ordering the treasurer to honor the warrant in
question, the court held that district school directors had
a right to issue warrants for their respective districts and
that such warrants were legal whether the trustees were or
were not de f a c t o . !38

!®®Constitution of Louisiana, 1981, art, IS, sec. 11,
Miahle v. a. 0. Fournet, (1058) 13
^®^Aets of Louisiana, 1855, Mo. 381, sec,
Miahle V. 0. 0. Fournet, (1868) 13

La, Ann. 607,
9,
La. Ann. 607.

Special oit y boards.

It has been the policy of the

state to grant exceptional privileges to some of the larger
centers in matters pertaining to their local school systems.
For example, since 1826 New Orleans has had special boards
to administer the operation of her public

s c h o o l s ,

!33

That such special boards have existed with 8 standing
in court since 1871 is evidenced by a consolidated case to
determine tha allocation of powers between two constituted
school boards of New

O r l e a n s .

!®4

The court recognized these

boards and described the case as being;
, , , 8 controversy between two sets of functionaries
deriving their powers from the same source and holding
their offices under the act of the Legislature ap
proved March 16, 1870, entitled "An Act to regulate
public education in the State of Louisiana and city
of New Orleans, and to relae a revenue for that
purpose." These contestants are styled "The City
Board of school Directors," and "The Ward Boards of
School Directors." The contest relates to priority
of Jurisdiction over the public schools of the city
and the right to receive and disburse the school
funds apportioned to the city schools.!"©
After a careful investigation of the power granted to the two
corporate bodies under the existing law, the court held that
the ward boards of school directors were given primary control
and supervision of the public schools of the city,

since the

IB^Acts of Louisiana, 18S6, "An Act establishing two primary
schools and one central school in the City of New Orleans, and
for other purposes," sec. 2, p. 146.
!^Third Ward school District of New Orleans v, City Board
of school Directors. Van Norden, Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas W.
Conway, State superintendent. Thomas W. Conway, state Superin
tendent, V. The City Board of School Directors. Van Norden,
Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas U'. Conway, State Superintendent.
(1871) 23 La. Ann. 152.
IGSibld., p. 163.
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oity board of school directors was subordinate in its powers
and functions to % e ward boards, it was not legally authorized
to make contracts with teachers, and to receive or disburse the
school funds belonging to, or coming to, the oity for public
school purposes.

SUMMARY

Political agencies— the legislature and the police
Juries— and boards of education— state, parish, and local— are
tha principal nonprofessional agencies which participate In
the control of the state's educational system.
Political Agencies
The influence that the political agencies have had
on the development of public school policies appears to be the
following:
1. On the theory that a legislative body may enact
laws which are not prohibited by the state or national consti
tutions the legislature in early statehood put into effect
laws which controlled public schools.
2. The legislature is the principal agency through
which the educational mandates of the state's organic laws are
executed.
3. The legislature may be restrained by organic lews.
For example, in 1879 the lawmakers were prohibited from author
izing support of any schools of a sectarian nature.
4. In some instances the legislature has delegated
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its powers— the right of the qualified taxpayers to vote
BpeelaX levies for sehool purposes is an illustration,
5.

police Juries were the chief controlling agencies

of education in their respective parishes during the early
history of the state.

Later their powers included the dis

cretionary ascertainment of the amount of tax levies for
schools and the supervision of special tax elections.
Boards of Education
Since the beginning of the state's public school
system the powers delegated to various boards of education
have influenced the development of the educational policies.
The facts pertaining to such policies seem to be mainly as
follows:
1. From the historical point of view the state
board must have been preceded by some other directing factor,
for this centralized control received no legal recognition
until after the War for Southern Independence,
2. The personnel of the state board during its
early history included many ex-offlolo members; apparently,
this was unsatisfactory, for the Johnson Act of 1916 eliminated
all such members and specified the personnel to consist of
the state superintendent of public education end five appointed
members.
S.

The constitution of 1921 provided for the reorgan

ization of the state board of education so as to consist of
eight members elected by the voters and three appointed by the
governor.

This board Is clothed with broad discretionary
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powers and is given supervision and control of all free public
schoolst the certification of teachers, and the adoption of a
program of studies fbr the public schools,

4.

Notwithstanding the almost unlimited powers of

the state board of education, the courts have rarely been
called upon to interpret its actions,
6.

The parish school board, as an agency of control,

had its inception in the public school system in 1821,
6. Since the beginning of the present century the
powers of the parish school board have been broadened to the
extent that this board now plays for the parish a role similar
to that which the state board plays for the state,
7. The personnel of the parish board consists of
one person elected for each police juror of the various wards
for overlapping terms of six years,
8, Vacancies for unexpired terms of parish school
board members are filled by appointment by the governor.
9, The secretaryship of the parish board is filled
by the parish superintendent by virtue of his office,
10. The parish school board is a corporate body with
all the legal standing appertaining,
11. school board members are classified as officers
of the state, for each board constitutes a part of the public
school system, which is a state function,
12. Since a school board member ia an officer under
the state, he can hold no other state or Federal office at
the same time.
13. The broad discretionary powers of the school
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board are Indioeted by its general jurisdiction over the
schools of the parish*

The court's policy has been non-

Interference with the board's discretionary action except in
case of abuse*
14. The records of school board proceedings must
be in writing to be valid*
15. The parish school board is granted discretionary
power in the selection of a parish superintendent of echools
but not to the extent of re-election of a superintendent a
year before his term expires.
16. Assistant superintendents of parish schools may
be employed and removed at the discretion of the parish school
board*
17. The parish school board's discretion in the
dlsbursemant of the school funds is circumscribed only by
general laws pertaining thereto.
18. The creation and abolition of school districts
and the location of schools therein are discretionary powers
of the pariah school board.
19. The official acts of ÿM facto school board
members are legally sound, but minority board proceedings
carry no value.
20. In transactions with the parish school treasurer
the board must hold the sureties on the treasurer's official
bond responsible until final settlements have been made.

The

board's settlement with the treasurer is accepted as final
and may be annulled only in case of established fraud or error.
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81. School Board members may be removed from office
for the restrictive causes specified by statute but only after
a legal hearing.
88. The local school board was a significant agency
of control in the early development of public education, but
toward the close of the nineteenth century its influence was
being replaced by the increasing power of the parish school
board.

The Constitution of 1921 continues to recognize the

local boards but circumscribes their powers.
23. A few special city school boards of a local
nature with broad powers have been in existence from an early
date.
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amOATIONAl CONTHOL ST PROFESSIONAL AOENGISS

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATIONAL CONTROL BT PROFESSIONAL AGENCIES

In the organization and administration of the state's
program of public education many responsibilities have been
entrusted to professional agencies of control— the various
types of superintendents and the public school teachers*

It

may be expected that the accompanying rights and duties have
been the bases of controversies requiring legal interpretation.
The present chapter is an attempt to show Louisiana's law
relative to the professional agencies controlling her public
school system.

SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS

State Superintendent
General supervision of public education by some one
who represents the state is a natural consequence of state sup*
port.

"The state must maintain supreme control of the public

schools, otherwise there will always be the danger that the
state purpose in establishing them may be d e f e a t e d , T h e
chief educational officer is the principal professional agency

Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public School
as a State Institution (Bloomington,
P* 33.
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of eontrol In initiating and executing the public school
policies of the state<^

In Louisiana this officer who must

direct the general supervisory program is the state superin
tendent of public education*
Legal bases*

The office of superintendent had Its

legal Inception in Louisiana in 1833 when to the office of
secretary of state was added the office of state superintendent
of education.3

The first subject reported by the committee

on education in the first constitutional convention of the
state which gave attention to the question of education was
the urgent necessity of establishing some system of state
control,4

As finally adopted the organic provisions were;

"There shall be appointed a Superintendent of Public Education,
who shall hold his office for two years.
prescribed by law,

His duties shall be

fie shall receive such compensation as the

Legislature may direct."3

in response to this constitutional

mandate, the legislature in 1847 amended its act of 1833 by
making the state superintendent of public education a separate
and distinct officer,®
In the next constitutional convention the majority
report from the committee on public education included no

®Frank P. Graves, The Administration of American Education
(Hew York, 1932), p, 541,
»

Acts of Louisiana, 1833, "An Act supplementary to the
several acts relative to Public Education," sec, 1, p. 141.
^Official Report of Debates in the Louisiana Convention.
1844-4b, p. "^16,
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art, 133.
®Aots of Louisiana, 1847, No, 225, sec, 7,
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provision for the offios of superintendent of publie éducation,^
On the other hand, the minority report pointed out that "the
abolition of the Superintendent of the Public Schools would
have a had effect upon all our system of public education."®
When the question came up again, having been called from the
minority rather than the majority report, an unsuccessful
attoftpt was made to vest the police juries of the respective
parishes with the power of control.

By a slight majority the

report retaining the superintendent's office was adopted, with
the provision that this officer be elective by the people,*
Later the whole section pertaining to state control of public
education was under consideration in the adoption of a sub
stitute which abolished the office of state superintendent and
transferred its duties to the secretary of s t a t e , A l m o s t
immediately the substitute was called up for reconsideration;
the final result was that the original article was adopted
with amendments to the effect that the office be elective and
its retention optional with the legislature,^^

From the above

it may be seen that in the Constitutional Convention of 1852
there were different opinions concerning the control of public
education.

The next convention made only the revisions that

^Journal of the Convention to Form £ New Constitution for
the fita'ïe o? loulaïana".
p, 53,
% b i a .. p. 87.

'ibid., p. 85.
^'ibld.. p. 86.
lllbia.. p. 87.
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the term of the state superintendent be Inoreased from two to
four years and that the salary be fixed at four thousand
dollars per annum until otherwise provided by law rather than

left to the direction of the legislature,^^
Various proposals concerning the state superintend

ent were made in the Convention of 1867-1868, chief of which
dealt with;

The placing of private schools under his super

vision,^® method of s e l e c t i o n , s a l a r y , d e l e g a t i o n of the
whole proposition to the legislature,^® and supervision,^*^

Some were included and others failed in passage, as is
indicated by the following adopted provisions;
There shall be elected by the qualified voters of
this State a Superintendent of Public Education,
who shall hold his office for four years. His
duties shall be prescribed by law and he shall
have the supervision and the general control of
all public schools throughout the State, He shall
receive a salary of five thousand dollars per
annum, payable quarterly, on his oiivn warrant,
Again, in the Constitutional Convention of 1879, it
was evident that the people had not become reconciled to state
agencies of public school control.

The minority group of the

C(mmlttee on education emphasized the need of such control and

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1864, art. 140,
Inofficial Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention for
Framing a ConstitutTo^n for the 6tate of Louisiana. 1867-1868,
p, it,
“
Itlbld.. p. 60.

ISlbld.
l*Ibld.. p. 94.
l?Ibia.. p. 208.

Constitution of Louisiana, 1668, art. 137.
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s u p e r v i s i o n , o n the other hand, some recommended that the
State superintendent's office he abolished and the duties
aeeumed by the secretary of s t a t e , b u t finally en amend
ment retaining the office of state superintendent was adopted
by & email m a r g i n , T h o s e who would lower the status by a
reduction in salary were successful to a certain extent, for
the maximum annual expense of the office was noLied at three
thousand doliars,
The theory of state control of public education
seems to have been accepted without protest in the Constitu
tional Convention of 1898,^^

The provisions for a state

superintendent of education were brought forward from the
constitution of 1879 with the revision only that the maximum
amount which might be used as office expense was fixed at
two thousand d o l l a r s h o w e v e r , an amendment to this article
in 1908 raised the salary of this officer to five thousand
dollars, payable monthly on his warrant, and removed the
provision concerning

e x p e n s e s ,

^5

Inofficial Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention o lf the Ata^te of Louisiana, 3379. pp, 168-169*
*"lbid.. p, 173.
^4 b l d .. p. 17B.
" i b i d .. pp, 202-203; Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art,
223.
Offioial Journal of the Prooeedlnaa of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Loui si ana, 1§96,
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art, 349,
^®Ibid,, as amended by Act No, 38 of 1908, adopted November,
1908.
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The policy of etate control having been accepted,
there were no controversial issues on this subject in the
Constitutional Convention of 1921 except relative to the method
of selecting the chief educational officer.

Some members

thought the voters of the state should have the privilege of
electing this o f f i c e r , w h i l e others believed that the state
board of education should make the s e l e c t i o n F i n a l pro
visions were:
Tho board shall elect for terms of four (4) years a
chairman and a State Superintendent of Public
Education. The latter shall be ex of f i c i o secretary,
and his salary shall be fixed by the board at not
less than five thousand
000.00) dollars nor m ore
than seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00)
per annum, payable monthly on iiig o v m warrant, and
he may be removed b y the board,
This section was amended the next year so as to make the officer
elective by the voters of the state and not subject to removal
by the state board of education,&*
Official rights in court,

It is remarkable that for

more than e century the chief educational officers of the
state have conducted the affairs of that office in the interest
of publie education without interference from the judicial
branch of government.

However, the superintendent of public

education, as a ministerial officer of the state, is assured

^®Offlqial Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention o t the 6tate of louisi ana. 1 9 2 T 7 PP* 44, 128,
2?Ibid.. p. 688.
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Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec, 5.

^^Ibid.,

1922.

as

amended by Act No, 105 of 1922, a d opted November,
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the benefit of the state's counsel In court cases or other
legal procedures in connection with the functions of the
office*

He is prohibited from appearing in court in his

offioial capacity except through one of the state's attorneys*
This principle was clearly demonstrated in the Edwin E, Fay
case,®® where the plaintiff, in his official capacity, entered
suit through the assistance of private counsel to enjoin the
disbursement of certain sums of appropriated money.

The

supreme court interpreted that part of Act No. 21 of 1872
%Aioh controls the case as follows;
The first Section of the Act positively
prohibits the Auditor, the State Treasurer, or any
other ministerial officer of the State, from appear
ing in court, either in person or by private counsel
in any suit in which such officer may be a party or
may be interested in his offioial capacity, but in
all such oases he must be represented by the Attorney
General, if the suit is Instituted in New Orleans,
or by the local District Attorney in any of the
parishes of the State. It authorizes the Governor
or Attorney General, in case of necessity, to have
such officer represented by an at tomey-at-law.
The second Section prohibits any court of
the State from maintaining any suit in which such
officer may appear in person or by private counsel,
and requires the dismissal of such suit "ex officio
or on motion," as in case of nonsuit, and provides
that notice of such dismissal be served on the
Attorney General or proper District Attorney, who
may on motion reinstate such action, if he deem it
expedient so to do.®^

Edwin E. Fay, Superintendent of Public Education, v. Allen
Junel, Auditor, and 1, A. Burke, Treasurer, (1885) 35 La. Ann.
5*8.

pp. 366-889.

274
Division Superintendent
Heoonstruetion legislation in 1869 provided that the
state hoard of éducation, which had been appointed by the
governor, should appoint six division superintendents of public
education.

Their duties were to supervise and control the edu

cational systems of their respective districts.®^

Statutory

provision for this type of superintendent was continued in the
general school act of 1870 with the change that the appointive
power was transferred to the governor,®®

However, these offi

cials and their system of supervision went out of existence
with the termination of the Reconstruction Period.
Removal from office.

A check of the court records

reveals one significant case dealing with division superin
tendents.®^

Since the ease is self-explanatory and very

briefly reported, its record is quoted in full;
On the twenty-ninth of March, 1870, the
relator was appointed Division Superintendent of
Education, first division, in pursuance of the
third section of act No. 6 of 1870, entitled "An
act to regulate public education in the State of
Louisiana and city of New Orleans and raise a
revenue for that purpose." His term of office
was three years, and salary #2500, payable quarterly
upon his own warrant. This proceeding was insti
tuted on the twenty-first of September, 1872, to
compel the State Auditor to issue to him a warrant
on the State Treasurer for #1770.55, for amount of
salary from the first of December, 1871, to the
thirty-first of August, 1872, and from a judgment
making the mandamus peremptory this appeal is taken.

®®Acts of Louisiana, 1869, No. 121, sees. 46, 55.
®®Ibid.. Extra Session, 1870, No. 6, sec. 5.
®^State of Louisiana ex rel. R. 0. Richardson v. James
Graham, State Auditor, (1875) 26 La. Ann. 73.
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The above act which created the office
authorized the removal of the division superintend
ents upon certain contingencies* and the mere fact
of relator's removal* which Is admitted, is pre
sumptive evidence that it was made for a proper cause#
See the case of Dubuc v* Voss, 19 An* 210 (92 Am*
Dec* 526) euad Vincent v. Populus* Opinion Book 37,
p. 584* It was incumbent on and in the power of
relator to show that the removal was without cause
or not in conformity to law* This has not been done*
In the cases cited by the relator, provision was not
made for the removal as was effected, or no proof of
a removal was adduced, and they are therefore not
applicable to this case*
It is therefore ordered that the Judgment
appealed from be reversed, and that there be Judg
ment in favor of defendant rejecting the application,
with costs in both courts*^®
Therein legal recognition was given to the office of division
superintendent, appointment to and removal therefrom, and the
end of the state's responsibility to pay that officer after he
had been removed for cause*
Parish Superintendent
Legal developments of office#

It seems that the

idea of professional supervision of the parish schools did not
develop until after the Constitutional Convention of 1844-1845,
of which one result was the enactment of a general educational
law of the state.

This law included provisions for the elec

tion of a parish superintendent by the voters of the parish
and fixed the maximum remuneration for his services at three
hundred dollars per year*®®

"iMd.
Acts Of Louisiana, 1847, No. 225, sec. 11.
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Apparently the people were not ready for this type
of control, for In 1862 the office was abolished*®?

In 1077

the parish school board was authorized to elect a secretary
at a salary of #100 per year*®®

Not until 1862 was the office

re-established, after having had organic authorization;®^ at
that time the parish school board was empowered and directed
to select this officer at an annual salary of not more than
#200 for the double function of serving as secretary of the
board and parish superintendent*^®

The Constitution of 1898

required the same double function and provided that the salary
and qualifications of said offioial should be under legisla
tive control.*^

Since the beginning of the present century

the parish school board has been given considerable latitude
in the annual salary schedule of the superintendent;
of 1902 fixed the minimum at #200 and the maximum at

the law
>

42

idiile the act of 1904 increased the lower limit to #600 and
abolished the upper limit * ^

In 1916 the minimum was increased

to #900 and the maximum was fixed at #4000*^^

®?Ibid*. 1852, No.

The Constitution

310, secs. 1-3.

®®Ibid.. Extra Session, 1877, No. 23, sec. 7.
®*Oonstitution of Louisiana, 1679, art. 226.
^Acts of Louisiana, 1882, No. 70, sec. 2.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 250.
^®Aots of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 35.

**Ibld.,

1904, No.

167, see. 36.

1916, No.

lEO, seo. 27.
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of X921 placed the qualifications and duties of the incumbent
of this office under the supervision of the state board of
education and left certain phases of control, such as the
selection of the official, to the parish school board*

Also,

it was provided that the board need not confine Itself to
any particular political subdivision of the state in finding
a suitable official,*®

At present the parish superintendent,

under the direction of the parish school board end in cooper
ation with the state department of education, has become the
chief agent in supervision and control for promoting the
educational policies of the state In his particular parish.
Official status.

It is generally admitted that the

parish superintendents of the state are integral elements of
the public school system, but their status seems to have been
a variant, concerning which the courts have been called upon
to give several interpretations.
In a suit in 1905,*® occasioned by the refusal of
a district attorney to institute removal from office proceed
ings against a parish superintendent on the grounds that this
superintendent is not a public officer, the court decreed;
We find in this position every element
which the courts have decided it takes to make a
public office. It is a public station or employ
ment provided for by the Constitution of the state.
The manner by which the person who is to fill this
station is to be chosen is fully designated end
declared both by the Constitution and by statute,

^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, seo. 10,
*®State ex rel. Smith et al, v, Theus, District Attorney,
(1905) 114 La. 1097, 38 So, 870,
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and the title of the officer Is given in the same
way. The tenure of office, its duration, and the
duties of the officer are all specifically prescribed,
and there can be no question that a parish superin
tendent of public education is a public officer—
a state officer Whose duties are limited within the
bounds of the parish for which he is elected. "
Another point established In the instant case was that citizens
and taxpayers have a legal right when properly united to demand
that the district attorney bring suit against an incumbent who
is Charged with having illegally usurped and intruded into, or
with unlawfully holding and exercising, the office of parish
Biq^rintendent of public education.
As was shown in the legal developments pertaining to
this school official, the Constitution of 1921 provided that
the parish school board need not confine itself to any partic
ular political subdivision when making the selection of a
parish superintendent.

An interpretation of this provision

was rendered by the court in 1931*® in a case concerned
primarily with removal of the superintendent from office.
The pertinent provisions of the constitution of 1921 and their
repetition in section 19 of Act No. 100 of 1922 were cited.
It was interpreted that these were the equivalent of saying:
. . . a parish superintendent of schools need not
be an elector of the parish; because, according
to section 1 of article 8 of the Constitution of
1921, a person cannot be an elector of a parish
unless he is, and has been for a year, an actual
and bona fide resident of the parish, and unless
he is and has been for two years an actual and
bona fide resident of the state. Hence, when the

4?Ibla.. 114 La. 1104,
«X rel. Harrey t. Stanly, (1931) 173 La. 807, 138

So * 845.
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Coaatltutlon of 1921 declares that a pariah superin
tendent of schools need not be a resident of the
parish, it, in effect, declares that a parish super
intendent of schools shall not be deemed a public
officer, because he cannot be a public officer
without being a resident of the parish#*^
In the meantime, the court of appeal

in 1928®®

treated the parish superintendent as a public officer in
connection with proceedings for the garnishment of his salary.
However, this case did not mention the new provision concern
ing the residence requirements of this official and it based
its reasoning on a case decided before the late constitution.

The Harvey case of 1931®^ which held that the superintendent
is not a public officer under the Constitution of 1921 would
seem to control, since it is a supreme court case, is of more
recent date, and makes specific explanation that the court of
appeal

case did not apply because it based its decision on

a previous constitution.
Thus, although the parish superintendent of schools
was correctly considered a public officer in the early history
thereof, that status was changed with the Constitution of 1921
and at present this school official is not legally considered
a public officer.
Viva voce vote required in election.

In a case

concerning the election of a parish superintendent the question
of whether the school board should elect this offioial by

173 La. 814-813.
SOodom ▼. Hodge-Hunt Limber Co., Ino., (1928) 9 La. App. 418,
121 So. 237.
®^Stat. ex rel. Harvey v. Stanly, (1931) 173 La. 807, 138
So. 845.
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secret ballot or by viva vooe vote was the principal issue*®®
In the controversial situation the school board of Winn Parish
proceeded to elect by secret ballot a parish superintendent.
The count showed a vote of 6 to 4 in favor of Jesse J* Mixon;
later 5 of the 9 members declared to have voted for the in
cumbent, Asa Leonard Allen*

The board met the next day and

after deciding that an error had been made the day before in
announcing the election results, proceeded to elect by viva
vooe vote, which resulted in the selection of Allen*

Suit

vas instituted to compel Mixon, the defendant, who was pre
viously superintendent, to surrender the office to Allen who
was last elected.
The court confirmed Allen's right to the office
and explained its action in terms of article 208 of the Consti
tution of 1918, which declares that the vote shell be viva
voce in all elections by persons voting in a representative
capacity.

More recently the state's legal adviser has rendered

the same interpretation®® of similar provisions in the Const!ttttlon of 1921.54
Fixed term of office.

The questions of «hat consti

tutes the legal term of office of the parish superintendent
and the relation thereof to changes in the personnel of the

®®State ex rel. Long, Diet, Atty. et al. v. Mixon, (1918)
142 La, 714, 77 So. 512.
®®Oplnlona of the Attorney General of Louisiana* May 1, 1932,
to April 1, 1934, p. 3Ï0.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 8, seo. 7.
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pariah board were presented in a case in 1909*®®

The test was

oeoasioned by a change in the statutes to the effect that
parish school boards should be elected by the voters of the
various wards,®*

where formerly they had been appointed by
57
the state board,
and by the provision in the later statute

that the incumbents would hold office until their successors
were elected «hioh elections were to be at the time of the
Oongressional elections*

Each board was authorized to elect

a parish superintendent for a term of four years*®®

Conformity

to the revised statutes produced the situation that the out
going board elected a superintendent whose term would extend
practically throughout the official period of the incoming
board.
In the case®® which sought interpretation of this
condition the superintendent appointed by the new board insti
tuted an ouster suit against the superintendent appointed by
the old board*

The incumbent's terra had expired shortly before

the new board was elected and the old board had reappointed
him.

Attention was called by the court to the corporate

existence of the board, which signifies that the change of the

®®State ex rel. Wilson v. Hardin, (1909) 123 La. 736, 49
So* 490*
®*Acts of Louisiana, 1906, No. 60, seo. 1*
5^1bld.. 1888, Ho. 81, sec. 3.
" i b i d .. 1908, Ho. 49, seo. 8 .
" state ex rel. Wilson v. Eardln, (1909) 123 La. 736, 49
So. 490.
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individuals who compose the hoard does not affect the status
of the hoard.

It was recognized that the parish board had the

authority to appoint a superintendent for four years but for
no shorter or longer term end that, therefore, the outgoing
hoard performed its mandatoiy duty at the expiration of the
superintendent's term by appointing a successor for a period
of four years.

Thus, this decision reserved to the superin

tendent appointed by a board legally constituted the right to
serve four years regardless of termination of office of the
board who elected him, the subsequent board's being bound by
its predecessor's action.

Removal could have been secured

through authorized means but not because the governing board
for the majority of the term was not the appointing board,
Naturally, complications might arise between a superintendent
and a board serving under such conditions as in the Instant
case; in this connection the court said:
Whether it would be more agreeable or
convenient, or would better subserve the interest
of the public, that the matter should be so arranged
that the members of the board should at all times be
able to control the appointment of the superintendent
of education of the parish, in order to control, or
as incidental to the control of, the appointment of
the secretary of the board end of the treasurer of
the school funds of the parish, is a matter for the
consideration of the General Assembly, We can only
say that the existing laws do not so arrange It, . ,
Salary determination.

The Constitution of 1981, by

omitting any reference to the salary of the parish superintendent,

"ibid.
*llbid.. 123 La. 741.

283
left that responsibility with the legislature.

That body

delegated the duty to the perish school'board; in Act No.
ISO of 1916 it was specified that the maximum salary should
be $4000, but in Act No. 100 of 1988 no reference was made
to salary.

In view of the latter statute the Webster Parish

School Board, which had been paying its school superinten
dent an annual salary of $4000, increased the said superin
tendent's annual salary $1000, beginning July 1 , 1985*

Certain

taxpayers*® attacked the legality of such action by the school
board.
The principal issue for the court to determine was
if Act No* 180 of 1916 was superseded by Act No* 100 of 1988,
A similar principle was Involved in a suit carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States and in another case to a
state supreme court; both decisions maintained the theory
that where two laws dealing with similar subject matter were
enacted at different times, the latter covering the whole
subject matter of the first and embracing new provisions, the
former was repealed or superseded by the l a t t e r . I n uphold
ing the school board's discretionary power to fix the salary
of the parish superintendent, the court said:
Our conclusion is that the provision
limiting the salary of parish superintendents
of education as contained in Act 120 of 1916 was
repealed or superseded by the Act 100 of 1982, and

*®Knight V. Webster Parish School Board, (1927) 164 La. 482,
114 So. 104.
®®Onlted States v. Tynen, (1870) 11 Wall. 88 , 20 L. M . 153;
Wood et al. t. Bateman, (1921) 149 La. 290, 88 So. 824.

284
that the authority to fix the salary of ouch super
intendents is vested in the parish board of school
directors.64
De facto superintendent required to function.

The

law is self-explanatory in prescribing that parish superin
tendents are to execute contracts with teachers as directed
by the school boards of their respective parishes.

One perti

nent point at issue, however, has been to determine if a
school superintendent under the law may be compelled to execute
a contract vdien he refused on the ground that he had been
alleged to be a

facto superintendent by the plaintiff.*®

The courts have been consistent in maintaining that officers
whether ^

facto or de .lure have a right to discharge the

duties of their office as prescribed by law as long as posses
sion is maintained.*®

In the instant case the court pointed

out the possible results of holding otherwise as follows;
If one in possession of office, under color of
title, could not be required, during his incum
bency, to discharge the duties of the office,
the public might suffer until his title to it
could be ascertained in a proper proceeding. The
acts of an officer de facto are valid as to third
persons and the public.*?
In ordering the defendant to sign the contract in question,
the court said that according to section 23 of Act No. 100 of

*4Khight V. Webster Parish School Board, (1927) 164 La, 487,
*®State ex rel. Floyd v. Hodges, (1928) 165 La. 552, 115
So. 747.
**State V. Sadler et al,, (1899) 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So.
390; Williams et al* v. Police Jury of Concordia Parish et al.,
(1926) 160 La. 325, 107 So, 126; State v, Moreau et al,, (1923)
153 La. 671, 96 So. 527.
®'^State ex rel. Floyd v, Hodges, (1928) 165 La. 656.
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1928 it beoaise "the duty ot the parish superintendent to sign
all contracts with teachers,"*® and further:
* , . section 49 provides that no person shell be
appointed to teach without a written contract for
the scholastic year in which the school is taught.
The duties falling upon relator, as we appreciate
them, include teaching, Relator has been selected
by a majority of the membership of the board, and
not to require defendant, as superintendent, to
sign the contract would be to permit him to over
ride the law.
In this instance the duty heis to
perform is merely a ministerial one,*®
Thereby the court held that the parish superintendent
de Jure or ^

facto must perform the duties of his office.

Removal causes restrictive.

The power to remove a

parish superintendent is vested in the parish board, which
board may remove him, at its discretion, for Incompetency,
inefficiency, or unworthiness— such was the interpretation by
the state's legal adviser,?®

The court's viewpoint on this

was sought in the Harvey case,?! in which a newly appointed
superintendent instituted suit to compel an incumbent to
surrender office— the incumbent had been notified by the board
that his services were terminated because the majority of the
board was out of harmony with him.
The constitutionality of removal by parish boards
was upheld by the court in the following explanation relative

®®rbld.. p. 558.
"ibid.
70
Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 1928,
to May X, 1984” pp'7"4b0-4bi •
—
?!state ex rel, Harvey v, Stanly, (1951) 173 La. 807, 138
So, 845,
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no
to the controlling act; *

The legislative act includes but one
broad comprehensive object, and that is the admin
istration and supervision of the public schools of
the state. Its provisions embrace the means for
the accomplishment of that object* Tlie removal of
parish superintendents, as well as their election,
by perish school boards, constitute an important
and necessary part of the administration and super
vision of the state’s school system. And the section
of the legislative act authorizing such removal falls
within Its title.
Since the office of superintendent is not a public office under
the Constitution of 1921, the question to be decided was whether
or not the reasons for removal were in compliance with the
controlling lew which provides that parish superintendents may
be removed only on proof of "incompetency, inefficiency, or
u n w o r t h i n e s s T h e court maintained the soundness of the
contention of the respondent to the effect that the specifica
tions in the controlling law "of the causes authorizing the
removal of a parish superintendent of schools are restrictive,
and that consequently a removal for any other cause is unauthor
ized

Further, the court pointed cut that the Ieoh of

harmony might have been brought about without any irregularity
in the superintendent’s performance of his duties.
In handice down this decision the court continued
its policy of holding ouster suits to the strict interpretation

?®Aots of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, seo. 19.
?®State ex rel. Harvey v. Stanly, (1931) 173 La, 016*
74

Acts of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, seo. 19.

?®State ex rel. Harvey v. Stanly, (1931) 173 La. 819.
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of the law and diseotiraged school boards from attempting to
remove parish superintendents because of petty differences,
or in a manner otherwise than that directed by the legislature*

PUBLIC 3CE00L TMCHIHS

In the last analysis the teacher is the chief agent
for the Individual development of the youth*

"The real work

of the school as an instrument for carrying out the purpose
for which the school was established is done by the teacher,"?*
Then, the state and the public must be concerned about the
teaching personnel of the public schools,
Employment of Teachers
Necessity for certification.

The policy requiring

certification of teachers in some form had its beginnings with
the establishment of the public schools*

The police juries,

as managers of the parish schools,?? parish school boards,?®
ward trustees,?® parish superintendent® of schools,®® or some

?*Hermann H. Schroeder, op. cit.. p. 66,
??Acts of Louisiana, 1819, "An Act to amend the several laws
enacted on the subject of Public Schools within this State, and
for other purposes," sec* 2 , p. 52.
?®Ibid., 1820-21, "An Act to extend and improve the system of
PublicTSuoation in the State of Louisiana," sec* 2 , p. 64,
?®Ibid.. 1827, "An Act to provide for the support and adminis
tration of parish schools and for other purposes," sec* 5,
pp* 80, 82.

"ibid.. 1847, No. 828, seo. IS.
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local authorities®! were empowered at various periods to certify
to the eligibility of teachers until 1912, since which time
the state hoard of education has had complete authority in the
certification of teachers.®®
The question of whether the possession of a certifi
cate is necessary to validate a contract was one of the
principles involved in the Gauthier case,®® in which attempt
was made to recover a salary.

One provision with which the

claimant did net comply was the requirement that a teacher
must hold a certificate issued by the Louisiana State Board
of Education, vdaieh certificate must be of a grade sufficiently
high to meet the requirements for the

s c h o o l .

®4

Those teaching

at the time of the passage of this regulation were differently
provided for,®® but this did not apply to the person in ques
tion.

The plaintiff possessed a diploma from the State Normal

College; he contended that this was the equivalent of the
required certificate and that the parish superintendent should
be permitted to recognize it as such, for the document read,
"it entitles the holder to a State Teacher's Certificate."
The court held that to sustain this contention would be to

81lbid.. 1852, No. 310, sec. 6 .
62

Ibid.. 1912, No. 214, sec. 47; Opinions of the Attorney
General of Louisiana. May 1 , 1916, to May 1, 1918, p . 439.
®®Gauthier v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Board et

al., (1927) 5 La. App. 570.
®4Aots of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 49,
®®Ibid., eeo. 56.
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violate the whole tenor of the governing aot end place the
Imagsient of the parieh superintendent heyond that of the legis
lature and thereby nullify the provision:

"After this aot goes

into effeot, me person shall be appointed as teacher in the
publie sehools of the state, unless he or she holds a proper
eartifioate."®*
Thus the court established very definitely that a
teacher must be certified according to the governing act; this
means that all who did not hold certificates prior to the
passage of Act No. 100 of 1928 must be the possessors of
eextifioates issued by the Louisiana State Board of Education,
Method of selection»

The selection of teachers Is

made by the school board, and the parish superintendent has
no legal right to contract with a teacher not named by the
board— his power extends to nomination only*

This was estab

lished in the Gauthier oase®^ where an attempt was made to
collect a salary on an alleged contract entered into with the
parish superintendent.

The court referred to the governing

act which provides that, "The parish school board shall • « •
select such teachers from nominations made by the parish
superintendent, provided that a majority of the full membership
of ^ 0 board may elect teachers without the endorsement of the
superintendent.

o«
Gauthier v. St. John the Baptist Parish Bohool Board et
al., (1987) 5 La. App. 570.

66‘Acts of Louisiana, 1982, No. 100, sec. 80.
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Trm, this it may be seen that the law governing the
ehoiee ef teaehers is mandatory to the effect that parish
s ^ o e X boards shall aaleot teachers from nominations made by
the parish superintendent è

The court believed that this power

of seleetion ooald not be delegated to the superintendent;
eonseuuently, it held that a selection made by other than the
parish school board is of no effect*
The same policy was upheld by a later decision®® in
vAieh the court refused to legalize claims based upon a teach
ing contract entered into between a teacher and a parish
superintendent without consent of the school board.

In 1935

the court u]^eld the latter part of section 80 of Act No* 100
of 1922— teat is, a majority of the full membership of the
parish school board may elect teachers without the endorsement
of the parish superintendent.®®
Control by employing board » .Differences of opinion
have arisen between parish school boards as to the control of
teachers where a school district is made up of territory from
two parishes.

In 1926 the court of appeal^^

was called upon,

in a case transferred to it by the supreme court, to determine
teieh school board governed the employment of teachers in the
Fairview-Alpha High School,

The facts In the case seem to

show that the school in question was maintained at the joint

®®Brown v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, (1930) 14 La.
App. 460, 131 So. 760.
®®Cupit V. Vernon Parish School Board, (1933) (La. Ort. of
App.) 145 So. 391.
®^Parish School Board of Bed River Parish v. MoHaney, (1926)
S La. App. 696.
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•xpenae of the parishea of Red River and Hatohitoohes, and that
by egre«B»nt, the management and control of the school
belong to them alternately.

w as

to

For the session in question,

Natohitoohes Parish was in charge and had employed
tee defm&dant as principal.

Red River Parish Bchool Board

brought suit against the said principal to restrain him from
exercising any control in the Fairview^Alpha High School,
teerging that he had assumed his position without legal

authority*
The court maintained that such agreement between
school boards was under the authority of the school laws and
that the board in charge for 1982-1923 had exclusive control
during that year over the teachers whom it had employed and
must not be interfered with by the other board.
The Contract
Indefinite duration prohibited.

That the time element

is an essential feature of the teacher's contract was evidenced
in the Golden case,®®

According to the following resolution

teioh was adopted in 1877, New Orleans made an effort to extend
her teachers' contracts to an indefinite periods
"Resolved. That the following named
teachers in the pub'lic schools of the City of New
Orleans are appointed subject to a probation of
three months' service, and all those who may not be
removed for cause within three months, are hereby
declared permanently selected, subject to removal

®®F. A, Golden v. Board of Directors of the Public Schools
of New Orleans, (1882) 34 La. Ann. 354.
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only on written charges and after trial and con
viction by this Board, in the manner and for the
causes specified by l a w . " ® 3
the plaintiff had been dismissed by the New Orleans Board of
itehool Directors*

On the basis of compliance with the fore-^

going resolution, he filed suit to collect his salary on the
ground that he was employed for an Indefinite period of time.
In disapproving the claim for the alleged salary, the court
explained— after stating the legislative provisions pertaining
to employment of teachers by the parish board and by the city
board— that there seemed to be no inconsistency between the
two sections but that the limitation of the term of employment
of all teachers is fixed at one year.

It pointed out the

possible danger of employment according to the resolution,
which could mean practically a life tenure.
Fairly recently legislative sanction has been given
to the effect that those teachers who were properly certified
and employed in the New Orleans system at the time of the
passage of the act®* would be regarded as permanent and that
later employees were to be contracted with annually for three
years, after which time appointment might be made permanent
by the board.®®

This provision received endorsement by the

attorney general in 1922.®*

pp. 355-356.
of Loulaiana, 1922, ao« 100,
8*0 ' 66 .

*6oainlone of the Attorney General of louiaiana. l£ay 1. 1922.
to Itay 1. 1924, p. 4BIT
'
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It Is generally

eoneedad that written contracts are legally sound, especially
teere at least a scholastic year is under consideration,

With

regard to the employment and the contracts of teachers the
eentrolling legislation provides that the parish hoard may
employ teachers by the month or hy the year and fix their
salaries®^ and that, "Ho person shall he appointed to teach
without a written contract for the scholastic year in Which
the school is to be taught, . ,

The results of reading

these provisions together was the interpretation sought in the
Oupit case#®®
The court held that the requirement of a written con*
tract, as stated in the act, had reference to those persons
teo were appointed to teach for the scholastic year in which
the school is to be taught and that the correct inference is
that a written contract is not required where the teacher is
employed to teach by the month as was the plaintiff.

On the

principle the court said:
It can readily be conceived why a written contract,
in the teaching profession as well as in any other
profession or occupation, teere the employment is
for a long period of time, would be desirable in
order to protect the rights of both parties, whereas
in an employment for a short period at the time it
may not be necessary,

®®Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Ho, 100, sec, 20,

*ec. 49.
99

Oupit V. Vernon Parish School Board, (1935) (La, Ort. of
App*) 143 So, 391,
IQOltia.. pp. 391-892.
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Also, in the explanation it was pointed out that the provision
in the controlling act^®^ to the effect that it is the duty of
the parish superintendent to sign all contracts with teachers
has reference only to contracts entered into for the scholastic
year in which the school is to be taught#
Length of period for acceptance# In the oonsunaaation
of a contract, the sending of an official notice to a teacher
to inform her that she has been appointed to a teaching position
brings up the question as to how much time may elapse before
acceptance without the invalidation of the contract in question.
An illustration of this principle was involved in the Picou
case^®® in which a teacher, after having been duly employed to
teach a certain colored school was prohibited by the school
board and superintendent from teaching said school.

When the

suit was filed for the permission to teach said school or to
collect the salary asagreed upon, the school board claimed
that the contract was rendered

invalid because of a lapse of

twelve days in the teacher's acceptance#

In view of the fact

that the plaintiff had complied with all governing regulations,
the court maintained:
It is inconceivable from consideration
of all the factsinvolved in this case, and partic
ularly that the plaintiff had for ten years been
teaching in the parish of St, Bernard as a public
school teacher, and had been so doing even up to

^®^Acts of Louisiana, 1928, Ho, 100, sec# 83.
^®®Picou et al, V, St, Bernard Parish School Board, (1984)
(La, Ort# of App#) 138 So, 130,
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the year previous to the «Igning of the foregoing
oontraot, that the eohool hoard oould have expected
of her an Imediate reply to or acceptance of her
appointment, Oertainly the twelve days taken up
^ her for deliberation was in no manner unreason^
able I and constituted such delays under the provi
sions of our code as are to be contemplated as
reasonable, and within the intention of the parties
making the offer,^^
Oonsequently, the perish school hoard ^vaa ordered to pay the
plaintiff the full salary for the complete term, since the
time for actual performance of the duties had long since
elapsed.
Grounds for nullity. A teacher's contract protects
both the employer and the employee and only under rare circum
stances may such documents be nullified,^^^ except when
teachers have been selected contrary to the mode and manner
1AR

prescribed by law,

1Aa

or without the proper qualifications.

In the Picou case the board pleaded nullity of contract because
the married teacher was not authorized by her husband to sign
the written acceptance of employment ; the court held that if
a married woman is contracted with as a teacher, the contract
ing board cannot later claim nullity of the agreement on the
baeis of lack of her authority to contract, especially teen
the husband joins the wife in the suit,^^^

One cause held to

l O B i b l d .. p. 1 3 2 .
Ouinlons oî the Attorney General of Lpulaiana, May

1914. to

1, 1 9 1 6 , p. iS88.

1,

May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 1037.

l O G l b l d ..

p. 523,

at al. V. St . Bernard Pariah Sohool Board, (1924)
(La, Crt, of App. ) 138 60, 180,
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justify ths nullity of eontraet was involved in the Neilson
oaso,^®® in whieh an effort was made to oolleet a salary
balanee.

After the plaintiff had taught about six weeks, the

steool was elosed beeause the attendance was less than the
minimm requirement

of an average of ten pupils*^®®

There-

upon, the board paid the plaintiff two months' salary but
refused to pay more*

The court held that when the school

attendance fell below the average required by law, it was no
longer legal to keep the school in progress and that the ful
fillment of the contract for the scholastic year was condi
tioned upon the ability of the board to keep the sohool open*
Express and Implied conditions in contracts were differentiated
as follows:
"They are express, when they appear in the
contract ; they are implied, whenever they result
from the operation of law, from the nature of the
contract, or from the presumed Intent of the parties
Conditions in the contract were shown to be Implied through two
sources:

the governing law forbidding operation without the

minimum average attendance, and the knowledge of both contract
ing parties that there was danger of the school's being closed.
Since it was impossible to keep the sohool open, the court
declared the contract null on the basis that if a thing is
isqpossible or prohibited by law, every condition of it and any
agreement depending on it are void*

^®%eilson V* Lincoln Parish School Board, (1989) 18 La, App,
179, 18$ So* 458*
^®®Aets of Louisiana, 1928, Ho, 100* sec* 56,
^^Sleilson V, Lincoln Parish Sohool Board, (1989) (La. Ort,
of App*) 180 So* 459*
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In another

the sohool board had refused

payment of salary on tee ground

that the dostmotion of the

sohool building hy fire was a fortuitous event, which closed
t#e sohool and voided the contract.

The refusal of the hoard

to meet Its legally assumed obligations was not well taken,
for numbers of controlling decisional^* were cited to establish
the facts that the destruction of the building by fire was not
a fortuitous event and that, even if it had been so considered,
the contract would not have been nullified, unless the execu
tion thereof had been rendered impossible#

Accordingly, the

court held that the destruction of the building was not suffi
cient cause for nullity of the teacher's contract.
The Salary
Bases for determining. Salaries are generally pro
vided for in the law or stipulated in the contract, or they
may be determined on quantum meruit. In the Offut ease^^® a
teacher sued for the value of his services on the principle
of quantum meruit# which method woe opposed by the employing
board*

By reference to a former case^^^ the court sa ids

^^Hughes V, Grant Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La* Ort, of
App.) 145 So# 794.
^^Lehman, S t e m & Go,,Ltd,, v, Morgan's La, A Tex, R, A S# ë#
Go., (1905) 115 La. 1, 38 So# 073; Dejean v. La, Western Ry, Go#,
(1936) 167 La, 111, 118 So# 823; Noel Bros, v# Texas and Pao* Ry,
Co., (1981) 16 La# App, 622, 133 So, 830; Dallas Cooperage A
Wdodenware Go, v. Creston Hoop Co#, (1926) 161 La, 1077, 109 So,
644; Sugster A Co# v« Joseph West A Go#, (1683) 35 La# Ann# 119#
^^Felix G# Offut V, Séraphin Bourgeois et als#, School
%reetors, (1661) 16 La, Ann. 163.
Miahle V, G, G, Foumet, (1858) 13 La, Ann# 607,
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fhe law has not fixed the amount to he
paid to the teaehere for their aervioee; and, if
this matter he not regulated hy contract between
them and the school directors* the former's services
must be tested-on a quantum meruit, and accordingly
remunerated•
Final disposition was not made, for the record did not show
sufficiently the value oTthe services; for that reason the
ease was remanded for new trial#

However, the court did estab*

lish that quantum meruit is the basis upon which remuneration
must be made teen specification is lacking in law and contract,
Another aspect of the fixing of salaries developed
in 1906 when the court of appeal was called on to ascertain
tee had the authority to fix the salary of the superintendent
of the public schools of New O r l e a n s . T h e main facts in
the case were that the salary of the superintendent had been
raised by the school board but that the city treasurer, who
was also the school board treasurer, refused to honor the
increase on the ground that the board was not authorized
under the law to make such raise#

The court called attention

to the requirements that the superintendent be a competent and
an experienced educator,11? and it was reasoned that the law
makers could hardly have intended that such official would be
required to discharge his duties without pay#

The implied

power of the school board to fix the salary in question was
maintained by the court as follows:

llBfelix G# Offut V# Séraphin Bourgeois et als#, Sohool
Directors, (1661) 16 La# Ann# 164#
lldgtate of Louisiana ex rel# Warren Easton v# Treasurer of
Board of School Directors of New Orleans, (1906) 3 Orl# App# 383,
ll?Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No# 814, sec# 35#
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Where the power to do any given thing
la granted hy the law, the means whereby this power
amy be ezereised la likewise granted. Besides this
the oontemporaneona cone tract ion of the law by the
o f f i c e s cherged with Its execution, as also by the
entire city authorities and Its law officers, has
b e m that the School Board had the authority to pay
a salary to its Superintendent# The weight which
la to be given to such oont^poraneous" construction
is expressed in State vs. Owptoir National, etc.,
51 A. 1361# In that case the Court saldt "In this
state it has been more than once held: 'Common
interpretation of statutes which have existed for a
length of time will be considered, as it generally
is, the correct Interpretation.
To the same
effect is State ex rel# etc# vs. Board, etc., 52 A#
335; and cases cited#^^
fheret^on the court upheld the discretionary power of the board
of school directors of Hew Orleans to fix the salary of the
superintendent of the public schools of the City, and in the
instant case the treasurer was ordered to pay the salary as
teteified by the board's pay roll for the month in question.
Concerning the fixing of salaries of teachers in
general, this o a s e ^ ® also maintained that Aot Ho, 167 of 1904
emended and re-enacted Act Ho. 314 of 1903 so that the partin n t seetion reads
' That in addition to the powers and duties herein
before granted to and imposed upon parish boards,
the powers and duties of said board of directors
of the parish of Orleans shall be as follows:
First, It shall adjust and fix equitably
the salaries of teachers and janitors, secretary,
employees, and of such assistant superintendents as
it may deem necessary for an efficient supervision
of the school.^*®

^^State of Louisiana ex rel, Warren Easton v. Treasurer of
Board of Sohool Directors of Hew Orleans, (1906) 3 Orl, App. 391.
p« 308.
^® A o ts Of Louisiana, 1904, Ho. 167, sec. 73,
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1 of Aot No, llO of 1928, parish sohool

boerda a n oloteed with the authority to fix teaohers' salaries
bat t h v dfe required to develop an equal basis schedule for
both mem and womem*^*^
S r » , 4 m at yfMimtn M. â m s m æ ; *

seems not to

have beam queatiomed that the eohool directors have power to

issue warrante on the parish treasurer for the payment of
teaelters' salaries and that the jarish treasurer is legally
bound to honor suoh warrants, but the question has been raised
as to teether a de faeto board has suoh power*

This principle

was involved in the Miahle oase^®® in which a suit was insti
tuted to collect a salary from the school board treasurer of
St* Martin Parish, which official had refused to honor the
warrant because it was authorised by a board whom he charged

as not having been elected and not having qualified*

The court

held that the members of the board were d£ facto directors and
recognized as such, and that "the treasurer would have been
Justifiable in paying the warrant, for it would have been a
valid voucher for the payment of the money represented by it,”^*®
In approving the teacher's right to collect his salary accord
ing to the order of the de facto board, the court maintained

as directory the law which provided;

1 3 % , Ml#hle ▼, 0. O, 7o a m 0t, (1888) 13 La. Ann. 607.
I33lbia.. p, 606.
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That each warrant drawn for the salary of any Teacher
hhall he aeee#pamled hy a statement of the directors *
showing the ntther of schools in the district, the
nwmher of children taught, the number of children
teo do not attend school, and«the monthly rate of
compensation to the Teacher,
Ms statwent of the described nature accompanied the warrant,
and for this reason also the treasurer refused to payv

The

court desiganted the statement as not being an adjunct so
SCeCdsary to the warrant that payment could not be made with
out it.
Ihrther, the treasurer accused the teacher of exact
ing from the parents extra compensation of one dollar per
month per pupil.

Since this complaint was not properly brought

interested parties, the court held that it did not consti
tute a defense to payment of the salary.

It was pointed out,

hcwever, that such action by the teacher furnished good grounds
for complaint to the directors.
Protection from garnishment.

The salary of a teacher

in the public schools is exempt from seizure to satisfy a
judgment.

Section 1 of Act Ko. 166 of 1908 has been inter

preted to fix the status of a teacher in the public schools
as an officer| thereupon the salary of this individual is held
exmspt from garnishment.^®®

In 1989 the court of appeal was

called upon to decide if public school funds set aside to pey
teachers' salaries may be legally garnisheed by a teacher's

184
Acts of Louisiana, 1855, Ko. 381, sec. 11.
^®Fifth Avenue Library Society v. Miss Hortense Kilshaw,
(1910) 7 Orl. App. 496.
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creditor teile said funds are in the possession of the board.
In rendering the deeision, which protected the teacher's salary
from garnishment and allowed the hoard to resist successfully
any action against salaries, it was shown that such decision
is in keeping with the view held in other oases^®? which have
maintained that as a matter of public policy it is generally
held that salaries of public officials are exempt from
garnishment.
Pertaining to teachers proper and not to officials
in general, the court gave as the final besis for its decision
an explanation made by the supreme court of Utah and stated
that it included the reasons generally assigned for holding
W mchers' salaries exmnpt from seizure under garnishment
process.

The rather lengthy excerpt was as follows:

"But there is another reason why the con
tention of counsel cannot avail the appellant. In
the case at bar the defendant Watters was a teacher
in one of the public schools In the city of Ogden,
regularly employed by the board of education, which
board was created by authority of the legislature
for the benefit of the public. Thus employed, he
was a public servant, receiving a stipulated salary;
and no portion of such salary, so long as the money
remained in the hands of the board, was subject to
the process of garnishment. There is perhaps no
class of persons more intimately connected with the
welfare of the municipality than the teachers in the
public schools. Their labors are of interest to the
entire body of the people. As a general rule they
belong to that class of persons who depend upon their
salaries for the support of themselves and families.
As a class, they are honorable, industrious public
servants, and are generally poorly paid. If their
wages Intended for the support of those dependent

^®*Bank of Winnfield v* Brumfield et al., (1929) 11 La. App.
647, 124 So. 628.
^?Fischer v. Dubroca, (1927) 163 La. 292, 111 So. 710; Dunbar
V. Binkgravc et al., (1655) 10 La. Ann. 545; Fifth Avenue
library Society v. Miss Sortense Kilshaw, (1910) 7 Orl. App* 496,

303
upon them were s u b t o the process of garnishment,
the public might be deprived of their services at any
time I end suffer greet inconvenience because of inter
ruptions in the ménagement of the schools which would
thus occur. The children of the country cannot be
educated without competent teachers, end those
teachers, usually devoting their whole time to their
vocation, must have the necessaries of life; and
their salaries ough^ not to be subject to process
which will tie them up, in the hands of a board of
education, for an indefinite length of time, in dis
regard of the public interest. The territory has
undertaken te establish, at great expense, a system
of public schools, and it cannot allow the wages of
the teachers to be intercepted, at the risk of the
efficiency of the system being thereby impaired."1*®
Prescriptive periods of collection,

in a case in

1933 the basis claimed for refusal to pay a teacher's salary
was prescription of one and two y e a r s . T h e

court found

so two-year prescription applicable to salaries of school
teachers.

The one-year prescription was pleaded on the

ground that actions of masters and instructors in the arts
and sciences for lessons by the month are prescribed by one
year.

The court's reply was;
The fact that the employment in the present
case was for a term of eight months end not by the
month makes the one-year prescription inapplicable,
and relieves us of the unpleasant necessity of decid
ing whether or not a grade sohool teacher is a master
and instructor in the arts and sciences.

91th respect to three-year prescription applicable to actions
for salaries of certain employees, among whom are teachers of

^*®Bank of Winnfield v. Brumfield et al., (1989) (La. Crt.
of App.) 124 So. 330-631.
^®®Hughes V. Grant parish school Board, (1933) (La. Crt. of
App.) 143 So. 794.

5. 7*6.
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te# #elen##m who glv# lemsona by the year or quarter, and eone m mteg te# disposition of tee preseription plea, the oourt
stated:
tee three-year preeeriptlon, not having
been pleaded and not having aocnaed, need not be
eensldered* tea plea of preseription was properly

overmled.^^

Removal
Only legal method justified.

The law^®* governing

tee reroval of teachers states that upon the basis of a proper
hearing a teacher is subject to be discharged for incompetence,
inefficiency, or unworthiness.

Under the law the school board

is the final authority in completing the process of employing
teachers, but when once a contract is duly executed the board
has no right to remove a teacher without c a u s e . S i n c e the
causes for dismissal are named In the statute, the court has
held that no other cause is sufficient except one recognized
by law as avoiding all c o n t r a c t s . T h e s e standard© for dis
charge were maintained in answer to a sohool board's contention
that the words, "unless sooner discharged," included in the
contract made the contract terminable at their will and thereby
gave them authority to discharge the teacher at any time.

The

court explained that the contract was in no way enlarged by the

I00A«tfl of Loaialftna, 1922, Ro« 100, seo. 48*
T« St. Bernard Parish Sohool Board, (1930) 14 La.
App, 460, 181 So. 760.

^^^fBkghes T. Grant Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La. Ort. of
App.) 148 So. 794.

305
additional words, for they were not equivalent to specifying
eteer than legal grounds for discharge*^®®
OoMlMtaft FU9Hi£ia& payment of .salary .

In

1924

the oourt of appeal^®® was oalled upon to decide whether a
teacher rmeoved from her teaching position during the scholas
tic year without cause was entitled to the balance of her
contracted salary.

It seems that the teacher in question had

been duly wployed, under Act No.

120

of

1916,

as principal

in the colored school of Verretville and that after having
t a u ^ t for a short while at said school she was ordered by the
boMPd to discontinue her services*

Since the facts revealed

that the teacher had been removed without any legal cause
whatsoever# the court decreed judgment in her favor for the
year's salary as agreed to in the contract*
A similar principle was Involved in the Sessions case

of 1954.^^

In this controversy the plaintiff, whose teaching

service was discontinued because of the scarcity of funds,
entered suit against the school board for the balance of her
contracted salary.

In approving of her right to collect said

salary for the school year with interest from date of Judicial
demand, the court held that the discretionary powers of the
school board did not imply the right to discharge a teacher
under contract merely because of lack of funds but only under

I00IMd.
^ ^Fieou et al. t . St. Bernard Parish Sohool Board, (1924)
(La. Ort* of App*) 132 So. 130.
lS?SessicaiB v* Livingston Parish Sohool Board, (1934) (La.
Crt. of App.) 153 So. 484.
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r
te# eonditiOB# a# provided^®® by statut©— that before the
teaeher was employed there should have been determined the
#mteer of teachers to be used.
lae
In 1933
the oourt was confronted with the question
ef tee amount of salary that a teacher could demand when
employed W

the monte#

the teacher Involved had been employed

by the monte îàr tee session of 1931-1938, but the board reseinded Its action employing her and notified her to that
effect four days before tee opening of tee school term,

the

district court had awarded tee teacher one month's salary.

In

affirming this ju%ment the court of appeal said:
Her payment having been stipulated at so much, and
the employment being by the month, her compensation
became payable by the m)nth, telch was the period
fixed, and it cannot be construed into a question
of monthly payments for a longer period, from the
testimony admitted by the lower oourt to show the
reason which actuated the school board in rescinding
her appointment, it would appear to us that Miss
Oupit was dealt with a bit harshly, but still under
the nature of her employment, which was by the
month, the board had the right to dispense with her
services without any cause, at the end of any month,
tee presented herself at the Pickering High School
to which she had been assigned, on the opening day
of the term in September, 1931, end offered her
services teieh were refused. She had relied on being
ex^loyed there, and had not attempted to secure
another position. The district judge held that she
was entitled, therefore, to recover the salary due
for that month, end aceordingly^rendered Judgment in
her favor for the sum of

^®®Acts of Louisiana, 1988, Ho. 100, seo. 48.
^®6upit V. Vernon Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La. Ort. of
App.) 145 So. 391.
p. S9S.
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In the same year the g our t of appeal rendered judgWÊmt for a teacher who had a written oontraot to recover the
remainder of a session's salary.

The hoard contended that the

j^visiom, "for a teym of e l # t months, unless sooner dis
charged, at #60.00 per month of actual employment payable
monthly," placed responsibility for them to pey the teacher
tely teen she was actually teaching, but the court held that
the tern "actual mployment" as used meant legal employment,
and that since she had been dismissed without cause, she was
entitled to recover her salary with legal interest from time
ef her discharge for the unexpired term of legal employment
O h e a m e d salary matured by dismissal without cause «
It has been shown that under certain conditions a teacher's
contract may be nullified and the teacher be removed without
the board's having to pay the balance of the contracted obli
gation; in other oases where teachers were removed without
cause, the salaries were collectable for the duration of the
oontraot or for the unexpired term, teether any teaching had
or had not been done.

Also, the question has arisen as to what

effect the discharge of a teacher has on that part of the
salary not earned prior to dismissal.

The oourt of appeal was

confronted with this question in the Hughes case;^^® it was
held teat the discharge of the teacher without cause matured

^®^Kughes V. Grant Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La. Crt. of
A]^.) 146 So. 794.
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ter unpaid salary fine her— that she was entitled to recover
at date of diseharge the entire salary, as if she had taught
the sehool as per contract#
Certificates of Indebtedness
Certificates of indebtedness issued to teachers for
their services in the public schools of New Orleans during
approximately the last quarter of the nineteenth century seem
to have gone fairly well into circulation as commercial paper#
Attempts by the holders to liquidate these certificates were
the bases of several litigations, some of which were of long
duration and carried through not only the state supreme court
but also tee Federal District end the United States Supreme
teurt#

The judicial judgments rendered established various

characteristics, methods of liquidation, identification require*
msnts, and protective rights,
Henresnonsibilitr of the citv for liquidation. The
certificates were not liabilities of the city of New Orleans ;
the whole system of public schools during that period was
decidedly a state institution— a natural result of the central
ising policies of Reconstruction,
Bonds issued for the purpose of liquidating the in
debtedness of the city were adjudged as not a source of liqui
dation of the certificates for the years 1674, 1675, and 1676;

^Caroline Labatt v, City of New Orleans, (1866) 38 la, Ann.
233; Mrs# M# M# Fisher and Husband v. Board of Directors of
dity Schools of New Orleans et al., (1892) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10
So, 494.
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im fact* the etatute^^ which attempted to place the unpaid
salarie# of teachers subsequent to 1878 and prior to January
Xi 1880, with the indebtedness to be secured by the issuance
of city bonds was declared

unconstitutional,

^45

According to

a lower court decision confirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, the board of liquidation of the city
was not permitted to issue city bonds for the amount of the
certificates for which the holders had obtained judgment
against the sehool

board.

1^6

Also, a claim to have the certif-

isates redeemed out of the surplus bond fund levied under Aot
Ho. 186 of 1894 m s denied and the act itself, which attempted
to divert from its created purpose the tax of one-half of one
per cent for the support and maintenance of the Hew Orleans
schools, was declared unconstitutional.^^?
With respect to the payment of teachers for services
rwdered in 1882, 1683, and 1864, the city seems to have
accepted more responsibility.

Acting under and by virtue of

the provisions of articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Constitu
tion of 1696, the city council assumed payment of the teachers
for these years and through the city comptroller issued
certificates of indebtedness for this purpose to the amount

3^44A@te of Louisiana, 1880, Ho. 74, see. 3*
lA8o ^ Q 2j[^jj0 Labatt v. City of Hew Orleans, (1886) 38 La.
Ann, 283.
^®®%ited States ex rel. Fisher et al. v. Board of Liquida
tion of City Debt of Hew Orleans, (1094) (Oir. Ct. of App.) 60
Fed. 367.
147||jps^ M. M« Fisher v* Board of Sohool Directors, (1896) 48
La. Ann. 1077, 20 So. 163; United States ex rel. Fisher v. Board
of Liquidation of City Debt, (1696) (Oir. Ot. of App.) 75 Fed.
343.
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938*53*

Aeoordlng to organic provision, the funds

m w e m a s W to pay thaaa claims were to be secured through the
sale of a suffieiemt number of the constitutional bonds based
on a tax of one per cent provided for by "Aot Ho* 110 of the
@eamMtl Assembly for the year 1890, and by the amendment to
the Constitution of the state submitted to the people by said
act ate adopted at the general election in 1898**148

when

such certificates were presented for payment, the city board
ef liquidation refused to remit the respective amounts on the
ground

that the sale of bonds for this purpose violated the

obligations of contracts; thereupon the soundness of this plan
was brought to the courts for test,149

Again the court said

that these certificates did not represent debts of the city
and explained;

"The effect of the adoption of that amendment

was not to constitute those claims ipso facto debts of the
city*

The city only became committed to payment of the same

by its subsequent voluntary act,"!®®

!Phe board of liquidation

was ordered to pay the sums requested by the city council with
the provision that the teachers' claims be held subordinate to
the claims of creditors vested with contract rights at the
date of the adoption of the Constitution of 1898#

In 1905,

151

14®Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 317*

14Dstate ex rel. Wilder et al, v* Board of Liquidation of
City Debt et al,, (1699) 51 La, Ann, 1849, 86 So, 679,
150'Ibid,. 51 La, Aim, 1867,
l®lstate ex rel. Wilder at al, v. Board of Liquidation of
City Debt, (1905) 119 La* 471, 39 So, 448,
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similar alalma ware presented for the year® 1885, 1886, and
iiSf*

%

that time the #10,000,000 of bonds provided for in

let Me# 110 of 1890 had been issued in full, and the plaintiff#* request was that the need be met by a sal© of bonds
drawn against the surplus of the one per cent tax*

In response

the court showed where the constitution^®® had specially dedieated this surplus and thereby indicated that the redemption
ef sush eertifieates was to come from the sale of a particular
issue of bonds.

The creditors in the instant case were told

ttet their remedy would have to be legislative and not Judicial,
for the court was not empowered to order the city to issue and
sell additional bonds under the circumstances, when the city
had not agreed to Bake provision for the liquidation of certif
icates for the particular years#
In a later attempt to secure payment of certificates
throute the city it was pointed out that in the city council
was vested the discretionary power to determine the annual
levy of not less then one-fourth of one per cent necessary to
provide for the support of the public schools, and that tee
courts would not compel the city council to levy a special tax
to liteidate a judgment previously granted for an alleged
indebtedness against the sohool board of the city#^®®

^®%enstitution of Louisiana, 1898, arts# 254, 513-314#
^®%tate ex rel# Fisher et al, v. Mayor, etc.,
Orleans, (1908) 181 La# 768, 46 So, 798; John B,
H# Fisher, William G, Fieher, et al,, Plaintiffs
foyer and Oouneil of City of Hew Orleans, (1910)
81 S# C# 57, 54 X# Hd# 1090.

of City of Hew
Fisher, James
In Error, v.
818 tJ, S. 438,

SIS
RwiaonalliiAlteP M

%M

Ward of aobool airgotora for

ilimiâfttlte. The holders of the eertifioatea were exclusively
#p#ditora of the New Orleans Board of Directors of the Public
Uhools by wh<m the certificates were issued; therefore, claims
few the years 1072 to 1B79, inclusive, could be presented only
against the uncollected taxes representing the appropriations
ef the respective years of the issues.

The ext mat of the

citera responsibility was the collection by its treasurer, who
was also «

officio treasurer of the school board, and the

proper distribution of the amounts

received

*!®4

Consequently,

JadgsoBta were granted against the school board but not against
tee city for the amounts of valid certificates teen the claims
ted been properly presented, the judgments to be paid only
teas sufficient amounts had been collected.!®®

In one of the

attention was oalled to the statute!®® which made school
eertifieates previously issued receivable for any taxes due
^ior to 1879 and to the fact that this had the effect of creat
ing one fute for liquidating school indebtedness prior to 1879.^®?

"^Caroline Labatt v. City of New Orleans, (1886) 3$ La. Ann.
9; Mte* M. M# Fisher and Husband v, Board of Directors of City
S ^ o l s of New Orleans et al., (1698) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 So.
494: F. J. Oasquet v. Board of Directors of City Schools, (1695)
te La. Ann. 348, 18 So. 306.
^®Mfs. M. M. Fisher and Husband v. Board of Directors of City
Steoola of Hew Orleans et al., (1898) 44 La* Aim. 184, 10 So*
494; F. J. Oasquet v. Board of Directors of City Schools, (1893)
te La. Ann. 348, 18 So. 306; Mrs. M* M, Fisher v. Board of
Sehool Directors, (1696 ) 48 La. Ann. 1077, 20 Bo* 163.
^®Aots of Louisiana, 1380, No. 49, seo. 1.
^?tes. M. M. Fisher and Husband v, Board of Directors of City
Sehools of New Orleans et al., (1698 ) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 Bo,
494.
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When the verioue eertlfieate holders who had been
granted judgments for the amounts of their claims attempted
to eolleot, a Judleial accounting of the amount which the city
was dhe the school board from taxes collected for 1871 to 1679,
both inclusive, was occasioned#

The chief point at issue was

the city's refusal to include in the amount due the school
beard the funds derived fr<m the penalties of delinquency#
This controversy was appealed from the circuit court to the

united States Oiycuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit!®®
and was called by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States»

ISC

In the various decisions it was held

teat the interest as penalty was an accessory of the principal
and belonged to tee same authority as the principal; tee amount
thus found to be due the school board by the city was #71,938#78#
In addition, the city was ordered to pay five per cent Interest
an the majority of that amount from judicial demand until paid
and on the remainder from the time it was collected— subsequent
to the filing of the suit— until paid»
A change in the status of certificates of indebted
ness as a responsibility of tee Orleans Parish School Board
seems to have been accomplished by legislative enactment in
1918 through the provisions:

^®®City of Hew Orleans v# Fisher et al,, (1899) (Oir# Ct, of
App.) 91 Fed. 374.
^®®City of Hew Orleans, Petitioner, v. John Fisher, Tutor,
etc., et al., (1901) 180 U, S. 183, 81 S, 0# 347, 45 L, Ed. 485.
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. , * la the parish of Orleahs the budget of expend*
Itures shall not exceed (93 per cent) nlnety*flve
per sent of said budget of revenues; * * •
Be It further enacted^ etc.# That In the
Barish of Orleans at the end of the year after pay
ment of all the Indebtedness budgeted, the school
board shall apply said surplus of (5^/ five per
cent to any Indebtedness of previous years reduced
to final judgments liquidating and fixing the
amount of indebtedness# whether the judgments be._.
absolute or limited to the revenues of any year.l&O
With referenee to this statute the court has said*
Whatever may have been the status of
these school certificates under the statutes and
jurisprudence prior to the year 1912# it seems
clear that a radical change was produced therein
by the enactment of Act No, 214 of that year.
Section 68# paragraph (b) of the act plainly gave
(or recognised) a cause of action on such certif*
ieates before the funds might be collected * .
Similar statutory provision in 1916 merely reduced the percent*
age to be applied for this purpose,
Regulations pertaining to endorsements and prescrip
tion, When certificates of indebtedness were endorsed they
often passed from one person to another as marketable securities
and both the state and the city followed the policy of recog
nizing the holder of a certificate as the one entitled to
collect therefor, without any particular proof of the genuine
ness of the endorsement.

The custom of the city and state not

to pay without the production of the certificates was a protec
tion against double demands.

The courts have taken a different

attitude and have demanded that there be proof of the assignment

^^®Aets of Louisiana# 1912# No. 214, sec. 68.
161|iiftytinez V. Orleans Parish School Board# (1924) 155 La. 118,
l^^Acts of Louisiana# 1916# No. 120# sec. 56; Martinez v.
Orleans Parish School Board, (1924) 155 La. 116# 98 So. 860,
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or endorsement of oertlfio&tee of indebtedness In the récog
nition of a claim or in liquidation through judicial

d e m a n d .

Ï&&

At times the defendant school board has pleaded pre
scription as a reason for nonpayment.

When in 1893 it was held

that the certificates for 1892 to 1879# inclusive# were payable
only out of the revenues of the years for which they were issued#
the school board was refused protection through prescription#
since it was not shown that there had been at any particular
time funds in the school board treasury applicable to the pay-

m&Bt of such claims.^** In the second appeal of the Martinez
caae^*® the former decision^®® pertaining to prescriptive rights
was held to be the law of the latter case.

The plaintiff in

1924 sought liquidation of certificates issued in 1874# 1675#
mad 1876; the basis of his claim was the provisions of the con
trolling legislative act of 1912.1**

The défendant board

pleaded prescription of t m years# but the court explained that
the plaintiff's right of action did not arise until the adoption
of the act of 1912 and held that since the suit was brought
within ten years after the passage of the act# prescription
would not hold to prevent the plaintiff's presentation of his
claim.

J. Gasquet V# Board of Directors of City Schools# (1895)
45 la. Ann. 342, 12 Bo. 506s Martinez v, Orleans Parish School
Board# (1981) 173 la. 114# 136 So. 267.
lC4y^ J, Gaaquet v. Board of Directors of City Schools# (1893)
45 la. Ann. 342# 12 So. 506.
^**Martinez v. Orleans Parish School Board# (1951) 173 la#
114# 136 So. 287.
^^®Martinez v. Orleans Parish School Board# (1924) 155 la.
116# 96 So. 860.
l**Acts of louieiana# 1912, Ho. 214# sec. 68.

m
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Professional agencies of control in the publie sehool
system of the state have been presented in two main groups*
the superintendents— state# division, and parish— and the
teachers#
Superintendent a
The superintendents seem to have served as a connect
ing link between the nonprofessional agencies of control,
state and puish, and the schools proper#

The chief policies

pertaining to them in their capacity of professional agencies
appear to be the following:
1.

The state superintendent of public education as

an agency of control originated through the secretary of state*:
office in 1633 when the holder of that office was charged with
the direction of the public schools of the state#

8* The Constitution of 1643 provided for the appoint
ment by the governor of a state superintendent of public edu
cation with such powers and duties as the legislature might
prescribe; this authorization was enacted in the general edu
cation law of 1847#
3# Apparently the state reluctantly accepted central
ized supervision, for in the constitutional conventions until
near the close of the nineteenth century many efforts were
made to abolish, or restrict the powers of, the state superin
tendent.
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Since approximately the beginning of the preaent
eemtnry the theory of state control of education seems to have
W e n well adopted and with it the state superintendent has
been accepted as the chief agent.

Since 1852 this officer has

been elective by the people.
5. It seems significant that the state superintendent,
clothed with his many vested powers, has functioned for more
than a century with only very little interference from the
Judiciary.

6. As a ministerial officer of the state the superin
tendent has a standing in court only through the state's
attorneys #
7. The division superintendent of public education
functioned in a supervisory capacity, but since this office
was a product of Reconstruction, it passed with that period.

8 . The parish superintendent of schools became a part
of the controlling force of public education in 1847 but appar
ently the state was not ready for this form of professionalized
supervision of its schools, for the office was abolished in
1652 and did not appear again in any form until 1877, at which
time the parish board was directed to select a secretary which
officer in 1682 assumed through statutory authorization the
duties of parish superintendency.
9. One indication that the populace was reticent to
accept professionalized supervision of public schools was the
meager salary of parish superintendents until after the begin
ning of the present eentury.
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10# Biaee the perish superintendent Is a product of
the peri^ eehool heard, he is expeoted to earry out its
polieies in oooperation with the state hoard of eduoation#
11.

The parish superintendent is legally and generally

eeeepted as an integral part of the supervisory program of
publie eduoation, but his status has not been that of a publie
officer since the Constitution of 1921 removed the requirement
that he be an elector of the parish in which he serves#
12# It has been establit^d that the parish superin
tendent must be selected by viva yooe vote of the parish board
and that his election must be for four years, but the board
has been granted discretionary power in fixing the salary of
this employee#
12# The official acts of ^

facto parish superinten

dents are legally sound#
14# The parish superintendent may be removed only on
the established charge of incompetency, inefficiency, or
unworthiness#
Teachers
Public school teachers are accepted as the chief
professional agency through which the educational policies of
the state are finally carried out#

The dominant principles

which have directed the work of the teachers appear to be the
following;
1# Certification of the eligibility of teachers was
early recognized as a necessity#

This feature was locally

3X9

controlled until the present century since which time the state
bemrd of educetion has been clothed with complete authority.
2#

The en^ployment of teachers is discretionary with

the parish school board after nominations have been made by
^ e parish superintendent, and teachers are subjectto the con
trol of their employing boards.

2 * Indefinite duration of contracts has been disap
proved, although recent legislation for such special provision
in New Orleans has been endorsed by the attorney general*
4. The teacher's contract is an essential feature
for both the employee and the employer*

Employment by the month

may be through verbal contract, but a valid contract for a year
or more must be in writing.

Â reasonable length of time for

acceptance must be granted the teacher.
5# Rarely have the courts consented to the nullity
of contracts and then only upon the establishment of good reasons
therefor.

6. Specification of the amount of salary is generally
included in the contract between the teacher and the employing
board, but if no salary is mentioned In the contract, the
teacher may secure remuneration through the method of evalua
tion of services by quantum meruit. Since a recent date boards
are required to fix salaries on an equal basis schedule for
both men and women.
7. Warrants for teaching service are drawn by the
school directors on the parish treasurer and said official must
honor these warrants whether the issuing board be ^
d£ jure.

facto or
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6 « The salary of a teacher is not subject to garnish-

meat by the teacher's creditors while the funds are in the
possession of the school board*
9.

Attempts to prevent the collection of teachers*

ssleries on the basis of prescription seem to have been unsuc
cessful*
10 * The state's policy has been that of reluctance

in removing teachers under contract*

Where removal has become

necessary, it has been legally executed only after proper
hearing, and the causes as specified by statute have been held
restrictive.
11* The policy which requires payment of the contracted
salary, whether earned or unearned, when a teacher has been
dismissed without cause has been consistently upheld.

This

principle refers to a sesslOn+s or a month's salary, according
to employment by the session or the month.
IE. In the comparatively large number of suits seeking
liquidation of the certificates of indebtedness issued to New
Orleans teachers during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, several principles pertaining to the certificates,
which had become practically commercial paper, were established
as follows:

(a) they were not responsibilities of the city,

and payment could be expected of the city only through its
voluntary act; (b) they were responsibilities of the board of
school directors issuing them, were payable out of the taxes
of the respective years of issuance only, and were receivable
for the payment of taxes of specified dates; (o) by 1912

sax

legislative enaotment ohanged the status by providing a speci
fied surplus for the liquidation of certificates of any dates
reduced to final judgments; (d) legal transactions with certif
icates required authentic endorsements; and (e) prescriptive
claims must date to the time that funds were actually available
or i^en satisfactory provision for liquidation was made*
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CHAPTER IX

SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND PROPERTY

Since the state hae a right to establish, maintain

and control a system of public schools, it has by implication,
as a means of administration thereof, the right to organize
the state into districts which may act as bodies politic to
deal with such problems as the building program and its main

tenance, the supervision of school property, and the direction
of other educational functions of the state system.^

The pur

pose of this chapter is to determine the Louisiana law vdiich
deals with the organization of school districts and the con
trol of the school property therein.

An attempt is made to

^ o w how court decisions and legal opinion on constitutional
and statutory provisions have influenced the shaping of the
policies ediich have been pursued by those in charge of school
districts and the property used for school purposes.

SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Constitutional provisions pertaining to school dis
tricts were chiefly implied.

In the Convention of 1652 one

of the substitutes offered for the majority report of the
committee on public education included:

Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public School
a s __________________
a State Institution (Blobiington, 1 9 2 8 7 7 PP*
323
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The Legislature ahall provide for a
eyetwR of Conmon Schools, by vdiieh a school shall
be kept up and supported in each District, at least
three months in every year; and any School District
neglecting to keep up such a school, may be deprived
of its proportion of the interest in the school
fend during such neglect.&
In the constitution adopted by the delegates to this convention
the parish was recognized as a school district by the provision
that the school funds were to be distributed "to each Parish
in proportion to the number of free white children between
such ages as shall be fixed by the General Assembly."^
A desire by taxpayers for more autonomous privileges
was evidenced in the petitions presented to the Constitutional
Oenvention of 1898; one petition which bore fourteen signatures
reeosmended "That the Constitution should provide more latitude
for local taxation for school purposes, and that each parish,
ward, and mmicipality should be allowed to tax itself for
such purpose#"^

In this convention an unsuccessful attempt

was made to "provide for the creation of boards for school
districts in the several parishes,"*

However, in the final

draft of the constitution, the general assembly was authorized
to provide for the creation of "Parish Boards of Public Educa
tion,"* and it was directed that the funds derived from the
o

Journal of the Convention to Form a New Constitution
for the state of houiaiana. l8*5S. p, 847
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1852, art. 156.
^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the États oFTouisiana. 18*9§T p. 40,
%> i d .. p. 290,
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898* art, 250.
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eellectlem of the poll tax in each parish be paid to the local
oAool board for aahool purposes,^

Also, in the provisions

for bond iamm# and apeoial taxes, the school district was
raoogniped,®
ikom the foregoing it may be seen that the consti
tutions of the state have been silent, except
with regard to the school district.

hy implication,

Consequently, its anthori*

nation is based on the theory of law whereby a state legisla
ture nay enact any measure which violates neither the state
nor the federal Constitution,* and to the statutory acts and
their interpretations by the courts one must look for the law
pertaiming to school districts.
Nature and Purpose
Various studies involving the nature of the school
district have determined it to be a quasi corporation,^*

In

a treatment of public school eaipend!tares, Joakim f, Weltzin
eweluded with respect to the nature of the public school
district:
Public corporations may be divided into three
groups, quasi-public, municipal and quasi corpora
tions, School districts and school boards belong
in the last group. The statutes of many states ex
pressly make the school districts and boards bodies

'ibid.. art. 852.
®Ibld.. art. 281.
*Balph Takel, The legal Control of the Administration ^
3^ 1 i e 3cteol Expeiwturcs (Hew York, lol#), p, 10,
^%evton Sdwards. The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago,

1933), p, 54,

------
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cwperate: othara maraly Infer that oharaeter,
Judlalal axpraasioB with practical universality
tarm the aahoal district and hoard a quasi corpo
ration, which means that they are not complete
aarporations tat are bodies granted corporate
eharaetar for the limited purpose of their creatita aaiy.^
As generally considered the school district 1# the "intrusted
agent of the state,"1% formed for the purpose of maintaining
public schools •

Its corporate power extends only to such

matters as are necessary to assure the fulfillment of its
created purpose.^*
lenisiana's theory of the purpose of the district
was explained in the following reply to a complaint that the
resolution creating a certain district did not state the purpeee thereof:
As a matter of law, and of common experi
ence, it is well known that school districts are
created for the purpose of levying special taxes,
and of incurring debt and issuing bonds for the
various school purposes enumerated in the Consti
tution of the state. Const, 1913, arts. 832. 281;
Const. 1981, Sec, 10, art, 10, sections 14(e) and
14(b), art, 14; Act 46 of 1981 (Ex. Sees,} Sec. 8.^*
Also, it was maintained In this ease that, since the
governing statute^* placed no limitation concerning purpose

^Joakim f, Weltzin, The Legal Authority of the American
Public School (Grand forËs, 1930), p. 29.
^Rpcd Engelhardt, Public School Organization and Adminis
tration (Boston, 1931)7^p. 88*
^^^Harvey C* Voorhees, The Law of the Public School System
of the taited States (Boeicm,"TSieT, p. sST
^*Gauthier et al. v. Parish School Board of Parish of
AveyeUes, (1988) 165 La, 860,
^Aots of Louisiana, 1980, Ho. 158.

327

and did not require a statement of the purpose in the résoluticm of creation, an established dietrlot muet he recognized
ae having been created for all purposes enumerated by the
constitution •
Establishment
In carrying out Louisiana's program of public educa
tion the state has provided, mainly through statutory enactments,
for the incorporation of school districts in order that the
people residing therein may, as an associated body, establish
and maintain free public schools as authorized by the law,
Parish school board's discretionary nowe^rs. For many
years the incorporation of school districts has been one of
the discretionary powers entrusted to the perish school boards
of the state.
An illustration of this power concerning districts
is shown in the Burnham case;l? therein the authorization of a
special levy was attacked on the ground that the school board
was without power to create the district in which the tax was
levied until the parish had been divided into districts,
tiffs based their contention on the statutory provision;
That it shall be the duty of the parish
board with the parish superintendent to divide the
parish into school districts of such proper and
convenient area and shape as will best accommodate
the children of the parish. The parish board shall,
as soon as practicable, proceed to the work im

^*Oauthier et al, v. Pariah School Board of Parish of
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La, 256, 115 So, 479,
^*Bamham et al, v. Police Jury of Glaiborne Parish,
(1902) 107 La, 913, 32 So, 87.

Plain
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posed upon thorn, and upon completing this work,
they shall make a report to the parish superinten
dent, whieh report shall eontain the boundary and
deseription of the said distriot designated by
number* The parish superintendent shall record
the same in a well bound book, kept by him for the
tarpose, taieh book shall be held by said parish
superintendent and be at all times open to inspec
tion, The parish board, if they deem it to the
best interests of the schools, may divide the
parish into districts without reference to the
wards in the parish.^®
It appears that the way in which the school board of Olalbome
Pariah complied with this law was to pass a resolution each
year designating the schools by wards and authorizing the
apportionment of funds accordingly.

The court held this to

be sufficient compliance, if only the distribution of funds
was concerned, but labelled the method as extremely informal
and slipshod,

Bince those tao brought this suit were not

interested parties, the court gave no heed to them, but indi
cated its philosophy concerning the creation of the district
thus:
It will be time enough to consider the question
taen the parents or guardians of the excluded
children complain, though we surmise It will then
probably be found that the matter of fixing the
limits of school districts has been confided by
the statute to the school boards, and that the
discretion thus confided cannot be controlled by
the courts,At
This principle is maintained also in the Drouin
case** in which an attack was made on the action of the school
board in carving one district out of another.

The authority

^Acts of Louisiana, 1806, No, 81, sec. 11.
le

Bnrnhasi et al, v. Polie, Jiiry of Claiborne Parish, (1902)
107 la. 516.
aô
*®Droula
Drouin et al. v , Board of Directors of Public Schools of

Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 398, 67 So. 191.
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m d # r itaich the board aeted was the 1912 statute whleh states:
"It shall be the duty of the parish board with the parish
•aperintendent to divide the parish into school districts of
saeh p r o p w and convenient area and shape as will beet acooimodate the children of the Parish."*^

Before rendering final

Jurisdiction the court reviewed its policy of recognizing
abhool boards as quasi corporations and of interpreting broadly
taeir power in advancing the educational welfare of their re
spective districts.**

This policy was further upheld in the

ease at bar as follows:
And this power to create districts includes the
power to create new districts out of old ones or
to consolidate two or more districts already
fmasd, and to repeal the ordinance creating any
one or sore districts. The discretion vested in
the parish board in forming school districts can
not be controlled by the courts, where it is not
shown that this discretion has been grossly
abused.**

Although the parish board of school director© Is

conceded as having broad discretionary power in the establish
ment of school districts, it must recognize enacted prohibitory
law pertaining to the creation of such districts,

By the en

actment of a law in 1920,*^ the creation of districts which
were to be overlapping with respect to other created districts,
composed of parts of the parish, wee prohibited.

Ordinances

^^Aets of Louisiana, 1912, No, 214, sec, 15.
^Burnham at al. v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1902)
107 La. 512, 22 So, 87; Moore v. Board of Directors of Sabine
Parish, (1912) 151 La, 757, 60 So. 234,
®*Drottin et al, v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of
Pariah of Avoyelles, (1915) 156 La, 396.
^^Acta of Louisiana, 1980, No, 152, sec, 2,
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Of toe Wian Pmrlah tahool Board purporting to create certain
districts contrary to this provisicn were declared null and
void.*®
Again, in 1987, the school hoard's discretion in the
creation of districts was upheld idien, in answer to charges
concamlng the condition of roads, the designated limits of
the district, and the board's proceedings,*® the court said:
"It would require proof of a gross abuse of discretion to
Justify a court in interfering with the creation of a school
distriot . . . The record in this ease does not disclose such
an abuse.
The school board's use of its power in the creation
of districts may be questioned by those who have a constituted
right, but it is the court's policy to place responsibility
for proof of statement upon those who complain.

For example,

if thwe is the charge of illegal creation of a district, the
plaintiff must prove his allegation rather than expect the
school board to prove the legality of its use of power in the
particular action.**
Thus, it mey be seen that the state's legal inter
pretations have been consistent in maintaining a very high
regard for the discretionary power of the parish school

^^inton et al. v, Winn Parish School Board, (1984) 155
La. 666, 99 So. 583.
86

Sylvestre et al. v. St. Landry Parish School Board,
(193?) 164 la. £04, 115 So. 818.
164 la. 311-313.
^%aiton et al. v. Unco In Parish School Board, (1933)
153 la. 761, 94 So. 586.
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beard and have nullified the hoards ’ ordinances of creation
emly when they ware prohibitory of the governing statute.
Creation of iater-nariah districts. Adjudications
eenearning the power to create Inter-parish school districts
eeem to have been sou^t mainly from the attorneys general
of tae state• The policy of the state's legal counsel toward
this question was traeed by one attorney general as follows:
* . • while there was contained in the various
general educational bills up to the passage of Act
152 of 1920 a provision to the effect that ad
joining parishes might, vdien convenience required
it, lay off school districts composed of portions
of two adjoining parishes, these provisions had
always been interpreted by this office as con
ferring no authority for special school tax elec
tions and bond issues in such Inter-parlsh school
districts, but as authorizing the creation of same
for the purpose of convenient school administration,
OBly.*®

With reference to the supreme court's having held that the
legislature was authorized to provide for the creation of
school districts, and in endorsing the constitutionality of
the act permitting districts to be composed of parts of two
parishes, he said:
The matter was then, as we see it, one of legis
lative discretion as to the manner of creating
school districts, and, exercising that discretion,
the Legislature provided that school districts
should be composed of property situated wholly
within one parish, and later modified Its views
by the adoption of Act 152 of 1920, which per
mitted and authorized inter-parish school dis
tricts.*0

**Oniaions of the Attorney General of Louis3.ana, May 1,
1922, to May 1, 19&4, p. %94.

p. 898.
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An inter-parlsh distriot may vota a school maintenance tax
tat the part lying In one pariah may not take this action

alme#*^
@ia#

dietriet.

A

eehool distriot may ineluie the

entire parish, as is shorn in the MoOune ease,®* in which man*
damns proeeedings were instituted to oanoel a tax levy for
liquidating bonds on the ground that the school board had no
authority to inolude the entire parish in a school district,
Wsm court reasoned:
There is no merit in the contention that
the school board was without legal authority to
create one school district embracing the whole
parish# Act 158 of 1C80, in express terms, confers
this right, There is no constitutional inhibition
of this power# The Constitution does not create,
nor dees it designate, the method of establishing
school districts.^ The matter is left entirely to
the LeglslatxoHNr**
It was concluded tant the board was "well within its legal and
constitutional powers in creating the whole pariah into one
school district."*^
Also the board, by authority ^ f Act No, 81 of 1918,
is permitted when it creates a parlsh*wide district to declare
all previously existing districts as subdistricts.®®

*^33^., p. 419.
state vx ral, MOCtma
Board of Sohool Dlreotora of
Pariah of faffarson at a l ( 1 9 B £ ) IBB la. 1008, 95 So. 104.
” lM,d.. IBS la. 1009-1010.
^ M d .. p. 1010.

^ ^ kaiHtsa*. «« 1.

335
In another ease*® the size of the distriot was on©
ef the controlling issues.

The school district involved had

been created out of the territory of the entire parish by the
school hoard in 1919, under the provisions of Act No. 81 of
1918*

That act was repealed by Act No. 152 of 1920, but in

the latter act it was provided that the existence of districts
created under the laws in force at the time of the repeal of
the act of 1918 was not affected.
tained;

Further, the court main

"In fact, it may be said that the Act of 1920 provides

for the creation of parish-wide sohool districts in the same
manner and for the same purpose as did the Act of 1918.
tions 1, 2, and 4 of Act 152 of 1920."*?

Sec

In answer to the

plaintiffs* contention that the existence of a parish-wide
school district created tor taxing purposes is inconsistent
with section 10 of article 10 of the Constitution of 1921 the
court explained;
We, however, see no inconsistency between
section 10 of article 10 of the Constitution and the
existence of a parish wide school district. The
section expressly mentions school districts and sub
school districts as being among the political sub
divisions authorized to levy taxes under the section,
and while it does not mention parish wide school
districts, yet it does not indicate how large or
small the districts must be, but impliedly leaves
the size of them to the legislative branch of the
government.**

*®louisiana & A. Ry. Co. et al. v. Sohool Board of Webster
Parish et al., (1925) 157 La. 1046, 103 So. 318.
187 La. 1057.

®®lbl4., pp. 1057-1058.
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Again, in 1928,

S9

the court upheld Its policy of

decreeing that since the constitution did not make any attempt
at defining the territorial limits of a school district, the
p w i s l o n e therefor were left to the legislature.

The pro-

vislens governing the case at bar were contained in Act No.
198 of 1980.

That act gave the parish board power to create

districts at any time and to use limits set at its discretion
with a prohibition against overlapping districts.

The distriot

in question had been properly created by resolution, the lines
had been surveyed, and there was no overlapping on another
created distriot.

The court held the creation legal and again

maintained that to the legislature was left the duty of making
specifications e m c e m i n g the territorial limits of a school
district.
Regulations concerning boundaries.

In the creation

of districts the location of the boundary lines is a factor
with which the board has wide discretion, but In its designa
tion of them there must be no uncertainty, as is shown in the
following decisions.
When the EaynesviUe School District, Ho. 11,
Olalbome Parish, was created, the description of its north
boundary designated the termini and a section line on which
it was to run#

Attack was made that the section line referred

to was impossible with the termini specified— that quarterseetion line was meant.

The court held that the quarter-

®*Gauthier et al. v. Parish Sohool Board of Parish of
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La. 856, 115 So. 479.
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itetloB line meaning was so evident that the reference to
section line could impart no ambiguity to the other desoript i w given— that the phrase "on the section line" had the
meaning of "parallel with the section line."^^
% e creation of district Ho. 50 in the parish of

AveyeUes was objected to on the ground that one of the
beesdazy lines was "indefinite, tortuous, end

unfair,"*!

deaee showed only that the boundary was tortuous; witnesses
had no difficulty in locating it, thereby establishing it as
not indefinite.

With regard to its being unfair, the court

said:
The crooked boundary complained of is not shown to
be unfair to the educable children of district No,
50; on the contrary, it is shown that the majority
of property owners in that district were desirous
of establishing a high school for the children of
the distriot, which high school is shown to have
great advantages over the ordinary graded school;
and the board, to accommodate the children of the
parish residing in district No, 50, in providing
a high school for them, ran the boundary line com
plained of in such way as to embrace within the
district the property of those who were desirous
of taxing themselves for the improved school conditi<ms. The citizens of the state have a right
to tax themselves for such purpose, and it is the
duty of the sohool board to establish and create
school districts and achoolhouses whidi will best
acetmmodate the children of the parish,**
In the district involved in the Deblieux case** the

^ B o m h a a et al* v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1908)
107 La* 513, 38 So* 87.
^Drouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of
Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So. 191.
*®Ibid*. 136 La. 399.
*®Peblieux et al. v« Board of School Directors of
Natchitoches Parish, (1917) 142 La. 147, 76 So, 590.
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boundary was found to be very uncertain.

In this district

#m election for a special tax had been defeated.

Thereupon,

tae eehool board attempted by resolution to define the dis
trict 80 as to eliminate certain parts of the existing district,
A surveyor found it impossible to describe upon the official
parish map the boundary lines specified in the resolution pur
porting to establish the new district.

The court held that

the distriot was not created according to law, and explained
the basis of its decision to annul the resolution thus:
Where, as in this case, the resolution
for the creation of the district is so vague and
uncertain in its calls that no surveyor can locate
one of its boundaries, the defect is fundamental,
as it affects the location and extent of the tax
ing district.**
Feralssible minor procedures.

Among the charges

brought against the establishment of school districts there
have been various complaints which the court has considered
minor but on some of which it has rendered decisions,
A census end an enumeration assessment of an antici
pated district prior to the election for its creation are not
necessary If there has been compliance*® with the act which
provides:
The registrar of voters shall furnish to
the election commissioners appointed to hold such
elections a list of the taxpayers entitled to vote,
together with the valuation of each taxpayer’s prop
erty, as shown by the assessment roll last made and
filed prior to such election, • . .*®

14S U . 160.
^Qaxithler ,t al. ▼. Barish Sohool Board of Parish of
ATOjrsUes, (196$) 166 la. 666, 115 So. 470.

of Louisiana, Bxtra Session, 1961, No. 46, see. 14.
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Xn m m a m r to an attack against the creation of a
ttatriet on the ground that the resolution was not entitled,
ta# e o w t said:
The contention that the resolution cre

ating the Sessmer school district No. 6 should
have a title indicating its object# like a legis
lative act# is not well founded. The constitutional
requirement that every law shall have but one ob
ject# and shall have a title indicative of such
object applies only to the Legislature, and not
to police Juries# town councils# or school boards#
talters V. Duke# Tax Collector# 31 La. Ann. 666;
Galla^an v* Town of Alexandria# 58 La. Ann# 1013#
87 So. 540; Town of Mansfield v. Herndon, 134 La#

10# 65 So. 606.4?
Since the statute*® which names January 1 as one of

the legal holidays does not include the transactions of a
SCheel board among the list of things unlawful to be done on
that day# an ordinance creating a school district is not
censidered void mereiy because it was passed on January 1.**
The claim that roads for certain times of the year
are impassable to the extent that children cannot travel them
to school will not interfere with the power of the school
board to create and alter school districts# where evidence
shows that the time lost to pupils thereby is not sufficient
to render the board's action gross indiscretion.®®

In the

session under discussion only 6 days out of 178 were lost
from this cause.

*?Oauthier et al. v. Parish Sohool Board of Parish of
Avoyelles# (1988) 165 La. 864.
*®Acts of Louisiana# 1986, No. 49# sec. 1.
*%oodard et al* v. Biehvllle Parish Sohool Board, (1930)
169 La# 631# 186 So# 807.
®®Sylvestre at al. v. St. Landry Parish Sohool Board, (1927)
164 La. 804, 113 So. 816.
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The Governing Authority
Parish school hoard as governing body.

It has been

shown that the court has consistently recognized the power of
the parish sohool hoard to create districts and that it has
been hesitant to annul the hoard's action unless there was
gross abuse of discretion.

The extent of the authority which

a board has over the district it creates was one of the inter
pretations sought in a suit®^ in 1925# in which the plaintiffs
questioned the right of the sohool board to call an election
for voting a special tax levy.

In reply the court upheld the

theory expressed in section 3 of Act Ho, 158 of 1980# as fol
lows:

"The sohool board of a parish is the governing authority

of school districts created by it, end has authority to call
elections for the submission of propositions to the taxpayers
to authorize their respective districts to levy taxes under
eeetion 10 of Article 10 of the Constitution,"®®
In 1928 the court outlined the purpose of the whole
act pertaining to the creation of school districts to be "to
provide for the creation of school districts, end for the
governing authorities of such districts and to define their
powers# as a necessary incident to the levy of special taxes
for school purposes."®*

Section 3 of the act®* was interpreted

® ^ u i s i a n a & A, Ry. Go, et al, v. Sohool Board of Webster
Parish et al., (1925) 157 la. 1046, 103 So. 318.
'^Ibld.. 157 La. 1056.
®*Qauthier et al, v* Parish Sohool Board of Parish of
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La. 262-263.
®^Aeta of Louisiana, 1920, No, 152.
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AWllahm#nt and Modification
A W I l a h m m t of .dijatriot and change of houndaries.
Since parish school hoards have the r l ^ t to create school
districts# it may rcasonahly he cnpèeted that they are em
powered with the right to aholish or modify the districts of
their creation.

In 191S it was held that these bodies have

the right to district and redistrict the lands in the parish
at their discretion, provided there is no abuse of this right.^8
Eowever# the revision of a district cannot result in the expeaditnre of fends other than in that district,®^ and it has
he«a maintained that a district may be abolished or changed
only after a voted levy or maintenance tax has expired.@0
Im 1927 the gnestion of the changing of boundaries was brought
te the courts for interpretation.^^

The school board involved,

after failure of a tax election in a newly created district,
had proceeded to abolish said district end create another with
slichtly changed boundaries.

% i s action of the board was

attacked partly on the ground that the ordinance creating the
new district was Invalid because it attempted to contract the
limits of the district created by the first ordinance and be-

^^^^^O^ii^ns^of^the Attorney General of Louisiana. June 1,
®*Ibld.i May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 461; May 1,
1988,'Tô-Appil 1, 1934, p. 291.
,
May 1, 1928, to Itoy 1, 1924, p. 423; May 1,
l984,^EcTiiay 1, 1926, p. 474.
*4^1v..tr. #t al. T. St. l<andry Pariah School Board,
(1987) 164 La. 804, 113 So. 818.
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famés it «as meraly a schéma to eliminate a part of the tax
payers Who were opposed to the bond issue.

In interpreting

the governing statute Justice Winston Overton said:
Act 152 of 1920 authorizes parish school
hoards to create school districts in connection with
the exercise of the power of special taxation. Since
a school hoard has such authority# it has# by implicatiou# the power# where circumstances permit, to
aholish a district created under this authority#
and since the power expressly granted is a continuing
one# to create, if it sees proper# another district
of smaller area# idtich does not include some of the
territory of the one abolished, or# if it deems best
and circumstances p e mit . to amend an ordinance cre
ating a district# so as to contract or enlarge its
boundaries# avoiding# however# the creation of over
lapping districts,8*
Previous decisions®^ on a similar principle but different
statutes were cited as bases of this interpretation,

The court

held that since the first district had contracted no indebted
ness and had refused to sanction the bond issue submitted to
it# there was no reason for continuing its existence.

Also#

it held that the procedure in abolishing the district was
legal# and that since the former district was abolished# there
was no reason that a new district of smaller area should not
be created for the purpose of ascertaining the will of the
residmit taxpayers pertaining to the levying of a tax to
issue bonds for building purposes.
Consolidated and overlapping districts.

Several

statutes pertaining to the modification of school districts by

**Ibld.. 164 La, 210.
^^KSoore V. Board of Directors of Sabine Parish# (1912) 131
La, 757# 60 So, 254; Drouln et al. v. Board of Directors of
Public Schools of Parish of Avoyelles# (1915) 136 La. 393# 67
So, 191.
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teMOlidatiom have been enacted and their provisions seem to

have been gaite variant.

When litigations involving this phase

ef wheel dlatrlcta have been brought to the state's legal

Mttneel

tmû the

courts# it has been the policy to uphold the

previsiws of the governing statutes.

In answer to an Inquiry concerning the legality of
^ e ereatlcn of coextensive districts, or a district which

imludes a part of a district already created, it was explained
that such creation was permissible if the ten-mill limit of
taxation as provided in article 261 of the Oonstitution of
ItlS was observed; the governing legislation was traced as
fellows:
The creation of School Districts was
authorised by Section 16 of Act 214 of 1902,
and that same authority is repeated in Section
13 of Act 214 of 1912. It is only made more
specific in Act 17 of 1912. The provisions in
Act 17 of 1912 that these Districts may Issue
bonds, etc., la merely a repetition of the
existing law, in Article 281 of the Constitution
of 1919 and Act 256 of 1910 and amendments. In
short, the School Board may create School Districts
and say order elections therein, but it all must
be done under limitation of Article 281.®*

While Act Bo. 17 of 1914, which did not seem to
authorize the division of a school district into subdistricts,
was in force, it was suggested to one board that instead of
its creating a parish-wide district the police jury might
levy a parish-wide maintenance tax and thereby prevent what
might prove a hindrance to

creation for taxing purposes

^Opinions of the Attomev General of Louisiana. May 1.
1916,% % y l , l W , T u 4 l 5 7
-----------
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## districts smaller than the parish.®^
Pertaining to Act No. 81 of 1918 the court said that
Wmpsunder **it was permissible for parish school boards at
way time to create a school district composed of a part or

parts of one or more existing school districts, and to estab
lish even subdistrlcts, i, e.# a district within a district.”®®
When the next legislative act, No. 152 of 1920, came
Inte force, the overlapping districts created under the act
ef 1916 and prior to the passage of the 1920 act remained un

affected and their existence was recognized.

Ordinances

attempting to create overlapping districts under the pro
visions of the act of 1920 were declared null and void# since
such creation was prohibited by section 2 of that statute.®^
Some exceptions were provided in this enactment prohibitory
of overlapping districts; one which was upheld was the creation
of a district out of a portion of a parish although there was
in existence a parish-wide districts®^
1922 there seems to have been another change in

the policy concerning overlapping districts, for the legis
lature of that year "specially authorized and empowered school
boards upon their own initiative to merge or consolidate two
or more school districts into one, . «

Since the act

®®ÎSid., May 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. 415.
®®Hinton et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924) 155 In. 678,
®^Ibid.. 155 La. 666, 99 So. 523.
®®OplnloM of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1924,

to Mhy 1# l9S6, p. 40?%
®^oodard et al. v. Bienville Parish School Board, (1930)

169 La. 896.
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fVpealtd all law» in oonfllet therewith^® and since the dis
trict in question was created after the passage of the 1922
act, attacks to the effect that the enlargement of the district

would take in a formerly created district were held as of no

m»m»equwoe.^^
Responsihility of debt of districts consolidated.

The consolidation of school districts has often presented the
question of the disposition of tax levies existent in the
smaller districts.

Opinions handed down have been to the

effect that such levies must continue during the full time
for which they were v o t e d . A n o t h e r opinion endorsed one
hoard’s solution of the problem through the conduct simul
taneously of an election to vote a school tax for the entire
parish— the new district in question— and to determine the
will of the people on the retention or the abrogation of the
original district tax.^®
In some instances v^ere the consolidation of a school
district has been legalized it has become necessary to deter
mine vdiether the property in the new district may be assessed
te refund outstanding bonds of one of the original districts.

in the

Consolidated District Bo, 2 of Catahoula Parish, which

70

Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Bo. 53.

^^Hoodard et al. v. Bienville Parish School Board, (1930)
169 La. 831, 126 So. 207,
^^Oninions of the Attorney General of Louisiana î

May 1,

1910,"“to K y " ÏT1?I2#’T* 4lïV lEyT7"l9T8, to May 1, 1920,
p« 411.
May 1, 1916, to Ifey 1, 1918, p. 445.
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ÜMi mmwWK. lu 1930 by the eonfiolldatlon of three distrîats,
fee* 3# 3#

nnà 4,

the teypayers voted to Issue refunding bonds

ÈS the sum of #33*000 to he identified with the outstanding
bwde of the original aohool district Bo* 3 and to be paid
fsr iWr a levy on all the propwty in the consolidated distriot.
This action was attacked and the lower court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff*

The supreme court affirmed the

division and quoted the interpretation of the district court
as follovs:
"There can be no doubt of the right of a
political subdivision to refund its outstanding
indebtedness# Including bonds supported by special
taxes, by following the provieims of Act 318 of
1934# The Constitution and the Act of 1924 use
the possessive pronoun ’its* in referring to the
indebtedness of bonds to be refunded. A bonded
indebtedness of a particular district does not
automatically beo<me the indebtedness of a larger
district, in which it is included, from the act
of larger or consolidation, Therefore, in granting
the ridit to refund its outstanding or bonded in
debtedness under certain conditions, the lawmaker
must have had reference to the subdivision or dis
trict originally incurring the debt and issuing
the bonds# To construe this law otherwise, we
necessarily would have to say that when a consoli
dated district is formed of two or more districts,
one or more of which has outstanding bonded in
debtedness, that such indebtedness automatically
b e c o M s its (the consolidated district’s) indebted
ness and therefore may be refunded# We do not
think this the correct ocnstruotlcai to place on
the laws on the subject as they presently exist#"^*
further, the lower court showed the danger of approving such
policy to be:
"If the law be construed as contended
for by defendant, we can conceive of cases where
great injustice and financial wrong could be infiieted upon some taxpayers, for instance, a

^®aruoe et al# v, Oatahoula Parish School Board, (1932)

174 La# 434-455.
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mskll but thickly populated district with a bonded
indebtedness outstanding could be merged with large
tracts of valuable# unimproved lands, inhabited by
few people# and at an election for the purpose the
bonded debt could be fastened for payment upon the
entire new district# almost entirely by the vote of
the populous district# Such a procedure would be
tentamcunt to enlarging the original district and
securing Indirectly vdiat cannot be accomplished
legally directly# via#: a reduction in the millage
rate necessary to pay the bonded indebtedness by
adding more taxable property to the original dis
trict,"™

Thus# it was held that the indebtedness created by
a particular district remains the indebtedness of that dis
trict as a distinct entity regardless of the fact that the
district be later merged with others; the new district# even
thou^ It be willing# as expressed by the voice of an elec
tion# is not permitted to assume the indebtedness of one of
the original districts.

To follow a contrary policy could

be the means of permitting a great injustice to citizens
under certain conditions,

SCHOOL PROPERTY

Some of the responsibilities which the quasi-corporate

districts of the state assume, through their authorized agents#
are the purchasing of property# the building program# and
general supervision of the property within their respective
jurisdictions

p. 488.
* H ar r ^ 0. Toorbees, 0£, clt.. p. 59.
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School Building Constraotion
The eonstruotion of sohool bulldinga through some
legitimate ehazmel ie as old as the institution of public
éducation itself# but the eonstruotion financed by the levying
of taxes on the property of a school district# preparatory to
issuing bonds for the puzpose of erecting buildings# is of
recent development.
Since the funds derived from the latter source are
funds specially designated# it becomes a responsibility of
the school board# as the governing authority of the district#
to supervise the use of those funds in such way that they will
not be diverted from their original purpose, but that their
expenditure will result in the buildings expected by those
furnishing the f u n d s , S o m e of the main features involved
in securing these objectives are the correctness and the proper
execution of a contract# the responsibility of the committee
Immediately in charge# liquidation of obligations# and the
protection from# or correction#of# the diversion of funds.
The contract,

In the construction of school buildings

the contract is of specific vahie.

Some assurance from both

the school board and the contractor is necessary in order that
all agreements may be subject to enforcement.

The content of

the contract is left to the discretion of the contracting
parties# but fulfillment of whatever provisions may be in
corporated therein has usually been held mandatory# when judi
cial interpretation has been found necessary.

^^Oplnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1# 1906#
to May 1# 1908# p7 ^ E 3 ,
"
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1. B m eesÆlM Hog material to meet speolfleatlona,
the material used la the eonstruotion of school buildings
meat comply eaaeatlally with the standards provided by the
ecmtraet#

Failure of contractor to furnish material of the

required standard entitles the school board to refuse to honor
the warrant therefor or to recover after the warrant has been
iMtued under fraudulent statement of facts,^®
2. Strict interpretations upheld.

It has been the

policy of the courts to place strict interpretations upon
building contracts, when contested questions arise.

This

j^pinciple is illustrated in a case?* in vdiioh a contracting
daapaay had agreed to erect a high school building by February
7, 1985, "no allowance to be made for bad weather," but failed
to comply therewith. A clause in the contract provided that:
if the building was finished prior to the date, February 7,
set for delivery, the contractor would receive a bonus at the
rate of $150 per day, but for every day after February 7
w t i l actual date of delivery he would be penalized at the
M B S rate.
Although an extension of sixty days was granted by
the board, vdiich made the parmissible date of completion April
#, the building was not substantially completed until June 11,
at which date it was accepted by the board.

When the work was

completed in all respects, the board, in answer to the contracting

Parish Board of School Directors v. Alexander, (1910)
185 La. 808 , 51 So. 906.
79
Stewart-McGhee Const. Co. v. Caddo Parish Sohool Board,
(1988) 165 La. 800, 115 So. 458.
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e e w m m y ’# é e m m â tor the balance due, authorized payment of
# # t balance leee the penalties for the time from February 7
#

June 18#

Thereupon, the construction company sued the

beard for the full amount of the balance, the cost of heating

the building during construction, and the expenses incurred
in relaying rubber tile flooring made necessary by the climatic
àmditioM at that time#
As in a prerioue e a s e the losses alleged because

ef elimatie eon dit ions were held to be the contractor’s risk.
If beat was neeessary and was not provided by contract, it was
ineumbent upon the contractor to supply that in the same way
as it was his responsibility to supply the tools necessary for
the carrying out of his contract,

Evidence did not establish

that it was the custom of the owner to furnish heat during the
CMistruetioa of the building.
Since it was conclusively shown that the defendants
did not contribute to the delay in the completion of the
building, the plaintiff was required to accept the deduction
of $150 per day, as agreed upon, from the termination of the
extension of time until the building was officially accepted,
Re heed was given to the plaintiff’s contention that penalty
bhould not hold Wien the school board had suffered no damages

trcm the

delay.
3.

Importance of the time element. Another aspect

of adjudications ooncexning building contracts is the time

®*Fieard Const. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Caddo Levee List,,
(1986) 161 La# 1008, 109 So. 616.
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element for the deliverenee of all material.

In one building

leegrem the eomtrmetor relied on terra cotta prices received
# telegraph and made hie bid accordingly, ohly to be notified
•eon thereafter that there had been an error to the amount of
15000 in the tranamiseion by the telegraph company and that
far that cause the ctmpamy was refusing to carry out the contract.

Thereupcm, a new a#eemeht was entered into between

#&e terra cotta company and the contractor, whereby the con
tractor agreed to a price #1000 more than the original price
on the conditions that all the material be delivered by the
date specified in the telegram and that the company fail in
collecting the #9000, amount of error, from the telegraph
company.
It was shown that the maximum liability of the telegra^ company for error in transmission by its employees is
#00; therefore the condition in the contract of the materialman
with the supply compary became one of time only.

Time had be

come a condition of remuneration and a very important phase of
the contract.
The material was not delivered completely by the time
specified in the contract; thereupon, the court sustained the
contractor’s refusal to pay the additional sum of $1000, for
idiich the terra cotta o<e|q»any had brought suit against the
contractor, the school board, and the surety#®^

Terre Gotte Co. v. Butler et al. (1928) 166 la.
241, 117 So. 184.
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4# m e l r n W m M t m m

eontractor and euretv.

Judgments

èmdered a^imst a building oontraotor and bis surety are
# 4 # M m t a In a o l l M . Dnder a u # conditions, # e n there has

b a n judgment in favor of lienholders, "the surety is entitled
to

the same

judgsmnt against the oontraotor, who was called in

warranty, as was rendered against it."®®

tmm eorreeted

The supreme court

judgments to that extent when such omissions

have been made by the lower court,®®
In ease of judgment rendered against a subcontractor
m û his surety, an appeal made by the surety alone must be
confined to certain limitations:

the judgment against the

subc^tractor is not sub ject to review when that individual
did not appeal, the surety is limited to defenses made by the
principal, and the burden of proof that the subcontractor has
discharged the obligations is with the surety and not the
materialmn in whose favor jud^aent was rendered,®^

The sub

contractor as debtor has the right of imputation of payments
as h# pleases in the absence of fraud and his surety cannot
cotttirôl him therein, although there may be controlling stip
ulations in the contract between the general contractor and
him and in his bond, signed by the surety.

In a case in which

a subcontractor was debtor to a materialman for material used
in two school buildings at different places, and evidence was

**Ibld.. 166 La. 248-244.
I*. 241, 117 So. 134.
0, ITalaoa Mfg. Co. ▼. Wllkerson et al., (1934) (La.
Crt. of App.) 192 Bo. 157.
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mot «uffleieiit t© # © w that th© payments were imputed to the
debt in questioa rather than to the other debt. Judgment was
held againet the aabeoatraotor and his surety, and the surety
m e not entitled to use as defense that payment had been made.®®
3* Disposition of fraudulent procedures.

% a t the

W a r t s have protected th© rights of the taxpayers against
t e m M l m t proeedures oonneeted with oontraots for the oonstraatloa of sohool buildings Is avid ©need by the Ooreil ease
ef ISSd,®® la which the purchaser of the sohool district bonds
had exacted of the school board the following condition:
"'Award of contract for construction
iavolviag this issue, and issue which it supplemeats, to be a ooatraotor mutually satisfactory
to the School Board and ourselves
The execution of this condition was the bonding
ecmpaay'e demand of the bidding contractors that to the amounts
of their respective bids #13,000 be added for the benefit of said
cos^aay.

Accordingly, the contract was let for the work to be

done at a cost to the sohool board of $99,444»

About three

months before the building was completed, plaintiffs brought
suit against the school board and the contractors to enjoin
payment of the #13,000, which was alleged to be in excess of
the true considérât i m and to be a fraud perpetrated upon the
taxpayers of the district.

Before the date of the case the

final payment involving the #13,000 had been made, but evidence

Jbid.
®®Ooreil et al» v. Evangeline Parish Sohool Board et al»,
(1986) 160 La. 1011, 107 So. 783.

160 La. 1018.
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# # w e d that it was not authorized by the sohool board and
m m not known to # # president of the board until after it
had been made#

thereupon, the court held the final payment

unauthorized.
The oourt found that the testimony established the
alleged fraud; consequently, it decreed the true consideration
ef the contract to be $86,444, and annulled the contract to
the extent of $13,000..

Judgment for this amount was granted

##inet the school board and the contractors.

The school

board prayed for amendment to the effect of its release, but
the court held that the pleadings did not warrant such an
amendment.

However, it explained to the board that this

Judgment did not preclude it from asserting in a proper pro
ceeding any action against the oodefendant.
Thus was demonstrated the court’s policy of protecting
the taxpayers in the expenditure of their money for school
buildings, even though the school board had seemed to abuse its
discretion by accepting a contract which had been made Immorally
and A%udulently.
While the courts have held consistently to the policy
of strict interpretation of the law in protecting the taxpayers
from fraudulent building contracts, they have been equally
consistent in demanding that accusations of fraud In the ex
penditure of the building fund be definitely established*

To

certain petitioning taxpayers®® explanation was made as follows:

®^6uillory et al* v. Fontenot, Parish Superintendent of Public
Mucation, et al., (1986) 161 La. 67, 108 So. 127.
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While it is true that the Jurisprudence of the
state authorizes taxpayers, in proper oases, to
sue for the reoovery of public funds or property,
in which they have an interest in common with all
ether citizens similarly situated, when it is
alleged that the governing authority ehich is
charged with its administration has illegally or
fraudulently disposed of it, such a suit is not
based upon any contractual relation, and, in the
absence of a showing in the petition that the
governing authority, which, in this case, is the
school board, was a party to the alleged fraud and
refuses to act in the premises, the taxpayers’
suit is, at least, prmoature.G®
Responsibility of the building committee.

The parish

board is the governing authority of schools within its Juris
diction, but often it becomes necessary for the supervision of
building projects to be delegated to local committees.

Con

troversies as to the responsibility of such local boards may
be expected.

In one instance*® a local committee which was

appointed to contract for the building of a schoolhouse ac
cepted a purchase of bricks, the warrant for the payment of
# l c h was honored by the school board.

Subsequently, the

board was advised officially that the bricks were of inferior
quality; thereupon, it repudiated the action of the committee
and brought suit against the chairman of the committee for
recovery of the price paid for the bricks with interest from
Judicial demand and for the expenses of inspecting, separating,
and moving the bricks.
Evidence showed that the chairman of the committee
held the decisive vote and cast it in favor of the purchase,

®*Ibid.. 161 La. 69,
*®Parish Board of School Directors v. Alexander, (1910) 125
La. 606, 51 So. 906.
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he knew of the provisions of the omtract to guard
# # l n a t the aeeeptaaee of Inferior bricks.

He induced some

« m b e r # of the emmittee to sign the warrant ty representing
to t h m that he was the rightful owner of the bricks, since he
was ereditor for more than the price of purchase to the one
who made the bricks, and that he would be responsible for any
diffmpenee in the quality.
The court held that the defendant, chaixman of the
ecmmittce, having knowingly accepted bricks of such inferior
quality as to be valueless, was responsible to the board for
m e price of the purchase with intwest.

%

way of explana

tion, it established the responsibility of a local building
committee to its governing board as follows s
The building committee, of which
the defendant was chairman, was the agent of the plain
tiff board, and as such was responsible to their
principal for damages resulting from the nonper
formance of their duty, or from unfaithfulness in
their management, or from their fault or neglect.
Civ. Code, arts. 3002, 3003. The bricks being
unsuitable for the purposes intended, the com
mittee was in fault for warranting on the plain
tiff board for the ocmtract price, and the
defendant, having unduly received the proceeds of
the warrant as a creditor of the contractor, is
bound in law and equity to make restitution to
his principal.**
Liquidation of coat of construction.

#ienever there

is the construction of a school building, there is likewise
the responsibility of some agency to pay the expenses right
fully incurred.

From early to recent times various litigations

have become necessary concerning the methods of last resort

188 La. 818.
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to liquidât# sohool building eonstruotion indebtedness,
1.

Levy u m M m r i z o d by speojal statute.

The power

of th# otet# to ooBOttuot and maintain sohool buildings through
it# authorized #%#at# is so obvious that its legal existence
is aooeptod without question.

One of the early suits*® dealing

with this subject sought to compel the sheriff of Avoyelles
Parish in 1836 to assess and collect a special tax In a certain
district for the payment of a building obligation.

The relator

# 0 built th# schoolhouse in question had obtained judgment
against the school directors about six years previous but had
been unsueeesSful in his efforts to collect; the legislature
case to hi# rescue by the statutory provision:
Be it enactedI &c. That it shall be the
duty of the Sheriff of Avoyelles, to assess and
levy a tax in addition to the State tax, equally on
all taxable property within the Second School
District of said parish of Avoyelles, sufficient
to pay the Judgment in the case of W. H. Bassett v*
Behool Directors of the Second District, in the
Thirteenth Judicial District Court of the parish
of Avoyelles, together with the costs of collec
tion, and to collect the same and pay to the
plaintiff or to hie assigns, the amount of said
judgment and costs; and the fees of collection to
be th# smae as the fees for the collecting the
State tax, and thereafter, if any balance remains,
to pay the same over to the School Directors of
said Second Sohool District.*®
The sheriff attacked the constitutionality of the
act on the ground that the legislature’s organic right to pro
vide for the support of public schools by general taxation

*®W. H« Bassett v. L. Barbin, Sheriff, (1856) 11 La. Ann.

678.
*®Acts of Louisiana, 1855, Ho, 889.
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excluded its right to authorize special taxation, as in this
instanoe.

However, the oourt held that the act was oonstitu-

tioual and that the sheriff must levy the prescribed tax*
Thereby the oourt upheld the legislative action which had
considered the liquidation of a building debt of sufficient
importance to warrant special statutory provision therefor,
S« Oertificates of indebtedness.

What may be ac

cepted as consideration In liquidating the cost connected with

a building program is often a question necessary to be settled.
In 1924 the school board of Jackson Parish, under authority
of lew,®^ called an election for voting a special tax of two
mills for two years to be used in reroofing and repairing a
school building.

The election was promulgated favorably and

a contract was made with a merchant to furnish a certain amount
ef roofing.

% e merchant refused to deliver because the board

had nothing but a certificate of indebtedness to offer in pay
ment until the taxes could be collected,

Ultimately the board

purchased the needed material from another party.

The first

seller then entered suit*® to collect from the said school
board for the roofing which he contracted to sell* but # l c h
he had refused to deliver on the payment basis offered by the
board, although it was understood by all parties that the
certificates of Indebtedness would be used to pay the debt.
The school board recognized that the required amount could not
be taken from the general fund, and it was unsuccessful in its

1916, Mo, 180, B.C. 9,
®®H. C, Walsworth v, Jaokson Pariah Sohool Board, (1924)

1 La. App. 57.
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e t t w t e to got the oertlfloatea cashed.

The court admitted

that ia theory the school hoard violated a contract but stated
that alBoe both parties knew that the money was to come from
a special tax which had not been collected— and particularly
when the fund was to be created in accordance with a specific
law— the case was taken out of the general rule.

Also, the

court pointed to the fact that most of the material in question
was standard and could be sold easily ty the plaintiff without
lose.
Thereby it was held that certificates of indebtedness,
properly issued, are suitable for fulfilling the payment part
ef a contract; upon that basis the plaintiff's demand to desigmate # e

defendant's failure to pay cash as the breaking of

ecmtract was rejected.
8. Sale of building for indebtedness. A school
building is not exempt from seizure and sale for defaulted
payment on the material used in Its construction, when judgment
therefor has been properly secured.

This policy was followed

in a litigation*® concerning a school building debt, for
liquidation of adiich, a judgment had been obtained by a manu
facturing company.

The district court granted the company

a lien and privilege to seize and sell the building at any
time for the satisfaction of the judgment,

V/hen four years

later the company was about to seize and sell the building,
the board made an unsuccessful attempt in district court to

*®Hawthome et al. v. Jackson Parish Sohool Board et al.,
(1985) 5 La. App. 508.
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the procedure.

Shortly thereafter some taxpayers attempted

to attack the part of the Judgment granting the privilege on
the building on the alleged ground that the judgment was con
trary to law.*^

The court failed tc maintain the mere ground

of error ae a cause for annulling a judgment, and held that
since the Judgment had become final e long time previous,
idiether right or wrong, it was binding, and that the citizens
had then "no cause or right of action to annul a judgment ob
tained against the board as governing authority of the district,
the board being properly cited and represented.”*®
Thus it was legally established that by proper pro
cedure a building may be sold to liquidate a debt thereon
created by the governing board, when that board does not ful
fill the obligation of payment.
Use of Sohool Property
Diversion from created nurnose -prohibited.

A public

school building erected at the expenses of the taxpayers may
not be converted into a business enterprise as long as it is
needed for school use.

One building in controversy** had been

built with a $20,000 levy and $60,000 contribution from the
city of Monroe; taxpayers charged that a part of it was being
used as a public theater by city authorities under a pretended
lease.

The taxpayers' right to come into appeal oourt on this

p. *18.
*®SugMr «rfc al, ▼, City of Monro, at al,, (1908) 108 la.
677, 38 So. 961.
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question was upheld aeeording to previous decisions,1®® as
fellows:
. # # upon • $ • the question whether the munioipal
authorities are diverting or making an illegal use
of the building in question, whioh is public prop
erty, any taxpayer has the right to come into court,
and, quoad the amount, the Jurisdiction is deter
mined by the value of the property or of the interest
therein represented by the money specially voted for
a school building; the case not being materially
different from what it would have been if the mayor
and council had originally proposed to devote the
#0,000 raised for that puzpose to the construction
of a theater, and had been enjoined from so doing**®i
Much and varied testimony was presented concerning
the effect that the operation of a theater in a part of the
building would have upon the attainment of the educational
purpose for # i o h the building was established*

The court did

not attempt to rule on this phase of the question but said:
Considering the case in the light of this testimony,
the least that we can say is that, whereas we know
that the qualified voters of the city of Monroe
voted to tax themselves for the purpose of erecting
a schoolhouse, we have no assurance that they would
have so voted if they had been informed that the
building to be erected would be used as a theater
as well, and that we should not consider that they
were fairly treated if the property for # i c h they
are still paying, year by year, should be permitted
to be used for a purpose not intended by them, and
of idiieh, in all probability, some, if not a major
ity, of them would disapprove.*®®

^ T h o m a s H. Handy et al. v. The City of Hew Orleans et ale.,
(1887 ) 89 La. Ann. 107, 1 So. 593; Edward Cenéry, Jr., et al.,
V, The Hew Orleans Waterworks Company et ale., (1887) 39 La.
A m . 770, 2 So. 555; State ex rel. Orr v. City of Hew Orleans
et al. (kotestant Orphans’ Home et al.. Interveners), (1898)
50 la. Ann. 860, 24 So. 666; City-Item Co-operative Printing
Go# V. City of Hew Orleans et al., (1899) 51 La. Ann. 713,
85 So. 813#
^^Sugar at al. v. City of Monroe et al., (1902) 108 La. 681.
lO^Ibid.. p. 684.
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In giving its complet© policy upon the right to us©
ft part of a school building as a theater the court explained:
In expressing this conclusion, we do not wish to
be understood as going to the extreme of holding
that the city authorities may not make such casual
and incidental use of the building in question,
not inconsistent with or prejudicial to the main
purpose for which it was erected, as they may deem
advisable, nor as holding that changed conditions
in the future may not Justify them in devoting it
to some other purpose* The question here presented
is # c t h c r they have the legal right at this time
to make use of it, or any part of it, for the pur
pose of maintaining a theater therein, or of giving
theatrical performances, as a business; and this
question we decide in the negative**®®
Likewise, the school board is without authority to
use or utilize any sohool property for purposes other than
those of public education*

This applies to the construction

of a swimming pool on the school grounds for the benefit of
the children of the municipality or to the leasing of a por
tion of the grounds to individual citizens for the purpose
of constructing a public swimming pool*^®^
Illegality of leases to business enterurlses.

A

similar principle as in the previous case was involved in
the Presley suit,^®® with the lease for a different purpose*
In the instant case the parish school board had leased a por
tion of certain school grounds for the proposed purpose of
the establishment of a cafeteria for the teachers and pupils*
Relative to the board's lack of power for this action the court
of appeal quoted from Ruling Case Law:

“ “a a ^*Oulnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana * May 1, 1930,
to April W , ilS^S, p, 4 # V
^®®Preslcy V. Vernon Parish School Board, (1932) 19 La. App*
217, 159 So. 698.
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# # . vol# 84, subject Schools, P* 585, Sec. 34:
"Unimproved school lands are subject to the same
restrictions as sehoolhouses, and the school board
cannot permit them to be used for collateral pur
poses, even though profitable# This is on the
ground that school boards have power only over
educational matters, and so have no power to lease
or grant school property for other p u r p o s e s
hereupon It was maintained that a school board may
not divest itself of its authority over school property.

The

dangers of endorsing a policy to the contrary were pointed
out as follows:
It looks reasonable that while a cafe
teria on the ground might be a convenience to the
pupils and teachers, the business conducted « . •
may beemme a nuisance, %&ich, for the welfare of
the pupils and teachers, should be suppressed.
And such power must be preserved.*®?
The discretion %Aich the board may exercise in the
use of the property was described thus:
A school board does not have power,
under the law, to lease ground acquired for school
purposes, on which a school building has been
erected, and a public sohool is being therein
conducted, unless as stated in 108 La. 677, 32
So. 961, 59 L« H* A. 783, it is for some casual
use, not prejudicial to nor inconsistent with
the main purpose for whioh the property was
acquired. And such an exceptional situation does
not exist in the present case.*®®
Sale of luncheons under certain conditions permis
sible .

The sale of refreshments during hours of intermission

for the convenience of teachers and pupils is not considered

13« So. 694.
p. 696.
Th. .... r.f.rr.d to a. 108 La. 677, 32 So. 961
89 L. B. A. 783, 1. Sugar at al. v. City of Monroe et al.,
(1902), aunr*.
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esL unlawful usa of the sohool buildings.

In a contest^®® of

# i # use of sohool property the plaintiff alleged that the
sohool hoard of Mow Orleans had entered into a contract whereby
eertain parties were given permission to sell merchandise on
the sohool grounds in violation of constitutional provisions
to the effeet that:

"The funds, credit, property or things

of value, of the State or of any political corporation thereof,
shall not he loaned, pledged or granted to or for any person
or persons, association or corporation, public or private;
* •

The decision handed down was;
• • • the mere sale of luncheons, etc., on the
school premises, during lunch hours only, to
teachers and pupils only, under the circumstances
and for the purposes set forth In defendant’s an
swer, is only incidental to the main purpose of
said schools, and is in the interest of the safe,
sanitary, and efficient conduct of said schools,
and that same is not an unlawful use of said
buildings under such oircumstancea.
Authority of school board to sell old site.

Sohool

b^irds amy sell school property idiich is no longer needed for
school purposes with a view of using the proceeds thereof for
the purchase of more suitable property.

The law governing

this principle is interpreted in the Henderson case^^^ in which
the school board of Caddo Parish was enjoined from selling
to the city of Shreveport a lot idiich had been purchased for

^^Ralph V. Orleans Parish Sohool Board, (1925) 158 La. 659,
104 So. 490.
^^Oonstitution of Louisiana, 1981, art, 4, sec. 18.

«68.

T. Orl.am. ParlBh Sohool Board, (1925) 158 La. 662-

*H«id«p.on at al. t, City of Shrareport et al., (1926)
160 la. 860, 107 So. 189.
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a aohool building site but never used for such purpose.

The

oourt held that since a school board has no right to acquire
lands for any other than school purposes, it follows that:
« • * it cannot hold lends indefinitely for other
than school purposes; and hence it is the plain
duty of the school board to divest itself of any
land which admittedly, according to the Judgment
of the board itself, is unnecessary or unsuitable
for school purposes; end mandamus would certainly
lie to compel the board to divest itself of land
so held.11»
Such sale was held authorized by the statutory pro
vision:

"The parish school board shall determine the number

of schools to be opened, the location of the sohool houses,
, . . they may change the location of a school house, sell or
dispose of the old site, and use the proceeds thereof toward
procuring a new o n e . " H ^

It was explained that "old site"

means "any site" whioh is no longer used, or necessary, or
suitable for a school.

The purchase of new property for the

same purpose does not have to be made simultaneously with the
sale of the old.
In sunmary, the court upheld the right of sale as
follows:
In the case at bar we have shown, we
think, that the legislative branch of the govern
ment has expressly consented to the sale by a
school board of the "old sites" of schools, and
that any site which is unused and unnecessary
or unSltaSIe for school purposes la an old site,
within the meaning of the statute.**®

160 La. 567.
Of Louisiana, 1988, Bo. 100, seo. 80.

^^^^BMidOTson at al. t. City of Shrorsport et al., (1986)
160 La. 571.
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The

legal ooimael seems to have Interpreted

a# an implied power ^ e authority to use the proeeeds from
tâie sale of property for the purpose of, improving or equipping
.«tistent sehoolhousee

However^ after the enaotment of the

# v e m l n g statute^^^ of 192S, school hoards were advised to
have such use of the funds endorsed

the supervisor ofpub

lie aeoounts before taking definite action* for there is
statutory specification of the use which may be made of these
funds.
Protection of school nronertv.

Since the early his-

tmpy of her educational system, Louisiana seems to have attempted
to safeguard the interest of her public schools.

Prom 1664^^^

to 1679 the legislature was empowered to exempt from taxation
all property actually used for school purposes, and since
ISO
1 6 7 9 ^ such property has been exempt by organic provision.
Hhether the exemption is granted by authorized statutory enaetment^^^ or by the constitution, exemption from all taxation,
mmieipal as well as state, is m e a n t , T h i s exemption does

^ ^Opinjons of the Attorney General jgf Louisiana; m y 1, 1980,
to m y 1, TéSS, p.
S£y 1, iSis to may 1, idAd, p. 444.
^^Aets of Louisiana,

1988, Ho, 100, sec. 80,

^"^^Ouimioms of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1986,
to A p ^ l a o , IWlB, p. 8 # ^
^^Oonsti tut ions of Louisiana:

1664, art. 184; 1868, art, 116.

^ ^Xbid., 1679. art, 807,
^^Acts of Louisiana,

1868, No, 196, sec, S.

^® K p , & m s , Lefrano v. City of New
Ann, 188.

Orleans,(1875)

87La.
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met include property merely owned by tbte sohool and not aotuelJ^r

uee, although that property produces no revenue or

its revenue Is used for school purposes; however, it does in
clude lets used in oonneotion with a school, such as playgrounds

Uhen property used for sohool purposes is owned

by some individual or company deriving rent therefrom exempt l m from taxation does not hold;^^^ on the other hand, if
the use of a building belonging to other than school authori
ties is granted for school purposes without receipt of profit
er income, such property is exempt on the grounds of being
actually in use for sohool p u r p o s e s , T h i s privilege per
tains to ordinary taxes but does not exempt school property
from local assessment or special taxation, such as on pavements
and s i d e w a l k s P r o p e r t y which belongs to the school board
and is used for sohool purposes is considered public property
and is not subject to be sold for taxes,
Parish school boards are considered as engaged in
the exercise of essential governmental functions; consequently,
gasoline and lubricating oil purchased by them from the manu-

^ ^Oninione of the Attorney General of Louisiana., May 1, 1980,
to May 1, X988, p, é07,
^^^aroline Armand azid Husband v,
£• Dumas, State Tax
Collector, (1876) 88 La, Ann, 403; Oninions of the Attorney
General or Louisiana. Mhy 1, 1988, toTprll 30, 1930, p, 693.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1981, art. 10, sec, 4; Opinions
of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1988» to April 30,
^®^Onittions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1930,
to x i p H r W T i ^ ^ T v
127ibid,. May 1, 1980, to May 1, 1988, p, 830.
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Êaeturer are exempt from the tax Imposed by the Federal Govern-

The state has endeavored to protect the pupils of
im h U e schools from the presence of intoxicating drink by
prohibiting the operation of a saloon near the school buildIjng^lfiO

jji X909 It %Mie definitely established that a liquor

dispensary could not be operated within three hundred feet of
a school,^®®

Similar regulation may be made forceful now by

legislative enactment i ^ o h names a radius for a particular
school, or by municipal ordinance,

m m m Y

The School District
Th9 underlying principles governing the school dis
trict as it has functioned In the state*# program for the
development of a system of free public schools appear to be
the following:
1. The legal basis for the school district is implied
in the power to establish, for the district was a recognized
entity many years before it was provided for in the state's
organic law.
2. The school district is a quasi-corporate sub
division of the state created for the purpose of maintaining

May l, 1988, to April 1, 1934, p. 906.

189

May 1, 1898, to Itoy 1, 1900, p. 137.

130Ibid.. May 1, 1908, to May 1, 1910, p. 255.
^^Ibia., May 80, 1988, to April 1, 1934, p. 609.
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the public schools within its jurisdiction.
3, The establishment of the school district is author
ised by law but the parish school board is clothed with broad

ileeretionary power in the creation thereof.
4^ The size of the district is not a factor, for any
pert of a perish, the idiole parish, or portions of two parishes
may be included within its limits as defined by the parish
beard.
3# The location of bcmndariee of districts is subject

to a wide discretion of the school board, but the designation
thereof must permit of no uncertainty.
6« The parish board of school directors is the

governing authority of the school district.
7. The parish school board which has the power to
create school districts may in its discretion alter, abolish,
er consolidate the districts of its creation, if prohibitory
statutes are not violated.
8. The obligations of debt assumed by a district
through bond Issues or any other legal channels are not affected
by the consolidation of that district with another,
Sohool Property
The principal policies pertaining to the administra

tion of public school property as upheld by the law are as
follows;

1. The parish school board as the governing authority
of the district is custodian of all public school property
therein.
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S, A building program may be financed through the levy
of special taxes by the qualified taxpayers of the district.
S. The contract is an integral feature of the building
program; strict interpretation thereof and adherence thereto are

held for all parties concerned.

The law serves to protect the

taxpayer against fraudulent procedures in making or executing
contracts,
4. Surety companies are held responsible for the faith*
ful performance of their clients, as agreed to in the contract.
5. Parish sohool boards often appoint auxiliary local
building committees, who are held accountable for all trans
actions made under their supervision.
6. Contracted obligations for a building program
must be liquidated, even if the liquidation necessitates
special legislation or the sale of the building for recovery
of the amount of indebtedness.
7. Certificates of indebtedness vdiioh have for their
security an authorized tax levy are suitable for satisfying
the payment part of a contract,
8. Diversion of sohool property from its established
purpose is contrary to the interpretation of the law,
9. The parish school board may, at its discretion,
dispose of sohool property which is no longer needed for pub
lic school use,
10. It has been the policy of the state to safeguard
the interest of public schools by exempting their property from
ordinary taxation and by protecting schools from contaminating
influences.

CHAPTER X

ADMINISTRATION OP PUPIL PERSONNEL AND THE CURRICULUM

OHAPTSH X

AiailNISTRATION OP PUPIL PERSONNEL AND THE OUHRICULUM

The Constitution of the u&lted states, the organ!o
lavs of the state, common lav theory, court decisions, legal
opinions, and common practice are in accord on the theory
that the state has the power to provide for the establishment
of a system of free public schools.

Since pupils and

programs of study are essential elements of a school system,
it is axiomatic that the state has a right to establish,
through its duly authorized agents, a legal basis governing
the pupil personnel end the organization and administration
of the curriculum as they relate to the public school system.
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the lav of the
state pertaining to the pupil personnel and the curriculum
as revealed by the organic laws and statutory enactments
relating thereto and as interpreted by the courts and legal
counsel of the state.

PUBLIO SCHOOL PUPILS

"Under the English common lav a father had almost
unlimited control over the education of his child, and in the
American colonies the same principle applied until modified
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Statute.*1

The Supreme Court of the United states has

held that a reasonable amount of education for all children
is aeoesaary to promote the public welfare of the states and
that legal provisions enforced by a state with such objectives
in vie* are not in violation of the principles of personal
liberty, which the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti
tution assures to every Individual.®

Then, the foundation

for the promotion of the general welfare of the state through
education was made possible for the American youth when free
public "schools were established end when the states of the
tmdLen assumed the responsibility for protecting children
against the elements which tended to deprive them of this
rightful heritage.
Legal Foundations
The power to establish public schools obviously
implies a basis for the administration and supervision of
those who are to attend such institutions.

That Louisiana

assumed the right to control pupil personnel is evidenced
by her establishment of a school system long before there
was any organic provision on the subject*

what may be termed

the first implication was the mere suggestion of state direction

^Newton Edwards» The Courts and the public schools (Chicago»
1953), p. 480.
®Ibid.» p. 401.
®Fred Engelhardt, public school Organization and Adminis
tration (Boston, 1951), p. 3 4 8 . ^
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in the provielon that school funds be distributed to the
parlAea eooordlng "to the number of free white children
between aaoh ages as shall be fixed by the General Assembly."^
In the Convention during the War for Southern
Independence there was much quibbling over whose children
the constitution should provide for.®

It was finally agreed

to include "all children of the state, between the ages of
six and eighteen years,"® with no mention or race or color.
The Constitution of 1868 extended the upper age limit to
twenty-one years and provided for admission of all pupils of
such ages "without distinction of race, color or previous
c o n d i t i o n . I n 1879 the age limits were put back to six
and eighteen years for all children,® with no mention of
race or color.

These limits have remained unchanged with

the exception that where kindergarten schools exist, children
may be admitted between the ages of four and six years.^
Also, since 1896 provision for separate schools for the white
and colored races has been in effect.

^Constitution of Louisiana, 1688, art. 136.
^Debates in the Convention for the Revision and Amendment
of the ConstiTutTSn of ibe' ëïiate of Louisiana» làdi, pp.

roiTTsg;-wr:------------------- ----------------

^Constitution of Louisiana, 1864, art. 141.
"^Ibid.. 1868, art. 135.
®Ibid.. 1879, art. 824.
*Ibid., 1898, art. 248.

^®Ibld.s 1896, art. 248; 1981, art. 18, sec. 1.
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Separate Sehoole for White and Colored Hacea
Since the expiration of the period of the war for
Southern independence and Reconstruction the state consti
tutions, the oourts, sohool authorities, and common practice
have maintained the policy of separate schools for white and
colored children.

In 1881 the question of separation of

pupils of color was presented for judicial interpretation in
a suit^^ to compel the New Orleans School Board to admit
colored children In a sohool of white children.

The supreme

court upheld the policy of separate schools for the white
and colored races by rendering a decision adverse to the
relator and maintaining the school board's right to refuse
admission of colored children in a school of white children.
A much more recent controversy^® shows a continuation
of the policy of separate schools for children of color.

The

act which brought the issue to the oourts was the expulsion
of the plaintiff's daughter from a white school on the ground
that she had negro blood.

Her father was white and she and

her mother appeared to be white.

After she had attended the

white school from the age of seven to fourteen years she was
excluded by the sohool hoard.

From the decision of the

district court, which refused to reinstate the child as an
eligible pupil for the white schools, the plaintiff appealed
to the supreme court; he was met with the explanation that

^^State ox rel. u. Dellande v. New Orleans school Board,
(1861) 33 La# Ann. 1469.
l^Oberly v. Calcasieu Parish School Board et al., (1918)
142 La. 788, 77 So. 600.
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%he district court ham Jurisdiction of suits Involving civil
or political rights, under which classification the issue
falls.

Gonsequently, the appeal was dismissed and the

décision of the district court was left controlling,

in

refusing to force reinstatement of the child the court upheld
a dcmeatic regulation, "which one state in its sovereign
judgment may require to be different from the regulation of
another.
permission for Transfers to Another Parish
The state has provided a public school system for
its youth and it is the duty of the administrators to make
this opportunity for education available to those for whom
it is provided,

k pupil who does not live within reach of

a suitable sohool may be permitted to attend a school in an
adjoining parish.^*

Deteiminetion of the source of authority

for such transfers was sought in 1925.^®

In the situation

involved, the school board of Jefferson parish had adopted a
resolution permitting the son of the plaintiff to attend a
school in an adjoining parish but the parish superintendent
had refused to issue

the

permit.

The court pointed out that

Act No. 100 of 1922 governed the case and that nowhere in the

^®Harry R, Trusler, Essentials of sohool Law (Milwaukee,
1927), p. 46.
l^Opiaions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, June 1,
1912, t o Tiay "I— 1 W Î ,
-------------------Instate ex rel. Oharles Pourroux v. Board of Directors of
the public Schools for the Parish of Jefferson and j« C* Ellis,
Supt., Appellants, (1926) 3 La. App. 2.
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«ttttuto vas the sohool hoard given power to act in the matter,
fha pertinent statutory provision was to the effect that:
Children for whom adequate schools of
suitable grade have not been provided in their
home parish may attend schools in an adjoining
parish* In such eases permits shell be secured
from the parish superintendent of the children's
home parish, and after they have been approved by
the pariah superintendent of the parish in which
the schools that the children desire to attend
are located they shall be presented to the princi
pals of the schools which the children wish to
attend, who shall be required to admit the chil
dren and provide for their instruction the same as
if they were resident a of the p a r i s h . 16
The exoerpt of the statute quoted shows the valid reason for
the transfer of a pupil to be that there are no schools of
suitable grade to meet his demands in his home parish.

This

reason wee not assigned in the instant case; the father
claimed the privilege merely because "of the advance studies
and desiring to complete the education of his said child,"
In upholding the sole right of the parish superin
tendent to issue such permits, the court maintained that
"the Parish school Board and the superintendent of the public
Schools are treated as separate and different persona and
are vested with different rights and subjected to different
duties and obligations separate and distinct.

The functions

of each are clearly d e f i n e d . s i n c e the law prescribes that
the parish superl ntendent issue the permits, the court was
neither empowered to substitute the board of school directors

^^Aets^of Louisiana, 1928, No. 100, sec* 59.
State ex rel. Charles Fourroux v. Board of Directors of
the public schools for the Parish of Jefferson and J. o* Ellis,
Supt., Appellants, (1925) 5 La. App* 4.
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la t M a oapaoity nor to control the exercise of discretion
by the designeted officer unless he had made abuse thereof,
consequently, the parish superintendent was not ordered to
iseue the permit petitioned.
The state's legal counsel has ruled^® that after
atwh transfers are granted there must be adherence to the
provision:

"The Superintendent of the children's home parish

Shall settle monthly for the instruction of such children as
shall take advantage of the provision of this section, the
settlement to be on the basis of the monthly per capita cost
cdT instruction in the children's home

perish.

Transportation of Pupils
A comparatively recent educational development,
which has ccsae particularly with the consolidation of schools,
is the transportation of children who live at an inconvenient
distance from the school center.

Formerly those pupils not

living within walking distance of a sohool of the necessary
grade boarded in the school community, furnished their own
means of travel, or resignedly remained at home.

For obvious

reasons most school boards have found transportation a solution
to many of their problems concerned with assuring necessary
educational opportunity to all pupils alike end, although its
proper execution continues to present many novel problems,

^®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1930, t o April"?0Tl[93# , ÿ . 467.

^^Aota of Loulciane, 19B2, No. 100. aeo. 59.
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adoption has become a fairly well established policy
throughout the state,
practically all types of pupil transportation are
now in uae,

school boards may contract with common carriers®^

and owners of motor t r u c k s , o r they may purchase trucks as
school property and employ operators therefor,®® but they are
not empowered to spend money fbr the transportation of children
except In a manner prescribed by law,®®
Many of the questions which transportation has
presented are settled by the school board under whose juris
diction they CŒce, but in a few instances the board's ad
judications have not been acceptable to all parties and the
state's legal advisers and courts have been requested to
interpret certain pertinent policies.
Discretionary power of school hoard to furnish
transportât ion.

By section 50 of Act Ho. ISO of 1916, as

re-enacted in section 29 of Act No. 100 of 1922, parish
school boards were given authority to provide for the trans
portation of pupils who live more than two miles from school.
The extent of the board's discretion In this respect was
tested in 1925 by the Wall case,®*

Therein the plaintiff

®®OpinlonB of the Attorney General of Louisiana,
1 9 1 8 , T o Bay ' i T ' l W , p, 633.
®^Ibid,, May 1, 1918, to May 1,1920, p,

1,

724.

®®Ibld,. May 1, 1926, to April

30, 1928, p. 883,

®®Ibld.. May 1, 1930, to April

30, 1932, p. 640.

®*Lorrin wall v. Livingston Parish Sohool Board, (1985)
1 La. App. 730,
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collection of a balance claimed to be due according
t© a recolution of the board to allow him a stipulation per
daily attendance of his children in lieu of transporting
them to school.

The per diem payments had been made until

the board, by resolution, discontinued the practice and
thereupon refused to meet the plaintiff's demands#

The

court maintained that under the governing acts the authority
conferred is merely permissive and in no way compulsory#
The compulsory attendance law, Act Ho# 117 of
1928, contains a proviso for the exemption of those children
living more than two and one-half miles from school and for
idira transportation is not provided by the school board#
This is further recognition of the school board's discretion

ary power in furnishing free transportation to pupils#®®
Deleaatlon of discretionary power of transportation

forbidden. The parish school board has complete jurisdiction
in matters pertaining to the transportation of pupils and
under no circumstances may it delegate such discretionary
power to others#

It is a public board constituted to function

in the interest of public welfare and must finally determine
every subject committed to its judgment# An example of this
policy is shown in the Johnson case®* in which the court of ap
peal was called upon to decide if the sohool board could delegate
one of its members to contract with a school bus driver*

In

T. Sabine Pariah Sohool Board, (1932) 19 la. App.
248, 140 So. 87.
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holding to the theory that the school board could not
#legete Its disoretloaery power, and In declaring, Illegal
the oontraot which one of the board members made with the
driver, the court was merely being consistent with other
decisions concerning the delegation of discretionary power#
gummarily, the opinion handed down was:
Clearly, the action of the defendant
board in delegating ite power to contract with
reference to a matter In which it was necessary
to exercise a discretion, and in referring the
exercise of that discretion to an individual, Is
without statutory authority or other legal sanction.

AS Mr. Cates was without legal authority
to bind the defendant school board, the contract
which he made with the plaintiff was without legal
effect and the plaintiff Is not entitled to the
relief sought in the premises.®®
Availability of funds as basis of transportation
term.

When a school board contracts for the transportation

of pupils to a school within its Jurisdiction and designates
the length of the period, the contracting parties are subject
thereto.

The expression,"session months," as used In a con

tract with a bus driver in St. Helena Parish was interpreted,
in view of parol evidence, to mean the general fund term.®^

®^City of Shreveport v. Herndon, (1925) 169 La* 115, 106
do. 244; The State of Louisiana v. Lewis C. Garibaldi, (1892)
44 La. Ann. 809, 11 So. 56; State ex rel, Thurmond v. City of
Shreveport, (1909) 124 La. 178, 50 So. 3; Gauthier v. St, John
the Baptist Parish Sohool Board et al,, (1927) 6 La. App. 670.
®®Johnson V. Sabine Parish Sohool Board, (1932) (La. Ort.
of App.) 140 80. 87.
®%ataon v. St. Helena Pariah sohool Board, (1932) 19 La.
App. 764, 141 So. 482.
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Expiration of the time during which funds were available
f@p financing the transportation was to terminate the contracts
in the particular situation, for the board realized that the
funds were limited and uncertain and that after the exhaustion
of the provided funds there could not be operation of transfers
on anticipated revenues.

The court held that, although the

session was of nine month's duration, transportation as a
liability of the school board ceased after the expiration of
two months and thirteen days, and that truck drivers were
entitled to remuneration for that period, as per contract,
but for no longer time.

Further transportation became a

responsibility of the parents.
Thus not only the discretionary power of the school
board pertaining to transportation was upheld, but also the
stability of its contractual power in this relation, although
% e term specified was rather incomparable to the length of
the school session.
Legalized as a trade.

The increased prevalence of

the operation of transportation vehicles presents the need
for determining whether the work has become a profession and
to what extent the driver of such vehicle is entitled to legal
protection.

Judicial recognition has been given to the facts

that a school transportation vehicle must be operated five
days per week on a fixed schedule in the mornings and after
noons, and that the driver is personally responsible for
efficient operation accordingly.®^

The importance of this

& Co., Umlteû, v. Johnson, (1931) 16 La. App.
580, 135 SO. 77.
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m r k and the rank which it has ooma to take were established
thus in 1931:
The school bus is an important adjunct In the
successful carrying on of the high school© of the
state, in fact, an indispensable factor therein,
and the operation of such busses now may be
properly oaXJLed a trade or profession on the part
of those engaged therein, . • ,&1
The driver in the Hamner ease was given legal protection
from the sheriff's seizure and sale of the transportation
truck for debts, since the truck we© held to be the tool or
instrument necessary for the exercise of the trade or pro
fession by which the owner and operator earned his living.®®
Accidents of school bus drivers#

Operators of

transportation vehicles are responsible to the school board
for the faithful performance of their duty.

On the other

hand, there is the question of the extent of the liability
of the board for the action of such employees#

In one

litigation®® the board was sued by the plaintiff to recover
damages for his child's injuries, which were alleged to be
the result of an accident caused by the negligence of the bus
driver.

As the basis for its refusal to hold the school

board responsible for such accidents, the court referred to
other

deoisions®d

to ©how that shhool boards are only agencies

Gllbid, . 135 So. 78.
®®Ibid., 16 La. APP. 580, 135 So. 77.
®®Horton V. Bienville Parish School Board, (1926) 4 La.
App# 123.
®*8herman et ux. v. Pariah of Vermillion et al., (1899)
51 La. Ann. 880, 25 So. 538; Fisher Land and Improvemsnt Go.
V. Bordelon, President Police Jury, (1099) 52 La. Ann. 429,
27 so. 59.
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Qt the state for the administration of public education in
their respective parishes and, although authorized to provide
for transportation, are not liable in damages for injuries
eaused by their officers and employees*
Another aspect of law dealing with drivers of trans
portation vehicles was established in a 1934 case®* in which
the court, having found the,bus driver innocent of any
negligence, refused to hold him responsible for a collision
with a reckless car driver, who received personal injuries
and a wrecked automobile as a result of the accident*

The

wrecked automobile contained an occupant besides the driver;
this person also filed suit against the insurance company
for damages, but since the driver of the automobile rather
than the bus driver was held responsible, this claim was not
allowed,®*
Thus, the courts have legalized the operation of
school transportation vehicles as a trade.

Also, it has

been the legal policy to relieve the employing school board
of all liability in oonneotion with the action of transpor
tation vehicle drivers and to assure to such drivers
decisions in keeping with the evidence presented concerning
accidents.

®*pate V. American Employers» Ins. Co., (1934) (La. Ort.
of App.) 152 So. 365.
®*Lewts Edwin Bounds v. American Employers» insurance
Company, (1934) (La. Ort. of App.) 152 So, 364*
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school Attendance
Since the public school is established for the
ehlld and since the state has a right to compel the taxpayer
to contribute of his earnings in order that the children of
other parents may be given equal educational opportunities,
It is reasonable to assume that the state’s power would
include the right to require the presence of the child at
school in order that the purpose of public education may be
executed#®^

Through statutory enactments the state has

provided for compulsory school attendance and has entrusted
the parish school board with its enforcement.®®
The governing act provides that children shall be
in school not later than two weeks after the opening of the
session; parents who do not comply therewith may be prosecuted
for the violation.®*

Exemptions for certain classes of chil

dren have been provided and to the parish school board is
delegated the final determination of which children may be
so classified.*®

In fact, the parish board has come to be

considered the legal source of Initial procedures in devel
oping the policies of compulsory school attendance.

®^Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public school
as a state institution (Blooralngton, I92sT7 P* 7137” *“
®®Qpinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1914, t T B s y 1T~19I3, 'p. 364:
U . 7 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 429.

40lbld.. way 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. 419.
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Administration of Pupil Disciplina
It has bean the policy of the state to clothe the
publie school teachers with the power and authority to hold
pupils accountable for disorderly conduct "in the school or
on the playgrounds, or on the street or road while going to
or returning from sohool," but there is no statutory author
isation for the infliction of corporal punishment as a means
of discipline.*!

The legalized method of punishment seems to

be restricted solely to suspension for a limited or indefinite
term, this to be administered by the principal of the school,
subject to the approval of the perish superintendent.*®
With the parish superintendent rests the final power in
determining what arm good causes for suspension; he may
appeal to the state superintendent for advice and assistance,
but the

latter official is not warranted In interfering on

his own

volition.*®

Where the system of incidental fees

is ra^ployed, pupils who refuse to pay such fees may be
mispended only if the parish board of school directors
authorizes such penalty.**

*^Ibia.;

tlay 1, 1910, to May 1, 1918, p. 404; May 1, 1988,

to April 30, 1930, p. 452.
4*Ibia.
, May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918,

p. 485.

**Ibia.. May 1, 1914, to May 1, 1916,

p. 369.
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The Physical welfare of Pupils
By Acts Nos* 150 of 1908 and 79 of 1921, the state
hoard of health, in cooperation with the municipal end parish
authorities, is empowered to provide for a health program
to safeguard the physical welfare of the sohool children of
the state.*®

It has been legally advised that no child

attending the public schools may be exempt from vaccination
because of religious beliefs,** but that pupils may not be
subjected to physical examination without the consent of
their parents.*?

THS PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM

The fundamental principles of curriculum organization
for a dynamic society are susceptible to change according to
changes in the social order.

That a state has the right to

prescribe the program of studies for its public schools is
generally admitted.*®

However, the states have been very

liberal in prescribing what shall be included in their
currioulums— most of them prescribe only the "fundamental
subjects which must be taught in the elementary schools"—
and in delegating to the school board the power to prescribe

*®Ibid. ; May 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. 551; May 1, 1924,
to Maynrr 1986, p. 86.
* *Ibid. , May 1, 1988, to April 50, 1930, p. 561.
*?Ibid. . May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 435.
*®Hermann H. Schroeder, 0£. cit., p. 63.
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a particular oourse of study,**

Court oases bearing on this

subjeet maintain the public school's right to offer any
seeular subjeot not prohibited by the statutory laws.®®
Organic Basis
According to Louisiana's organic provisions the legal
basis of a curriculum for the public school system is Implied
in the right to establish,

This assumption may be sustained

by the fact that this subject is not expressed in any of the
state's constitutions prior to the War for Southern Independimce.

However, the first constitutional committee on public

education, functioning in the Convention of 1844-1845, seemed
to iag^ly very much the theory of a public school curriculum,
as may be seen by the following excerpts from its chairman's
r^ort;

"Another cause of the failure has been that large
es^endltures have been made for building colleges
and academies for the promotion of the higher
branches of literature, before providing the means
for teaching.the first rud iments of a common
education.
"The necessary steps ought first to be
taken to place within the reach of the mass of the
children throughout the State, such an education
as will fit them for the higher branches, and in
such a manner as to place all on an equal footing
in the enjoyment of the benefits to be derived
fyom the funds of the State,

*®ftred Sngelhardt, 0£, cit., p, 442,
®®Otto T, Hamilton, the Oourts and the Curriculum (New York,
1927), p. 24,
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"Provision ought to he made by the state
for
. . # fund . • . large enough if possible to
afford the means to all the children In the state
of obtaining a knowledge of reading, writing, and
arithmetic; branches which are indispensably nec
essary to every citizen in his intercourse with
his fellow men * .

The report proper of the committee included;
The legislature shall encourage the
institution of common schools throughout the
State for the promotion of literature and the
arts and sciences, and shall provide means for
that purpose and for their support."®
The first attempt of a constitutional convention
to specify the regulatory principles of curriculum offerings
was made in 1664 when the committee on public education
recommended that "The English language only shell be taught
in the common schools in this state,"®®

Various substitutes

were presented®* and the compromise finally agreed upon became
article 142 which read:

"The general exercises in the common

schools shell be conducted in the English language,"®®

This

provision, with no additions, was incorporated in the consti
tution by the 1867-1868 Convention,®*

®!official Report of Debates in the Louisiana Convention,
1844-^37 —
517 : ^ -----------------------------------------p. 319.
®®Official Journal of the Proceedings of ^he Convention for
the Re via ion and Amandment of tüe Const ftuFlon of the state"'"of
libuisTaneT T864, p.
®*Ibid., p. 138; Debates in the convention for the Revision
and Amendaeat of t he dons tit u7i on of' the St aie "of Louisiana,
m

d f f : r o g : ----------------------- -------------------------------

^^Constitution of Louisiane, 1064, art. 142,

®*Ibid,, 1068, art, 158.
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In the Constitutional Convention of 1879 resolutions
and committee reports were presented explaining "the necessity
for extending the course of study in the public schools, beyond
the mere rudiments of an elementary English Education,*»®? so
as to Include "reading, writing and arithmetic, with, perhaps,
some knowledge of geography, grammar and history*"®®

"A broad

course of study in schools of every grade, from the primary
to the state University" was recommended.®*

The provision

for a regulated curriculum as incorporated in the adopted
constitution was:
The general exercises in the public
schools shall be conducted in the English language
and the elementary branches taught therein; provided
that these elementary branches may be also taught
in the French language in those parishes in the
State or localities in said parishes where the
French language predominates* if no additional
expense is incurred thereby.*®
The Convention of 1898 brought forward curriculum regulations*!
very similar to those embodied in the previous constitution.
In the constitution adopted by the Convention of
1921 the implications pertaining to à curriculum are found
in the sections which provide that all work offered in the
educational institutions from the elementary sohool to the
university shell be integrated and that "only fundamental
branches of study, including instruction upon the constitutional

®?Offioial Journal of the Frpoeedings of tjm constitutional
Convention of the' State of Louisiana, 18797 p. 16Ô.

S8lbld.
®*Ibld., p. 170.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1870, art. 826.

*llbld.. 1898, art. 261.
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Ay Stem of State enA national government and the duties of
eltlsenshlp^ shall be taught In the elementary s c h o o l s , @2
This organic heels was executed through the enactment of the
1988 statute which provided that:
The branches of spelling, reeding, writing, drawing,
arithmetic, geography, grammar, United states his
tory, and health, including the evil effects of
alcohol and narcotics, shell he taught In every
elementary school « in addition to these, such other
branohes shall be taught as the State Board of Edu
cation, or the provisions of the state Constitution
may require.65
Relative to prohibited teachings In the schools of
the state system the organic provisions have reflected a
consistent attitude.

In the Constitutional Convention of

18Ô4 efforts were made to prohibit the teaching of religious
or sectarian doctrine of any nature in the public schools. ^4
This theory was indirectly reflected in article 146 of the
constitution adopted by that convention,, and a similar theory
has been expressed in every constitution since that time
through the definite provisions that no public school funds
shall be appropriated for the support of private or sectarian
institutions of learning.@5
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the
organic law of Louisiana has not rendered inflexible the

42ibld, , 1921, art. 12, secs. 2-3.
4®Aots of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 60.
G^Offieiai Journal of the proceedings of the Convention
for tke RevlTsion and Amendment of the constitution of the
giate of Louisiana. 1864, pp. lTS-143.
^^constitutions of Louisiana:
18Ô4, art. 146; 1868, art
140; 1879, art. 228; 1898-1913, art. 253; 1921, art. 12,
sec. 15.
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organisation and administration of the curricular program,
which aeama to be a procedure quite opposite from that in
many states.®®
Heading of the Bible a Violative Procedure
The constitutions of Louisiana have assured to every
person the inherent right to worship God according to the
dictates of his conscience;®? the constitution of 1981 provides
further:

"nor shall any preference ever be given to, nor any

discrimination made against, any church, sect or creed of religion
or any form of religious faith or worship*"®®

That such under

lying principles have been upheld by the courts of the state In
protecting the pupils of the public schools from the teachings
of sectarian principles is evidenced in the Kerold case of 1915.®®
In this suit the plaintiffs included two Jews and one Catholic
who complained of the parish school board's action in adopting
and undertaking to put into practice the following resolution;
"Whereas, it is a fact well established
among us that the children in our public schools
are at the most impressionable age for receiving
and retaining good or evil; and
"Whereas, the lessons and truths contained
within the Holy Bible are acknowledged by rightthinking people as being of paramount value in

®®Ralph Yakel, The Legal Control of t M Administration of
Public school axpenSTtures (Hewlfork, l W 9 ) / p* iSO"*"
®?Constitutions of Louisiana;
1868, art. 12; 1379, art.
4; 1898-1915, art. 4; 1921, art. 1, sec. 4.
^ b l d .. 1921, art. 1, sac. 4.

.

®®H.rold et al. t Perish Board of school Directors et al.,
(1919) 139 Le. 1034, 98 So. 116.
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creating and maintaining a better moral atmosphere
In every community and also in the individual life:
Therefore, be it
"Resolved that the principals and teachers
be requested to open dally sessions of the public
schools of Caddo parish with readings from the
Bible, without note or comment, and, when the leader,
is willing to do so, the Lord's Prayer shall be
offered,"?0
It was alleged that there are too many religious philosophies
and different interpretations of the Bible to permit the use
of that book by the public school teachers as a part of the
daily school program.
The court's analysis of the various religious dogmas
and the principles of organic and statutory law which were
Involved included an explanation of the theory of religious
freedom and of the ways in which this attacked practice of
the school board might or might not be violative.

After

showing both legal and organic recognition of the Bible, the
court expressed the theory of equal religious rights as follows;
Therefore, while we are grateful to God
for religious freedom, with other blessings, we
may not interfere with any citizen's natural right
to also worship that same God according to the
dictates of his own conscience. The Jew will be
permitted without interference to worship God
according to his conscience, and so will ell others,
Concerning the alleged discrimination against the Jew, It
was held:
And, as he is guaranteed "the natural
right to worship God, according to the dictates
of his conscience," and as the resolution in
question permits "lessons and truths" to be read

18* Le. 1035.
^^Ibld.. p, 1049.
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oar tooght from the New Testament, particularly
oaneemtiig the son of God and His resurrection from
th# âeàd, etc., it gives a preference to the chil
dren of the Christian parents, and discriminates
against the children of the Jews. The resolution
Is therefore violative of the Constitution.?®
A request by the parish board of school directors
is practically equivalent to a cozmand.

Relative to the

compulaory character of the resolution the court said:
The general policy of the government
always la to avoid with care any compulsion which
Infringes on the religious scruples of any, however
little reason may seem to others to underlie them.
Oooley, p« 685. The reading of the Hew Testament
as the Word of God infringes on the religious
scruples of the Jews. The discrimination against
them, and the inequality of rights and privileges,
are manifest by such requirement*
Jewish
by the
person
to the

The subjection by school authorities of
children to Christian worship Is forbidden
Constitution, which guarantees to every
the natural right to worship God according
dictates of his conscience.

"Before the constitution Jews and Gentiles
are equal; by the law they must be treated alike;
and the ordinance . « . which gives to one sect a
privilege which it denies to another, violates both
the Constitution and the law, and is therefore null
and void." Shreveport v. levy, 26 La. Ann. 671.73
Judge Thomas M* Cooley's views were quoted as
follows to show that the teaching of religion is not a
responsibility of the schools:
"The more enlightened opinion of the
present day denies the duty (to teach religion
in the public schools), and affirms that any step
in that direction is in greater or less degree a
specie8 of persecution of those who are not
favored, and therefore incompetent, in any country
whose political institutions are based upon the

'Bibia.. p. 1047.
?8lbia.. p. 1048.
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prlnoipXes of equality before the lew. Religious
inatruetion is, therefore, referred exclusively to
the voluntary action of the people." Cooley on
Taxation, 197.?*
Dismissal of certain pupils from the exercises was
held to be an unsatisfactory means of correction, thus:
The answer made by defendants that "in
all of said schools the said teachers might with
due propriety have excused from attendance on
such exercises the children of said plaintiffs
and others of similar belief, if so requested by
the students or their parents or guardians," is
an admission of discrimination against the children
of those citizens whose consciences would not
permit them to worship God as taught in the
particular portion of the Scriptures selected and
read by the teacher of the class in which the
children of said citizens happened to be#
Under such circumstances, the children
would be excused from the opening exercises of the
school because of their religious beliefs. And
excusing such children on religious grounds,
although the number excused might be very small,
would be a distinct preference in favor of the
religious beliefs of the majority, and would work
a discrimination against those who were excused.
The exclusion of a pupil under such circumstances
puts him in a class by himself; it subjects him
to a religious Stigmd; and all because of his
religious belief, Equality in public education
would be destroyed by such act, under a Consti
tution which seeks to establish equality end
freedom in religious matters. The Constitution
forbids that this shall be done.?8
The court's decree was that a judgment be Issued:
• • . enjoining the board of school directors of the
parish of Caddo and the parish superintendent from
enforcing or carrying into effect the resolution of
said board requesting the principals and teachers
to open the morning sessions of the public schools
of Caddo parish by reading from the Bible, without
note or.comment, and the offering of the Lord's
Prayer."®

^*1919.. p. 1049.
. pp. 1049-1080.
. p. 1050.
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several years later the state's legal counselor
oo&tlaued to uphold this policy by declaring that "any attempt
to teach, or comment upon, the Bible in the public schools of
Louisiana would be contrary to the Constitutional provisions"
which guarantee to every person religious freedom.??
While the constitutions have contained comparatively
few provisions concerning the curriculum of the schools of the
state, herein is illustrated a means of curriculum control
through negation— that Is, school authorities have not the
constitutional right to teach the Bible to the pupils through
reading or in any way that can discriminate against any
branches of any religion.
State's Right to furnish Textbooks free
to All School Children
It is generally conceded that a state has the power
to furnish free textbooks to pupils who attend the public
schools, but it has been a mooted question as to whether a
state has a right to furnish free textbooks to all children
regardless of the schools attended by them.
Louisiana's earliest provisions on this subject
seem to have been the organic regulation for the Parish of
Orleans;
public
unable
books,
by one

All pupils in the primary grades in the
schools throughout the Parish of Orleans,
to provide themselves with the requisite
an affidavit to that effect having been made
of the parents of such pupils, or If such

??Opinlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1920, io APfir^07T9S5, p. 15Ù#
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parents be dead, then by the tutor or other peraou
in charge of such pupils, shall be furnished with
the necessary books, free of expense, to be paid
for out of the school fund of said parish; and the
school Board of the Parish of Orleans is hereby
directed to appropriate annually not less than two
thousand dollars for t M purpose named, provided
such amount be needed*?#
This local privilege was recognized and upheld in 1906 by
the attorney general in the ruling that the parish of Orleans
should not be barred from the benefits of exchange prices for
used books, as arranged by the state with the various book
companies, on account of its power to furnish textbooks free
to certain children*?®
In 1988 the Louisiana legislature enacted the Free
Textbog* Act which had for its purpose the furnishing of
textbooks without cost to all children who were attending any
school Wistsoever,

immediately after the enactment of this

law several suits attacking the legality of such measure were
instituted by citizens end taxpayers,®® citizens, taxpayers,
and patrons,81 and by school boards and parish superintendents.®®
These litigations began in the Nineteenth Judicial District

?®Qonatitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 861*
?*ODlnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1904,T o T g g y T *

itgt ---------- -------

®®3orden et al#* v. Louisiane State
al., (1989) 168
La. 1005, 185 So. 666.

BoardofEducationet

®^Ooohran et
al., (1989) 168

BoardofEducationet

al. v. Louisiana State
La. 1050, 123 So. 664.

®®Bossler parish school Board at el. v. Louisiana state
Board of Education et al* Caddo Parish School Board et al.
V. same.

(1929) 168 La. 1055, 125 So. 665.
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Court and the final dispoaltlon of one case was a decision
handeddown by
fro m

the supreme Court of the United states.®®
adverse dédisions in the district court, the

various plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court*

in dealing

with the first suit this court denied a motion by the defend
ants, for a dismissal, overruled the defendants' plea that
the plalntiffa— oitizens and taxpayers— had no right of action,
a ad proceeded with the ease on its merits*®*
The pertinent features of the law governing this
ease are

based on Act No* 100 of 1926 which reads as follows:

Be it enacted by the Legislature of
Louisiana, That the Severance Tax Fund of the
State, as levied by Act 140 of 1922, as amended,
shall be devoted after allowing funds and appro
priations as provided by the Constitution of the
State, first, to supplying school books to the
sehool children of the State of Louisiana, and that
thereafter such further sums as remain in the said
Severance Tax Fund shall be transferred to the
State public School funds.
That the State Board of Education of
Louisiana shall provide the said school books
for school children free of cost to such children
out of seid tax fund, end thereafter apply the
remaining sums out of the said severance Tax Fund
to the State public school funds*
That this act shall not apply to persons
attending colleges and universities*#^

GGgmmett Cochran, w. M. Ouice, Jr., Henry stelnau, et al.
Appts., V* Louisiana State Board of Education et al., (1930)
281 U. S. 370, 30 S* C. 335, 74 L. Ed* 913*
®*Borden et el* v. Louisiana State Board of Education
at al., (1929) 168 La* 1005, 123 So. 655.
*®Acts of Louisiana, 1926, No. 100, secs. 1-3.
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Act No. 143 of 1928, the other act attacked, le
the General Appropriation Aet, which provides for various
appropriations and specifically states that seven hundred
fifty thousand dollars shall be appropriated for 1988-1929
and 1989-1930 out of the severance tax fund, to be applied
for the "purchase of free school books for the use of school
children of this State, to be expended by the State Board
of Education of Louisiana as provided by House Bill m *

90

of 1928, or so much thereof, as may be necessary."®®
The plaintiffs alleged that these measures were
unconstitutional on various grounds and emphasized that:
# • . the expenditure of the severance tax for such
illegal purposes is the taking of their property
for private purposes, without due process of law,
in contravention of section 8 of article 1 of the
Constitution of this state, end of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
and is an act contrary to the republican form of
government, guaranteed to each state by section 4
of article 4 of the constitution of the United
States.
In handing down the opinion on the unconstitution
ality charge, Justice Winston Overton said:
Act NO* 100 is not, and does not purport to be,
an appropriation act. It does not authorize the
drawing of anything from the treasury. It merely
dedicates a part of the severance tax fund, without
even specifying the amount to the purchase of
school books, standing alone the act could have
no practical effect, save as a basis for specific
appropriations. That such an act is not an
appropriation act, but merely an act of dedication,
see Fisher v. Steele, Auditor, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1
So. 682; Board of Administrators v. Hiohhart, 139

®^yald.. No. 148, seo. 1.
®^Borda& .i al. t. Louisiana State Board of Bduoatlon et
al., (1929) 168 La. 1016.
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La. 446, 71 SO, 735; Lionel's Cigar Store v.
McFarland, Supervisor, 162 La. 956, 111 so. 341.
Sinoe the act is not an appropriation act, it was
unnecessary that the Legislature, In passing it.
comply with the constitutional provisions relative
to the mWcing of appropriations, by making them
for specific purposes end specific amounts and
for a period not exceeding two years.#®
The attack that the title of Act No, 143 did not
indicate the Intention of the act to make appropriations for
the purchase of school books was met by the decision:
The title of the act is similar to the titles
usually used in General Appropriation Acts in this
state, and in fact follows the constitutional
requirements as to mAiat may be contained in such
acts. We think that the title suffices to cause
one to anticipate that, upon investigation, some
appropriations may be found in the body of the
act. we therefore conclude that the title is
sufficient.#*
In upholding the discretionary right of the legis
lature to include the appropriation for the purchase of school
books in the General Appropriation Act the court reasoned;
The Legislature evidently considered that the
appropriations for the purchase of school books
were sufficiently connected with the ordinary
expenses of government to Justify their Inclusion
in the General Appropriation Act. The purpose
had in view, in making the appropriations— that
of reducing, and if possible of obliterating,
illiteracy in this state— was a purpose in which
the state was vitally interested, and the necessity
for the continuance of the appropriations to accom
plish that end was such as to give reasonable
grounds to consider the matter an ordinary obliga
tion and expense of government. We are not prepared
to say that the Legislature erred in so treating
the matter.90

®®Ibld.. p. 1017.
®*ibia.. p. 1010.
p. 1019.
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It was charged that the two acts are violative of
certain sections of the Constitution of 1921— section 4 of
article 1, section® 8 and 12 of article 4, and section 13
of article 12.

To this the court answered:

In our opinion, which is the view of the
majority of the court, these acts violate none of
the foregoing constitutional provisions, one may
scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money
Is appropriated for the purchase of school books
for the use of any church, private, sectarian, or
even public school. The appropriations were made
for the specific purpose of purchasing school books
for the use of the school children of the state,
free of cost to them. It was for their benefit and
the resulting benefit to the state that the appro
priations were made. True, these children attend
some school, public or private, the latter, sec
tarian or nonseotarian, and that the books are to
be furnished them for their use, free of cost,
whichever they attend. The school®, however* are
not the beneficiaries of these appropriations.
They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved
of a single obligation, because of them. The school
children and the state alone are the beneficiaries.
It is also true that the sectarian schools, which
some of the children attend, instruct their pupils
in religion, and books are used for that purpose,
but one m a y search diligently the acts, though
without result, in an effort to find anything to
the effect that it is the purpose of the state to
furnish religious books for the use of such children.
In fact, in view of the prohibitions In the Consti
tution against the state's doing anything of that
description, it would be legally impossible to
interpret the statute as celling for any such action
on the part of the state, for where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, one of which makes
it unconstitutional and the other constitutional,
the interpretation making It constitutional must be
adopted, what the statutes contemplate is that the
same books that are furnished children attending
public schools shall be furnished children attending
private schools. This is the only practical way of
interpreting and executing the statutes, and this is
what the state board of education is doing. Among
these books, naturally, none is to be expected,
adapted to religious instruction.
As relates to the contention that the
statutes violate section 12 of article 4 of the
Oonstitution, we do not find this contention well
founded. The school books are not granted or donated

401
to the children# , • « It is only the use of the
books that is granted to the children, or, in other
words, the books are lent to them, which implies
that they are to be returned. , . , where the
granting or lending of anything o f value, belonging
to the atate, or any political corporation thereof,
is necessary in the reasonable exercise of the
police power, section IS of article 4 of the consti
tution was not intended to prevent the granting or
lending . « • The furnishing of school books to the
children of the state, for their use, in attending
school, tends directly to promote the education of
the children of the state and to obliterate illit
eracy, thereby Improving the morals of the children
and promoting the general welfare and safety of the
people, and hence comes within the police power.
Of. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357,
38 L« Ed, 933. Our conclusion is that the foregoing
pleas,^directed against both acts, should be over
ruled.*^
In answer to the allegation that the state board of
education was not empowered under the constitution to dis
tribute the general school funds according to the educeble
children of the various parishes of the state, which in
principle was provided in the Free Textbook Act, It was
explained that the money used to purchase said textbooks was
appropriated from the severance taxes which were not considered
a pert of the public school fund.

It was further contended

that the measure violates the "due process clauses of the
Constitutions of this state and of the United States, and
also section
States,"*®

4

of article 4 of the constitution of the united

In answer to these charges the court said;

The contention, as to the violation of the due
process clauses, is based on the ground that taxes
may neither be levied nor expanded for any but a
public purpose, and that to do either for any but

. pp . 1 0 8 0 - 1 0 8 8 .
p. 1088.

402
such e purpose amounts to a taking of property
without due process of law. It Suffices to say
that we do not understand that plaintiffs question
the legality of the levy, hut they do question the
legality of the proposed expenditure. We have
found, however, that the taxes, here appropriated,
ere to he spent legally for a public purpose, and
this, we think, disposes of the question here
presented. As to the violation of section 4 of
article 4 of the Constitution of the United states,
it is certainly difficult, end we think impossible,
to see how the expenditure of public funds for
textbooks for the use of the children of the state
has any tendency to destroy the republican form
of government, enjoyed by the state. However,
the question here presented Is e political one,
which does not fall within the Jurisdiction of the
courts. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
V. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 8. Ot. 284, 66 L. Ed*
377; South Dakota ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33
S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206,
Ann. Cas. 1916B, 860.*5
Summarily, the supreme court of the state defended
the statute in every significant point raised by the plaintiffs
and held that the state under the law has a right to furnish
free textbooks to ell children for their use while in school
regardless of the school attended.
Companion cases on this subject resulted in very
similar decisions.

Of one case the court

said:

The issues presented in this case are
the seme, in all essential respects, as those this
day decided in the case of Silas p. Borden et al*
(No. 89,669 of the docket of this court), ante,
p. 1005, 183 So. 656; the only difference between
the two oases being that plaintiffs, besides suing
as citizens and taxpayers, are also suing as patrons
of the public schools.
For the reasons given in the case of
Silas P. Borden et al. v. Louisiana state Board
of Education, the judgment of the trial court,
refusing to issue the injunction, is affirmed. ^

'®Ibld.. p. 1088.
**Ooohr.n
«1. T. Louisiana state Board of Bduoatlon et
al., (1989) 188 La. 1088.
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In another case which dealt with consolidated suits
Instituted hy school boards and parish superintendents the
court failed to recognize cause of action of the plaintiffs,
as is shown by Justice Overton's decree;
Â8 we held in the Borden Gas®, Act No.
100 of 1928 is merely an act that dedicates funds,
and is not an appropriation act. of end by itself
it has no practical value, save, perhaps, to serve
as a basis fbr future appropriations, if Act No.
143 of 1928, or, for that matter, if Act No. 100
of 1928, were declared unconstitutional, or if both
of them were so declared, in so far as they relate
to the purchase of text-books for the us© of the
children of the state, plaintiffs would gain nothing
by the decree. The declaring of these acts unconsti
tutional, to the extent mentioned, would leave the
$750,000 in the treasury, subject to appropriation
by the Legislature, and would not, as urged by
plaintiffs, cause this sum, or any part of it, to
pass to the public school fund, subject to dis
tribution smong the parishes.
We therefore think that plaintiffs dis
close no right or cause of action. They have no
Interest to sustain these suits, and were properly
diamiseed.*®
One of the companion cases on the textbook question*®
was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for
further adjudication.*?

In upholding the decisions of thb

supreme court of Louisiana, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes
of the Federal Supreme Court said:

®Bossier Parish School Board et al. v. Louisiana State
Board of Education et al. Caddo Parish School Board et al.
V. same.
(1929) 168 La. 1035.
*®Cochran et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education et
al., (1929) 168 La. 1030, 123 So. 664.
*?2ffimett Cochran, W. M. Ouice, Jr., Henry steinau, et al.,
Appts., V. Louisiana State Board of Education et al., (1930)
281 U. S. 370, 60 S. 0. 335, 74 L. Ed. 913.
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No substantial Federal question is pre
sented under See. 4 of article 4 of the Federal
Constitution guaranteeing to every state a republican
form of government, as questions arising under this
provision are political, not judicial, in character.
Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist.
decided March 18, 1950 (281 U. S. 74, ante, 710, 66
A. L. H. 1460. 50 Sup. Ct. Hep. 828), and oases
there cited.*#
In reply to the complaint that the acts in question
would aid private and other schools not in the public educa
tional system by furnishing textbooks free to the children
attending those schools, the United States Court quoted from
an interpretation of this legislation rendered by the supreme
court of Louisiana and concluded:
Viewing the statute as having the effect
thus attributed to it, we can not doubt that the
tiaxing power of the state is exerted for a public
purpose. The legislation does not segregate private
schools or their pupils, as its beneficiaries, or
attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively
private concern. Its interest is education, broadly;
its method, comprehensive. Individual interests
Q.
are aided only as the common Interest is safeguarded.
Thus, it may be seen that the Free Textbook Act
withstood all attacks made upon it, regardless of the personnel
of the plaintiffs, or the jurisdiction of the courts in which
it was tested.

Hereby every school child of Louisiana is

definitely granted the right to receive from the state free
use of textbooks.

®®rbia., 281 Ü. s. 374.
'•ibid., p. 378.
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SUMMARY

Pupil Personnel
The supervision of the pupil personnel is one of
the essential functions of the directors of a public school
system,

pertinent policies revealed hy the state's organic

provisions and judicial interpretations are mainly the
following:
1# The administration of the pupil personnel is
implied in the power of the state to establish public schools.
£. To legislative enactment and the ministerial
officers of education have been left largely the provisions
for aupervlaion of the school pupil.

No organic bases for

this function were recognized until the Convention of 1852
and then only by implication.
3. The establishment of public schools for all the
children of the state without race or color distinction was
provided for in the Reconstruction constitutions.
4. Since 1679 separate schools for the white and
colored races have been established in theory and practice.
5. Ordinarily pupils attend the schools of their
parish, but those pupils not within reach of a suitable school
therein may, through mutual consent of the two parish superin
tendents involved, attend school in an adjoining parish.
6. Parish school boards may administer the problem
of transportation according to their discretion but may not
delegate that power to other officials.
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7* The business of transporting pupils is reoognized
as a trade or profession and the school board is in no way
liable for damages in accidents of Its bus drivers.
8. Children in Louisiana shall attend the schools
provided for them.

To the parish board is entrusted the

enforeemnt of statutory law to this effect.
9. Pupils must render account for conduct considered
disorderly or indiscreet by the teachers in charge, and with
the parish superintendent is vested the final jurisdiction in
applying punishment, of which the only drastic method approved
ia suspension.
10. A state health program operates to safeguard the
physical welfare of pupils; its provisione in some respects
are mandatory, while In others they are directory.
The Curriculum
The administration of its curriculum is one of the
Implied functions of the state's public school system.

That

Louisiana's populace has believed in the theory of a dynamic
course of study is evidenced by the fact that the state cur
riculum has had its development without very much legal basis
except such powers as were delegated to the educational agents
of the state.

Leading facts and outstanding policies in the

development of the state's public school curriculum are:
1. The theory of a curriculum was present in the
Constitutional Convention of 1844-1845; however, there was no
expression on it in any of the state's constitutions prior
to the War for southern independence.
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2* From the time of the Constitutional Convention
of 1664 efforts have been made to give organic sanction to
the bases of a eurrioulum.

However, the various constitutions

in their final form have included only a recognition of the
essentiality of instruction in the English language and of
an integrated course of study from the elementary school to
the university, to be developed by the educational officers
at their discretion with but a few fundamental subjects
specified as required,
3, To assure absolute religious freedom to the
pupils of the public schools no teacher or school official
is permitted to teach the Bible through reading, or to use
it in any way in the exercises of the school,
4. The state grants the free use of textbooks to
all school children regardless of the school attended by
them,

Louisiana is a pioneer in this particular phase of

educational development and her action has been completely
upheld by the Judicial system of both the state and the
United States,

OmPTBR XI
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CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

The United States of America Is established on the
theory that a federated democracy can best serve its consti
tuency hy providing for three separate and distinct branches—
law-making, explaining, and enforcing.

The three branohes

not only have functions peculiar to their particular divisions
but also each branch tends to circumscribe the power of the
other in the development of governmental policies,

Louisiana,

in accord with the other states of the Union, has established
a state government based on the fundamental principles of the
Federal Government,
The American system of free public schools as a
function of the state reflects the underlying principles of
this form of federated democracy.

That Louisiana recognized

her educational responsibilities is evidenced by her legal
foundations for a program of public education prior to her
admission to the Union,
The controversial issues arising from the organiza
tion and administration of Louisiana's system of free public
schools have been an influential factor in the development of
the educational policies of the state.

Many of those issues,

having been carried to some phase of the judiciary for legal
interpretation, have occasioned the determining of the law of
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the publie eehool s y s t m .

That judiolal interprétations based

on organic and statutory laws, as well as on established
custom, have been contributory to the development of education
al policies is indicated by the facts that the courts have
rendered approximately two hundred fifty decisions including
interpretations on almost every underlying principle of the
educational law of the state and that the attorneys general
have supplemented those interpretations with approximately
nine hundred fifty opinions. .
In the present chapter of this study no attempt is
made to summarize all the educational principles and policies
established by judicial interpretations, for that information
may be found in the various chapter summaries.

However, as

circumscribed by the limitations of the problem, the funda
mentals of educational law which it is found to have been estab
lished seam to justify the following conclusions concerning the
policies of Louisiana's public school systmm:
1» As a result of the transplanting of educational
theories from France and Spain, the schools of the colonial
period were primarily a product of the Catholic Church.

Also,

there were some reflections of an increasing Interest in the
development of a program of public education under the auspices
of regal orders.
Zm

Toward the close of the territorial period the

legislative assembly, under the leadership of Governor William
0, C. Claiborne, laid statutory foundations for the theory of
a public school system as a function of the government.
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3* The Ordlnanoe of 1787 and the Federal Oonstltutloh, reflecting the laissez-faire attitude of its framers
toward the suhjeot, recognized the responsihillty of puhlio
education to be one of the undelegated powers reserved by the
states.

That Louisiana was cognizant of this right is shown

by her various provisions for a system of public education
many years before the organic laws of the state made any
aeticm thereupon mandatory,
4, The constitutions of the state, except the first,
reflect a growing interest in broadening the scope for a
comprehensive system of free public schools.

Provisions for

educating the children of color was a controversial issue
during the period of Reconstruction, but since the Constitutiom
of 1879 it has been the policy of the state to provide educa
tional facilities for all children of school age in separate
schools for the white and colored races,
5, It is maintained judicially and legally that the
state has the right and duty to establish and support a system
of free public schools for the purpose of disseminating knowl
edge and promoting the general intelligence of the citizenry*
Legal recognition has been given to the authority of the state
for extending the system upward to include the secondary school
and junior college and downward to include the kindergarten*
6, Louisiana accepted the Federal Government'a grant
of the sixteenth sections of land to develop a permanent source
of revenue for the support of public education.

It has been

the policy of the state, as the legally recognized trustee
thereof, to preserve the school lands through strict adminis
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tration and to aae the funds derived in various ways therefrom
only for the support of the public schools of the township
idkereln the particular section is located*
7# The free school fund accumulated as a result of
the administrative policies pertaining to the sixteenth section
lands.

The state accepted this fund as a trust and proposed to

distribute its accrued interest proportionately to the schools
of the townships concerned*

The legislature in 1872 attempted

to abolish the state's responsibility for the entrusted debt,
but its action was overruled by the supreme court decision
idàieh maintained the perpetuity of the fund#
8# That the responsibility of maintaining a system

of free public schools was readily accepted by the state is
evidenced by the legislature's appropriation of approximately

one and three-fourths million dollars for this purpose before
the oonstitution made such support mandatory*
9# A state-wide property tax has supplied one of the

chief sources of the general school fund since 1847*

Also,

the administration of a general property tax for schools has
been delegated to local authorities*

For many years the police

juries were authorized to levy such tax in their respective
parishes; in 1886 the authorization was made mandatory, but
since 1908 this tax must be included in the regular budget to
be valid#
10# It has been a policy of the state to supplement
the general sehool fund by the revenue from various minor

sources#
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11* % e state has adhered to the policy of holding
parish school treasurers strictly responsible as custodians
of thé general school fund and for the disbursement thereof
according to orders from their respective school boards as
prescribed by law*
IS* A cash basis system of defraying expenses is
practiced I and only in the exceptional case has the current
educational expenditure been permitted to exceed anticipated
revenues for the fiscal year.

However, the liquidation of

school indebtedness by means of funding it into interestbearing certificates has been legalized*
If* Special tax levies authorized by the qualified
voters of a particular school district, considered as a sepa
rate and distinct entity, have been legally recognized for
approximately a century as a source of public school support*
That the people of Louisiana have made use of this autonomous
privilege is indicated by the fact that more than six million
dollars of educational revenue was collected through this
process in the fiscal school year, 1930-1931*
14* It has been the policy of the state to adhere
strictly to the organic provisions and controlling statutes
in levying and collecting the special school tax*
16* The calling of a tax levy election is discretion
ary with the parish school board, except vhen it is legally
petitioned by the qualified voters of the district concerned*
16* A valid tax levy election must comply with the
governing statute and, if carried, must receive a majority of
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both the votes and the property valuation by correct count*
17* The courts have been called upon to adjudicate
80 many contested tax levy elections that they have advised

mot only that the laws be clarified but also that policies he
adopted by the administrators to prevent the many types of
irregularities which have culminated in litigations*
18. The Judiciary has maintained definitely that all
special school funds ^ a l l be disposed of as prescribed by
the qualified voters of the district*
19. The bond Issue as a method of raising revenue
for the construction of school buildings and teachers' h<mes
and the purchase of necessary grounds and equipment therefor
is one of the recent educational developments.
20. Sinoe a bond issue Is liquidated through deferred
payments derived from funds predicated on the levying of a
special tax by the qualified voters of the district, the
policy of adhering to special tax regulations for school main
tenance purposes is applied— that is, the proposed bond issue
is required to have a specific purpose and to comply with all
organic end statutory law governing the bond issuing process
at the time of issue.

If the special basis tax for the bond

issue has already been voted, the funds may be made more quickly
available through the issuance of certificates of indebtedness.
21. As a means of protection to all who may be con
cerned with special tax levies and bond issues the ri^ts of
prescription are legally recognized and employed.
22. The legislature is the chief nonprofessional agency
through which provisions for the control of a free public school
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ffjrstm have bean made#
£3# Powers delegated to the polioe jurisa during the
formative period made them one of the oontrolXlng agenoles of
pablie edueatlon,
S4i Since the beginning of louisiana*s public school
system the powers entrusted to various boards of education
have influenced the development of the state's educational
policies*
25* That Louisiana was reluctant to adopt the policy

of centralized educational control through nonprofessional
agencies is indicated by the late development of the state
board of education# which had primarily a personnel ex officio
with limited powers until the present century#

However* the

Constitution of 1921 clothed this board with broad discretion*
ary powers of control and supervision of the free public school
system of the state.
26. The parish school board * which had its beginning

in 1821* has been a potent factor in the development of educa*
tional policies#

JProm the time of the present century this

agency has been granted extensive discretionary powers pertain*
ing to the educational affairs of the parish,

for example# it

gevems all special school tax elections, selects the parish
superintendent of education, affirms the nominations of all

teachers and fixes their salaries, creates and abolishes
school districts, and cooperates with the state board of edu
cation in the development and execution of the school policies
ef the state#
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£7« T h e local school board was one of the principal
c^trolling factors during the formative period of public

education, but by the close of the last century its influence
was being replaced by the increasing power of the parish school

board*
28* The state superintendency as a means of central»

ised professional control of public education had its inception
through the secretary of state's office in 1883, but in 1845
it was legally established by the constitution as a separate
and distinct agency of control.
tnae

Louisiana's hesitant accept-

of the centralization of educational power is evidenced

by the efforts which were made to abolish the office of state
superintendent or to circumscribe the duties pertaining thereto
until the latter part of the last century.

Since that time

the powers and responsibilities of this officer have been
expanded to include general control and supervision of the
entire free public school system.
29. The divisional superintendent**a product of
Beconstraction*»was eliminated from the educational program
with the passing of that period*

80. The office of parish superintendent was tempora
rily established as an agency of control in 1847,

The slow

development of professionalized supervision of public education
is indicated by the abolishment of this office or the delimi
tation of its sphere of activities until near the close of the
nineteenth century.

From the beginning of the present century,

however, the powers of the parish superintendent have been
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extended*

Since this offloer is a creature of the parish

eehôol board, there is wholesome cooperation between him and
the school board in the execution of the policies of public
education within the parish.
31. It has been the legal policy to consider school

board members and superintendents as officers of the state,
but due to the organic change in residence requirements in
1921 the parish superintendent is not now thus classified.
52. The public school teacher of Louisiana Is the

chief agent throu^ which the educational policies are finally
applied.
35. Oertification of the eligibility of teachers by
eome delegated authority was one of the state's earliest
educational policies.
54. Teachers are employed by the parish superintendent

vi'Ui the approval of the parish school board»
55, The teacher's contract is very significant to both

the employer and the employee and only in the exceptional case
is it subject to cancellation without the fulfillment of all
finanoial obligations therein.
36» Various holders of certificates of indebtedness

which were issued to teachers in the New Orleans school system
during the latter part of the nineteenth century have found it
necessary to carry their efforts at liquidation to the district,
state, and sometimes the Federal courts.
37. The school district is legally recognized as a

quasl«corporate subdivision of the state, created by law at
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the discretion of the pariah school hoard, for the purpose of
carrying out the state's policies in establishing and maintain
ing public schools within its jurisdiction#
3@« In financing a building program the parish school
board is required by statute to assume corporate responsibilities#
The contract la an integral feature of this program end the
courts have maintained strict adherence to the law for all
parties concerned therewith#
39. To the parish school board is entrusted the super
vision of public school property, but it is the policy of the
state to safeguard the use of this property and to exempt it
from ordinary taxation#
40# The administration of pupil personnel is implied
in the right to establish end maintain public schools for the
welfare of the youth of the state#
41# Only in exceptional oases are pupils permitted
to attend schools other than in their respective districts#
42# compulsory school attendance and transportation
of pupils are recent developments In educational law, and the
parish school board is held responsible for the execution
thereof#
43# Pupils are subject to discipline end may be
suspended from school for disorderly conduct, but corporal
punishment Is prohibited by the lew#
44# The curriculum is one of the implied essentials
of the public school system.

The state's policy has been to

prescribe the fundamentals and leave the development of the
curriculum proper to the ministerial officers of education.
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45# In accord with Louisiana's policy of assuring
religious freedom to all within its jurisdiction, the teaching
or reading of the Bible in connection with public school work
la definitely prohibited#
48# Recently the state adopted the policy of granting
to every school child the right to receive from it the free
use of textbooks#
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Shaping School Policiea in Mlssissllpipi. George Peabody
College l^or Teachers Contributions to Eduo at Ion, Mo. 113.
Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, 1932*
265 pp.
Graves, Frank P., The A^inlatration of Merioan Education.
Mew York; The l&omillan Mmpany
624 pp.
Hamilton, Otto T., The Courts and the Cunriculum. Teachers
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Martin Luther Riley was horn at Etta, Union County,
Mississippi, Deoemher 17i 1898.

He reoelTsd his early train

ing In the Salem public sehool and was then principal of the
Adam and Salem schools for five years#

After military ser

vice In the World war he was elected to the Mississippi
Legislature from Union county for the terms, 1980-1984 and
1984-1926#
In 1920 he entered State Teachers College, Hattiesburg,
Mississippi, where he received the B. S. degree in 1924#

During

the next three years he served as superintendent of the public
school at Blue Springs, Mississippi#

In 1987 he matriculated

in George Peabody College for Teachers to do graduate work
in the fields of Education, History, and Economies#

From that

Institution he was graduated with the M# A# degree in 1929,
During the period, 1928-1982, he was Associate professor of
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